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Preface
Planting trees today will provide our children with shade.
Liberalizing trade will give them jobs and prosperity.
(anonymous)
This publication brings together papers prepared for the “Regional Agricultural
Trade Liberalization” project, which was implemented by the Asia-Pacific Research and
Training Network on Trade (ARTNeT) researchers between May 2005 and December
2006.  The project explored the potential for agricultural trade opportunities at the regional
level through preferential trade agreements (PTAs), at a time when the number of PTAs
globally and in the ESCAP region has been increasing sharply.  The objectives of the
study were:  (a) to map and analyse existing trade agreements in the region and their
product coverage, particularly agricultural products, as well as associated tariff and
non-tariff barriers; and (b) to derive implications and recommendations/guidelines for trade
policy and negotiations.  Research in this area was endorsed by the participants at the
First ARTNeT Consultative Meeting of Policymakers and Research Institutions on 29 October
2004.
It was at that meeting that ARTNeT was launched as an initiative of ESCAP and
the International Development Research Centre (IDRC), Canada in cooperation with 10
national-level research institutions in the region.  ARTNeT operates as an open network of
national-level research institutions, supported by ESCAP and other core ARTNeT partners,
including the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the United
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Trade Organization (WTO).  The
ESCAP Trade and Investment Division serves as the secretariat of the network and, as
such, facilitates the conceptualization, implementation and delivery of ARTNeT activities in
collaboration with members, partners and government officials involved in trade analysis
and policy-making through their respective focal points.  The research network now comprises
20 member institutions in 15 economies of the Asian and Pacific region.
This book includes nine chapters, most of which are based on empirical research.
They contain both quantitative and qualitative analyses of liberalization efforts in the area
of agricultural trade, which took place in parallel to negotiations on agricultural trade
liberalization in the context of the Doha Development Agenda.  The PTAs analysed in the
book are from three subregions:  South Asia, East Asia and South-East Asia.  Therefore,
this volume fills the void that currently exists in quantitative analysis of preferential
agricultural trade liberalization in the Asian economies.
Furthermore, the publication adds value to the already rich, but separate, body of
literature on preferential trade and trade in agricultural products.  It provides an up-to-date,
reliable account of preferential trade in Asia with respect to agriculture – one of the most
important sectors for the majority of peoples in the developing countries of the region.  Byiv
using quantitative analysis, whenever data availability permitted, to assess the remaining
protection in PTAs across the region or the extent of trade created, this study provides
a solid basis for further work on tracking and assessing the performance of PTAs.  The
treatment of agriculture in those PTAs is also compared to its treatment under the multilateral
trading system and/or national trade liberalization efforts.  Non-tariff barriers still pose
a significant obstacle, and an illustration of their adverse impact is given through case
studies of two least developed countries (LDCs), Bangladesh and Cambodia.
An analysis of trade liberalization effects is not considered complete without also
using a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model for quantitative analysis of impacts.
Two chapters are related to this analytical approach.  One chapter presents the results of
quantification of potential gains from various bilateral and regional trade agreements.
Another chapter critically assesses the methodological problems that are associated with
the CGE models of the genre used for the quantifications described above.
The book also contains a review of agricultural reform in the largest Asian economy,
China, with implications for its positioning in multilateral and preferential trade liberalization.
A small but important step into the international political economy of agricultural protection
is made in a chapter that considers possibilities for strategic intervention in agriculture
trade for developing countries.  Finally, policy recommendations are offered for negotiators
of preferential trade arrangements as well as some guidance for further research.
No research ever published is perfect.  Limited resources, data availability and
expertise in some of the analytical areas resulted in some gaps in this study.  The most
obvious is the lack of welfare analysis at the community level as well as the
gender-differentiated impact of trade liberalization implemented through the PTAs so far.
These research themes remain high on a priority list for ARTNeT in a near future for two
reasons:  (a) to provide comprehensive assessments of trade liberalization processes:
and (b) to take research capacity-building to a higher dimension, as this research requires
not only primary data collection but also new research methods, some of which are being
used for the first time, even in the most developed research environments.v
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I.  TRENDS IN PREFERENTIAL TRADE LIBERALIZATION
IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC
By Mia Mikic
Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is twofold.  First, the aim is to clarify the motivation for,
and objective of the ARTNeT regional study on agriculture trade liberalization, and to lay
out the plan of this publication.  The second aim is to paint, with a rather broad brush,
a picture of preferential trade in the region as a backdrop for a regionally more narrow
analysis of preferential trade focused on agriculture goods.
As mentioned in the preface to this publication, ARTNeT research programmes
have been discussed and endorsed by stakeholders comprising policy makers, researchers
and representatives of civil society.  In the first ARTNeT research programme, set up in
October 2004 at the ARTNeT launch meeting for 2005, one of the two regional studies
adopted was “Agricultural trade liberalization trends in Asia and the Pacific, and their
implications for policy makers and negotiators”.  The objective of the study was ambitious.
It set out to:  (a) map and analyse existing trade arrangements in the region with respect
to their coverage of agricultural products; and (b) explore the extent and timing of agricultural
trade liberalization through the mapping of tariff cuts and the elimination of non-tariff
barriers.  The study also aimed at:  (a) identifying the presence of safeguards and other
contingency protection measures, technical barriers, export incentives and domestic support
measures that were dealt with in those agreements; and (b) comparing the preferential
liberalization approaches to the one set by the Agreement on Agriculture in the Uruguay
Round and the current multilateral Round.  Most importantly, however, the study was
intended to be a contribution to trade-related research capacity-building in the region
aimed at ensuring better-informed regional policy-making.
In terms of regional coverage, the study covers South Asia, East Asia/South-East
Asia and China.  Three factors influenced the decision to exclude Pacific island countries
(PICs) despite the original title of the study:
(a) The lack of data for many of PICs including trade flows and tariffs, non-tariff
barriers, and other instruments;
(b) The small number of reciprocal preferential trade agreements (PTAs)
implemented among PICs; and
(c) Limited project funding.
The motivation behind this study is the interest of policy makers and researchers
alike in gaining a better understanding of the treatment of agriculture in the PTAs of the2
Asian region.  They need to learn how agricultural liberalization in PTAs interacts with the
ongoing agricultural trade negotiations in the World Trade Organization (WTO), in order to
set negotiating priorities.  There is additional interest in finding out if and how the differences
in the design of PTAs, with respect to agriculture products, affect the liberalization path
both of the actual agreements and at the global level.
Readers will realize that the above-listed objectives were not all met in full.  In
some cases, it was just not possible to obtain data for quantitative analysis while in other
cases the desirable methodology of analysis could not have been adopted.  From discussions
in several consultative meetings and workshops in which the authors of individual papers
had the opportunity to participate, it was also realized that a study carried out by local
researchers of a linkage between agricultural trade liberalization and poverty would have
been valued by all.  This and other research questions, such as the gender-differentiated
impact of agricultural trade liberalization or the linkage between sectoral trade liberalization
and investment trends, are intended for future research by ARTNeT.
Readers will also notice that this book has not been extensively edited.  While
some effort has been made to use a common analytical framework and to standardize
presentation, the book remains as a collection of self-standing contributions written about
the common theme and sharing the same objectives.  On the other hand, it is possible to
read chapters randomly without missing the main objective of the study.  Nevertheless, it is
hoped that readers will find that the chapters converge conceptually.
This book contains nine chapters.  This chapter continues by providing an overview
of state of preferential trade in Asia and the Pacific.  Chapters II and III focus on selected
PTAs in South Asia and East Asia/South-East Asia, respectively, in exploring the state of
agricultural trade liberalization.  As far as possible, these chapters follow a common
structure and methodology in order to ease the comparison between the two subregions.
Chapter IV and V then demonstrate the use of computable general equilibrium (CGE)
modelling for the scenarios mimicking the actual PTAs in the subregions of South Asia and
East Asia/South-East Asia.  Chapter IV presents the results of quantification of potential
gains from various bilateral and regional trade agreements, defined as scenarios of
liberalization.  The quantifications take into account only agricultural tariff elimination,
assuming that trade will fully and promptly respond to such elimination.  Chapter V critically
assesses this quantitative approach and, in more general terms, the family of so-called
LINKAGE models with the main objective of making users of numerical results aware of
the limitations of such an analysis.
Chapter VI goes through the main turning points in agricultural reform in China.  It
also analyses in detail the linkages between that reform and China’s position in the current
WTO negotiations as well as its priorities for preferential trade liberalization in agriculture.
Chapter VII offers some explanations of why preferential trade agreements in agriculture
might be a better policy for developing countries wishing to revitalize their agriculture
sector, compared to the multilateral option that is unlikely to allow developing countries to
“get” policy space for strategic intervention in agriculture.  Chapter VIII uses case studies
of Bangladesh and Cambodia to reflect on how significant non-tariff barriers and design in3
rules of origin continue to be in trade by LDCs and developing countries in general.  The
book concludes with chapter IX, which summarizes the main points of each chapter and
offers policy recommendations for negotiators of preferential trade arrangements.  It also
points to future policy research needs in the area of agricultural trade liberalization.
This chapter proceeds with analysis of preferential trade in the context of Asia and
the Pacific.  Section A identifies several stylized facts about the preferential trade in Asia
and the Pacific.  Section B explores regional trade agreements with respect to their
commitment to trade liberalization in goods and other standard areas of cooperation.
Section C briefly discusses some international political economy forces that explain why
agricultural products are laggards in both multilateral and preferential trade liberalization.
Section D completes the chapter with some concluding remarks.
Before continuing, it is necessary to discuss the taxonomy of PTAs used in this
book.  The preferential trade phenomenon has not only become complex, it also now
exists under many different names.  As discussed above, the idea of a multilateral trading
system was simple – concessions were to be shared on an most favoured nation (MFN)
basis by the members of the club, and only a few exceptions from this principle were
envisaged.  At that time, the practice of preferential trade recognized free trade areas,
Customs Unions (CUs), and economic and political unions.
1  Theoretical literature also
followed this path and taxonomy was developed that described an extension of integration
from shallow agreements such as the free trade area, through intermediate such as the
CU, to deep agreements such as the common market and economic/monetary union.  The
focus, which also reflected the spirit of GATT exceptions, was of course on deeper and
regional (plurilateral) rather than bilateral agreements.
A.  Stylized facts
2
There are four clear, stylized facts about the Asian and Pacific approach to
preferential trade arising from analysis of information in APTIAD:
1. Bilateral trade agreements (BTAs) are the preferred option.  South-East Asian
economies have signed and enforced BTAs more frequently than the South
Asian economies.  However, cross-continental BTAs grow equally fast.
2. The “noodle bowl” effect is worsening, as there is no standard or common
template for the rules.  The current multiple trade rules are often mismatching
and conflicting.
1 Excluding so-called preferential clubs based on colonial trade concessions.
2 An early version of this chapter was presented at the APO Study Meeting held in New Delhi in
March 2007.  The chapter relies mostly on the Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Agreements Database
(APTIAD) in sourcing data and information for analysis.  APTIAD is available at www.unescap.org/tid/
aptiad4
3. Multiple memberships are easily tolerated.
4. There is only weak evidence that PTAs create new trade among the member
countries.  However, evidence of trade diversion for non-members is even
weaker.
Each of these four facts is discussed and illustrated below.
1.  The bilateral option
Figure I indicates that of the 87 agreements in force, in early 2007, 62 (71 per cent)
are BTAs, while the country-bloc agreements and RTAs
3 comprise the rest.  Of those
BTAs, 77.5 per cent are between two economies in the region and 22.5 per cent are of
so-called cross-continental scope.  There are 11 agreements (12.6 per cent) between
a country and a bloc, and 11 RTAs (12.6 per cent).  Among country-bloc agreements, six
(55 per cent) are with ASEAN and three with EFTA (27 per cent).  While RTAs are greatly
outnumbered by BTAs, they do have relatively large membership (on average,
8.8 economies).
4  Nine (82 per cent) comprise membership from ESCAP only, while two
(18 per cent) include non-ESCAP members.
5
Looking at the type of the agreements (which should be in compliance with the
multilateral trading rules), in both the bilateral and regional categories, the majority are
free trade agreements (FTAs) and framework agreements (FA).  Among the 62 BTAs,
50 (80 per cent) are listed as FTAs and seven (11.3 per cent) as framework agreements.
The rest include four preferential trading agreements (6 per cent) and one non-reciprocal
agreement.  In contrast, the 14 cross-continental BTAs include eight (57 per cent) FTAs,
four (28.6 per cent) of FAs and two other agreements.  In the category of country-bloc
PTAs, the structure is very different with more than half being framework agreements
(55 per cent), and rest made up of FTAs (36 per cent) and one CU (EC-Turkey).  The
results for RTAs show a combination of the previous two classes of agreements; one CU
(EAEC) and four PTAs (in the category of “others”), four (36 per cent) FTAs and two FAs
(18 per cent).
3 Zhai (2006) commented that BTAs were preferred because of their lesser costs in terms of
negotiation and enforcement efforts.  While this might hold true for every individual member of BTAs,
the resulting costs for all BTAs might easily be higher compared with all RTAs. Bonapace (oral
communication) argues that this could be because of the lack of “peer pressure” as well as institutional
framework that is often missing from BTAs but built in to many RTAs.  Feridhanusetyawan (2005) held
that the faster increase in BTAs than in RTAs (plurilateral agreements) contributed to a complexity of
the picture, as many of those BTAs arose “within and across different regional agreements”.
4 The ASEAN FTA in Goods (AFTA) and in Services (AFAS) are counted as two RTAs; if only AFTA
is counted, average membership is 9.7.
































Source: APTIAD, February 2007.
Note: The number does not add up to 87, as three other agreements are not shown (one global
and two country-plurilateral).
R = intraregional bilateral agreements.
XC = cross-continental bilateral agreements.
Figure I.  Mapping of Asia-Pacific preferential trade
It is important to note that the process of regional integration in Asia and the Pacific
started in earnest in the 1990s, and more precisely during and after the Asian financial
crisis in 1997 (figure II).  Only one trade agreement dates back to 1975 – the Asia-Pacific
Trade Agreement (APTA), formerly known as the “Bangkok Agreement”.  Other agreements
predating the 1990s are the Australia-New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade
Agreement (ANZCERTA, 1983) and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN,
1967); however, the latter grew more out of political rather than trade motivations.
6
This chapter does not seek to explain in detail the proliferation of BTAs and RTAs
in the region during the past decade, as there were different factors in play.  Some strongly
believe that regionalism flourished because governments realized that BTAs and RTAs
allowed for a faster, more tailored approach to specific country needs and were more
flexible in terms of implementation time and the inclusion of behind-border measures.
Another explanation refers to the political and strategic motivations, which enhanced
intraregional cooperation during the Asian financial crisis in 1997.  Yet another factor
associated with the spread of regionalism is the so-called “domino effect” that increases
6 Feridhanusetyawan (2005, p. 14), stated “ASEAN was established during the Cold War to maintain
peace and security in the region, and the formation of AFTA in 1992 kept ASEAN relevant when the
Cold War ended.”6
the incentive for countries to join existing agreements (the “follow the crowd” effect), and
which explains why so many governments will engage in the process of BTA and RTA
negotiations.  Bonapace and Mikic (2005; 2007, forthcoming) have addressed these and
other factors driving the proliferation of PTAs in the region during the past decade.
2.  Multiple and potentially conflicting trade rules
The fast multiplication of agreements shown in figure II resulted in an increasing
density of the “noodle bowl”
7 phenomenon associated with preferential trade.  Figure III
illustrates this “noodle bowl” view of the preferential trade routes.  It shows the entanglement
of bilateral and regional free trade and other types of agreements that are in force (areas
and red lines) as well as those that are in various stages of negotiations (blue dotted
lines).  It provides a simple visual test that shows how density will increase as these
agreements are signed and implemented.  It is quite appropriate to describe this state of
affairs as a “motley assortment” (Baldwin, 2006) that is working against trade creation
rather than for it.  With conflicting rules, these preferential agreements tend to fragment
markets and increase trade costs, thus adversely affecting trade volumes as well as global
and national welfare.
Figure II.  Asia and the Pacific – late bloomers in regionalism
Source: APTIAD, February 2007.
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7 The term “spaghetti bowl” is credited to Bhagwati (1992).  It appears that Findlay and Pangestu
(2001), introduced “noodles” to the RTA vocabulary.  Cf. Mikic (2002).7
3.  Multiple memberships
The previous analysis reveals an important asymmetry.  From 1994 to 2006, the
number of all agreements in force expanded from 10 to 87, a more than eightfold increase.
Of the total 58 ESCAP regional members, the number of those involved in this proliferation
of agreements increased from 41 to 50 during the same period, or 51 if the United States
of America is included.
8  Only one ESCAP-cum-WTO member remains unattached to any
of the trading blocs.  In contrast, most ESCAP members, who are not WTO members, are
members of at least one and up to 11 PTAs.  The average number of agreements per
ESCAP member is 5.6.  This indicates multiple memberships and a significant overlap in
the membership of agreements.
Figure III.  Adding more tangles to the “noodle bowl”
Source: Compiled by the author from APTIAD, September 2006.
8 Non-regional members are France, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland, and the United States of America.  Their agreements are not covered in the analysis
unless signed with one or more regional members; e.g., the United States-Singapore FTA is included,
while the United States-Jordan FTA is not.  This leaves only three ESCAP members (Mongolia, Palau
and Timor-Leste) and five ESCAP associate members (American Samoa, French Polynesia, Guam,
New Caledonia and Northern Mariana Islands) not involved in preferential trade at present. Of those
countries, only Mongolia is also a World Trade Organization member.8
Overlapping memberships arise from parallel BTAs and RTAs for the same set of
economies.  One country ends up negotiating with another under several unrelated framework
agreements.  As an example of this option, consider the case of India and Sri Lanka,
which have at least four trade-related agreements.  The oldest is APTA, 1975, by type
a preferential agreement, currently among six members.  Other regional agreements include
the BIMSTEC, 1997 and SAARC, 1985/SAPTA,
9 1995 and SAFTA,
10 2006 agreements
among the same members.  In addition, India and Sri Lanka signed a bilateral FTA in
2001.
It turns out that India leads in terms of overlapping memberships.  This overlap
occurs not only with Sri Lanka, as mentioned above, but also in the case of Thailand
(BIMSTEC, AFTA-India and BTA).  Furthermore, India has BTAs with almost all countries
that are also members of SAPTA/SAFTA and BIMSTEC as well as with most members of
APTA and some of AFTA (figure IV).  The important question, which is not discussed in this
publication, concerns the economic and political reasons for a country to negotiate parallel
and seemingly non-related agreements that include the same subset of members.
9 South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation/South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
Preferential Trade Agreement.
10 South Asian Free Trade Area.
Figure IV.  Leader in multiple memberships9
Singapore is implementing the largest number of agreements,
11 but does not appear
to be overlapping their members.  A small degree of overlap appears in the case of deals
with India (the Singapore-India BTA and AFTA-India agreement) and with New Zealand
(one BTA and one plurilateral).
Multiple and overlapping membership is spread across this region.  Only eight
ESCAP members and associate members are not involved in the PTA process (Mongolia,
Palau and Timor-Leste from among the ESCAP members, and American Samoa, French
Polynesia, Guam, New Caledonia and Northern Mariana Islands from the associate
members).  It appears that signing and implementing between one and three agreements
is either most beneficial, most popular or the easiest, as 21 countries implement from one
to three agreements (seven in each category).  Implementing more than three agreements
is more demanding, and the number of countries managing to do so decreases sharply as
the number of agreements increases (see the trend line in figure V).  The maximum
number of agreements per single country is implemented by Singapore (19), followed by
Thailand (14), India (13), Malaysia (12) and Turkey (12).  The average number of agreements
in force per country, not counting those countries without any agreements, is 5.6.  The
average number of all agreements per country, again excluding the eight without agreements,
is seven.
11 Seven of these are bilateral, with various but mostly high-income economies (Australia, Japan,
New Zealand, the Republic of Korea and the United States).
Figure V.  ESCAP economies in multiple PTA memberships, 2006
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Source: Compiled by the author from APTIAD, August 2006.10
The issue, however, is that with multiple agreements one does not know which
particular set of rules drives trade growth or which set might act as an obstacle.  In the
India-Sri Lanka case, while plausible to associate trade growth with the 2001 FTA, it is
important to be able to identify any contribution by other agreements.  The question should
also be asked whether an even larger increase in trade could have been achieved with
fewer agreements and, arguably, lower costs.  Finally, one should not ignore the impact of
unilateral liberalization processes in countries that are party to the agreement.  Sri Lanka
started to simplify and lighten its protective regime in late 1970s, and by the late 1980s
unilateral trade liberalization was reflected in the sharp growth of Sri Lankan imports.
4.  Trade agreements in search for trade?
The objectives of trade agreements, as set out in the legal documents and texts of
the agreements, include expanding trade, promoting investment, developing economic
integration, establishing regional cooperation and coordination, promoting human rights
and democracy, and improving security (cf. Feridhanusetyawan, 2005).  Newer agreements
in particular are trying hard to broaden coverage of commitments from liberalization of
merchandise trade to behind-the-border provisions in trade and other areas of cooperation.
In many instances, as mentioned above, members have broad concessional aspirations;
in order to reflect them, the members increasingly name agreements as “economic
partnerships” or “closer economic relations” rather than FTAs.
Notwithstanding the intent to liberalize beyond trade in goods, in many cases long
transition/implementation periods are required for any real liberalization to take effect and
be reflected in changed trade flows.  It is not rare for the agreements to consist only of the
agreement (often called a framework agreement) to start negotiations on cooperation or
trade liberalization.  Some anecdotal support exists for the claim that countries sometimes
only intend to initiate regional cooperation without much commitment with regard to trade
or even economic objectives.  This practice introduces unnecessary trade discrimination to
foster regional cooperation in areas that might not even require trade preferences, such as
recognition of regulatory regimes, or the exchange of information and infrastructural
provisions (cf. Schiff and Winters, 2003, p. 264).  The cost of achieving such cooperation
is then much higher than necessary (and sometimes even more than the benefits accrued
through cooperation).  Furthermore, it leads to “trade negotiation” fatigue that sometimes
tends to be cured by reducing efforts in multilateral trade negotiations, which are perceived
as more difficult.
This section provides some additional information on intra- and extraregional trade
flows and trade dependence to facilitate a better understanding of the potential impacts of
preferential trade agreements.  The expectation of members is that PTAs will help boost
mutual trade (of those products awarded [more] liberal trade treatment) over and above
the growth of their total trade.
Total trade of ESCAP members has increased in absolute terms, and in 2005
accounted for almost 30 per cent of world exports and imports.  The value of their
intraregional trade also increased (figure VI) dramatically from 1980 to 2005 in absolute11
terms.  Starting with a slightly smaller value of intraregional trade than NAFTA in 1980, by
2005 the Asian and Pacific region had surpassed NAFTA and had closed the gap with the
EU15 intraregional trade from 4/5 to 1/3.  However, as a share in total world trade, this
intraregional trade remained stagnant (table 1).
Figure VI.  Growth of intraregional trade for selected regions
Source: Calculated by the author from COMTRADE data.













Nevertheless, the growth in intraregional trade can be combined with an indicator
of trade dependence to tell us more about the “fortress building” attitude of trade agreements.
As table 1 shows, total trade dependence,
12 which is a contribution of total trade to the
region’s collective gross domestic product, increased by coefficient 1.7 over this time.
Similarly, an indicator showing only the contribution of extraregional trade to the region’s
gross domestic product grew by slightly less than the total trade dependence (coefficient
of 1.64 over the same 10 years).  Despite small differences, this points to an increase in
the reliance on intraregional trade by ESCAP economies, giving support to a claim of the
“appearance of the third mega trading bloc” to join the European Union and NAFTA.  Thus,
intraregional trade is growing in both the absolute and relative sense.  However, the
absence of a fall in trade with the rest of the world makes it difficult to identify this trend of
growing intraregional trade as trade diversion.  Furthermore, a reliable measure of a link
between the increase in intraregional trade and the existence of preferential trade (that is,
12 This indicator is often interpreted as “trade openness”.  See Bowen, Hollander and Viaene (1998,
pp. 12-15).12
BTAs and RTAs) is still lacking.  In addition, does trade growth among members of the
agreements precede or follow preferential agreements?  These questions remain high on
the list of future empirical research topics.
13
Table 1.  ESCAP trade performance basics
Group 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2005
a
Total trade as a percentage 26.8 22.7 23.4 26.3 26.3 28.2 29.4
of world trade
Intraregional trade as 13.0 10.7 10.3 12.4 12.7 14.0 14.6
a percentage of world
trade
Total trade dependence 27.3 33.1 35.3 39.4 38.8 46.6 50.0
Extraregional trade 14.0 14.1 17.2 19.3 20.0 23.5 25.1
dependence
Total number of BTAs
b 61 72 22 63 04 6 7 3
in force
Total number of RTAs 4 5 6 6 6 8 11
in force
Members with membership 20 22 24 25 26 29 30
c
in GATT/ WTO
Regional members and 41 44 44 44 45 49 50
associate members
involved in PTAs
Source: Compiled by the author from APTIAD and WITS, April 2007.
Note:
a GDP figures not available for 2005 and 2006, and trade figures refer to 2005.
b Includes cross-continental BTAs.
c Viet Nam accession process finalized in 2006, but it formally acceded 30 days after
completion of the internal ratification process, i.e., on 11 January 2007.  Tonga’s accession
process was finalized in 2005, but ratification is pending.
13 See Mayda and Steinberg (2007), on lack of evidence for across-the-board new trade creation in
response to the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, and DeRosa (2007), for slightly
different arguments.
Figure VIIa shows total trade among the members of each one of the 10 RTAs in
the region in 2005, while figure VIIb shows those values for the years in which those RTAs
were signed.  In 2005, AFTA led with almost US$ 300 billion-worth of intra-bloc trade, but
members of APTA were not far behind.  It is, however, not possible to assert how much of
this trade in any of the blocs is done under the preferential terms negotiated.  (In that
sense, the bubbles present the maxima.) Identification of the share of trade associated
with the establishment of the preferential trade area is still one of the most tedious forms
of empirical trade research (cf. Mayda and Steinberg, 2007; DeRosa, 2007).13
Figure VIIa.  Value of intra-bloc trade in 2005
Source: Calculated by the author from COMTRADE and APTIAD.
Note: The size of the bubbles reflects the value of intraregional trade (in thousand
US dollars) in years when the RTAs were signed:  AFTA 1992; APTA 1975;
BIMSTEC 1997; CISFTA 1994; EAEC 1995; ECOTA 2003; MSG 1993;
2PICTA 2001; SAFTA 1993; and SPARTECA 1981.
Source: Calculated by the author from COMTRADE and APTIAD.
Note: The size of the bubbles reflects the value of intraregional trade (in thousand




















Figure VIIb.  Value of intra-bloc trade in years of signature14
In 2005, slightly less than 30 per cent of total ESCAP trade was associated with
members of BTAs and RTAs (table 2); this amounted to less than 9 per cent of world
trade.
14  While close to 60 per cent of PTA-linked intraregional trade was done by members
of BTAs, more than half of that was linked to BTAs that had one extraregional member
(e.g., the United States, EU/EFTA etc.).  This could indicate that there is still a great deal
of untapped potential for developing intraregional trade linkages among ESCAP members.
Table 2.  Trade of BTAs and RTAs in force, 2005*
Share in total ESCAP Share in total world
trade (%) trade (%)
BTAs (61) 16.2 4.7
–  Regional members (33 BTAs) 6.6 1.9
–  Other (28 BTAs) 9.6 2.8
RTAs (11) 13.2 3.9
– Regional members (6 RTAs) 10.2 3.0
Total preferential trade 29.4 8.6
Total ESCAP trade 29.2
Memorandum items:
–  Total ESCAP trade (US$ billion) 5 077
–  Total world trade (US$ billion) 17 405
Source: Computed using APTIAD and COMTRADE data, February 2007.
* Where 2005 trade data are unavailable, the most recent available year is used.
B.  Liberalization patterns
There is a simple test for determining whether an agreement is efficient or
“good” – it must create trade for the members of the agreement without diverting trade
from the rest of the world (ROW).
15  The literature over time has also identified the
conditions under which net trade creation would be more likely.  The World Bank (2004)
summarizes
16 these as:
14 Note that table 1 shows intra-ESCAP trade as 12.9 per cent of world trade.  Intra-ESCAP trade is
larger than the sum of trade by members of BTA and RTA in implementation (which makes 8.6 per cent
of world trade).
15 This is, of course, a dramatic simplification.  Trade creation and trade diversion should reflect
changes in welfare that are sourced through the replacement of inefficient with more efficient production
among the partners (trade creation) and the opposite in relation to ROW (trade diversion).  As static
measures of welfare change, they do not reflect all efficiency changes that could be arising from RTAs.
Deriving general conclusions based on partial equilibrium analysis is problematic.  The calculation of
trade creation and trade diversion is complex and is not among the objectives of this publication.
16 GATT Article XXIV stipulates some of these in the form of “WTO compliancy”.  In particular, see
paragraph 5 (a), (b) and (c) as well as paragraph 8 (a) and (b).  Similarly, GATS Article V paragraph 4.15
• Number and type of members.  More members with dissimilar economies is
preferable to fewer homogenous economies;
• MFN tariffs faced by ROW.  Lower MFN tariffs after the formation of an
agreement will minimize trade diversion;
• Coverage in terms of measures, sectors and products.  A negative list with as
few exemptions as possible is preferred, and with reduction/elimination of all
border trade barriers in a short period;
• Rules of origin.  Flexible, transparent and liberal to allow for more trade
creation;
• Measures to facilitate trade.  Inclusion of areas and measures beyond good
trade will facilitate cross-border competition and permit more trade creation.
17
How do Asian-Pacific trade agreements measure up against those conditions?
Section B comments on them in turn, starting with a summary of the conclusions of the
(already discussed) first point.
1.  Membership in regional trade agreements
As discussed in section A, most of the large number of trade agreements in force in
the region are bilateral (71 per cent).  The largest share of those agreements pair developing
economies (or transition economies) together.  Less then 30 per cent are between two
“diverse economies”, e.g., a developed and a developing economy.  On the other hand,
even though the region accounts for only a small share of RTAs, on average they comprise
about nine members; this would go some way towards meeting the criteria for large
memberships.
Taking into account the fact that some 40 agreements are in the process of
negotiation just in this region, and that most of them include one or more of the major
trading economies of the region (or world), completion of those negotiations might bring
global efficiency improvement into line with this condition on numbers and types of members.
This improvement would arise because an increasing number of countries able to generate
trade creation would be leaving the “outsiders” camp and entering the club of “regional
partners” (thus reducing the potential for trade diversion, ceteris paribus).  However, this
extension of membership cannot occur automatically because, typically, existent agreements
are designed as “closed clubs”.  For example, most RTAs in the region remain closed for
the current members or future members of the association underlying the trade
agreement (ASEAN in case of AFTA, BIMSTEC in the case of the BIMSTEC FTA, ECO for
ECOTA, SAARC for SAFTA and the South Pacific Forum for SPARTECA).  Only two
agreements allow for expansion through direct members in the trade agreement:
17 Trade facilitation in regional PTAs is a theme of a separate paper and is therefore not discussed
here (see IIBE&L, 2006).  Competition policy and government procurement provisions in PTAs of
ESCAP are also not discussed here.16
(a) APTA, but only to the developing members of ESCAP; and (b) PICTA to any State or
territory.  Even with open access to membership, the efficiency-improving outcome would
be more clear-cut in the case of parallel consolidation of these agreements under harmonized
enforcement rules.  Additionally, it is necessary that the agreements satisfy other conditions,
particularly the extent of liberalization.
2.  MFN tariff levels
Table 3 demonstrates trends in unweighted average applied tariff rates in most of
the countries in the region.  It is true that most countries show declining average tariff
rates.  This is a result of combined working of the following forces:
(a) Multilateral trade negotiation of the Uruguay Round and accession to WTO;
(b) Preferential trade liberalization;
(c) Unilateral trade liberalization efforts that many economies in the region have
followed since the early 1990s.
Table 3.  Trends in average applied tariff rates, 1996-2005
a (unweighted, in per cent)
Code Economy/group 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 (est.)
1 Bangladesh 26.7 26.7 21.3 21.2 19.3 19.9 18.8 16.4 16.8
1 Bhutan 17.5 15.3 15.4 15.4 15.4 15.4 17.7 22.2 22.2
1 Cambodia 35.0 18.0 18.0 17.0 16.5 16.1 16.0 15.6  
1 India 37.0 34.2 32.4 32.7 30.9 28.3 28.3 16.0
1 Kyrgyz Republic 4.6 4.5 8.2 4.3  
1 Lao PDR 9.5 9.5 9.3 9.6 9.4 9.2
1 Mongolia 5.0 4.9 6.9 6.8 4.9 4.9 4.2
1 Myanmar 4.5 4.8 4.5 4.7 4.7 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.4 4.5
1 Nepal 14.8 17.3 21.7 14.2 14.2 14.7 14.6 14.8 14.8 14.7
1 Pakistan 41.7 46.6 45.6 24.1 23.6 20.2 17.2 16.8 16.2 14.3
1 Papua New Guinea 20.7 20.4 20.0 7.1 7.1 7.2 6.1 6.1 5.7
1 Solomon Islands
b 22.7 45.0 24.0 24.0 22.7 22.7 22.7 22.2  
1 Tajikistan
b 8.3 5.0 5.0 8.0 8.3 8.3 8.3 8.0  
1 Uzbekistan 21.0 21.0 29.0 29.0 29.0 10.4 10.6
1 Viet Nam 13.0 13.0 15.6 15.1 15.0 14.3 13.8 13.6 13.1
2 Armenia 5.0 3.7 4.3 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.6 3.6
2 Azerbaijan 12.0 12.0 12.0 10.8 9.8 10.1 10.0
2 China 22.0 16.7 16.6 16.3 16.2 15.2 12.3 10.5 9.6 9.0
2 Fiji
b 12.4 12.4 12.4 12.4 12.4 12.4 12.4 8.3 8.8 7.9
2 Georgia  10.0 10.0 9.9 9.7 9.8 7.6 7.4  
2 Indonesia 10.8 9.9 7.8 6.1 6.6 6.3 6.6 6.5
2 Iran, Islamic 28.0 30.0 30.0 37.4 30.0 27.3 18.9 17.7
Rep. of  
2 Kazakhstan
b 10.0 9.3 9.5 7.8 7.8 7.9 7.9     
2 Malaysia 8.4 8.9 8.2 8.0 7.5 7.5 7.4 7.5
2 Maldives 20.8 22.0 22.0 21.3 21.1 21.2 21.1 21.1 21.2
2 Philippines 14.0 12.7 10.4 9.5 7.1 6.9 5.3 4.5 5.5 5.417
2 Russian Federation 11.2 14.0 13.9 12.6 11.1 10.7 10.3 10.0
2 Samoa
b  18.0 18.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0    
2 Sri Lanka 19.6 11.1 10.9 9.3 8.9 8.9 8.7 9.9 10.8
2 Thailand 16.9 16.4 14.4 13.5 9.9
2 Turkey 7.0 6.7 7.2 3.2 3.1 2.6 2.7 2.5
2 Turkmenistan 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 5.4 5.3  
2 Vanuatu  29.0 22.8 22.8 22.8 22.8 17.0 13.8    
3 Brunei Darussalam 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.0 2.9 3.1 3.1
3 Hong Kong, China 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
3 Macao, China 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
3 Singapore 0.4 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
4 Australia 6.8 6.6 6.2 5.9 5.6 5.3 5.0 5.0 5.1 4.2
4 European Union 3.0 2.4 2.9 3.6 2.2 3.1 1.7 1.7 2.5 2.5
4 Japan 2.9 2.8 2.7 2.6 2.5 2.8 2.8 2.7 2.7 2.7
4 Korea, Rep. of 9.7 9.2 9.7 9.5 9.4 9.3 9.1 8.9 8.6 8.6
4 New Zealand 6.3 6.0 4.7 3.9 3.0 3.8 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.8
4 United States 4.3 4.3 4.3 3.7 3.6 3.5 3.7 3.3 3.1 3.0
Memo:  average   
1 to 2 Developing 17.9 17.7 16.5 14.8 13.7 12.4 12.1 10.5 11.9 10.2
countries (142)
1 Low income (56) 22.4 21.5 20.3 17.9 15.3 13.7 14.0 11.9 13.3 12.1
2 Middle income (86) 13.0 14.3 13.9 12.5 12.3 11.3 10.6 9.6 10.0 8.7
3 High-income 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.8
non-OECD (14)
4 High-income 5.5 5.2 5.1 4.9 4.4 4.6 4.3 4.2 4.3 4.1
OECD (10)
Source: Extracted from Francis K.T. Ng, 2006, Data on Trade and Import Barriers, World Bank
(http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRES/Resources/tar2005.xls).
Note:
a All tariff rates are based on unweighted averages for all goods in ad valorem rates,
applied rates or MFN rates whichever data is available for a longer period.  Tariff data are
primarily based on the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development TRAINS
database, with WTO IDB data used for filling gaps, where possible.  Data for the 1980s
are taken from other sources.
b Tariff data in these countries came from the IMF Global Monitoring Tariff file in 2004, and
might include other duties or charges.
Country codes are based on the classifications by income in WDI 2006, where 1 = low
income, 2 = middle income, 3 = high-income non-Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD) countries, and 4 = high-income OECD countries.
Table 3 (continued)
Code Economy/group 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 (est.)
With regard to MFN tariffs faced by ROW after the conclusion of the agreements, it
is difficult to acquire exact and reliable data.  The fact that among the regional RTAs there
is only one partially functioning CU (EAEC) means there is no real threat from the creation
of high common external tariffs.  Figure VIII shows the level of average applied tariffs of
10 RTAs (AFAS not included) for 2005 calculated from table 3 or in the most recent year
when 2005 information was unavailable (annex figure I shows individual countries in each
of the 10 RTAs).  This average ranges from 7.5 per cent for AFTA to 16.6 per cent for
SAFTA.  In fact, SAFTA is the only RTA in which all individual members’ averages stand at18
above 10 per cent, while in AFTA only Cambodia and Viet Nam have more than 10 per
cent average applied tariffs.  APTA, on average, has slightly higher protection than the
RTAs taken together, mainly because of the relatively high averages of Bangladesh and
India.
Figure VIII.  Simple average of applied unweighted tariffs of individual
countries grouped in RTAs (2005)
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3.  Approaches to tariff reductions in PTAs
How important is the contribution of preferential trade liberalization to the opening
of a country?  As noted above, declarative aspirations of all agreements are to transform
trade among partners into duty-free trade.  In many agreements, in fact, this is expressed
as an ultimate goal; however, partners are taking many different routes to achieve this
end.  Table 4 summarizes the difference in approaches to tariff reduction in the enforced
agreements that provide this information.  A positive list approach is considered, in principle,
less liberalizing and it consists of members agreeing to the products on the (positive) list
whose tariffs will be reduced or eliminated.  A negative list approach assumes a reduction/
elimination of tariffs on all products except those that are included in the negative list.  This
approach is closer to the spirit of GATT, even though it may often include a long list of
excluded products.19
Another important factor is the determination of a base tariff rate as a benchmark
for reduction.  In most cases, the MFN-applied rates are used for this purpose
(cf. Feridhanusetyawan, 2005, p. 16).  In an effort to comply with WTO rules on regional
agreements, most contain an intention to eliminate tariffs within what is considered
a reasonable period.  When an LDC is involved, it is provided either with longer transition
periods (e.g., AFTA) or lesser or no reduction commitments (e.g., APTA).  Another interesting
feature, and which supports previous claims about “made-to-measure” agreements, refers
to asymmetrical reciprocity in tariff reduction even when there is no LDC involved.
Feridhanusetyawan (2005, p. 17) describes how, in the Singapore-United States FTA
(which follows the “negative list approach”), the United States kept tariffs on about 8 per
cent of products during the transition period of eight years while Singapore eliminated all
tariffs immediately, binding them to zero.  In the Singapore-Japan FTA (which follows
a positive list approach), Singapore again reduced all tariffs to zero immediately while
Japan committed to eliminating its tariffs gradually over a 10-year period.
Table 4.  Tariff reduction approaches
PTAs Positive list Negative list
All in force with information available 31 33
BTA 22 25





Framework agreement 4 1
Preferential trading arrangement 6 2
CU 0 1
Non-reciprocal arrangement 1 0
Source: Compiled by the author from APTIAD, February 2007.
4.  Rules of origin
The current proliferation of agreements has spun a complex rules-of-origin web
(table 5).  In addition to each agreement having its own rules of origin, a bewildering array
of product-specific rules of origin is emerging.  Adopting the less restrictive rules of origin
could result in significant trade deflection and redundancy of a trade agreement, while
adopting the most restrictive rules of origin may result in no trade taking place under the
agreement.  Several chances have been missed, at both the WTO and regional levels, to
bring some uniformity to the formulation of preferential rules of origin.  GATT Article XXIV,
quite remarkably, is silent on the use of preferential rules of origin.  Should rules of origin
not be viewed just as other regulations of commerce, in that they should not raise barriers20
to third countries any higher than the level existing prior to the formation of the PTA?  The
most that is said is embodied in a non-binding common declaration on principles.
This increases the urgency for establishing an overarching, region-wide, common
framework of principles, guidelines and procedures to which BTAs and RTAs would be
anchored.  Notwithstanding its non-binding nature, the point of departure should be the
WTO common declaration.  Ongoing work, notably in APEC, and other useful trade and
development elements found in other agreements should be built upon with this need in
mind.  For example, APTA recently agreed to common rules of origin (representing a wide
spectrum of industrial development among the members) that are relatively simple, general
and liberal, that is:
(a) A flat rate of a minimum 45 per cent of local value content (35 per cent for
least developed countries) in bilateral rules of origin; and
(b) At least 60 per cent (50 per cent for least developed countries) of regional
content with full cumulation (cf. Baldwin, 2006).
Table 5.  Rules of origin provisions in selected trade agreements
PTA Change in Specific man. Local value Cumulation
tariff class. process addition
BTAs
ASEAN-China Yes ... 40% Full
ASEAN- Yes ... 40% Full
Republic of Korea
Australia- ... ... 50% Bilateral
New Zealand
India-Thailand Yes (or VA) ... 20-40% Bilateral
4, 6 digit level product specific
product specific F.O.B. value
India-Sri Lanka Yes (or VA) ... 35% Bilateral
4 digit level F.O.B. value
Japan-Mexico ... No specific 50% with some Bilateral
process required exception
F.O.B value
Republic of Korea- ... No specific 45% build down Bilateral
Chile process required method calculation,
30% build up
method calculation
Malaysia-Japan Yes (product ... 40% (product Bilateral
specific) specific)
Singapore- Yes ... 45-55% Bilateral
Republic of Korea
Singapore-Japan Yes (or VA) Yes 60% Bilateral
4 digit level F.O.B. value21
Singapore-USA Yes (or VA) Yes 30-60% Bilateral
2, 4, 6 digit level product specific
Singapore- ... ... 40% Bilateral
New Zealand Factory cost
Singapore-Australia ... ... 30-50% Bilateral
product specific
factory costs
Thailand-Australia Yes (and/or VA) Yes 40-55% Bilateral
4, 6 digit level product specific
product specific F.O.B. value
Thailand- Yes (product Yes Bilateral
New Zealand specific)
BTAs
Asia-Pacific Trade No tariff beading No specific 45% Full
Agreement change necessary process required (35% for LDC)
ASEAN Free Trade No tariff beading No specific 40% Full
Agreement change necessary process specified F.O.B. value




Source: Compiled from table 2 in Bonapace and Mikic (2006), and APTIAD.
Table 5 (continued)
PTA Change in Specific man. Local value Comulation
tariff class process addition
Consolidation of multiple membership agreements around more liberal rules of
origin will serve as a tool for diminishing noodle bowl-related costs of trading under
preferential regimes.  One such example is provided by the recent consolidation of bilateral
trade agreements among the southern European countries and a replacement by the
common rules as part of an amended Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA)
deal.  The new CEFTA consolidates 32 bilateral free trade agreements into a single
regional trade agreement.  The free trade area will be established for a transitional period
ending, at the latest, on 31 December 2010.  The new consolidated agreement replaces
the network (the “spaghetti bowl”) of bilateral free trade agreements in order to improve
conditions for promoting trade and investment by means of fair, clear, stable and predictable
rules.
The agreement consolidates and modernizes the region’s “rule book” on trade,
and includes modern trade provisions on issues such as competition, government
procurement and protection of intellectual property.  It facilitates the convergence of
relevant trade-related rules, notably with regard to industrial and sanitary-phytosanitary
rules.  A simplified single system of rules of origin (and other rules) makes it easier to trade
within the region.  Increased trade is necessary to promote growth, job creation and22
a reduction in youth unemployment.  It is the foundation for stability and peace.  Such
harmonization and simplification of rules of origin in the subregions of Asia could contribute
to a deepening of integration, as the rules are associated with an increase in “seamless
production”.
5.  Going beyond the goods trade
18
Many of the newer initiatives declare the intention to go well beyond the reduction/
elimination of tariffs and NTBs, including anti-dumping and safeguards, harmonization of
competition policies and standards, and customs.  However, a large number still just
remain a collection of aspirations towards liberalization that tend to be associated with
a longer negotiation process.  In addition, despite these intentions to go deeper than trade
integration, there is only an occasional mention of the formation of a CU or a common
market in the Asia-Pacific region.
19
Furthermore, while in the context of multilateral liberalization, a number of countries
strongly argue for more freedom in movements of labour (referring to Mode 4 liberalization)
when it comes to BTAs and RTAs, as only few cover this area.  A comparison of BTAs/
RTAs of this region with existing deals in the Americas also illustrates a type of reluctance
to negotiate all-inclusive comprehensive agreements.  Instead, trade agreements are often
accompanied by separate agreements on services, investments, intellectual property
protection, customs procedures etc.  Most of the new agreements cover trade in services
(but pre-General Agreement on Trade in Services [GATS] agreements still have separate
agreements on trade in services, such as the ASEAN FAS).
Most of the newer agreements could be described as WTO-plus agreements as
they extend concessionary coverage beyond multilaterally agreed disciplines – such as
government procurement, competition policy and the environment.  This is true for trade
agreements between developed economies, and between developed and developing
economies (Lesher and Miroudot, 2006).  It is important to note that most agreements
mention a number of WTO-plus sectors when describing the objectives of the agreement
(typically in the preamble of the agreement text).  However, a significant number of
agreements only include a statement of intention to negotiate liberalization in certain
areas.  These agreements have been excluded from the scope of this study because they
do not count for “substantive commitments”.
The overview that is provided in figure IX only shows whether a concessionary
commitment has been made in particular sectors or not.  In order to provide a better
assessment of the beyond-the-goods commitments, a more detailed analysis of the legal
texts of the agreements is required.  The most frequently covered area is that of investments
18 Some of the agreements do not have legal texts, either publicly available in English or at all, and
therefore might not have been captured properly in counting the sectors covered.
19 One such example is that of the already cited “single economic market” of Australia and New
Zealand.  At the zenith of the 1997 Asian financial crisis, there were also calls for the establishment of
a currency union.  They were later merged into proposals for an East Asian Community.23
provisions followed by IPRs and trade facilitation.  Other areas that also receive some
coverage are government procurement, competition policies and labour mobility.  Services
are covered only in 24 agreements, including separate agreements for some parties.
Table 6 provides a summary of treatments of four sectors (investment, IPR, labour mobility
and services) with a view to differentiating between BTAs and other agreements in terms
of the coverage of these sectors.
Figure IX.  Overview of sectoral coverage by PTAs
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In terms of scope of agreement, it is obvious that the “beyond-the-goods” sectors
are captured by agreements that are bilateral, i.e., between two countries and between an
established bloc and a country.  It is mostly FTAs that venture beyond goods liberalization,
except in investment where FAs feature, too.  It also appears that BTAs-FTAs are notified
to WTO faster than other agreements, contributing towards transparency of trading rules
at the global level.
20
C.  Preferential trade and agriculture
With regard to the coverage of goods liberalization, available empirical literature
shows that most of the agreements focus on reducing or eliminating tariffs and other
barriers to industrial goods or manufactures.  In contrast, agricultural products tend to be
included in the exemptions of the negative lists or excluded from the positive lists of tariff
20 For some comments on the content of provisions on these sectors, see Mikic (2007).24
Table 6.  Summary of treatments of selected sectors in preferential trade
agreements in Asia and the Pacific
Intellectual property protection
Total
Type of agreement Notified to
FTA FA CU Other WTO
BTA 19
a 16 (7)  17 (7)
Country-bloc  6
b 2 ( 1 ) –  5 ( 3 )
RTA 2 1 – – 1  2
Other 1 1 – – –  –
Total 28 (9) 21 (8) 3 (1) 3  24 (10)
Investment
Total
Type of agreement Notified to
FTA FA CU Other WTO
BTA 23
c 17 (4) 5 – 1 17 (4)
Country-bloc 6 2 4 – – 3
RTA 3 2 1 – – 1
Other 1 1 – – –
Total  33
a(4) 21 (4) 11 – 1 21 (4)
Mobility of labour
Total
Type of agreement Notified to
FTA FA CU Other WTO
B T A 871– – 7
Country-bloc 1 – 1 – – –
RTA 2 1 1 – – –
Other 1 1 – – – –
Total  12 9 3 – – 7
Services
Total
Type of agreement Notified to
FTA FA CU Other WTO
BTA 18 17 1 – – 14
Country-bloc  3 2 1 – – 3
R T A  2–2– –  –
Other  1 1 – – –  –
Total 24 20 4 – – 17
Source: APTIAD and annex tables 2-5 in Mikic, 2007.
Note: Figures in parentheses are the number of agreements involving Turkey.
a Includes seven BTAs between Turkey and Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia,
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Israel, Romania and Tunis.
b Includes one agreement between Turkey and EFTA, and one between Turkey and the
European Union.
c Includes four BTAs between Turkey and Bulgaria, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,
Romania and Tunis.25
reductions.
21, 22  Other chapters in this publication deal with preferential trade liberalization
in agricultural products in great detail.  As an introduction to these chapters, some views
are offered here on why there is asymmetry between agricultural and industrial goods
coverage in PTAs.  The list here is not exhaustive and in the chapters that follow, these
and some other important reasons are discussed in greater detail.
Table 7.  Leading forces influencing the degree of agricultural trade liberalization
Forces against liberalization Forces for liberalization
• Intense lobbying by agricultural interest • The Uruguay Round Agreement on
groups Agriculture and the Cairns Group
• The argument for food security • Agricultural policy inconsistencies in the
• Quality standards and food safety developed world
• Intrinsic characteristics of agriculture • New domestic pressures
• Agricultural non-trade concerns • Growing international pressures
• Food dependence (net food importers) • Internationalization of agribusiness
• Preferential trade agreements    corporations
• International migration of farmers
Source: Jank, Fuchsloch and Kutaes (2002).
The five reasons why agriculture does not feature prominently on the agenda for
full and/or quick liberalization through PTAs are that:
(a) Agriculture was excluded from the multilateral trade liberalization efforts until
the Uruguay Round, leaving space for protectionist policies in this sector,
which is one of the most supported sectors in many developed economies.
This combination of policies earned the sector the attribute of being the
“most distorted” in the world economy.  Obviously, the removal of trade
barriers and domestic support in such circumstances is not a simple matter.
The task is complicated equally by the influence of vested interests, and
a need for a coherent set of policy measures and financial resources to
provide corrective support during the adjustment period, which could extend
over a decade;
(b) Agriculture produces food that is considered indispensable to human life,
thus giving rise to concern over food safety and security.  These issues are
easier to include in multilateral negotiations with more players (and coalitions)
and more possibilities for quid pro quo than in similar negotiations with fewer
21 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2005).  Samaratunga and others
(2006) and chapter II of this book and Pasadilla (2006) and chapter III of this book report similar
findings for the agreements they analysed.
22 For the purposes of international trade statistics, agriculture is defined as chapters 0-24 of the
two-digit HS classification.26
members, particularly when the negotiations are among those with similar
interests in this area;
(c) Agriculture appears to offer more fertile ground than other sectors for
quantitative and export barriers as well as sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS)
barriers and standard IPRs (that is, geographic indicators).  Historical evidence
shows that these issues are easier to deal with at the global or multilateral
level than at the regional level;
(d) Continuous support and protection of agriculture in developed economies
has been justified by the so-called “multifunctionality” argument of agriculture.
The sector is also often linked to environmental quality.  It is easy to see that
when two countries with same “defensive” approach in relation to
multifunctionality negotiate a bilateral agreement, the scope for liberalization
in agriculture will remain narrower than in negotiations at the multilateral level
among countries with diverse interests in this area;
(e) Last, but far from least relevant, in many developing countries, agriculture is
still a very important, if not the most important sector of the economy in
fighting poverty.  In many developing countries, agriculture provides opportunities
for people to grow their own food and to exchange surpluses in informal
transactions without being registered as part of an official economy (e.g., in
employment or tax revenue records).  For example, while agriculture provided
paid employment in India for only 5 per cent of the labour force during 2004,
its rural population forms the largest part of the total population.  This means
the sector is instrumental in ensuring rural development and provision of
livelihood security.  When it comes to the negotiation of preferential liberalization,
which often embraces “made to measure” liberalization, this sector (is more
likely than others) will be granted longer transitional periods, lesser tariff cuts
and other exemptions in order for it to become a vehicle for rural development.
In developing this last point further, it would appear that preferential trade
liberalization is more in line with the objectives of strategic intervention in agricultural trade
than is multilateral liberalization.  As argued by Dhar (2007) (see also chapter VII of this
book) and literature cited therein, concern over food security, livelihoods and rural
development in developing countries can be responded to by adopting the twin instruments
of Special Products (SP) and the Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM) as a variant of
a strategic agricultural trade policy.  The goal of this policy is primarily to secure food and
safeguard livelihoods rather than create trade.  Judging by the difficulties surrounding
multilateral negotiations on these points as well as the comparatively easier introduction of
SP and SSM into preferential trade agreements (cf. Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development, 2005, pp. 16-17), PTAs ought to be ranked superior to multilateral
liberalization in delivering this particular goal.  However, further empirical research is
desirable in order to shed more light on the welfare-improving effects of this particular
strategic approach.27
D.  Conclusions
This chapter clarifies what types of preferential trade agreements are emerging in
Asia and the Pacific, and it establishes the fact that they vary widely in motivation, form,
coverage and content.  It finds that PTAs in Asia and the Pacific leave much to be desired
in terms of meeting established criteria for “best practice” or model agreements.  Bilateral
agreements are much preferred to plurilateral or regional ones, while “free” trade areas/
agreements are the most frequent form.  However, in most cases, they push achievement
of “free” trade for several years in the future.  Increasingly, countries are opting for
a partnership or framework agreement – in principle, to signal that either they mean much
more than trade integration or that they really do not mean serious trade integration, but
are using the format to put together a framework of cooperation in several (non-trade-
related) areas.  More often, the latter is the case.  This probably explains to some degree
why a number of countries sign multiple agreements with the same partners.
Analysis has also discovered a reluctance to commit to full and quick liberalization
in merchandise trade and to expose “other than goods” trade areas (including WTO-plus)
to preferential liberalization.  The coverage and extent of agricultural products in PTAs is
mostly unsatisfactory from the WTO compliance and welfare-increasing perspectives.  A
necessary next step in research is to establish conceptual frameworks for the consolidation
of multiple PTAs, and to determine empirically if and by how much such consolidation of
existing preferential deals will improve welfare and reduce poverty compared with the
current situation.28
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Annex table 1.  Comparison of rules of origin applicable to trade
between India and Sri Lanka*
FTA between India and
APTA AFTA
Sri Lanka
Determination of origin of not wholly obtained products
Article 7.a Rule 3(a) Rule 8(a) (ii)
…products worked on or …products worked on or …products worked on or
processed as a result of processes as a result of processed as a result of
which the total value of the which the total value of the which the total value of the
materials, part or produce materials, parts or produce materials, parts or produce
originating from countries originating from originating from other
other than Contracting non-participating States or of countries or of undermined
Parties or of undetermined undetermined origin used origin used does not exceed
origin used does not exceed does not exceed 55 per cent 60 per cent of the f.o.b. value
65 per cent of the f.o.b. of the f.o.b. value of the of the products produced or
value, and the process of products produced or obtained, and the final
manufacture is performed obtained, and the final process of manufacture is
within the territory of the process of manufacture is performed within the territory
exporting Contracting performed within the territory of the exporting Contracting
Party. of the exporting participating State (70 per cent for LDC
State. and 65 per cent for
Sri Lanka).
Article 7.b Rule 3(c) Formula: Rule 8(a) (i)
Non-originating materials Value
M + Value
O The final product is classified
shall be considered to be f.o.b. price in a heading at the four-digit
sufficiently worked or Where M = imported level of the HCDCS differently
processed when the product non-originating materials, from those in which all the
obtained is classified in parts or produce; and non-originating materials
a heading, at the four-digit O = undetermined origin used in its manufacture are
level, of the HCDCS, materials, parts or produce classified.
different from those in which (65 per cent for LDC).
all the non-originating
materials used in its
manufacture are classified.
Article 7.e Rule 3(d) Rule 11(a):
The value of the The value of the The value of the
non-originating materials, non-originating materials, non-originating materials,
parts or produce shall be: parts or produce shall be: parts or produce shall be:
i. The c.i.f. value at the i. The c.i.f. value at the time i. The c.i.f. value at the
time of importation of of importation …where time of importation of
the materials, parts or this can be proven; or the materials, parts or
produce where this can ii. The earliest ascertainable produce where this can
be proven; or price paid for…in the be proven; or
ii. The earliest ascertainable territory of the participating ii. The earliest ascertainable
price paid for the materials, State  where the working price paid for the materials,
parts or produce of or processing takes place. parts or produce of
x 100 ≤ 55%32
undetermined origin in the undetermined origin in the
territory of the Contracting territory of the Contracting
Parties where the working States where the working or
or processing takes place. processing takes place.
Cumulation
Article 8 Rule 4 Rule 9
The value addition in the The aggregate content The aggregate content
territory of the exporting originating in the territory of (value of such inputs plus
Contracting Party shall not the participating States is not domestic value addition in
be less than 25 per cent less than 60 per cent of its further manufacture) is not
of the f.o.b. value of the f.o.b. value (50 per cent for less than 50 per cent of the
product under export, and the LDC). f.o.b. value; The domestic
aggregate value addition in value contents (value of
territory of the Contracting inputs originating in the
Parties is not less than exporting Contracting State
35 per cent of the plus domestic value addition
f.o.b. value of the product in further manufacture in the
under export. exporting Contracting State)
is not less than 20 per cent
of the f.o.b. value; And the
final product satisfies the
condition of change in
classification at the four-digit
level CTH.
Source: Compiled from respective rules of origin of each agreement downloadable from APTIAD.
* While these two countries are also members of BIMSTEC (other members include
Bangladesh, Bhutan, Myanmar, Nepal and Thailand), there is no electronically accessible
legal text of that agreement; furthermore, rules of origin have yet to be negotiated so they
could not be included in the table.
Annex table 1  (continued)
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APTA AFTA
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II.  MAPPING AND ANALYSIS OF THE SOUTH ASIAN
AGRICULTURAL TRADE LIBERALIZATION EFFORTS
By Parakrama Samaratunga, Kamal Karunagoda and
Manoj Thibbotuwawa
Introduction
The South Asian Economies (SAEs), comprising Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives,
Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, represent 22 per cent of world’s population but only
account for just over 1 per cent of world trade.  In 2003, agricultural trade in the SAEs
amounted to US$ 22 billion and accounted for approximately 4 per cent of global agricultural
trade and 23 per cent of the regional trade.  During the 1970s, SAEs had highly protected
trade regimes supported by high tariffs, non-tariff barriers (NTBs) and stringent controls on
exchange.  The rationale for such protective policies was safeguarding domestic industries,
improving the terms of trade, raising revenue, altering the income distribution and raising
nutritional levels.
During the 1980s, the hitherto inward-looking policies of the SAEs made a marked
shift towards outward-looking policies.  Economic policies were aimed at export-led
industrialization as a means of achieving rapid economic growth.  Moreover, the SAEs by
then had obtained memberships of various international organizations, and a range of
reforms was implemented to meet international obligations.  The exchange rate regimes of
many SAEs changed from fixed to a managed float or free float, and the restrictions on
current accounts and capital accounts were substantially reduced.  The trade policy changes
emphasized fewer trade restrictions and brought down tariff levels to a great extent in
some SAEs, especially in the case of Sri Lanka, and in others to some extent.
During the late 1970s in Sri Lanka, and in the late 1990s in other SAEs, the tariff
structures were simplified and the number of tariff bands was reduced.  The changes in
the SAE tariff structures and exchange rate regimes as well as relaxation of payment
restrictions during the 1990s show that SAEs have moved towards greater openness in
their trade.
All the SAEs, except Bhutan, are members of the World Trade Organization (WTO);
under this multilateral trade agreement, the SAEs’ bound agricultural tariffs are at
considerably higher rates.  During the first 10 years (1995-2004) after the establishment of
WTO, the involvement of SAEs in regional trading arrangements rapidly expanded
(table 1).  The SAEs established the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
(SAARC) in 1985.  In 1993, SAARC established regional cooperation in trade and initiated
the South Asian Preferential Trade Agreement (SAPTA).  The SAEs envisage greater
economic cooperation within member countries by establishing a free trade area (SAFTA)
by 2010, a Custom Union by 2015 and economic union by 2020.  The SAEs have also34
formed bilateral free trade agreements, i.e., India-Sri Lanka, India-Nepal and Pakistan-
Sri Lanka BTAs.  Regional economic cooperation has been fostered further with
interregional agreements such as the Asia-Pacific Trade Agreement (APTA), Bay of
Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectorial Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC),
India-Thailand and India-ASEAN framework agreements and the Indian Ocean Rim
Association for Regional Co-operation (IORA-RC).








Bangladesh APTA, 1976 Bangladesh-India, Bangladesh-Nepal
SAPTA, 1995 2006 Bangladesh-Pakistan
BIMSTEC, 1997 Bangladesh-Morocco, Bangladesh-Islamic




Bhutan SAPTA, 1995 India-Bhutan,
BIMSTEC, 1997 2006
India APTA, 1976 India-Sri Lanka, ASEAN-India, 2004 India-Malaysia
SAPTA, 1995 2001 India-Afghanistan, India-Republic
BIMSTEC, 1997 India-Mercosur 2003 of Korea
PTA, 2005 India-Bangladesh, India-China






Nepal BIMSTEC, 1997 India-Nepal, 1991 Bangladesh-Nepal
SAPTA, 1995
Pakistan ECO, 1985 and Pakistan-Sri Lanka, China-Pakistan, 2005 Bangladesh-Pakistan
ECOTA, 2003 2005 Sri Lanka-Pakistan, Pakistan-Malaysia
SAPTA, 1995 2005 Pakistan-GCC
Pakistan-Afghanistan
Sri Lanka APTA, 1976 Islamic Republic Singapore-Sri Lanka Sri Lanka-Singapore
SAPTA, 1995 of Iran-Sri Lanka, United States-
BIMSTEC, 1997 2004 Sri Lanka TIFA, 2002
Sri Lanka-Pakistan, Sri Lanka-Egypt
2005 Sri Lanka-Bangladesh
Source: APTIAD (2007).
Note: RTA = regional trade agreement; BTA = bilateral trade agreement.
a It is difficult to classify BTAs precisely as distinction between a free trade agreement
(FTA), economic partnership agreement (EPA) and framework agreement (FA) is often
blurred, and is often only distinguished by the name of the agreement itself.
b Years refer to signing of the agreements; not all of them are being implemented.
c Includes a documented unilateral perspective.35
The SAEs, similar to other developing countries, had been taxing agricultural activities
directly, through tax policies, and indirectly, through economy-wide policies.  The higher
indirect distortions in agriculture were the result of overvalued exchange rates and the
protection provided to the manufacturing sector (Kruger and others, 1988).  Despite the
changes in economic policies in the 1980s and early 1990s, protectionist policies did not
change sufficiently and relatively higher tariff rates remained on agricultural commodities.
Since the agriculture sector is a very sensitive area for SAEs, the changes in economic
policies and the structures of the economies have not changed the socio-economic importance
of the sector.  The institutional developments related to trade in the South Asian region
have paved the way for some liberalization of agricultural trade.
This chapter maps the agricultural trade liberalization efforts of the SAEs.  Section
A discusses the nature of agricultural trade in the SAEs.  Section B presents the agricultural
policy changes and employs various approaches to measure the levels of agricultural
trade liberalization.  Section C reviews institutional development that has led to agricultural
trade liberalization of SAEs while Section D presents conclusions based on the findings of
the previous sections.
A.  Agricultural trade in South Asia
The structural changes during the 1980s and 1990s placed non-agricultural sectors
of the SAEs in the driving seat of economic growth.  Nevertheless, the SAEs have also
achieved a considerable growth in agriculture during the past few decades.  Although the
share of agriculture in national outputs has been declining, agriculture and agricultural
trade still play a very important role in the SAEs (table 2).  Agriculture contributes to about
26 per cent of the regional gross domestic product (GDP), (ranging from 21 per cent in
Maldives to 41 per cent in Nepal).  Rural populations on average account for more than
two thirds of the regional population (64 per cent in Pakistan to 93 per cent in Bhutan).
Nearly three-quarters of the labour force in the region is involved in agriculture and the
prevalence of poverty in the rural sector is very high.  The percentage of the population
below the poverty line ranges from 25 per cent in Sri Lanka to 45 per cent in Nepal.
The SAEs have reported a favourable economic growth during past few decades,
but these developments appear to have had a lesser effect on their rural sector.  Rural
poverty and income inequality have increased in Bangladesh and Sri Lanka (World Bank,
2004).  This may be partly due to the decline in importance of the agricultural sector in
SAEs due to their non-agricultural sectors being placed in the driving seat of economic
growth.  This decline of agricultural importance has resulted in greater inequality and
poverty, since a larger share of population lives in rural areas and is involved mainly in
agricultural activities as a livelihood.  This becomes even more evident when changes in
the share of merchandise exports are considered.  Bangladesh, Pakistan and Sri Lanka
depend more on a narrow base of manufactured exports, textile and clothes, and some
other manufactured exports (figure I).36
Table 2.  Agriculture and South Asian countries
Bangladesh Bhutan India Maldives Nepal Pakistan
Sri
Lanka
Population (million) 128 0.8 998 0.3 22.9 135 19
Population density 981 48 336 956 164 175 294
(per km
2)
Rural population (%) 77 93 72 75 89 64 77
Agriculture labour 58 94 60 03 95 54 45
force (% of total)
GDP (US$ billion) 46 0.4 4 477 0.3 5 58 16
GDP per capita (US$) 362 490 450 1 220 220 508 814
Agricultural share 25 18 28 16 38 27 21
of GDP (%)
Source: World Bank (2004).
Note: Data represent 2004-2005 for Bangladesh and India, 2002-2003 for Pakistan, and
2003-2004 for Sri Lanka and Nepal.
Source: Anderson (2002).
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In order to obtain desirable benefits from liberal trade, the SAEs have placed
greater emphasis on achieving macroeconomic stability.  In addition to tariff protection,
exchange rate policies as well as monetary and fiscal policies are employed in order to
obtain direct and indirect protection for imports and exports.  During the late 1990s,
appreciation of real exchange rates was observed in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, which
has eroded the price incentives that were generated through exchange rate depreciation37
(Karunagoda and others,  2002; World Bank, 2004).  Consequently, these SAEs have
taken certain protective measures, such as increasing para-tariffs, to avoid undesirable
economy-wide impacts.
The agricultural tradeability index (ATI), the ratio of total agricultural imports and
exports to agricultural GDP, measures the changes in the economy with respect to agricultural
trade.  It also indicates how vulnerable a country is to liberalization of agricultural trade
(Valdes and McCalla, 1999).  All SAEs, except Bhutan, show increased shares of agricultural
trade in their economies.  The ATI also indicates that Maldives and Sri Lanka are more
open to agricultural trade while India is the least open country in the South Asia (figure II).
Figure II.  Agricultural Tradeability Index, 1992, 1998 and 2002
Source: Author’s calculations.












Food import capacity (FIC), the ratio of the value of food imports to that of total
non-food exports, measures the capacity of a country to finance food imports by non-food
exports (figure III) (Wilson, 2002).  A low ratio indicates relatively low food imports (India)
or relatively higher non-food sector exports (Sri Lanka).  The net agricultural export index
is positive for net exporters and negative for net importers.  Among the SAEs, only India
and Sri Lanka are net agricultural exporters while others are net agricultural importers
(figure IV).  The changes in the net agricultural export index show that Bangladesh and
Pakistan have moved from net exporter to net importer status while India has moved from
net importer to net exporter status.
1.  Export specialization in agricultural products
Trade theory suggests that, basically, trade between countries is driven by the
comparative advantages and differences in technology, economies of scale or preferences
and, in some circumstances, by strategic trade policies.  Prospects for trade expansion are
likely to be poor for countries that share a comparative advantage in similar products.  The
comparative advantage for SAEs is estimated for the agricultural commodities/commodity38
groups using a revealed comparative advantage (RCA)
1 index (table 3) (Balassa, 1965).
The concept of RCA is based on the assumption that the pattern of commodity trade
reflects relative costs and differences in non-price factors.  The RCA index for a product is
defined as the ratio of the share of a country’s exports to its share in world exports.  An
RCA value greater than one indicates export specialization in that commodity or commodity
group.  The RCAs for some product categories show that SAEs have wide differences in
export specialization and, thus, there is a potential for promotion of intraregional trade.
However, similarity of export specialization observed in some product categories may pose
a major constraint to agricultural trade development in the region.  India has RCAs in
a wide variety of agricultural goods, indicating a higher potential for India to benefit under
Figure III.  Food Import Capacity Index
Figure IV.  Agricultural Net Export Index, 2002
(US$ million)
Source: Wilson (2002).
Note: FICI = Value of food imports/value of total non-food exports.









Note: ANEI = Agricultural exports – agricultural imports (Bhutan = -3).





1 The RCA index does not, however, give a true measure of the comparative advantage.  The ratios
are static measures and are influenced by the trade distortions of importing and exporting countries.39




1995 1998 2001 2004 1995 1998 2001 2004 1995 1998 2001 2004
Live animals 0 0 0 0 0 00000 0 0
M e a t 0000111100 0 0
Fish and crustaceans 10 7 8 12 3 0 4 3 78 87 74 74
Dairy products 0 0 0 0 0 00000 0 0
C o f f e e ,  t e a ,  c o c o a , 2111565300 0 0
   spices
Cut flowers and foliage 0 0 0 1 1 11100 0 0
Vegetables and fruit 0 0 0 0 2 22200 0 0
Cereals and cereal 0 0 0 0 4 43000 0 0
   preparations
Oil seeds 0 0 0 0 2 12200 0 0
T o b a c c o  a n d  t o b a c c o 0002111100 0 0
   manufactured
Sugar, sugar preparation 0 0 0 0 1 03200 0 0
   and honey
B e v e r a g e s 0000000000 0 1
Product
Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka
1995 1998 2001 2004 1995 1998 2001 2004 1995 1998 2001 2004
Live animals 2 1 0 2 0 00000 0 0
M e a t 0000000000 0 0
Fish and crustaceans 0 0 0 0 2 22122 3 3
D a i r y  p r o d u c t s 00 1 0 0000000 0 0
Coffee, tea, cocoa, 1 2 2 7 0 0 0 0 23 24 41 37
   spices
Cut flowers and foliage 0 0 0 0 0 01021 1 2
Vegetables and fruit 1 3 2 3 0 11122 1 1
Cereals and cereal 0 1 1 0 5 78700 0 0
   preparations
Oil seeds 7 2 0 0 1 11111 1 1
T o b a c c o  a n d  t o b a c c o 0000000022 2 4
   manufactured
Sugar, sugar preparation 0 0 0 5 7 10 3400 0 0
   and honey
B e v e r a g e s 0000000000 0 0
Source: Estimated using data in COMTRADE database.
Note: The value zero indicates no trade or lack of comparative advantage.40
a more liberal trade environment.  Agricultural products of Bangladesh show an RCA in
limited product categories; however, higher protection levels by Bangladesh limit the
potential for trade expansion.  India and Pakistan show RCAs in cereals and sugar, but
both these commodity groups are on the sensitive list of Sri Lanka.
The competitiveness of agricultural exports, measured by a comparative advantage
index (CAI), shows a declining trend in the region (figure V).  The reduction in the CAI of
agricultural exports in the region indicates that the non-agricultural exports are growing
much faster than agricultural exports.  Bangladesh, Pakistan and Sri Lanka have faced
greater constraints on maintaining or expanding agricultural exports with the expansion of
global trade compared to India.  This can be attributed to a higher concentration of
agricultural exports by those countries of a lesser number of products as well as faster
growth of textiles and other non-agricultural sector exports.









2.  Concentration of agricultural trade
Historically, SAEs have traded similar types of agricultural products, and the
concentration of exports within limited agricultural product groups is a common phenomenon
in many SAEs.  The level of trade concentration in specific products is measured using the
Hirschmann-Herfindahl index (HHI), which is equal to the sum of the squared shares of all
individual products exported.
2  HHI indicates that agricultural exports by Bangladesh,
2 HHI = ∑          *100, i = product i. n = total number of product.  When a single product produces










Figure VI.  Agricultural trade concentration in South Asia:
Hirschmann-Herfindahl Index









All SAEs, except India, show less diversity in agricultural exports and more diversity
in agricultural imports (figures VII and VIII).  The export concentration is higher on beverages
in Sri Lanka, cereals in Pakistan, fats and oils in Nepal, and fish and crustaceans in
Maldives and Bangladesh.  Sri Lanka shows higher import concentration on sugar, cereals
and dairy products.  Fats and oil, and cereals account for greater part of imports of
Bangladesh.  Pakistan mainly imports beverages, spices, oil seeds, and fats and oils.
Meat, vegetables, fruits and dairy products are main imports of Maldives.  The diversity of
imports is higher in small economies while fat and oil dominates the imports in India,
Bangladesh and Pakistan.  The export and import concentrations indicate the potential for
trade liberalization.  In this respect, India could profit more due to higher diversity in
exports (lesser diversity in imports) than other SAEs (figures VII and VIII).
3.  Intraregional agricultural trade flows
All SAEs, except Pakistan, show remarkable progress in intraregional agricultural
trade.  With reference to the 1995 trade levels, Bangladesh has achieved the highest
growth rate while India has established a prominent position in South Asia for its agricultural
products.  In 2004, total regional agricultural trade accounted for 22 per cent of regional
trade, with India accounting for 80 per cent of that trade.  Bangladesh and Sri Lanka are
the main markets for Indian agricultural products.  Pakistan and Sri Lanka account for
8 per cent and 4 per cent, respectively, of agricultural trade in the region.  The decreasing
share of the intraregional agricultural exports in the region indicates an increase in trade of
intraregional non-agricultural products.  There has been no major shift in intraregional
agricultural trade pattern but all SAEs, except Pakistan, showed a remarkable growth in
intraregional agricultural trade from 1995 to 2004 (table 4).
Maldives and Sri Lanka concentrate on few products while the diversity of agricultural
imports is high in Maldives and Sri Lanka.  India is the most diversified country in terms of
agricultural exports and the least diversified in terms of imports (figure VI).42
B.  Policies and reforms related to agricultural trade
1.  Changes in agricultural trade policies
The pre-Uruguay Round agricultural policies of the SAEs were characterized by
direct public sector incentives for production, such as research and development, extension
services and input subsidies (fertilizer, irrigation and credit).  The parastatal organizations
were directly involved in imports and exports.  The structural adjustments of SAEs that
started in the 1980s were mainly focused on manufactured exports, and trade reforms
Figure VII.  Agricultural export concentrations
Figure VIII.  Agricultural import concentrations
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Table 4.  Intraregional trade and agricultural trade, 1995-2004
Value of trade (US$ million)
Percent
Country change Main market(s) (2004)
1995 1998 2001 2004 1995-2004
Bangladesh  6.85 10.36 11.52 21.85 228 Pakistan, India
(77.5)  (23.0)  (18.4)  (19.55)
Bhutan  15.25  15.68  n.a.  n.a. India, Bangladesh
India 486 642 486 872 79 Bangladesh, Sri Lanka
(28.3) (38.2) (23.7)  (21.2)
Maldives  9.8 11.44 13.92 13.97 43 Sri Lanka
(87)  (88)  (92)  (77)
Nepal  14.81  26.08 62.4  34.79 135 India
(31) (17)  (19) (10)
Pakistan  87.96 266.03 74.99  87.85 -0.1 India, Sri Lanka
(34) (63)  (20) (17)
Sri Lanka  39.42 53.44  43.62  51.32 30 India, Pakistan, Maldives
(45)  (42) (28) (10)
Source: Compiled from COMTRADE database.
Note: n.a. = not available, Figures in parentheses are percentages of agricultural trade with
respect to total regional trade.
during this period were targeted at supporting that policy objective.
3  The agricultural
sector policies of SAEs generally remained highly protected (Blackhurst and others, 1996).
The SAEs bound their agricultural tariffs at prohibitively high levels (100-300 per cent) in
the WTO agreement on agriculture.  However, the applied tariff rates of those economies
were much less than the bound rates and, in many instances, the applied tariff rates on
agricultural imports have been reduced over time.  Sri Lanka and Nepal have been maintaining
relatively lower applied tariff regimes than those of other SAEs, while substantial tariff
reforms have taken place in Bangladesh and India.  During 2002-2003, a slight decrease
in agricultural tariff rates (MFN rates) were observed in all SAEs, except India (figure IX).
At present, SAEs maintain a few tariff bands, whereas agricultural commodities have been
subjected to relatively higher tariff rates (table 5).
The agricultural trade liberalization efforts of Bangladesh, which were initiated during
the 1980s, showed a slowing down during the mid-1990s.  In many instances, custom
duties were reduced but these reductions were offset by a variety of other protective tariffs
(World Bank, 2004).  In 2000, para-tariffs accounted for more than one third of customs
collections from protective import taxes.  In addition, Bangladesh has retained a number of
quantitative restrictions (QRs) based on balance of payment (BOP) grounds.  Bangladesh
maintains quantitative restrictions on 40 imported items while a large number of agricultural
3 Sri Lanka started the South Asian trade liberalization in the late 1970s.  During the 1990s, other
major South Asian countries initiated trade libralization.44
Figure IX.  Comparison of most favoured tariffs (MFN) in SAEs
























































































































Average MFN Tariff 1997-1998 Average MFN Tariff 2002-2003
Table 5.  Status of trade liberalization efforts in South Asia
Bangladesh India Maldives Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka
General
Exchange rate Unified Unified Unified Pegged Unified Unified
free float free float pegged to to Indian free  float free float
US dollar rupee
Agriculture trade/ 3 2 25 7 3 10
GDP (%)
Imports
Quantitative restrictions Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
(QR) on imports (minor) (minor)
Import restrictions – Some No No No No Yes
import licensing restrictions (very few)
State import monopolies No Yes Yes No No No
Average custom duty 16.3 22.2 20.8 13.7 17.3 11.3
rate
Use of anti-dumping No Yes No No Yes No
Agriculture tariff lines 100 100 100 100 89.6 100
bound at WTO (%)
Average agriculture 188.3 115.7 30 42.3 101.6 50
bound rate
Exports
Export QRs Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Export taxes No Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Direct export subsidies Yes Yes No No No No
Sources: World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2001; World Bank (2004); World Trade
Organization Trade Policy Review – Bangladesh (2000); and World Trade Organization
Trade Policy Review – Nepal (2002).  Bangladesh’s trade and its industrial sector depend
more on export-oriented garment industries.45
commodities are highly protected.  In early 2004, as measured by its average unweighted
protective import taxes, Bangladesh was the most protected of the SAEs, with high tariffs
and other taxes on agriculture (World Bank, 2004).
The maximum tariff rates applied in India came down from a peak 355 per cent in
1990-1991 to 50.8 per cent in 1998-1999.  The average weighted tariff rates came down
from 87 per cent to 20 per cent during the same period.  India’s tariff regime appeared to
be more liberal in the 1990s, but was quite restrictive compared to the other South Asian
countries in relation to agriculture.  In the late 1990s, more than 31 per cent of agricultural
and fisheries products were subjected to import licensing, and a large number of products
were restricted based on balance of payment grounds (Panagariya, 1999).  Under the
Uruguay Round agreement, India agreed to eliminate quantitative restrictions, which were
maintained based on BOP grounds, on the majority of the remaining tariff lines by 2001;
phasing out of non-tariff measures for most agricultural commodities was started in April
2001.  However, India revised the tariff structure again in 2001 and the three-band tariff
structure of 8, 16 and 24 per cent was replaced by a 16 per cent tariff band with an
additional 4 per cent levy imposed on all imports.  State trading monopolies are being
maintained on major food grains (rice, wheat, and coarse grains except maize and barley).
Tariff rate quotas (TRQs) have been imposed under different bilateral trade agreements on
imports of tea (e.g., the Indo-Lanka Free Trade Agreement [ILFTA]), milk, maize, crude
sunflower and safflower oils, and refined rape and mustard oils (e.g., the Indo-Nepal trade
agreement).  India reactivated its technical standards, and health and safety regulations
on food imports.  In addition, India has designated ports and inland custom points at which
imports can be cleared.  India maintains a list of about 300 sensitive items, the import of
which it monitors.  These items include many agricultural products such as milk products,
fruits and nuts, coffee, tea, spices, cereals, oilseeds and edible oils, alcoholic products
and silk.  In addition, food grains and certain agricultural products are subject to procurement
by state trading companies to guarantee farmers remunerative minimum support prices for
these products (World Trade Organization, 2002).  The maximum tariff was reduced from
35 per cent in 2001 to 20 per cent in 2004.  However, agriculture was not included in the
latest tariff revisions.  The latest tariff reforms in India are associated with agricultural MFN
tariffs increase and non-agricultural MFN tariffs fall (figure IX).
Pakistan started trade liberalization efforts in the 1980s and continued without
serious interruptions.  In 1996, a new, comprehensive trade liberalization programme was
commenced and was continued until 2003.  The general maximum customs duty was
reduced to 25 per cent but, in contrast to other South Asian economies, strong protectionist
elements in agricultural policies remained such as the use of technical regulations,
regulations based on health and safety and, more specifically, a long-standing ban on
imports from India (World Bank, 2004).  Pakistan has minimum import controls on the
grounds of health and safety reasons.  Since 1988, Pakistan has granted unilateral duty
exemptions in excess of 25 per cent ad valorem (i.e., the maximum rate is set at 25 per
cent) to import 17 product categories arriving by land from Afghanistan, China, the Islamic
Republic of Iran and Nepal.46
Sri Lanka’s trade and its manufacturing sector are dominated by its export-oriented
garment industry.  After 1990, a marked reduction of Sri Lankan tariff rates was observed
for intermediate and capital goods and, after 1996, for agricultural goods (Central Bank of
Sri Lanka, 1998).  By 1998, tariff rates on investment and capital goods ranged from 5 per
cent to 10 per cent while tariff rates on the majority of Sri Lanka’s agricultural imports
ranged from 20 per cent to 35 per cent.  The quantitative restrictions were eliminated
except for 12 items, which were restricted on the grounds of national security, health and
environment.
The trade policies of Nepal and Bhutan are indirectly influenced by India’s trade
policies (World Bank, 2004).  Nepal maintains liberal trade policies and tariffs are generally
low, particularly in the case of agricultural trade.  Most of Nepal’s exports to India are free
of duty.  In 2002, the Government of Nepal added a “security tax” to its import tariffs and it
has increased the tariff protection for local industries (World Bank, 2004).  Exports of
hydro-electricity form the principal driving force in the economy of Bhutan.  The main trade
partner of Bhutan is India.  About 80 per cent of Bhutan’s merchandise trade, 75 per cent
of its imports and 95 per cent of its exports are with India.  The FTA with India facilitates
duty-free entry of exports by Bhutan to India, and imports from India are exempted from
import licensing and tariffs.  A sales tax, which is imposed only on imports, provides
protection for Bhutan’s domestic producers.
The economy of Maldives depends predominantly on tourism and fish exports.
The average tariff is about 21 per cent and imports provide about two-thirds of government
tax revenue.  QRs on imports were removed in 1998 but state trading agencies are being
used to regulate imports of rice, sugar and wheat flour.  Sri Lanka and India are the main
trade partners of Maldives; trade with Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal and Bhutan is zero or
negligible.  The principal role of the tariff system is to generate government revenue;
hence, the tariff levels and protection for local industries have not been as important in
Maldives as they have in the other SAEs (World Bank, 2004).
None of the SAEs used anti-dumping measures during the 1980s.  India introduced
anti-dumping measures in 1992.  In 2002, Pakistan’s first anti-dumping case was decided.
Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka do not use anti-dumping regulations.
India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka have used QRs on agricultural products
for BOP reasons.  With the improvement of the BOP situation, the SAEs could not maintain
QRs and NTBs on BOP grounds.  Consequently, most QRs have been removed.  A
summary of changes in QRs and NTBs during the 1980s, 1990s and 2000 is presented in
box 1.47
Box 1.  Agricultural import restrictions (QRs and NTBs) in South Asian countries
Country Quantitative restrictions and non-tariff barriers
Bangladesh
1980s QRs covered nearly 56 per cent of items at the HS six-digit level.
1990s During the 1990s, Bangladesh continued to liberalize its trade regime,
reducing its tariffs and eliminating many quantitative restrictions on imports.
Moreover, the lack of bindings and wide gaps between applied and bound
rates imparted a strong degree of unpredictability to the tariff regime.
Tariff protection was augmented by other border levies and, in some
instances, discriminatory application of internal taxes.  Additional protection
at the border was provided by import bans or restrictions, affecting nearly
11.7 per cent of all national tariff lines.
Early 2000s Trade-related restrictions were limited mainly to three categories:
agricultural products (chicks, eggs, salt), packaging materials and textile
products.  Bangladesh was the only country in South Asia with QRs on
imports still in place (63 items or 5.1 per cent of tariff lines).
(The Government cash compensation scheme for selected exports at
various rates on f.o.b. – 15 per cent for leather goods, agricultural and
agro-processing products, and crushed bone, 10 per cent on frozen fish
and 20 per cent on fresh fruit – constituted indirect barriers to imports).
Bhutan India is the main trade partner, due its location.  Bhutan is protected
indirectly by the trade policies of India.
India
1980s India used the GATT balance of payment (BOP) provision (Article XVIII B)
to justify quantitative restrictions.
1990s Nearly all consumer goods were subject to import licensing or parastatal
import monopolies.  QRs covered two thirds of GDP and 84 per cent of
agricultural GDP.
In the late 1990s, more than 30 per cent of India’s imports were subject to
licensing:  19 per cent on textiles and clothing; 51 per cent, industrial
products; and 31per cent, agricultural and fisheries products.  A large
number of products were restricted, based on balance of payments grounds.
India claimed exemption from the minimum access requirement of the
Uruguay AOA.  An understanding on Article XVIII:  B reached at the end of
the Uruguay Round required India to phase out QRs, which were maintained
on balance of payments grounds.
2000s Since 2001, India has not used the GATT BOP provision to justify QRs.
In 2001, India published a list of 300 sensitive goods.  Domestic production
of those products is protected by the use of high tariff rates or various
non-tariff measures that are compatible under Article XX b (protection of
human, animal or plant life or health) or Article XXI (security or defence
reasons).48
QRs on 2,714 tariff lines maintained for BOP reasons were removed in
April 2001.  However, India has listed 600 tariff lines, justified under the
articles of protection of human, animal or plant life or health and security
and defence.
Import monopolies existed for rice, copra, wheat and all coarse grains
except maize and barley in early 2000s.
TRQs are being used to protect domestic agricultural production but out-of-
quota rates are compatible with the AOA commitments.
India continues to maintain State Trading Enterprises (STE) for imports of
urea and justifies it under the GATT STE rules that allow government-
authorized import or export monopolies.  Other non-tariff measures include
the reactivation of quarantine regulations, standard certificates, and limiting
number of entry ports.
Maldives Imports of staple foods was a monopoly of the state trading organization
(STO).  Most of these restrictions were removed in 1998.
Import quotas, most of which were allocated to STO, are still being used to
regulate imports of rice, sugar and wheat flour.
Nepal Not an active user of NTBs for protection.  In 1997, the Agricultural Inputs
Corporation, the parastatal over fertilizer imports, was abolished.  Nepal
indirectly protects through the trade policies of India.
Pakistan
1980s1990s Pakistan used import licensing and other non-tariff barriers to imports widely
during its early import substitution period, and started removing QRs during
the 1980s.
Government-controlled import monopolies were maintained for most
agricultural products and the fertilizer industry.
In 1997, Pakistan embarked on a radical new trade liberalization programme.
This eliminated all remaining traditional QRs and parastatal import monopolies.
The most sweeping reforms occurred in the agricultural sector, where
government trading monopolies were abolished and other government
interventions were reduced.
Sri Lanka
1980s The removal of quantitative restrictions started in 1977, but agricultural
commodities remain subject to seasonal QRs.  Parastatal import monopolies
involved in agricultural imports.
1990s The private sector was allowed to import seasonally restricted agricultural
commodities under an import licensing system.  About 3 per cent of product
lines remain subject to QRs.  These QRs were applied to Sri Lanka’s
principal import substitution food crops of rice, potatoes, chilies and onions.
Sri Lanka justified its QRs at WTO under GATT Article XVII1:B.49
In 1997, this justification was challenged by WTO.  In 1998, Sri Lanka
removed import licensing of these products.  But high protection of the
import substitution crops has continued with the use of seasonally varying
tariffs and specific duties.
By 1998, only 3.7 per cent of the tariff lines were still subject to traditional
QRs.
Sources: World Bank (2004), Panagariya (1999) and Central Bank of Sri Lanka.
Although pressure from WTO resulted in many SAEs ending the use of QRs, they
have been trying to maintain the level of protection for agriculture through alternative
measures such as:
(a) Higher tariffs;
(b) The use of alternative clauses of the WTO agreement, such as protection for
human, animal or plant life or heath (article XX [b]), security and defence
(article XXI)) or the GATT STE rule etc., which are formally compatible with
GATT rules.
Bangladesh, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka use other import taxes as well as
custom duties with the intention of protecting domestic producers (table 6).  The aim of
these taxes is to increase revenue, but the absence of equivalent taxes on domestic
agricultural production generates extra protection against imports.  Due to these
Table 6.  Use of para-tariffs in South Asian countries
Country Para-tariff
Bangladesh Infrastructure development surcharge
Supplementary duty
Regulatory duty
VAT exemption for specified domestic products
India Specific duty (1996 to 1998)
Surcharge (1999 to 2000)
Special additional duty (1998 to 2004)
All para-tariffs were abolished in January 2004
Nepal Local development fee
Special fee
Agricultural development fee
Pakistan Income withholding tax
Sales tax
Sri Lanka A levy to fund the Export Development Board (since 1981)
Surcharge on custom duties (since 2001)
Ports and airport levy (since 2002)
Source: World Bank (2004).50
para-tariffs, the protection rates of SAEs have exceeded customs duty in Bangladesh,
Nepal, Sri Lanka and Pakistan by 62 per cent, 18 per cent, 31 per cent and 8.7 per cent,
respectively (figure X) (World Bank, 2004).  India removed its para-tariffs in January 2004.
Figure X.  Average custom duties and other protective import taxes
(para-tariffs) on agricultural commodities

















2.  Comparative agricultural tariff structure
The distribution of MFN agricultural tariff lines shows that Pakistan maintains less
than 20 per cent of tariffs for more than 90 per cent of MFN agricultural tariff lines
(figure XI).  Nepal maintains a higher percentage (80 per cent) of tariff lines within the less
than 20 per cent level.  The dispersion of Indian agricultural tariffs is higher than in other
countries, but more than two-thirds of Indian agricultural tariffs are placed at 30 per cent.
More than half of Sri Lankan tariff lines (56 per cent) receive 30 per cent protection from
tariffs.  Bangladesh maintains more than 55 per cent tariff protection for 25 per cent of
agricultural tariff lines (figure XI).
The tariff levels on agricultural products are a broad indicator of the potential for
trade development.  The relative tariff ratio
4 (RTR) index is constructed as the ratio between
a country’s faced tariffs and its imposed tariffs (Sandrey, 2000).  The index considers
a bilateral trade relationship, where each tariff line of country A is weighted by country B’s
share of total exports of the same tariff line and vice versa.  The index being closed to one
indicates that both countries have similar protection.  The RTR index can be used as
a practical tool to appraise trade agreements and as a starting point to identify a potential/
4 The RTR index =                 where, A, B = countries A and B, Xi = ad valorem equivalent tariff rate
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Figure XI.  MFN tariff structure in agriculture – frequency distribution
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Table 7.  Relative tariff ratio indices for the South Asian countries
RTR Bangladesh India Maldives Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka
Bangladesh 0.60 0.03 0.22 0.25 0.12
India 1.66 0.09 0.17 0.37 0.16
Maldives 31.64 10.51 5.60 3.91 1.94
Nepal 4.52 5.71 0.17 1.41 1.28
Pakistan 3.95 2.63 0.25 0.70 0.37
Sri Lanka 8.23 6.17 0.51 0.77 2.69
Source: Estimated using data in COMTRADE, TRAIN database (2005).
difficult sector for trade negotiations.  Table 7 compares RTR indices for agricultural
products of SAEs.
An RTR of 0.16 between India and Sri Lanka indicates that for every percentage
point that India faces in Sri Lanka, Sri Lanka faces 6.17 in India.  Conversely, the ratio
between India and Sri Lanka is 1/6.17 (= 0.16).  Bangladesh shows somewhat similar
protection in agricultural products.  The higher RTR of India and Bangladesh indicate that
the other countries in the region face higher protection from India and Bangladesh for
agricultural exports.  Sri Lanka and Nepal provide relatively more access to agricultural
products than those of other SAEs.52
The regional export-sensitive tariff index
5 (REST) (Jank and others, 2002) can be
used to measure the tariffs each country faces in exporting to its partners.  The REST
index aggregates all tariffs faced and imposed by each country in the region into a single
indicator, representing a ratio of the weighted value of those tariffs.  A REST ratio close to
1 can be interpreted as an overall evenness between a country’s tariff regime and that of
its regional partners (Jank and others, 2002).  Figure XII presents the calculation of the
REST index for agricultural products using MFN tariffs for SAEs.  It indicates that Bangladesh
and India face lower tariffs in the region than that of imposed tariffs whereas Nepal,
Sri Lanka and Maldives face higher tariffs than that of imposed tariffs.  The REST values
indicate that South Asian regional agricultural trade liberalization is uneven and that there
is potential/opportunity for further agricultural trade liberalization/negotiations.
Figure XII.  Tariff protection in regional trade integration:
































































3.  Domestic support
Domestic support for agricultural production could indirectly influence agricultural
trade in the region.  Bangladesh had a non-product specific support equivalent to 0.48 per
cent of total agricultural value in 1995-1996, increasing to 0.49 per cent in 1999-2000.  On
the other hand, the total support or Aggregate Measure of Support (AMS) was US$ 49
million (0.68 per cent) in 1995-1996 and was reduced to zero in 1999-2000.  India granted
sizeable agricultural subsidies compared with other countries in the region.  Indian agricultural
producers receive subsidies on fertilizer, power, irrigation, credit and certified seeds.  Even
though India’s AMS is negative, non-product specific support has been valued at 7.5 per
cent of total value of production (Gulati, 2002).  In Pakistan, domestic support for agriculture
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the productivity/competitiveness of the agricultural sector.  The share of non-product
specific support to the total value of Pakistan’s agricultural output was equal to 0.06 per
cent in 1995-1996, but it doubled to 0.13 per cent in 1997-1998 (World Trade Organization,
2001).  Sri Lanka’s agricultural producers are receiving domestic support in the form of
a fertilizer subsidy, irrigation and replanting (for tree crops), but the level of subsidy has
been very low (0.2 per cent to 1.6 per cent of total value) (Athukorala and Kelegama,
1996).  SAEs promote agricultural production through lower tariff for imports of agricultural
inputs (figure XIII).  They operate subsides to promote agricultural exports.  However,
regional trade agreements have not included the conditions on domestic support and
many SAEs do not use anti-dumping regulations.  The available export incentives in the
SAEs are summarized in table 8.
Figure XIII.  MFN tariffs on agricultural intermediate inputs
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Table 8.  Restrictions/incentives for agricultural exports in South Asian economies
Bangladesh India Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka
Export restrictions
Export NTBs Agricultural Fertilizers, Wool carpets Yes (a few) No
livestock and agricultural only
fisheries commodities
products
Export control by STEs No Maize, Niger Oil crops No Yes (a few)
seeds and
onions
Restrictions on imports No (10% No No No Yes
for re-export value addition (Tea and
charge on spices)
re-exports)54
C.  Preferential trade agreements and agricultural trade
liberalization in South Asia
SAEs possess conditions such as higher tariffs and NTBs, and geographical
closeness that provide potential for agricultural trade liberalization within the region.  The
trade agreements between India-Bhutan and India-Nepal have provided wider coverage
for agricultural exports to India from Bhutan and Nepal.  SAPTA includes 866 agricultural
items for concessions, and offers 5-20 per cent margin of preferences (MOP) from MFN
rates.  SAFTA came into effect on 1 January 2006 with the aim of reducing tariffs for
intraregional trade among the seven SAARC members.  Pakistan and India are to complete
implementation by 2012, Sri Lanka by 2013, and Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives and Nepal
by 2015.  SAFTA replaces the earlier SAPT and may eventually lead to a full-fledged
South Asia Economic Union.
The other intra-/interregional and bilateral trade agreements of SAEs have included
very few additional agricultural products for further liberalization.  ILFTA and the Pakistan-
Sri Lanka Free Trade Agreement (PSLFTA) take similar approaches to product coverage
and Rules of Origin.  These BTAs have classified agricultural commodities as sensitive
and subject to reduced concessions or NTBs, or excluded them altogether from the scope
Export subsidies
Direct export subsidies Yes Yes No No No





Transport and Yes Yes No Yes No




Indirect export Yes Yes No Yes No
subsidies Low interest Subsidy
loans
Indirect export Yes Yes Yes Yes No
subsidy through Ban on Leather Leather
policies affecting exports of products products
input policies wet blue
leather
Production by Yes Yes No No No
industry-specific Vegetables Agricultural
schemes export zones
Source: World Bank (2004).
Table 8 (continued)
Bangladesh India Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka55
of the agreements.  Under ILFTA, India has initially offered 50 per cent MOP for 53
tariff lines while Sri Lanka has offered only limited MOP for 22 agricultural products with
the balance subject to the negative list.  Under PSFTA, Sri Lanka has given limited
concessions for a few agricultural products that not covered by ILFTA (rice and potatoes)
while Pakistan has offered 100 per cent MOP for two Sri Lankan agricultural exports (tea
and betel leaves) subject to TRQ.
The India-Nepal trade agreement stipulates quotas and rules of origin for
Nepal’s exports to India while Nepal’s MOP preferences for Indian exports range from
10 per cent to 20 per cent.  Bangladesh offers 23 per cent of MOP under the Bangladesh-
Bhutan trade agreement for its principal imports (apples and apple juice) from Bhutan.
The BTAs of SAEs offer more liberal concessions than the WTO and SAPTA agreements.
The interregional trade agreements of SAEs, APTA, BIMSTEC and IOR-ARC do not include
a significant number of concessions relevant to agricultural trade.  However, none of these
agreements has explicitly addressed the domestic support and export subsidies on agriculture.
Only India and Pakistan currently use anti-dumping legislations.  Table 9 summarizes the
intra-South Asian regional trade arrangements and the coverage of agricultural products in
these agreements.
1.  Intraregional trade arrangements
(a) South Asian Preferential Trade Agreement
South Asian intraregional trade accounts for only a small fraction of total trade in
the region (table 10).  In 1982, intraregional trade accounted for 2.5 per cent of regional
trade, increasing to 6.3 per cent in 2004.  Developed countries, particularly the United
States, the European Union and Japan, account for the greater share of South Asian
exports.  The initiative for regional cooperation was started in 1985 with the establishment
of SAARC.  The seven SAARC member countries are Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives,
Nepal, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka.  The idea of liberalizing trade among the SAARC
countries was first discussed in 1991 at the sixth SAARC summit held in Colombo.  SAPTA
was signed in 1993 and put into operation in 1995.  Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives and
Nepal, which are designated as least developed countries (LDCs) under the agreement,
are eligible for additional concessions.  So far, three rounds of negotiations have been
conducted and the outcomes of these negotiations are summarized in tables 11 and 12.
Trade preferences are based on the principle of overall reciprocity and mutuality
of advantages.  Although SAPTA has identified four components – tariffs, para-tariffs,
non-tariffs and direct trade measures – tariff negotiation was considered as the initial step
for trade promotion among members.  The concessions negotiated and exchanged will be
incorporated in the National Schedule of Concessions, in which special and more
favourable treatment has been identified for LDCs.  The concessions agreed upon, except
those exclusively for LDCs, were to be multilateralized among all contracting members.
The consensus incorporated in the national schedule could be altered or withdrawn only
after three years.  SAPTA has special provisions to assist LDCs to improve infrastructure56
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 India and Pakistan use anti-dumping regulations, and safeguard measures have been included in all agreements.

































facilities, communications, transport and transit facilities that will support trade within the
region.
In order to qualify for preferential market access, products should satisfy the Rules
of Origin condition and the direct consignment terms.  The Rules of Origin state that
products having a domestic value addition content of at least 50 per cent will qualify for
preferential market access.  In the case of LDCs, this limit is set at 35 per cent.
Table 10.  South Asia’s intraregional trade
Intraregional trade World trade of Share of intraregional
Year of SAARC countries SAARC countries trade in world trade
(US$ million) (US$ million)  (%)
1994 2 194 46 907 4.6
1999 2 431 51 713 4.7
2001 2 855 64 692 4.4
2004 5 572 88 512 6.3
Source: Compiled from COMTRADE database.
Table 11.  SAPTA negotiations and outcomes
Year Outcome
December SAPTA-1 The tariff prevailing in the region was relatively high.  Tariff
1995 concessions on 226 products under the HS code system
negotiated.
Preferential tariffs offered as a percentage of available tariffs.
Preferences offered were ranged from 10 per cent to 100 per
cent from the prevailing MFN rates.
November SAPTA –2 Completed the negotiations on an additional 1,871 products.
1996 About 39 per cent of the product categories are only for LDC
members.  Tariff concessions offered in this round ranged
from 10 per cent to 30 per cent.
November SAPTA-3 Tariff concessions offered on 3,456 tariff lines.  LDCs offered
1998 more than 70 per cent of the total tariff lines under
preferential treatment.
India offered the largest number of tariff lines (1,975),
but the majority (1,932) was only for LDCs.
Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka (2003).59
India has offered the largest number of tariff preferences.  In 1997, India granted
tariff preferences ranging from 5 per cent to 10 per cent.  India provides further tariff
reductions ranging from 10 per cent to 50 per cent for non-LDCs and up to 100 per cent in
some instances for LDCs.  India lifted all quantitative restrictions maintained for balance-
of-payments reasons for SAPTA members on 1 August 1998.
The trade statistics for the region indicate that SAE intraregional trade increased
during the 1990s (table 4).  Regional trade is dominated by exports from India (74 per cent
in 2004), which go mainly go to Bangladesh and Sri Lanka.  India’s exports to the SAARC
members account for about 6 per cent of its total exports.  The low cost of Indian agricultural
products provides a competitive advantage in agricultural trade in the region.  However,
imports from other SAEs to India have been low.  India’s economy is more diversified than
other SAEs, and trade-related factors (tariffs, QRs, STE etc.) and non-trade-related factors
(exchange rate, economies of scale etc.) have placed India in an advantageous position
in regional trade.  The real devaluation of the exchange rate with regard to currencies of
other SAEs has also provided an impetus to India for expansion of exports in the region.
When compared with MFN tariffs, SAPTA has not offered substantial tariff reductions
(table 13).  The developed members offer tariff concessions in the range of 10 per cent to
100 per cent of the MFN level to the LDC members; the LDC members generally offer
concessions in the range of 10 per cent and 15 per cent to other members.  Agricultural
products have a higher trade potential in the region.  However, the most tariff preferences
offered under SAPTA are irrelevant to the trade interests of the member countries.  Plant-
based products, the largest export product group of the region, have received only 191
concessions (table 14).  but only a small number of these concessions is relevant to the
member countries (Weerakoon and Wijayasiri, 2001).
Table 12.  SAPTA preferences:  SAPTA 1-3*
LDC All Total
Bangladesh 144 (44) 407 (558) 521 (602)
Bhutan 124 (122) 109 (68) 233 (193)
India  2 082 (2 412) 472 (484) 2 554 (2 896)
Maldives  6 (369) 172 (19) 178 (388)
Nepal 163 (177) 328 (252) 491 (517)
Pakistan 229 (242) 262 (284) 491 (517)
Sri Lanka 44 (52) 155 (144) 199 (196)
SAARCC  2 762 (3 418) 1 095 (1 770) 4 667 (5 218)
Source: Weerakoon and Wijayasiri (2001).
* Preferences at the six-digit level of HS code.  The figures in parentheses indicate concessions
offered at the eight-digit level of HS code.60
Table 13.  MFN rates and Margins of Preferences under SAPTA
LDC/





Bangladesh 0-40 Non-LDCs 10 10 10
LDCs 10 10 10
Bhutan 20-50 Non-LDCs 10 10 10-15
LDCs 10-15 10-15 10-15
India 5-45 Non-LDCs 10-90 10-50 10-20
LDCs 50-100 50-100 50
Maldives 0-40 Non-LDCs 7.5 7.5-10 10
LDCs 7.5 7.5-10 ..
Nepal 5-25 Non-LDCs 7.5-10 7.5-10 5-10
LDCs 10 15 10-15
Pakistan 0-45 Non-LDCs 10 10-15 10-20
LDCs 15 15 30
Sri Lanka 0-30 Non-LDCs 10-20 10-20 10
LDCs 15-25 60 10-75
SAARC Non-LDCs 7.5-90 7.5-50 5-25
LDCs 7.5-100 7.5-100 10-75
Source: Weerakoon and Wijayasiri (2001).
Table 14.  Distribution of preferences of agricultural products offered under SAPTA
HS Code Chapter
01-05















Bangladesh 142 35 3 49 292 521
Bhutan 1 6 0 54 172 233
India 88 38 46 41 2 331 2 554
Maldives 0 1 24 5 148 178
Nepal 6 66 0 69 350 491
Pakistan 10 35 4 58 384 491
Sri Lanka 73 10 1 1 114 199
SAARC 320 191 78 277 3 801 4 667
Source: Weerakoon and Wijayasiri (2001).61
The SAARC members signed SAFTA in January 2004, envisaging that the
agreement would be operational by January 2006.  In order to ensure timely implementation
of the agreement by 2006, the committee of experts (COE) appointed by the council of
ministers has already drafted the agreement (such as the sensitive lists, technical assistance
to LDCs, the mechanism for compensation of revenue loss for LDCs and finalization of the
rules of origin) (Central Bank of Sri Lanka, 2004).  A tentative plan has been formulated for
phasing out of tariffs in two phases.  The first phase covers the period from 1 January
2006 to 1 January 2008 while the second phase covers different timeframes for the LDCs
(2008-2016) and other contracting members (2008-2013) (table 15).  However, tariff cuts
for SAFTA trade may not apply to items on each country’s sensitive list.  In the case of
other SAE PTAs, sensitive lists contain agricultural products.  Thus, a higher possibility
exists for the inclusion of agricultural products in the sensitive lists.
Table 15.  Planned tariff cuts in SAFTA
First phase Second phase
Country 1 January 2006 to 1 January 2008 to 1 January 2008 to
1 January 2008  1 January 2013  1 January 2016
LDCs: Reduce maximum Reduce tariffs to the
Bangladesh, Nepal tariff to 30 per cent 0-5 per cent in eight
Bhutan and Maldives years
Non-LDCs: Reduce maximum Reduce tariffs to 0-5
India, Pakistan and tariff to 20 per cent per cent in five years
Sri Lanka (Sri Lanka in six
years)
Source: World Bank (2004).
Note: Tariffs refer to customs duty only.
(b) Indo-Lanka Free Trade Agreement
India and Sri Lanka have relied more heavily on South Asian regional trade
integration as a means of diversifying, boosting and stabilizing trade.  The similarity of the
economic structures of South Asian nations was considered the major bottleneck in the
development of regional trade.  Therefore, the benefits from improved trade relationships
were expected to be marginal.  In contrast, bilateral trade between India and Sri Lanka is
growing faster than the overall economic growth of either country.  In 2000, Sri Lanka and
India finalized a bilateral free trade agreement, eliminating tariff barriers.  ILFTA is widely
seen as an important step because it has granted Sri Lanka greater access to the larger
Indian market.
Bilateral trade in agricultural and non-agricultural goods between Sri Lanka and
India can be used to describe the trends in trade between the two countries (table 16).
During 1990-2004, Sri Lanka’s exports to India showed a remarkable growth (1,380 per
cent) in both agricultural (340 per cent) and non-agricultural goods (1,628 per cent).  The62
value of Sri Lanka’s overall imports from India increased by 850 per cent during the past
decade.  Particularly significant has been the remarkable growth in agricultural goods
(1,480 per cent), while non-agricultural goods increased by 800 per cent.  In 2003, India
accounted for 22 per cent of Sri Lanka’s agricultural imports.  The trade balance has
therefore been in favour of India.
Table 16.  India-Sri Lanka trade structure
(Unit:  US$ million)
Product
Indian exports to Sri Lanka Sri Lankan exports to India
1990 1995 2004 1990 1995 2004
Agricultural products 10 (8) 93 (18)  158 (12) 5 (19) 10 (28) 22 (43)
Non-agricultural products 127 (92) 405 (82) 1 144 (85) 21 (81) 24 (72) 363 (57)
Total  137  498 1 302 26  34  385
Percentage of total  4.0  9.3  11.5  1.1  0.8  7.0
Source: Compiled From COMTRADE.
The RCA of Indian and Sri Lankan products followed a similar trend between 1995
and 2004 (table 3).  This similarity of export specialization may pose a major constraint to
Sri Lanka’s drive to find new market opportunities in India.  On the other hand, the
development of a trade relationship may help India to supply Sri Lanka’s main imports
such as food (rice, spices, vegetables and fruit, and sugar), textile yarn and more
capital-intensive manufactured items (iron and steel, and other manufactured products).
The composition of the manufacturing sector shows another important position of
trade development.  Sri Lanka depends more on food and textile products and therefore, is
not diversified.  As for India, apart from the textile sector, the engineering and chemical
sectors play a prominent role in the economy.  This further indicates the likelihood of India
profiting from a wide range of products in the Sri Lankan market.  Moreover, Indian firms
have the advantage of economies of scale due to its market size.
The provisions of ILFTA are summarized in table 17.  ILFTA is a preferential trade
agreement, and both countries may maintain a negative list.  The ILFTA Rules of Origin
are less stringent than those of SAPTA.  ILFTA provides concessions for products with at
least 35 per cent of domestic value addition content, which qualify for tariff concessions.
In addition, Sri Lankan exports with a domestic value addition of 25 per cent and
a minimum Indian input content of 10 per cent also qualify for preferential concessions
under the agreement.63
At present, Sri Lanka imports about 2,900 products (62 per cent of active tariff
lines) from India, of which about 20 per cent is on Sri Lanka’s negative list.  Concessions
with 50 per cent tariff preferences belong to the category of intermediate and investment
goods.  The tariff levels maintained by Sri Lanka for these products are low (4 per cent in
2002); therefore, a large trade diversion may not have occurred due to ILFTA.  However,
at maturity, ILFTA will cover nearly 80 per cent of the tariff lines that are of trade interest to
India (excluding the negative list).  Sri Lanka exports about 380 items (15 per cent of the
active tariff lines) to India and ILFTA has direct influence on 80 per cent of the currently
traded items.  A majority of concessions granted under duty-free access to India include
prepared foodstuffs, chemical products, paper products, machinery and mechanical products.
Sri Lankan agricultural products such as rubber products, tea and spices, which have
higher export specialization, are subject to India’s negative list.
The development of Indo-Lankan trade has proved that there is immense potential
for the expansion of trade between the two countries.  The diversity of the export structure,
the comparative advantage in a range of products and the geographical location provide
an advantageous position for India due to the liberal economic and trade policies of Sri
Lanka.
Apart from the institutional changes, depreciation of the nominal and real
exchange rate seems to favour the Indian trade flow to Sri Lanka.  The economic structure
of regional economies is similar to that of Sri Lanka and free trade agreements, thereby
placing India in an advantageous position as a vibrant trade partner in South Asia.  Sri
Lanka has received substantial opportunities to promote exports to India, but current
Table 17.  Commitments for duty concessions under Indo-Lanka
Free Trade Agreement – all products
Level of duty reduction
No. of tariff lines (by 6-digit HS-code)
Sri Lankan commitments Indian commitments
Nil (negative list) 1 180 429
 – 50% (fixed) garments (quota)
a –2 3 3
100% (zero duty) 319 1 351
50% (phased out in 2003)
b 889 2 799
50% (fixed) – tea (quota)
c –5
25% (fixed) – textile items – 528
Up to 100% in eight years 2 724 –
Total 5 112 5 112
Source: Indo-Lanka Free Trade Agreement, Secretariat (www.indolankafta.org.html).
a Garments imports are subject to an annual quota of 8 million pieces, of which a minimum
of 6 million pieces should contain Indian fabrics.
b Fifty per cent tariff preferences phased out in three years as 70 per cent, 90 per cent and
100 per cent, respectively, in 2001, 2002 and 2003.
c Tea quota = 15 million kg/year.64
exports have a limited influence on Sri Lanka’s overall trade.  Therefore, Sri Lanka should
seek to diversify trade with India.  India has become the major food supplier to Sri Lanka.
The import-competing agriculture sector of Sri Lanka is highly influenced by trade
developments with India.  Sri Lankan producers have been competing under different
incentive systems and have experienced the negative effects of the macroeconomic
management.
(c) Pakistan-Sri Lanka Free Trade Agreement
The Pakistan and Sri Lankan joint economic commission covers a wide range of
topics such as expansion of trade, market access, and agriculture scientific and
technology cooperation.  The framework for PSFTA was signed on 1 August 2002, and
a free trade agreement was implemented on 9 February 2005.  The basic objective of the
trade agreement is to promote trade by providing fair conditions of competition for trade in
goods and services as well as the harmonious development of economic relations between
Pakistan and Sri Lanka.  Pakistan is the second largest trading partner of Sri Lanka in the
South Asian region.  Sri Lanka’s export share to Pakistan is about 0.5 per cent, which
represents about 11 per cent of Sri Lanka’s SAARC regional exports.  In 2003, agricultural
products such as copra, tea, natural rubber, desiccated coconut, cashew nuts, betel leaves,
coconut in shell (fresh), tamarind and coconut oil represented 90 per cent of Sri Lankan
exports to Pakistan.  Among Pakistan’s exports to Sri Lanka, agricultural products such as
rice, potatoes, onions and fruit account for about 43 per cent of the total while woven
cotton fabric accounts for about 27 per cent.  The value of total trade between the two
countries in 2003 was US$ 104 million, which represented 30 per cent growth with respect
to total trade in 2001.
The rules of origin conditions are similar to those of ILFTA, and products can
qualify for preferences under two broad categories:  wholly obtained and products not
wholly obtained.  The value added components of the latter category should satisfy the
35 per cent value-added level.  The cumulative rules of origin condition holds for products
originating from other contracting parties and the value addition of the exporting contracting
parties should be a minimum 25 per cent of the FOB price of the product exported; and the
value of inputs imported from other contracting parties should be a minimum 10 per cent
of the FOB price.
Pakistan’s commitments include 100 per cent immediate concessions on 206
products, duty-free TRQ for 10,000 metric tons (mt) of tea, TRQ for 1,200 mt of betel
leaves with 35 per cent MOP on the applied MFN rate, TRQ for 3 million pieces of apparel
with 35 per cent of MOP on the applied MFN rate etc.  Pakistan’s negative list contains
540 tariff lines at the six-digit HS level, out of 5,224 tariff lines.  Tariffs on all remaining
items will be phased out within a three-year period (table 18).
Sri Lanka’s commitments include a 100 per cent immediate removal of tariffs on
102 products, duty-free TRQ for 6,000 mt of long-grain Pakistani rice and 1,000 mt of
potatoes.  Sri Lanka’s negative list includes 697 tariff lines at the six-digit HS level, out of65
5,224 tariff lines.  The negative list includes agricultural products (rice, sugar, frozen
chicken, fish products, vegetables, potatoes, onions and fruit).  Sri Lanka is bound to
remove tariffs on all other products within a five-year period (table 18).
The majority of agricultural products that are of trade interest to both countries are
on the negative list or subject to TRQs.  Pakistan has opened its market for coconut-based
products, except for coconut oil, and the MFN rate for these products has been put at the
5 per cent level.  Both countries have taken a step towards liberalization for some agricultural
products and have agreed on concessions for agricultural products.  Sri Lanka has offered
TRQs for rice and potatoes, and these items are on the negative list of ILFTA.  Pakistan
provides 15 per cent MOP for betel leaves imported from Bangladesh under SAPTA (LDC)
while under the PSFTA, Pakistan has offered duty-free TRQ for betel leaves.
Pakistan shows export specialization for fish, cereal and cereal preparations,
vegetables and fruit, sugar, sugar preparations and honey, textile fibres, animal oil and fat,
leather, textile yarn and fabrics, articles of apparel and clothing accessories.  Sri Lanka
shows export specialization in tea, oil seeds, crude rubber, rubber manufactures, articles
of apparel and clothing accessories.  Product categories that show export specialization
have been excluded or subjected to NTBs under PSFTA.
Table 18.  Commitments of Pakistan-Sri Lanka Free Trade Agreement (PSFTA)
Commitment Sri Lanka Pakistan
Immediate tariff removal 102 products (six-digit level) 206 products (six-digit level)
TRQ 10,000 mt of Basmati rice, 10,000 mt of tea, duty-free
duty-free (MFN rate: (MFN rate:  10% for bulk tea,
Rs. 9/kg) 20% for packed tea)
1000 mt of potatoes, 1,200 mt of betel leaves with
duty-free (MFN rate: 35% margin of preferences
Rs. 18/kg) (MFN rate 150 Rs/kg).
Three million pieces of
apparel with 35% Margin of
Preferences (MFN rate 25%)
Negative list 697 products 540 products
Tariff phasing out Within a five-year period: Within a two-year period
schedule (Upon entry into FTA – 20%, (Upon entry into FTA – 34%,
first year – 30%, first year – 67%, second year
second year – 40%, – 100%)
third year – 60%,
fourth year – 80% and
fifth year – 100%)
Source: Department of Commerce, Sri Lanka (2005).66
(d) India-Nepal Treaty of Trade
The India-Nepal trade treaty was signed in 1951.  It was renewed and formally
suspended several times during trade and transit crises (Box 2).  Initially, India allowed
duty-free exports to Nepal but imposed a stringent rules of origin condition on Nepal
(80 per cent local content requirement).  However, subsequent revisions lowered the
rules of origin condition to 55 per cent.  In 1996, India removed the rules of origin condition
and all exports from Nepal were exempted from Indian duties and QRs, provided that they
were certified by the authorized agencies in Nepal.  In 2002, India re-imposed the rules of
origin condition, setting a maximum share of non-Nepalese, non-Indian material content of
70 per cent, and with quotas set for Indian STEs (World Bank, 2004).  2002 revision had
put in place a quota system for the entry of four sensitive items namely vegetable fats
(100,000 tons per year), acrylic fibre (10,000 tons per year), copper products (7,500 tons
per year) and zinc oxide (2,500 tons per year) into India without payment of customs
duties.  Other agricultural goods not subject to TRQ have been exempted from duties if
they are wholly produced in Nepal.  Nepal has extended 10-20 per cent tariff reductions on
40-110 per cent and 40 per cent bands.  The trade composition between the two countries
shows that Nepal’s agricultural export value share has been decreasing (table 19 and
figure XIV).
Box 2.  Summary of India-Nepal Trade and Transit Treaty
Year Particulars
1951 Treaty of Trade was signed.
1961 The treaty was renewed in 1961.
1971 The treaty was renewed in 1971 with certain modifications to include
a provision for transit facilities extended by India for Nepal’s trade with
a third country.
1991 The treaty was renewed in 1991.
1996 A new treaty was signed with the provision for automatic renewal every
five years.
1999 A new treaty of transit was made with liberalized transit arrangements in
Calcutta for Nepal’s imports.  The treaty is automatically renewable every
seven years.
2002 The Protocol to the India-Nepal Treaty of Trade was renewed with some
modifications in February 2002
Source: World Bank (2004).67
Table 19.  India-Nepal trade value
(Unit:  US$ million)
India-Nepal bilateral trade 1995 1998 2001 2004
India
Agricultural exports 19.5 9.77 22 69
 (14)*  (8) (11) (12)
Non-agriculture exports 139.64 112.5 194.17 591.4
(86) (92) (89) (88)
Total exports 159.14 122.27 216.17 660.4
Nepal
Agricultural exports 12.17 12.8 61.2 29.5
(38) (10) (24) (9)
Non-agricultural exports 32.33 123.85 256.2 311.61
(62) (90) (76) (91)
Total exports 54.5 136.65 317.4 341.11
Source: COMTRADE (2004).
* Figures in parentheses are trade shares.
Source: COMTRADE database (2004).
Figure XIV.  Indian and Nepalese trade shares
(e) Impact of intraregional trade agreements
The gravity model postulates that trade between countries is inversely related to
the distance between two countries.  Even though the impact of RTAs is rather uncertain,
most empirical studies have shown that the trade creation effect dominates trade diversion.
0 1 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0 1 0 0
1995
2001
India to Nepal agriculture India to Nepal non-agriculture
Nepal to India agriculture Nepal to India non-agriculture
Percentage share68
The impact of regional trade agreements on agriculture was analysed using the
gravity model
6 (Tinbergen, 1962).  The estimated coefficients on the log of the product of
two countries gross domestic products (GDPs) and distances are 1.15 and 0.32 respectively.
The results of the analysis indicate that the preferential trade agreement of SAPTA has
had a significant agricultural trade creation effect in the South Asian region while ILFTA
indicates a trade diversion effect (coefficient -0.15) to non-members.  The other regional
trade agreements such as BIMSTEC show no significant effect on agricultural trade.
Hassan (2001) showed a trade diversion among SAARC countries, indicating
a reduction of trade among SAARC countries as well as with non-members.  In contrast,
Hirantha (2004) showed strong evidence of trade creation in the region under three levels
of SAPTA and with no trade diversion with non-members.  The estimated coefficients on
the log of product of two countries GDPs and per capita GDPs are about 0.771 and 0.13,
respectively, suggesting that trade increases with country size and income.  Hirantha
further showed the importance of distance and common borders in international trade
(coefficient -0.641 and 0.171).  He stated that the results augured well for the proposed
SAFTA.
Rahman and others (2006) investigated the trade creation and diversion effects
of several RTAs, with special emphasis on SAFTA.  They found significant intra-bloc
export creation in SAPTA as larger countries in the region (Bangladesh, India and Pakistan)
gained from joining the RTA.  However, Maldives, Nepal and Sri Lanka were found to be
negatively affected, creating a net export diversion in SAPTA.  APTA and BIMSTEC were
found to be intra-bloc export diverting while only APTA was net export diverting.  There is
no evidence of net export creation or diversion under BIMSTEC.
According to Delgado (2007), SAFTA tariff liberalization influenced regional
trade flows mainly by increasing India’s exports and imports from Bangladesh and Nepal.
The smallest countries (Bhutan and Maldives) experienced 2 per cent and 1 per cent of
GDP increase in trade flows while it is less than 0.25 per cent of GDP in all the other
countries.  The customs revenue decrease was larger in the former two countries while
India and Pakistan faced no significant changes.  Delgado further argued that extending
SAFTA to other RTAs such as NAFTA, the European Union and ASEAN, conferred significant
benefits.
What these results imply is that although there are certain benefits from RTAs, all
RTAs have not created benefits equally for all the countries and that benefit distribution is
unfair towards smaller countries.  Thus, a mechanism with a coordinated approach is
needed to ensure that the small countries also benefit equally.
6 The gravity model postulates that trade between countries is proportional to the gross domestic
product and is inversely related to the distance between two countries.  Tij = f (Yijt, Iijt, D, B, Aij), where
T = Bilateral trade volume, Y = Product of GDP, I = Product of per capita Income, D = Distance
between countries, A = Dummy Variable for membership in Trading Bloc.  Subscript i and j represent
two countries and t = time.69
2.  Extraregional preferential trade agreements
(a) India-Thailand
In November 2001, India and Thailand agreed to set up a Joint Working Group to
undertake a feasibility study of an FTA.  The Joint Working Group observed that both
countries would benefit from bilateral economic integration and an FTA could prove to be
a building block for both countries.  A Framework Agreement for establishing a Free
Trade Area between India and Thailand was signed on 9 October 2003.  The key elements
of the Framework Agreement cover goods, services, investment and areas of economic
cooperation.
The agreement also provides for an Early Harvest Programme under which common
items of export interest to both sides have been agreed on for tariff elimination on a fast
track basis.  The Early Harvest Programme items were finalized through negotiations
based on full reciprocity in terms of trade value between India and Thailand.  The Early
Harvest Programme list includes 84 products (11 agricultural tariff lines) for tariff
concessions.  For 2001-2002, exports to Thailand of Early Harvest Programme items
amounted to US$ 33.3 million while imports from Thailand during the same period were
US$ 38.5 million.  Tariffs on selected items were to be phased out by March 2006
(table 20).  India and Thailand expect to establish an FTA by 2010.
Table 20.  Time frame for tariff reduction for the Early Harvest Programme
Period
Tariff reduction on applied MFN tariff rates
(as of 1 January 2004)
1 March 2004 to 28 February 2005  50 per cent
1 March 2005 to 28 February 2006  75 per cent
1 March 2006 100 per cent
Source: Agreement schedules.
(b) India-ASEAN
India became a sectoral dialogue partner of ASEAN in 1992 and a full dialogue
partner in 1996.  In November 2001, the ASEAN-India relationship was upgraded to the
summit level.  In September 2002, it was decided to establish an ASEAN-India economic
linkages task force, and the first ASEAN-India summit was held in November 2002.  India
has expressed willingness to extend special and differential trade treatment to ASEAN
countries, based on their levels of development, in order to improve their market access to
India and establish an FTA within a 10-year timeframe.  In addition, India is committed to
aligning its peak tariffs to East Asian levels by 2005.  A Framework Agreement on
Comprehensive Economic Cooperation (FACEC) between ASEAN and India was signed in
October 2003.  The elements of FACEC cover FTA in goods, services and investment, as
well as areas of economic cooperation.70
The Agreement also provides for an Early Harvest Programme that covers areas of
economic cooperation and a common list of items for exchange of tariff concessions as
a confidence-building measure.  The tariff reductions were to start from 1 January 2006
and MFN tariff rates were to be gradually eliminated.  India will eliminate tariffs in 2011 for
Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Indonesia, Malaysia,
Myanmar, Singapore, Thailand and Viet Nam.  Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia,
Singapore and Thailand will eliminate tariffs for India in 2011 and the new ASEAN member
States (Cambodia, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Myanmar and Viet Nam) will
eliminate tariffs in 2016.  India and the Philippines will eliminate tariffs for each other on
a reciprocal basis by 2016.  The progressive tariff reduction under the Early Harvest
Programme commenced on 1 November 2004, and tariff elimination will be completed by
31 October 2007 for India and ASEAN 6, and by 31 October 2010 for the new ASEAN
member States.  The initial tariff reduction is based on full reciprocity between India and
ASEAN 6 and covers 111 tariff lines (eight agricultural tariff lines) at the HS six-digit level.
India accords 105 (six agricultural tariff lines) unilateral concessions to new ASEAN members.
(c) Asia-Pacific Trade Agreement
Agreement on APTA was reached in 1975 with the objective of fostering economic
cooperation among members by relaxing barriers to trade.  Seven countries were involved
in the initial negotiations, but only five countries (Bangladesh, India, the Lao People’s
Democratic Republic, the Republic of Korea and Sri Lanka) became members of the
agreement from the inception.  At that time of inception, intraregional trade among
members was less than 1 per cent of total trade.  In 2001, the accession of China provided
a boost to APTA.  The scope of the arrangements is confined to a small range of goods,
and services are not covered.  The very low level of intra-trade is mainly due to the limited
product coverage (box 3 and table 21).  APTA became rather ineffective because of
differences in approach, interpretation and perception among member countries.  APTA,
similar to, maintains special tariff concessions for the LDC members.  Membership of
APTA is open to all developing countries in the ESCAP region.
Box 3.  Progress of the Bangkok Agreement (Asia Pacific Trade Agreement)
Negotiation/year Outcomes of negotiation Remarks
First Round, 1975 Negotiations completed for Intra-trade was less than
104 products. 1 per cent.
Second Round, 1990 Negotiations completed for By the end of the 1990s,
438 products. intra-trade had risen to
2.4 per cent for exports and
2.2 per cent for imports.
The Republic of Korea
accounted for more than
90 per cent of intra-member
trade.71
Under APTA, Bangladesh extends tariff preferences to India, the Republic of Korea
and Sri Lanka on 119 tariff lines at the HS 8-digit level.  Items covered by the agreement
include agricultural products, chemicals, rubber and machinery.  While the preferential
margin varies from 10 per cent to 60 per cent, most of the preferences are 10-15 percentage
points below the MFN rate.
Third Round, 2004 Negotiations were aimed at The discussion was on an
offering a maximum amended version of the
50 per cent margin of agreement.  The agreement
preferences on existing was renamed the Asia-Pacific
tariffs with regard to agreed Trade Agreement.  The
items.  Offer lists were domestic value-added
exchanged among criterion with regard to not
members. wholly produced or obtained
remains an outstanding issue
to be negotiated.
Sources: Samaratunga (2003); Central Bank of Sri Lanka (2004).
Table 21.  Agricultural concessions offered under the Asia-Pacific
Trade Agreement
Country Number of agricultural MFN (%) Applied rate
concessions
Bangladesh 16 25 12.5
China 141 10-35 9-29.5
India* 84 35 0-30
Republic of Korea 18 3-40 2.4-22.5
Sri Lanka 9 10 5
Source: National Tariff Schedules of APTA.
Note: Includes only general concessions.  Members have offered special concessions to LDC
members.  The number of agricultural concessions include:  Sri Lanka to Bangladesh – 2;
Republic of Korea to Bangladesh – 2; India to Bangladesh – 2; Sri Lanka to Lao People’s
Democratic Republic – 2; and Republic of Korea to Lao People’s Democratic Republic – 2.
* Of India’s 84 concessions, 75 items come under HS code 01-03.  For these items, the
applied rate is zero.
D.  Conclusion
The SAEs have recorded favourable economic growth during the past few decades.
Dependence of a higher proportion of population on agriculture, a continuous decline of
farm income, changes in terms of trade in agriculture and the appreciation of real exchange
rates have led many SAEs to maintain relatively higher tariff rates for agricultural products
than for non-agricultural products.  In addition, trade liberalization in agriculture is politically
a very sensitive issue for SAEs.  Thus, the South Asian trade negotiations have yielded72
fewer opportunities for agricultural trade and the SAEs remain the most protective region
when in comes to agricultural trade.
The number of agricultural products covered in trade negotiations is very limited
and the items negotiated are of no significant trade interest to the contracting parties.
Trade barriers in agriculture are mostly based on ad valorem tariffs.  The percentage of
agricultural tariff lines with specific tariffs or TRQ is low.  However, specific tariffs and TRQ
have been used to protect sensitive (or high trade potential) agricultural commodities.
India dominates agricultural trade in the region and shows export specialization in
a diverse group of agricultural products.  SAE agricultural exports (except India) are
concentrated in a small basket of goods.  Involvement of state trading monopolies as well
as domestic support for agricultural production and exports could strongly influence the
pattern of trade.  The level of these incentives varies among the SAEs.  The issue of the
differences in incentives has not been taken into consideration in PTA or BTA negotiations.
Trade liberalization without due consideration of these issues will lead to unfair competition
in agricultural production and trade.
Although these institutional developments to trade have included limited
concessions for agricultural products, intraregional agricultural trade has expanded during
the past decade.  The expansion is attributed to multilateral trade liberalization as well as
regional and bilateral trade agreements.  The development of agricultural trade within the
region during the past decade and the prevalence of higher tariff protection levels indicate
the potential for the expansion of agricultural trade.  RTR and REST indices indicate that
there is potential for improving agricultural trade in the region, and India and Bangladesh
can provide more opportunities to promote such agricultural trade.  A reduction in the
competitiveness of agricultural production is being experienced by Bangladesh and Sri
Lanka due to exchange rate appreciation.  These two countries have resorted to alternative
methods of providing additional protection for domestic producers.  The real agricultural
trade interests of the SAEs are subject to the sensitive lists in RTA and BTA.  Therefore,
a substantial development of agricultural trade in the region cannot be envisaged without
any change in the sensitive or negative lists of the SAEs.  Reductions of specific tariffs,
the removal of TRQs and improving market access for products with considerable export
specialization can be considered as key issues for regional and multilateral trade
negotiations.73
References
Anderson, K., 2002.  Agricultural Trade Liberalization, Implication for Indian Ocean Rim
Countries, Centre for International Economic Studies, University of Adelaide, Australia.
Athukorala, P. and S. Kelegama, 1996.  The Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture:
Implication for Sri Lanka, Research Studies, Agricultural Policy Service, No. 4,
Institute of Policy Studies, Colombo.
Balassa, B., 1965.  “Trade Liberalization and Revealed Comparative Advantage”, The
Manchester School of Economic and Social Studies, 33, pp. 99-123.
Blackhurst, R., A. Enders and J.F. François, 1996.  “The Uruguay Round and market
access:  Opportunities and challenges for developing countries”, in W. Martin and
L.A. Winters (eds.), The Uruguay Round and the Developing Countries, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge.
Central Bank of Sri Lanka.  Annual Report (various issues).  Colombo.
Delgado, J.D.R., 2007.  “SAFTA:  Living in a world of regional trade agreements”, IMF
Working Paper WP/07/23, International Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C.
Department of Commerce of Sri Lanka, Colombo.  Website at http://www.doc.gov.lk/
regionaltrade.php?mode=inop&link=psfta
Gulati, A., 2002.  “Indian agriculture in a globalizing world”, American Journal of Agricultural
Economics, 84(3), pp. 754-761.
Hassan, M.K., 2001.  “Is SAARC a viable economic block?  Evidence from gravity model”,
Journal of Asian Economics, vol. 12, No. 2, pp. 263–290.
Hirantha, S.W., 2004.  “From SAPTA to SAFTA:  Gravity analysis of South Asian free
trade”, paper presented at the European Trade Study Group ETSG 2004 Programme,
September, Nottingham, United Kingdom.
Jank, M.S., I. Fuchsloch and G. Kutas, 2002.  Agricultural Liberalization in Multilateral and
Regional Trade Negotiations, Integration and Regional Programmes Department,
Inter-American Development Bank, Washington, D.C.
Karunagoda, K,. I. Shigeru and H. Kono, 2002.  “Trade liberalization of Sri Lankan agriculture
and its impact on crop diversification program”, Journal of Agricultural Development
Studies, The Japanese Society of Regional and Agricultural Development, Fujisawa
city Kamei field, 13(1) pp. 19-28.
Kelegama, S., 2003.  “Bangkok Agreement:  Assessment of its potential and the
revitalization process”, paper prepared to the Expert Group Meeting on Regional
Trade Agreements in Asia and the Pacific, Economic and Social Commission for
Asia and the Pacific, Bangkok.
Krueger, A.O., M. Schiff and A. Valdes, 1988.  “Agricultural Incentives in Developing
Countries:  Measuring the Effect of Sectoral and Economy-wide Policies”, World
Bank Economic Review 2(3):  255-72, September.74
Panagariya, A., 1999.  “Trade Liberalization in South Asia:  Recent Liberalization and
Future Agenda”, The World Economy.  vol. 22, No. 3, pp. 353-378.
Sandrey, R., 2000.  “The relative Tariff Ratio Index”, New Zealand Trade Consortium
Working Paper No. 7.
Rahman, M., W.B. Shadat and N.C. Das, 2006.  “Trade potential in SAFTA:  An application
of augmented gravity model”, CPD Occasional Paper Series 61, Centre for Policy
Dialogue, Dhaka.
Tinbergen, J., 1962.  “Shaping the world economy:  Suggestions for an international
economic policy.”  The Twentieth Century Fund, New York.
Valdes, A. and A.F. McCalla, 1999.  “Issues, Interests and Options of Developing Countries”,
Paper presented at The Conference on Agriculture and New Trade Agenda in the
WTO 2000 Negotiations, October 1-2, 1999, Geneva, Switzerland.
Wilson, J.S., 2002.  “Liberalizing trade in agriculture, developing countries in Asia and the
post-Doha Agenda”, Policy Research Working Paper 2804, Development Research
Group (Trade), World Bank, Washington, D.C.
Weerakoon, D. and W. Janaka, 2001.  Regional Economic Cooperation in South Asia:  A
Sri Lankan Perspective, Research Studies, International Economic Series No. 6,
IPS, Sri Lanka.
World Bank, 2004.  Trade Policies in South Asia:  An Overview  (Volume II), Report
No. 299949, Washington, D.C.
World Trade Organization, 2000.  Trade Policy Review – Bangladesh. Geneva.
, 2001.  Trade Policy Review – Pakistan.  Geneva.
, 2002.  Trade Policy Review – India.  Geneva.
, 2004.  Trade Policy Review – Sri Lanka.  Geneva.75
III.  PREFERENTIAL TRADING AGREEMENTS AND
AGRICULTURAL LIBERALIZATION IN EAST
AND SOUTH-EAST ASIA
By Gloria O. Pasadilla*
Introduction
In all trade negotiations, opening a domestic agriculture market is always a sensitive
issue.  Although agriculture commands a relatively small share of gross domestic product
(GDP) compared with manufacturing and services, the sector can slow or derail even
a most promising trading arrangement.  The deadlock in the recent WTO Ministerial
Conference in Hong Kong, China, is one example of how disagreements over agriculture
can block further progress towards any new agreement.  In ASEAN 6,
1 agriculture is, on
average, only slightly more than 10 per cent of 2003 GDP compared with the shares of
about 40 and 50 per cent of industry and services, respectively.  Yet, the initial hesitation
over a China-ASEAN trade pact was largely due to agriculture concerns.  The Japan-
Singapore Agreement, despite very little threat of agriculture exports from Singapore,
still incited Japanese farmers to protest.  The concern of farmers in the Republic of Korea
threatened to scuttle the Republic of Korea-Chile agreement, while the fate of several
other negotiations such as the Japan-Republic of Korea FTA, remains uncertain primarily
due to agriculture.
A major reason why agriculture holds so much sway in the political calculations of
various countries is, perhaps, that despite its minimal share in the economy, the share of
the agriculture sector in employment remains significant.  In ASEAN members, because
more than a third of employment is in agriculture, the protection of agriculture employment
becomes a primary concern.  Even in the case of developed countries, where the share of
agriculture in employment is almost trivial, intense lobbying by agriculture groups makes
governments circumspect.  Countries may cite non-trade reasons such as food security,
food safety and quality, or the so-called “multi-functionality” of agriculture, but the true
reason is the difficult political economy of liberalizing agriculture.  In Europe, the preservation
of “rurality” as a societal preference, together with an ageing farming population, is used to
justify the use of agriculture subsidies; yet, subsidy is, in fact, a cheaper alternative to
government payout for relocation of agricultural unemployment.
* The author gratefully acknowledges the research assistance of Angeli Lantin and Fatima Lourdes
del Prado.  The author received valuable comments from two anonymous reviewers and benefited
from the participants’ feedback in the second ARTNeT Consultative Meeting of Policy Makers and
Research Institutions, held in Macao, China on 6 and 7 October 2005 as well as the WTO/ESCAP/
ARTNeT Regional Seminar on Agriculture Negotiations, held in Xian, China from 29 to 31 March 2006.
1 Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand.76
Agricultural negotiation is a difficult issue everywhere, but more so in the multilateral
forum where many developing countries have vowed to stall negotiations indefinitely unless
they receive concessions that allow better access to agriculture markets in developed
countries.  As a result, regional and preferential trading arrangement (PTA) negotiations
escalated after the Seattle and Doha Rounds, with the aim of advancing market liberalization
ahead of the multilateral process.  This paper attempts to explore two questions:
(a) What are the liberalizing measures in agriculture in these PTAs?
(b) How have they actually affected agriculture trade?
In particular, it considers the common features of PTAs in East and South-East
Asia as far as agriculture is concerned, and examines a few selected trade agreements in
more detail.  Section A discusses how various preferential agreements in the region deal
with agriculture liberalization – their timelines, type of flexible arrangements as well as
safeguards and non-tariff measures.  Because most Asian countries have been avid supporters
of multilateral negotiations, bilateral and regional trading agreements are relatively recent
in the region, and thus are not yet susceptible to a historical assessment of trade effects of
the PTA.  To enable deeper data analysis, therefore, the focus is on the oldest and the first
PTA that was formed in the region.  Sections B and C discuss the effect of one specific
PTA, the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), on the regional protection structure and agriculture
trade flows, respectively.  Section D comprises a summary and conclusions.
A.  Preferential trading agreements and agriculture
1.  Number and motivation
Preferential trade arrangements now appear to be a permanent feature of the
multilateral trading system.  While there were few PTAs before the Uruguay Round, the
number has escalated since 2000 when the multilateral negotiations went into a virtual
crawl.  According to the list of WTO-notified partnership agreements, half of the total PTAs
have been forged during the past five years.
2  While the PTA fever has affected practically
all countries, from the Asian to the African continent, Asia-Pacific and Latin American
countries appear to be the most aggressive.  Of the 89 WTO-notified PTAs, a quarter
involve an East Asian country; this figure is likely to rise soon as 17 more PTAs involving
an East Asian country are under negotiation (table 1 and appendix table 1), of which 15
are proposed bilateral trading arrangements.
The rush to “partner” with other countries or regions in trade has affected even
erstwhile “multilateralists” such as Japan and the Republic of Korea.  Following the lead
of the European Union and the United States, those two countries have joined the
PTA-forming bandwagon as a defensive stance, in order to secure and protect market
2 Seventy-five per cent of all PTAs notified in the World Trade Organization are bilateral trade
agreements; some are cross-regional, such as that between Japan and Mexico, while other PTAs are
expanding and embracing whole continents (for example, the Free Trade Area of the Americas, which
is still under negotiation).77
access, and as insurance against a possible failure of the WTO consensus.  The Republic
of Korea is aggressively pursuing PTAs with scores of trading partners and hopes to sign
15 of them in 2007.  Australia, too, feared being marginalized if ASEAN plus 3 becomes
a reality and thus, forged a tie-up with Singapore as a toehold in the region.
Another reason for initiating such agreements is political.  China, for example,
courted ASEAN, largely as a confidence-building measure; the aim was to ease ASEAN
concerns over China as a regional threat and rival by providing preferential access to its
domestic market.  At the same time, it is eyeing ASEAN natural resources and large
internal market, while seeking to improve geopolitical influence in the region and
counterbalance the influence of Japan and the United States (Chia, 2004).  Japan followed
suit in order to preserve its influence in the region and avoid future exclusion from the
US$ 700 billion ASEAN market.  Even the United States reacted by launching its Enterprise
for ASEAN Initiative, in response to the Chinese dalliance with ASEAN, in order to lock in
its security relationships in the region.
Whatever the initial motivations, many of the PTAs in Asia have gone beyond WTO
provisions.  For example, the Japan-Singapore agreement, considered a template for
Japan’s bilateral agreements with other ASEAN countries, includes chapters on regulatory
trade regimes such as competition and investment policy that had been rejected in previous
WTO Rounds.  It should, however, be emphasized that although these chapters are
included, in many cases they merely state an agreement to discuss these issues in
subsequent Rounds or to provide a capacity-building grant (e.g., in competition policy) and
thus involve no major substantial divergence from WTO provisions.
2.  Treatment of agriculture in Asian PTAs
While, to some extent, several PTAs have been considered WTO-plus because of
restrictions on the imposition of anti-dumping measures or the inclusion of regulatory
regimes in investments, the evidence is mixed with regard to provisions that touch on
agriculture.  As in the multilateral negotiations, agriculture is also a sensitive issue in
bilateral and regional trade talks.  The same political economy, such as dependence of the
rural population on agriculture in developing economies (which makes liberalization difficult
in the multilateral stage), still looms large in small-group negotiations.  In many PTAs,
Table 1.  Preferential trading arrangements
Agreement  Number
WTO notification (1948-2005) 180
WTO notification (2000-2005) 89
Notification for South-East and East Asia (2000-2005) 23
Percentage share to total WTO notification (2000-2005) 25.8
Under negotiation for South-East Asia and East Asia (2005-2006) 17
Source: Regional Trade Agreement Gateaway, www.wto.org and APTIAD, www.unescap.org/tid/aptiad.78
negotiators lock horns and face deadlocks because of agriculture as in the ongoing
negotiations in the FTAA, Japan-Australia or Japan-Republic of Korea.
(a) Market access negotiations only
In WTO, agricultural trade liberalization involves three elements:  (a) market access;
(b) domestic support; and (c) export subsidies.  The various PTAs nearly always only deal
readily with market access issues, rarely with export subsidies, and almost never with
domestic support.  Domestic support is deemed impossible to handle within the PTA
framework because of externality problems brought about by its removal.  That is, once
domestic support is removed, its beneficiaries would not only be the preferential trading
partner but all countries that trade and compete in agriculture.  Thus, the default arrangement
is not to discuss domestic support in PTA, but rather to leave it to WTO.  Negotiations on
export subsidies, however, have prospered in limited sectors that parties to the agreement
intensely trade with one another, as in the case of the Australia-New Zealand trade agreement
(ANZCERTA).
(b) Exclusions and extended timelines
Yet, even negotiations on issues related to agriculture market access have not
been easy.  The usual way that negotiating partners skirt the difficult issue of agriculture is
through exclusion of whole or part of the agriculture sector as well as more extended time
lines for market liberalization relative to other goods sectors.  The various European Union
trade agreements, for example, routinely exclude a significant part of agriculture.  Others,
while including the agriculture sector, nearly always have sensitive sectors that are either
permanently or temporarily excluded.  Others contain a liberal extension time for transition
and adjustments, as in AFTA, the Republic of Korea-Chile or the Thailand-Australia
agreements.
(c) Use of applied tariffs
One positive aspect of PTAs, however, is that the point of departure for negotiations
is always the applied, rather than bound, tariffs, unlike in multilateral discussions.  Since,
almost all the bound tariffs of developing countries are much higher than applied tariffs,
this negotiation strategy is already an advance over the WTO talks.  In essence, therefore,
right from the start PTAs achieve the result that developed countries actually wanted from
previous WTO Rounds – that is, of bringing down bound rates to the actual applied rates.
(d) Safeguards and non-tariff measures
3
In addition to market access issues such as the extent and timing of tariff cuts for
specific agricultural products, discussions on agriculture also deal with the presence of
safeguards (that is, anti-dumping, safeguards, and countervailing duties), non-tariff measures,
3 OECD (2005) discussed SPS and safeguard measures in much greater depth across 18 PTAs,
worldwide.79
special sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures, and the appropriate design of rules of
origin.  In general, PTAs in Asia contain safeguards and SPS provisions, but most do not
go substantially beyond the provisions of WTO.
With regard to SPS measures, some PTAs have provisions for mutual recognition
or the application of equivalence.  Some take the approach of promoting international
harmonization or the use of international standards, if any exist (e.g., Singapore-
New Zealand).  The Republic of Korea-Chile FTA established a committee dedicated to
SPS matters.  Others, such as China-ASEAN, identify it as an area for future negotiation.
Safeguard measures are also present in many PTAs in the region.  Japan-Singapore
and the Republic of Korea-Chile agreements adopt NAFTA-type safeguard measures during
transition with criteria similar to WTO rules.
4  The difference is that the applied safeguard
tariff is capped at the MFN tariff rate.
5
The rules of origin provision is not very controversial as far as agriculture is
concerned, except in ensuring that the products are indeed produced and harvested in the
trading partner and not merely shipped from non-parties.
Next, several selected preferential trade agreements in the region are discussed in
more detail, in order to provide a clearer idea of how PTAs deal with agriculture issues.
3.  Focus on selected PTAs
(a) ASEAN Free Trade Area
The AFTA agreement was signed in 1992 by Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia,
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand.  AFTA thus signalled to the rest of the
world that the ASEAN focus had morphed from merely political and security concerns to
greater economic cooperation.
6  Subsequently, four other Asian countries acceded to
ASEAN – Viet Nam in 1995, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic and Myanmar in 1997
and Cambodia in 1999.  Considered as a South-South trading agreement, AFTA was
notified to WTO under the Enabling Clause, instead of Article XXIV of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which meant that AFTA was not strictly obliged to liberalize
“substantially all” sectors.  Nevertheless, despite the initial exclusion of unprocessed
agricultural products from liberalization, AFTA covered more than 89 per cent of tariff lines
for scheduled liberalization in 1993 (table 2).
4 NAFTA, however, does not apply safeguard actions to preferential trading partners except as part
of a global action.  See table 3 in OECD (2005).
5 Further details of different agriculture-related measures can be found in annex table 2.
6 Prior to AFTA, ASEAN had a preferential tariff arrangement as early as the 1970s whereby each
country provided a margin of tariff preferences for products coming from other ASEAN member States.
ASEAN member States also pursued unilateral tariff liberalization in the 1980s rather than through any
ASEAN framework.80
ASEAN Free Trade Area:  Common Effective Preferential Tariff in brief
AFTA follows a negative list approach for liberalizing tariffs using the Common
Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) Scheme.  In CEPT, concessions are granted on
a reciprocal, product-by-product basis at various speeds.  There are four lists under the
CEPT Scheme:  the Inclusion List (IL); the Temporary Exclusion List (TEL); the Sensitive
List (SL); and the General Exceptions List (GEL).  Only IL products enjoy tariff concessions
from other countries.  IL products were targeted for the reduction of tariffs to between
0-5 per cent by 2002 for ASEAN 6, 2006 for Viet Nam, 2008 for the Lao People’s
Democratic Republic and Myanmar, and 2010 for Cambodia.
TEL products do not enjoy concessions from other ASEAN partners until transferred
to IL status, which the ASEAN members were obliged to do in equal batches up to 2000.
The transferred products were subject to the same rate of tariff reduction as other products
(2002 for some and 2010 for others) in the case of ASEAN 6 (2015 for the CMLV [Cambodia,
Myanmar, Lao People’s Democratic Republic and Viet Nam] economies).  SL and highly
sensitive (HS) products have different timeframes both for phasing into the CEPT Scheme
and for ending tariff rates.  SL is for some unprocessed agricultural products that were to be
phased in between 2001 and 2003 with ending tariff rates of 0-5 per cent achieved by 2010.
HS items may have ending rates higher than 5 per cent.  For Malaysia and Indonesia, the
ending rates are 20 per cent.  GEL comprises only items that satisfy Article XX of GATT and
that may be permanently excluded from tariff reductions due to:  (a) national security
reasons; (b) protection of public morals; (c) protection of human; animal and plant life and
health; or (d) protection of items of artistic, historic or archaeological value.
Quantitative Restrictions and Non-Tariff Barriers are likewise to be removed by 2010
(ASEAN 6), 2013 (Viet Nam), 2015 (Lao People’s Democratic Republic and Myanmar), and
2017 (Cambodia).  Rules of origin require 40 per cent cumulated local content.
As in other PTAs, AFTA initially excluded unprocessed agricultural products (UAPs)
from tariff liberalization but subsequently incorporated them into CEPT, allowing for
flexibilities such as adding new SL and highly sensitive product categories.  All SL products
of ASEAN members are from chapters 1-24 of the Harmonized System.  The exception is
Myanmar, which listed additional products from chapters 50-52 (e.g., silkworm cocoons
and cotton yarn).  However, not all UAPs were protected.  Table 2 shows that in 1995, of
the total 2,025 tariff lines of UAPs, more than 50 per cent were on the IL, 377 tariff lines
were on the TEL and 261 were on the SL.  To date, only a handful of tariff lines remain on
the SL while the rest have been liberalized or are on track for eventual tariff reduction to
0-5 per cent (see discussion in section B on AFTA’s effect on protection structure).
Table 2 is an example of how progressive tariff reductions, phased transitions and
other flexible arrangements eventually achieve agricultural liberalization, which was thought
impossible only a decade ago.  Although there were a number of reversals (e.g., the
reintroduction of automobiles by Malaysia into TEL) or major difficulties in liberalizing
some agricultural products (e.g., rice for Indonesia and the Philippines), the majority of the81
agriculture sector is now included in the ASEAN regional liberalization.  How the gradual
opening of ASEAN agriculture markets via tariff reductions translates to actual growth in
trade is discussed in section C.
(b) China-ASEAN (CAFTA)
China and ASEAN signed a Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic
Cooperation in 2002, which covers tariff elimination on goods, services, investments, trade
facilitation, special and differential treatment, and expansion of cooperation in various




No. of 1994 UAP% Timeline
Coverage of
share to
tariff import  intra- to reach Additional
tariff
total
lines- value ASEAN 0 to 5% notes
lines UAP
2 US$ imports tariff
3
 million
Inclusion List (IL) 40 773
1 89.46
4 1 387 125.68 31.6 Jan 1994 – 2006 for Viet Nam
Jan 2003
Fast Track 14 855 32.59 2008 for Lao PDR
and Myanmar
Normal Track 25 918 56.87 2010 for Cambodia
Temporal Exclusion 2 888
2 6.11
5 377 130.7 32.9
List (TEL)
1 – Manufactured 2 496 5.28 Jan 1996 –
and Processed Jan 2000
Agricultural
Products




8 15 0.03 Jan 2010
Sensitive List
6 261




2 0.99 2015 for Lao PDR
and Myanmar
TOTAL 2 025 397.53 100 2017 for Cambodia
Source: ASEAN Statistical Yearbook
Notes:
1 1993
2 1995.  In 1993, total TEL includes 3,322 tariff lines
3 for ASEAN 6
4 Total tariff lines; 1993 = 45,575
5 Total tariff lines; 1995 = 47,252
6 Sensitive List category was added in 1995 after the 26
th AEM Meeting, September 1994
7 General Exemption are products that satisfy Article XX of GATT
8 UAP = Unprocessed Agricultural covered by State-Trading Enterprises (STEs); added in
199582
areas.  With regard to the liberalization of goods, CAFTA provides for three tracks:  Early
Harvest, Normal Track and Sensitive Track.
The Normal Track follows a positive list approach, i.e., products listed by countries
for liberalization on their own accord, and set target dates of January 2005 up to January
2010 for phased reduction to zero per cent tariffs for ASEAN 6 and 2015 for CMLV
economies.  The Sensitive Track follows the same positive list approach but has no
negotiated timelines yet for liberalization.
The Early Harvest Programme (EHP) has both a negative list (for chapters 1-8 of
HS) and a positive list for other products from other chapters.  The aim is an accelerated
tariff reduction for these products to zero per cent, starting from January 2004, and no
later than January 2006 for ASEAN 6 and 2010 for CMLV economies.  The China-ASEAN
agreement emphasizes reciprocity for the products that are to be liberalized, whereby
China matches the concessions for exactly the same products.
Chapters 1-8 comprise approximately 10 per cent of tariff lines in the HS classification.
The products come under the categories of live animals, meat and edible meat offal, fish,
dairy produces, other animal products, live trees, and vegetables, fruit and nuts.  In
addition, a small list of additional products from other chapters is included in the early
harvest.
Table 3 summarizes the content of Annexes 1 and 2 of the China-ASEAN agreement.
The Philippines, by opting for an inclusion list for Annex 1, ended up excluding more than
60 per cent of the products in chapters 1-8; other ASEAN members have liberalized
practically all the chapters vis-à-vis China.
Table 3.  China-ASEAN FTA Early Harvest Programme
 
Country
Annex 1:  Exclusion Number of tariff Annex 2:
(Chp. 1-8) lines (Chp. 1-8)
a Inclusion List
Brunei Darussalam 0 510 To match China
Cambodia 30 248
Indonesia 0 512 14
Lao PDR n.a. 208 0
Malaysia n.a. 504
Myanmar 0 345 0
Philippines 209
b 586 5
Singapore 0 510 To match China
Thailand 0 539 2
Viet Nam 15 510 0
Source:  China-ASEAN Framework Agreement, Annexes 1 and 2.
a Based on 2004 CEPT rates.
b The Philippines chose an inclusion list instead of exclusion list for Annex 1.83
The significant difference with CAFTA was that, while other FTAs skirted around
agriculture, the agreement negotiated it openly instead by having an EHP that covered
a significant portion of agriculture products as per the Harmonized System chapters.  Of
course, the usual flexibility applies via the exclusion list.  However, it appears that with the
exception of the Philippines, which opted for positive list, the other ASEAN members are
eager to engage China with more open agriculture trade, shown by the relatively few
excluded products.  Because of the strong reciprocity condition of market access, the
willingness to allow Chinese unprocessed agriculture products into ASEAN markets also
reflects ASEAN interest in making inroads into the large Chinese market.  In contrast, the
Philippines, by liberalizing mainly products that are not significantly produced domestically,
signalled its relative lack of interest in penetrating the Chinese agricultural market.
(c) Republic of Korea-Chile
The Republic of Korea-Chile FTA was important to the Republic of Korea, not only
because it was that country’s first bilateral FTA but also because it was able to reach an
agreement on agricultural products, thus proving the Government’s commitment to the
pursuit of FTAs.  In the Republic of Korea-Chile FTA, agriculture access was again
a central issue.  Yet, amid public concern, the bilateral FTA coverage of agriculture
liberalization is one of the most widely ranging examples of such an agreement.
The approach is negative listing with exceptions and phased tariff reductions.  The
Republic of Korea finally conceded 1,432 farm products with 10 types of schedules for
tariff elimination (table 4), but exempted rice, apples and pears from tariff reductions.
Manufacturing is mostly liberalized upon date of entry into force, compared with only
16 per cent of farm products.  The remainder is to be liberalized in 5, 7, 9, 10 and
16 years.  In addition, grapes (the product of interest for Chile) have seasonal tariffs (over
a 10-year transition period) from May to October, during the Republic of Korea’s harvest
season.  Items subject to tariff rate quota (TRQ) plus DDA include beef, chickens, whey
and plums where in-quota tariffs are eliminated and out-of-quota tariffs are at the prevailing
tariff rates; these are to be renegotiated after the Doha Development Agenda (DDA)
Round (Chung, 2003).  Tariff elimination of some 373 agricultural products (about 26 per
cent of agriculture tariff lines) will be negotiated after the end of the Doha negotiations.
7
The agreement relies on WTO for most of the disciplines on the safeguard and
SPS measures.  It establishes a committee dedicated to SPS matters in order to facilitate
the application of SPS-related provisions and monitor compliance.  It also has best endeavour
wording for harmonization towards international standards and application of equivalence
(OECD, 2005).  Interestingly, because of concern that preferential access may be eroded
through multilateral concessions, the Republic of Korea-Chile FTA contains provisions that
should any party decide to grant an MFN concession, it should consult the other party to
7 Hae-kwan Chung (2003) highlighted the fact that some products were classified with DDA, or were
to be negotiated after the Doha Round, showing that some sectors were more pliable to liberalization
at the multilateral level than at the regional level. In exchange for the exemption, Chile also permanently
excluded 54 items covering mainly washing machines, refrigerators, sugar, wheat and oilseeds.84
consider adjustments to tariffs applied to reciprocal trade.  Such types of provisions can
potentially make bilateral agreements an obstacle to multilateral negotiations.
(d) Thailand-Japan
After hitting several snags in the negotiations, the Thailand-Japan FTA has been
signed for enforcement in the near future.  The main battlefront, as usual, was agriculture.
Of the ASEAN countries, Thailand is the biggest exporter of agricultural and fisheries
products to Japan, even if nearly half of its current annual agricultural exports face market
access restrictions.  Predictably, Thailand pushed for greater market access for its farm
products in the Japan-Thailand bilateral trade agreement.  However, Japan finds it practically
impossible to scrap tariffs on imported rice and sugar because it would hurt the economies
of Okinawa and Hokkaido.
Table 4.  Republic of Korea tariff limitation schedule
Category Total
Industrial Farm Forest Marine
Main description
products products products products
Year 0 9 740 (87.20) 9 101 (99.9) 224 (15.6) 138 (58.2) 277 (69.5) Mixed feeds, pure-bred
breeding animals, silk
fabrics, coffee
Year 5 701 (6.3) – 545 (38.1) 70 (29.5) 86 (21.5) Bracken, roses, bean
curd, wine, almonds
Year 7 41 (0.4) 1 (0.01) 40 (2.8) – – Fruit juice, prepared
fruit, meat of poultry of
heading, soup, potatoes
Year 9 1 (0.01) – 1 (0.07) – – Other fruit juices
Year 10 262 (2.3) – 197 (13.8) 29 (12.3) 36 (9.0) Tomatoes, pork,
cucumbers, kiwis
10S
a 1 (0.01) – 1 (0.07) – – Grapes
Year 16 12 (0.01) – 12 (0.08) – – Prepared dry milk
TRQ
b+ 18 (0.15) – 18 (1.26) – – Beef, chicken,
DDA
c mandarins
DDA 373 (3.3) – 373 (26) – – Garlic, onions, red
peppers, dairy products
E
d 21 (0.2) – 21 (1.5) – – Rice, apples, pears
Total 11 170 9 102 1 432 237 399
Source: Hae-kwan Chung (2003).
Notes: Unit:  10-digit HS codes, %.
a Liberalization over a transitional period of 10 years on a seasonal basis.
b Liberalization with tariff quota.
c Tariff elimination schedule will be negotiated after the end of the Doha Development
Agendas of WTO.
d Customs duty applied will not be eliminated.85
The compromise agreement was to exclude rice and sugar together with other
products from the current agreement, and to renegotiate those after five years (table 5).
Chicken meat, another contentious product, would however have its tariffs lowered from
6 per cent to 3 per cent in five years.  In exchange for the exclusion of rice and sugar,
Japan did not manage to pry the Thai car market wide open especially for Japanese luxury
cars.
While it appears that Japan proposed import tariff cuts on more than 500 food and
farm products, actual market access benefit depends on negotiations on rules of origin
and reduction of food safety standards in Japan.
8  At the time of preparing this paper,
however, no information was publicly available about the final agreement on rules of origin
and safety standards, except that Japan would provide technical assistance to improve
food safety in Thailand as part of the efforts to increase Thai exports of meat and other
foodstuffs.
8 For example, Japan currently bans imports of live chickens and raw meat from Thailand for
quarantine reasons; only meat cooked at designated food processing facilities is allowed entry.
Table 5.  Thailand-Japan FTA highlights:  Agricultural,
fishery and forestry products




Mangoes, mangosteens, durians Immediate
papayas, rambutan, okra, coconuts
Fresh bananas
in-quota rate Duty-free
TRQ quantity Year 1 – 4,000 metric tons
Year 5 – 8,000 metric tons
Fresh pineapples
in-quota rate Duty-free
TRQ quantity Year 1 – 100 metric tons
Year 5 – 300 metric tons
Fresh, frozen vegetables Tariff elimination within 5-10 years
Mixed fruit, fruit salad and fruit Immediate
cocktail prepared, preserved
Prepared, preserved chicken meat Tariff reduction from 6 per cent to 3 per cent
Prepared, preserved pork and ham in years
in-quota rate Immediate reduction by 20 per cent of MFN
rate
TRQ quantity 1,200 metric tons from the first year
Rice bran oil Tariff reduction by 55.5 per cent in 5 years
Pet food Tariff elimination in 10 years86
Cane molasses TRQ on the third year
in-quota rate Reduction by 50 per cent of out-quota rate
TRQ quantity Year 3 – 4,000 metric tons
Year 4 – 5,000 metric tons
Esterified starch
in-quota rate Duty-free
TRQ quantity 200,000 metric tons from first year
B. Fishery Products
Shrimp and prawn prepared, Immediate
preserved and frozen or boiled
shrimps and prawn
Fish Fillet and jellyfish, Tariff elimination in 5 years
fresh and frozen Mongo lka
Prepared, preserved tuna, Tariff elimination in 5 years
skipjack, other bonito and crab
C. Forestry Products
Forestry products other than Immediate
plywood, particle board and
fibreboard
Particle board and fibreboard Tariff elimination in 10 years
2. Exclusion or for Re-negotiation
Rice, wheat, barley, fresh, frozen
and chilled beef and pork, raw cane
and beet sugar, refined sugar,
starches, canned pineapple,
plywood, fishery products
under import quota, tuna and





Apples, pears and peaches Immediate
B. Fishery Products
Yellowfin tuna, skipjack tuna, Tariff elimination in 5 years
sardines, herrings, cod Immediate
2. Exclusion or for Re-negotiation
Mackerel, tobacco, raw silk,
bird’s egg, dried egg yolks, etc.
Source: Japan-Thailand FTA, Attachment 2.
Table 5 (continued)
Tariff Elimination Schedule Timeline87
4.  Preferential trading arrangements versus multilateral trade
The various ways that agriculture exceptions are accommodated in PTAs includes
permanent or temporary exceptions, flexible timelines for adjustments and less stringent
discussions on non-tariff measures.
This special treatment of agriculture has both a positive and negative side.  On the
positive side, the ability to remove any sensitive agriculture subsectors out of the discussion
allows the negotiations to move forward, focusing on other sectors that can give mutual
benefits and preventing a lengthy delay, as in the case of multilateral talks.  PTA negotiations,
therefore, become simpler and faster relative to WTO, not only because there are fewer
parties to talk with and convince, but also because it is easier to agree on temporary
exclusions of highly sensitive sectors.  Scollay (2003a) even argued that for trading partners
that were non-competitive in agriculture, such exclusion reduced the trade diversion that
was associated with preferential trading arrangements, hence making PTAs more welfare
enhancing.  Allowing exclusions, therefore, could be mutually beneficial.
Moreover, other experts claim that even with the extended time for liberalization or
permanent exclusion of sensitive agricultural products, PTAs still prepare the way for
future multilateral liberalization, as they condition the political economy to the workability of
a liberalized environment.  In fact, some PTAs reflect progress in traditionally difficult
sectors such as rice and sugar by using this extended timeframe strategy, without which
these products would never have found their place on the negotiating table.  For example,
for many Asian countries, rice is a politically sensitive product that they would rather not
bring into trade negotiations; yet, under PTAs, these types of product have been included
in the country schedules and timelines for liberalization.
The negative side of PTAs is that they encourage economies to focus increasingly
on such negotiations at the expense of their commitment to multilateralism.  Given the low
number of government officials who are knowledgeable about trade, neither PTAs nor
WTO negotiations would receive the same adequate level of attention, with multilateral
negotiations normally taking the back seat.  Moreover, with different countries having
different sensitive agricultural subsectors excluded from liberalization, the future
harmonization of different PTAs also becomes bleaker, thereby possibly locking countries
into the current spaghetti bowl trading system.  For example, a bilateral agreement that
excludes rice from liberalization would be difficult to expand to an Asia-wide agreement
unless other countries, such as Thailand, likewise agree to exclude rice.
B.  Effect on agriculture protection structure
This section and the subsequent section discuss the effect of PTAs on the protection
structure and trade flows.  Since many of the PTAs in East Asia are relatively recent
phenomena, an econometric ex post analysis of their impact on trade is not possible.
Instead, therefore, the focus is on the effect of the ASEAN FTA, which is the original free
trade agreement in the region.88
What can be generally observed from the tables and graphs in this section is the
significant progress made in lowering tariffs in AFTA compared to each country’s MFN
rates.  To analyse the effect of AFTA on the protection structure of ASEAN member
countries, the Harmonized System tariff schedules available from UNCTAD and the World
Bank have been used.  Although the majority of the tariff schedules are only detailed as far
as eight digits, some are as detailed as 10 digits.
9  For computation of means and
tariff distribution, the raw data of tariffs up to whatever digits are available have been used.
However, for weighted tariffs, the tariffs have been averaged up to a six-digit classification
to harmonize them with six-digit trade data.  Since trade protection is not only achieved by
way of tariffs, the analysis is supplemented by a brief discussion of other non-tariff measures.
1.  Mean and median tariffs
When looking at figure I, it is immediately evident that the AFTA agriculture tariff
has produced an enormous improvement over its MFN equivalent.  While the average
MFN agriculture tariff for Indonesia and the Philippines is more than 11 per cent, it is
roughly 4 per cent and 3 per cent in CEPT, respectively.  Thailand’s concessions in CEPT
are even more pronounced, with a mean tariff of 4 per cent compared with more than
29 per cent MFN.  Brunei Darussalam and Singapore, of course, have always had liberal
trade policies, whether in the multilateral or regional stage.  The analysis of standard
deviations of tariff lines (not shown) also confirms that CEPT had lowered the dispersion of
tariffs; while the average standard deviation of MFN tariffs is 12 per cent, that of CEPT is
only 2 per cent.
The fact that in Indonesia and the Philippines the MFN means are greater than
MFN medians indicates the simultaneous presence of a large number of tariff lines that
are far below the means as well as a few tariff lines with very high rates.  This phenomenon,
commonly called tariff peaks, typically results from the application of very high tariffs on
a small group of sensitive products while the rest of the tariffs are kept at low levels.  In
ASEAN, the fact that certain products such as rice remain outside the ambit of tariff
reduction illustrates the tariff peaks that still exist in AFTA.  Table 6 shows that whatever
tariff peaks exist, they occur in agriculture.  In Indonesia, 19 products out of 25 highly
sensitive products – hence temporarily exempted from tariff reduction – are agricultural
products, while another 60 agricultural products are classified under the General Exclusion
List.  In the Philippines, all 19 sensitive products are agricultural ones.
2.  Tariff distribution
MFN and CEPT tariff distribution is examined next.  Figure II shows that AFTA
successfully reduced tariff rates below 5 per cent for almost 99 per cent of tariff lines (both
agriculture and industry), of which almost half were already traded tariff-free.  In contrast,
MFN applied rates appear to be relatively more concentrated in the 5-20 per cent range,
9 In the HS classification, chapters are two digits, headings are four digits, and subheadings are six
digits.  The first six digits are harmonized under the HS system, but countries assign the last two
digits, and thus they are no longer uniform across countries.89
with a few products still exceeding the 30 per cent tariff rate.  In the case of Indonesia, the
highest tariffs are still levied on almost 5 per cent of products while for Malaysia the figure
is 3 per cent and for the Philippines, 2 per cent.
A slightly different picture emerges from the tariff distribution analysis of agriculture
tariff lines alone (figure III).  Unlike figure II, relatively less concentration on the zero per
cent tariff in CEPT is shown in figure III, with the exception of Brunei Darussalam and
Table 6.  Sensitive and exclusion lists in AFTA
  Brunei
Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand
Darussalam
Total tariff lines  10 702  11 153  10 387  11 059  10 705  11 125
Sensitive/highly sensitive  –  25 –  19  – –
Percentage of total tariff lines –  0.2 –  0.2  – –
   of which agriculture – 19 –  19 ––
General exclusion list  778  100 –  27 – –
Percentage of total tariff lines  7  1 –  0.2 – –
   of which agriculture  80  60 ––––
Mixed rate  – – –  – –  157
Specific rate  23 – –  – – –
Source: Author’s calculation based on WITS data.
Note: For Malaysia, no information is available regarding that country’s sensitive and exclusion
lists in AFTA.
Figure I.  Comparative tariff structure of ASEAN 6 in agriculture based
on MFN and CEPT rates at HS 8 digit level
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Figure III.  Percentage distribution of CEPT and MFN tariff rates of agricultural
products (HS 8) in ASEAN countries

























































Singapore.  Still, CEPT is again proved successful in that more than 90 per cent of
agriculture products are, likewise, below the 5 per cent tariff rate.  Among the ASEAN 6,
the Philippines has the highest number of agriculture tariff lines (about 5 per cent) with
CEPT rates higher than 20 per cent.
MFN agriculture tariff concentration is, not surprisingly, in the higher tariff rate
range.  Malaysia and Indonesia have 76 and 85 per cent, respectively, of tariff lines below
5 per cent, while for the Philippines and Thailand the concentration is only 45 and 17 per
cent, respectively.  The latter two countries also have the highest number of tariff lines with
the highest tariff rates:  45 per cent of the agriculture tariff lines in Thailand and 14 per
cent in the Philippines have more than 30 per cent tariffs.  However, unlike Thailand, which
has around 6 per cent of tariff lines at zero per cent, practically no products enter the
Philippines tariff-free.
A comparison of agriculture and industry tariff distribution within CEPT illustrates
yet another interesting contrast.  Figure IV shows that ASEAN countries liberalized industry
faster than agriculture.  The concentration of industrial goods that are traded tariff-free
within ASEAN is higher than that of agriculture products.  Moreover, less than 1 per cent of
industrial goods still have tariff rates higher than 5 per cent, while the percentage share for
agriculture is higher (e.g., the Philippines, 5 per cent; Thailand, close to 1 per cent).
Figure IV.  Percentage distribution of CEPT tariff rates for agricultural
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3.  Imposed tariffs
A question that may be asked is whether ASEAN countries have brought down the
tariff rates of “insignificant” products while maintaining high tariff rates for the export
interests of partner countries in AFTA.  To evaluate whether or not this is the case, the
export-weighted or imposed tariffs of each country – that is, the tariff rates of the imposing
country multiplied by the export share per tariff line of the partner economy – were
measured.  The assumption is that if all of a country’s exports go to one partner country,
the weighted tariff is the average amount of tariff that is faced by the economy of the
exporting country; conversely, the weighted tariff can show the average amount of tariff
that the importing country imposes on the exporting country.  If the imposed tariff rates are
higher than the simple tariff average, it can mean that the importing country may have
lowered tariffs on products that are not so beneficial to the exports of the partner country,
hence possibly reflecting irrational tariff liberalization.  Put another way, if a high tariff is
imposed on a major export product while a low tariff is levied on a non-exported product,
the export weighted tariff is likely to be higher than average.
(a) Export-weighted tariffs
Figures Va to Vd, which are based on the comparison of a simple tariff average
and imposed tariffs, show a somewhat mixed result.  The CEPT export-weighted agriculture
tariffs of Thailand against Singapore and Malaysian products, for example, are higher than
its simple average, but lower for products of Indonesia and the Philippines.  In contrast,
the Philippines’ imposed tariff on Thai agriculture products is much higher than its simple
average of 4.37, while it is lower for products from Indonesia.  Malaysia’s imposed tariff is
highest for Indonesia.  This result may also reflect the fact that one country’s major exports
are likewise the importing country’s major exports and protected sector, as in the case of
Malaysia and Indonesia, or Thailand and the Philippines.  Put differently, cases where the
imposed tariff exceeds the simple average may reflect the lack of complementarity of
agricultural exports among subgroups or pairs of ASEAN countries, or merely that the
export interest of one country is well protected in the domestic market of another.
In contrast, non-ASEAN export markets like Australia, United States, the Republic
of Korea and Japan have imposed tariffs on ASEAN agriculture products that are less than
the simple averages in these respective countries (Figure VI).  The Republic of Korea’s
simple average agriculture tariff of 56.43 per cent, for instance, is greater than imposed
tariffs on Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia but lower than that on Thailand.  This
shows possible complementarity of agriculture exports between the Republic of Korea and
the three ASEAN countries, but possible competition with Thai products.  China’s imposed
tariffs on ASEAN (except the Philippines), on the other hand, are greater than its simple
average tariff, which means that China’s domestic market is well protected from competition
from ASEAN agriculture products.93
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Figure Vd.  Thai agriculture tariff imposed on ASEAN
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Figure VI.  Tariffs imposed by non-ASEAN countries
(b) Incidence of tariffs on top exports
Table 7 illustrates why some countries receive higher export-weighted tariffs than
other countries.  In general, the table shows that, of the top 10 agriculture exports of each
ASEAN country, most already receive CEPT tariffs of 5 per cent or lower, except for
a sprinkling of a few products.  These few exceptions are:  (a) Indonesian coffee exports
(HS 090111), which, in Thailand, face a 40 per cent tariff; (b) Malaysian sugar exports
(HS 170199) which, in the Philippines, face a tariff of 29 per cent; and (c) Thai sugar, fowl
and cassava exports, on which the Philippines impose high tariffs.  The latter result
explains why the tariff imposed by the Philippines on Thai agricultural products is 10.5 per
cent , which far exceeds its simple average of 4.37 per cent.
4.  Relative tariff ratio index
The relative tariff ratio (RTR) index, originally developed by Sandrey (2000), is
a summary measure that helps evaluate the effects of trade liberalization in a bilateral
negotiation.  The index considers the bilateral protection between two countries where
each tariff line of country A is weighted by country B’s total exports to the world for the
Source: Author’s calculation based on WITS data.96
Table 7.  CEPT and MFN tariffs on top ASEAN agricultural exports 










CEPT MFN CEPT MFN CEPT MFN
Indonesia
151190 Palm oil and its fractions 1 392 411 0.25 5 5 5 15 0 5
refined but not chemically
modified
151110 Palm oil, crude 1 062 215 0.19 0 0 3 15 0 5
180100 Cocoa beans, whole or 410 278 0.07 0 0 3 3 5 27.3
broken, raw or roasted
090111 Coffee, not roasted, 250 882 0.05 0 0 5 35 40 40
not decaffeinated
151321 Palm kernel or babassu oil, 206 242 0.04 0 0 3 15 0 5
crude
240220 Cigarettes containing 135 550 0.02 0 0 5 10 5 60
tobacco
180400 Cocoa butter, fat and oil 118 340 0.02 0 25 0 3 5 10
151311 Coconut (copra) oil crude 99 368 0.02 0 5 3 10 0 5
090411 Pepper of the genus Piper, 93 203 0.02 0 0 5 12 5 30
ex cubeb pepper, neither
crushed nor ground
090240 Black tea (fermented) and 90 509 0.02 5 25 0 3 5 60
partly fermented tea in
packages exceeding 3 kg
Malaysia Indonesia Philippines Thailand
151190 Palm oil and its fractions 4 117 561 0.50 0 0 5 15 5 0
refined but not chemically
modified
151620 Vegetable fats and oils and 753 520 0.09 5 10 2.7 13.9 5 27.3
fractions, hydrogenated,
inter/re-esterified,etc. ref
151110 Palm oil, crude 512 078 0.06 0 0 3 15 5 0
151329 Palm kernel/babassu oil 241 966 0.03 0 0 5 15 5 0
their fract refined but not
chemically modified
180400 Cocoa butter, fat and oil 147 808 0.02 5 5 0 3 5 10
151790 Edible mx/preparations of 121 936 0.01 1.8 5 3 15 5 30
animal/vegetable fats and
oils or fractions ex hd
No. 15.16
240220 Cigarettes containing 111 143 0.01 5 15 5 10 5 60
tobacco
170199 Refined sugar, in solid 96 307 0.01 0 0 28.8 34.9 5 0
form, nes
210690 Food preparations nes 90 326 0.01 5 47.6 2.7 5.9 4.9 25.7
230660 Palm nut/kernel oil-cake 88 168 0.01 0 0 3 15 5 9.1
and other solid residues,
whether or/not ground or
in pellet form97
Philippines Indonesia Malaysia Thailand
151311 Coconut (copra) oil crude 399 436 0.22 0 0 0 5 5 0
080300 Bananas including 333 000 0.18 5 5 0 0 0 42
plantains, fresh or dried
151319 Coconut (copra) oil and its 105 424 0.06 0 0 0 5 5 0
fractions, refined but not
chemically modified
080111 Coconuts, dessicated 95 745 0.05 0 5 5 20 0 54.6




170111 Raw sugar, cane 62 023 0.03 0 0 0 0 5 0
040229 Milk and cream powder 57 160 0.03 0 5 0 0 0 5
sweetened exceeding
1.5 per cent fat
130239 Mucilages and thickeners 47 167 0.03 0 5 0 0 5 20
nes, modified or not,
derived from vegetable
products
200940 Pineapple juice, 46 810 0.03 0 0 0 30 0 0
unfermented and not
spirits, whether or not
sugared or sweet
080450 Guavas, mangoes and 44 734 0.02 0 5 5 0 0 42




Code Top 10 agricultural
value
 agricultural
exports of ASEAN exports Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Thailand
Singapore
240220 Cigarettes containing 346 687 0.13 5 15 0 0 5 10 5 60
tobacco
220820 Spirits obtained by distilling 161 788 0.06 0 170 0 0 5 10 5 60
grape wine or grape marc
Palm oil and its fractions
refined but not chemically
151190 modified 126 150 0.05 0 0 5 5 5 15 5 0
210690 Food preparations nes 108 417 0.04 5 47.6 3.2 11 2.7 5.9 5 25.7
220410 Grape wines, sparkling 88 877 0.03 0 170 0 0 0 5 5 54.6
210111 Coffee extracts, essences, 82 359 0.03 5 5 0 5 5 37.5 5 49.6
concentrates
240310 Smoking tobacco, whether 73 602 0.03 5 15 0 0 5 7 5 60
or not containing tobacco
substitutes in any proportion
220300 Beer made from malt 67 854 0.03 0 40 0 0 5 15 5 60
Table 7 (continued)










CEPT MFN CEPT MFN CEPT MFN98
190190 Malt extract and food 64 866 0.02 4.7 5 2.8 5 3.1 4.3 4 18
preparation of Ch 19 <50%
cocoa and hd 0401
to 0404 < 10% cocoa
220830 Whiskies 57 418 0.02 0 170 0 0 5 15 5 60
Thailand Indonesia Malaysia Philippines
100630 Rice, semi-milled or 1 572 222 0.20 0 0 0 0 S 50
wholly milled, whether or
 not polished or glazed
020714 Fowl (gallus domesticus), 597 883 0.07 0 5 0 0 40 40
cuts and offal, frozen
170199 Refined sugar, 502 369 0.06 0 0 0 0 28.8 34.9
in solid form, nes
170111 Raw sugar, cane 425 678 0.05 0 0 0 0 48 57.5
160232 Fowl (gallus domesticus) 379 281 0.05 0 5 0 0 5 40
meat, prepared/preserved
200820 Pineapples nes,o/w prep 282 515 0.04 5 5 0 10 5 10
or preserved, sugared,
sweetened, spirited or not
230910 Dog or cat food put up for 273 948 0.03 0 0 0 0 0 5
retail sale
210690 Food preparations nes 257 536 0.03 5 47.6 0 11.4 2.7 5.9
071410 Manioc (cassava), fresh 252 468 0.03 2.5 5 5 5 35 40
or dried, whether or
not sliced or pelleted
100640 Rice, broken 225 428 0.03 0 0 0 0 0 50










exports of ASEAN exports Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Thailand
same tariff line, and vice versa.  The index is the ratio of the tariffs faced by the country
(in the numerator) and its imposed tariffs (in the denominator) (Jank and others, 2003).
A ratio close to 1 means that countries compared have similar tariff protection or that the
tariff barriers are comparable.
10






B)] where A and B are countries, Xi are the ad valorem tariffs
for product I, Yi is the share of exports of product i in total exports, and n is the number of tariff lines.
For agriculture RTR, n considers only the number of tariff lines regarded as part of agriculture under
the World Trade Organization definition.  The value of the numerator is the faced tariff of country A
from B while the denominator is the imposed tariff of country A on B.  For agriculture RTR, the trade
share Yi is computed as the product share in total agriculture exports; for industry RTR, it is the share
in total industrial exports.99
The main RTR index advantage is that it summarizes a large amount of trade flow
and tariff level data into a concise number that is easy to interpret.  It can be an excellent
instrument for measuring progress in PTAs.  However, the index is mostly influenced by
sensitive or major exported products and major trading partners.
11
Table 8 presents the agriculture relative tariff ratio index of ASEAN agriculture
exporting countries.  The table does not reflect the level of tariffs but only their relative
ratios.  A ratio between, say, Indonesia and Malaysia, of 1.08 means that for every percentage
point that Malaysia faces in Indonesia (or that Indonesia imposes on Malaysia), Indonesia
faces 1.08 points in Malaysia.  This ratio is close to one that indicates the bilateral
protection between the two countries is comparable.  The table also reveals that countries
with a bigger percentage of high tariffs, such as the Philippines or Thailand, tend to have
CEPT RTR that are less than 1 vis-à-vis their other ASEAN trading partners, whether
agriculture or industry.  Generally, this implies that those countries impose higher tariffs on
agricultural products than tariffs they face in trading partners.  Conversely, Malaysia and
Indonesia (which have practically all their tariffs capped at 5 per cent) have RTR ratios
greater than 1; that is, they face more protection than that which they impose.
In the MFN column, the general picture is that of relatively greater domestic
protection in ASEAN markets vis-à-vis non-ASEAN countries.  Almost all RTRs are less
than 1, meaning that ASEAN countries face relatively less protection than they impose,
except for China and the Republic of Korea in the agricultural market.  Indonesia, Malaysia
and Thailand face higher relative protection in China, while Malaysia, the Philippines and
Thailand face relatively higher protection in the Republic of Korea.  In industry, Indonesia
and the Philippines face higher protection in Japan than that which they impose on Japanese
industrial goods, while Thailand has a broadly comparable protection level.
C.  Effect of AFTA on trade
This section first reviews the literature on the effect of PTAs on trade flows.  Most
of these types of studies use gravity models to assess empirically the importance of trade
agreements on bilateral exports.  Fortunately, some of these studies have applied the
gravity equation to test the effectiveness of AFTA.  The section then tackles intra- and
extra-ASEAN trade in agriculture, and closes with a brief discussion of non-tariff measures.
1.  Results of past studies
Academics have always been concerned about the trade diversion effects of
preferential trading arrangements that, in some cases, can fully offset the positive benefits
from trade creation.  However, various empirical works using gravity models have, until
11 M. Jank, I. Fuchsloch and G. Kutas, 2003, summarized the weaknesses of RTR as including the
fact that it ignored elasticity effects and substitution possibilities when tariff barriers were decreased.
The index does not account for many non-tariff measures and subsidies, and may be unrealistic for
some least developed countries100
Table 8.  Relative tariff ratio index in ASEAN 4 by type of commodity
Relative Tariff Ratio Index
Indonesia Malaysia  Philippines Thailand
  CEPT MFN CEPT MFN CEPT MFN CEPT MFN
Agricultural commodities
Indonesia 0.93 1.01 0.56 0.64 0.23 0.35
Malaysia 1.08 0.99 0.1 0.41 0.07 0.34
Philippines 1.78 1.56 10.52 2.44 3.29 1.04
Thailand 4.39 2.86 15.19 2.97 0.3 0.96
Australia 0.02 0.34 0.15 0.04
China 3.63 6.13 0.87 1.13
Japan 0.26 0.69 1.07 0.22
Republic of Korea 0.69 1.14 2.26 1.99
United States 0.27 2.01 0.26 0.24
Industrial commodities
Indonesia 1.6 0.44 0.33 0.49 1.51 0.68
Malaysia 0.63 2.28 0.33 1.43 0.96 1.51
Philippines 3.05 2.06 3.02 0.7 2.6 0.9
Thailand 0.66 1.47 1.04 0.66 0.38 1.11
Australia 0.91 0.24 0.55 0.58
China 0.89 0.42 0.51 0.6
Japan 2.8 0.59 1.75 1
Republic of Korea 0.65 0.18 0.39 0.32
United States 0.38 0.1 0.29 0.23
All commodities
Indonesia 1.52 0.47 0.35 0.48 1.07 0.62
Malaysia 0.66 2.14 0.29 1.16 0.73 1.34
Philippines 2.89 2.10 3.50 0.86 3.11 1.09
Thailand 0.93 1.61 1.37 0.75 0.32 0.92
Australia 0.53 0.30 0.54 0.35
China 1.10 0.59 0.57 0.71
Japan 2.90 0.89 2.52 1.41
Republic of Korea 0.77 0.23 0.62 0.77
United  States  0.38  0.14  0.28  0.24
Source: Author’s calculation based on WITS data.
Note: The figures should be read as shown in the following example:  Column under Indonesia –
for every 1 percentage point protection that Malaysia faces in Indonesia, Indonesia faces
1.08 percentage points in Malaysia.101
recently, found net trade creation from most PTAs.  This means that the adverse impact on
non-members of PTAs (trade diversion) is more than offset by the benefits created for
members (trade creation).  In fact, in AFTA, studies have not found any necessarily
negative effect on countries outside the bloc, or where there is such an impact, trade
diversion is small relative to trade creation.
12
Table 9 shows various past estimates of trade diversion (normally the estimate of
the Dummy 2 coefficient).
13  Unlike other PTAs such as NAFTA, which yield negative
coefficients, AFTA shows positive coefficients.  These results suggest that AFTA has not
discriminated against imports from outside the ASEAN bloc; it is, therefore, considered
a building bloc, not a stumbling bloc, to multilateral trade.
One of the reasons why AFTA has shown little trade diversion could be the fact that
when AFTA was launched in 1993, the ASEAN member countries had already embarked
on major unilateral non-discriminatory trade liberalization.  As a result, the difference in
import barriers against ASEAN and non-ASEAN products is low, as shown in the average
margin of preference (table 10) for intra-ASEAN imports.  Except for Thailand, the average
margin of preference is in the single digit range for all countries.  Thailand and the
Philippines have a relatively high MFN-CEPT difference for agriculture, while Thailand and
Malaysia have a high margin of preference for industrial products.
Another possible reason is that ASEAN countries, as a whole, have been the
production base for multinational companies, with vertically integrated operations within
the region, whose products were ultimately destined for outside the region, especially the
United States and Japan.  Hence, trade volumes with non-ASEAN countries were hardly
affected after AFTA.  If anything, it even facilitated trade outside the region by lowering the
transaction costs of trade in industrial inputs within ASEAN and by making the vertical
integration of MNCs seamless.
12 Past studies also support the hypothesis of a natural trading bloc within East Asia, which includes
ASEAN plus China, Japan and the Republic of Korea. Simulation studies show that should ASEAN
plus 3 (APT) integration take place, Australia would find itself on the losing side, thus it is intent on
being included in a possible East Asian trading bloc.
13 The gravity model is the key econometric technique used to examine the determinants of bilateral
trade flows.  In brief, trade between two countries is positively related to their size and inversely
related to the distance between them.  A number of other explanatory variables are added to this
model.  Critical for trade creation and trade diversion tests are the PTA-specific dummy variables.  The
first dummy variable takes the value of 1 when the two countries are members of the same PTA.  The
second dummy variable is 1 if either country in a particular pair belongs to a PTA.  A positive
coefficient on the first dummy variable indicates that the PTA enhances intra-bloc trade; thus, it is trade
creating.  A negative and significant coefficient for the second dummy variable suggests that the PTA
leads to trade diversion.  The sum of the two coefficients indicates whether there is a net trade
creation or net trade diversion, or whether the PTA is a building bloc or a stumbling bloc. R. Adams,
P. Dee, J. Gali and G. McGuire (2003) provide an incisive explanation of the gravity models as used in
the trade literature.  Note that trade creation and trade diversion here is understood only in terms of
trade flows, not in terms of welfare changes.102
Table 9.  Past estimates of trade creation and diversion effects of ASEAN FTA
Static estimates
Authors  Year Dummy 1 Dummy 2    Dummy 3 Second
    (trade creation) (trade diversion)  wave
a
Frankel, 1997 1970-1992 1.318
d 0.767
d BB
Fink and Primo Braga, 1999 1989 2.476
d
Krueger, 1999 1986-1996 0.78
b 0.16
b BB
Li, 2000 1970-1992 1.311
d 0.653
d BB
Clark and Tavares, 2000 1995 1.673
b 0.489
b BB
Gilbert, Scollay and 1984-1998 (merch.) 0.65
d 0.54
d BB
 Bora, 2001 1984-1998 (manf.) 0.63
d 0.54
d BB
 1984-1998  (agr.) 0.32
d 0.45
d BB
 1997  (services) 1.08
d 1.01
d BB
I. Soloaga and 1986-1988 0.18 0.15 0.70
d BB







Sources: J. Frankel, E. Stein and S. Wei (1995); J. Frankel (1997); A. Krueger (1999); Q. Li (2000);
X. Clark and J. Tavares (2000); J. Gilbert, R. Scollay and B. Bora (2001); and I. Soloaga
and L.A. Winters (2001).  As cited in R. Adams and others (2003).  I. Soloaga and L.A.
Winters (2001) used a third dummy variable to indicate export diversion, i.e., while dummy
2 is 1 for imports from extra-bloc countries (country i is in the PTA), dummy 3 is 1 for
exports from extra-bloc countries (country j is in the PTA).
Note:
a Denotes whether a PTA is building block (BB) or stumbling block (SB) – the second wave
issue – based on “net trade effects” of a PTA; that is, the sum of intra-bloc and extra-bloc
effects.
b Denotes the significance at the 10 per cent level;
c Denotes the significance at the 5 per cent level; and
d Denotes the significance at the 1 per cent level.
Most of the gravity model results above, however, use total trade in the equation,
not just agriculture trade.  Of these, only Gilbert, Scollay and Bora (2001) disaggregated
the AFTA effect on agricultural, manufacturing and services trade.  Interestingly, their
empirical work revealed that while there was a net positive effect on both agriculture and
manufactures trade, the impact on agriculture declined after 1992 and is of lesser statistical
significance.  Hence, the authors concluded that ASEAN had only been successful in
promoting manufactures trade, but not trade in agriculture.  Moreover, within ASEAN, net
benefits had not been uniform across countries.  Higher-income ASEAN countries, especially
Malaysia and Singapore, took the greatest gain in trade diverted towards the region and
supplied the bulk of increased interregional demand for manufactures.
However, results more recently produced from gravity equations have shown
a different conclusion.  Adams and others (2003) employed a dynamic gravity model on
panel data and found that, unlike many previous studies, trade diversion outweighed trade
creation in most PTAs, including those that were initially found to be building blocks, such103
as AFTA (table 11).
14  With this result, they underscored the fact that many PTAs had not
truly been liberalizing because of the many provisions, such as rules of origin, that were
needed to underpin and enforce the preferential agreement and were actually trade
restricting.  These non-tariff measures are discussed later in this section.
2.  Growth in intra-ASEAN trade
While gravity models remain the better test for determining the effect of AFTA on
trade in general and on agriculture trade in particular, an analytical evaluation of trade data
Table 10.  Margin of preference by type of commodities






















Source: Author’s calculation based on ASEAN Secretariat data.
* The average difference between the MFN and CEPT rate.
Note: For Malaysia and Thailand, 2003 MFN rates have been used.
14 R. Adams and others (2003), employed different gravity model specifications that addressed
product differentiation and possible selectivity bias from exclusion of partners with zero trade.  They
also made use of so-called dynamic dummies, and estimated a Tobit model with fixed effects to
account for unobserved heterogeneity.  Previous empirical results did not used fixed effect models,
which, they said, led to an omitted variable bias.  Indeed, they found that the fixed effects model
removed the upward bias in the estimate of net trade effect of PTAs.104
Table 11.  New evidence that PTAs are a cause of net trade creation or diversion
Past estimates New estimates
Net trade
Inconclusive
Net trade Net trade Net trade
creation diversion creation diversion
Andean LAIA NAFTA Andean AFTA
CER MERCOSUR LAFTA/LAIA EFTA














Source: R. Adams and others (2003), “Trade and investment effects of preferential trading
arrangements”, Productivity Commission Staff Working Paper, Canberra, Australia.
can supplement the models’ results.  This subsection attempts to make an analytical
presentation of how AFTA has affected interregional trade.
One of the main issues to be overcome is the problem of attribution.  Was the
growth in intraregional trade, for example, due to the trade agreement or to other factors?
At best, the answer can only be indicative.  Table 12, for example, shows an increase in
intra-ASEAN imports of those products for which tariffs were eliminated.  The tariff elimination
may not be the only factor that explains such growth nor is it certain that those imports
took advantage of the PTA, considering the burden of satisfying rules of origin requirements,
but such information provides a reason to pause and reflect on the potential role of PTAs.
Another caveat in analysing trade data is that a large percentage of products
illegally traded across country borders is not reflected in official trade figures.  The importance
of this situation is evident in the fact that often trade flows do not exhibit significant change
after tariffs have been lowered because many of them have already managed to enter the
country, tariff-free.  In addition, tariffs are not the only way by which countries protect their
domestic markets.  A whole gamut of non-tariff measures exist that can obviate the
liberalization that tariff reductions are meant to accomplish.  Therefore, a more apt indicator
of liberalization would perhaps be the difference in border and home prices, i.e., the effect
of liberalization is shown in a decrease in the price difference.  However, data limitation
precludes undertaking an analysis in this chapter, using this method.105
(a) Growth in intra-ASEAN trade due to industry trade
A descriptive analysis of trade creation and trade diversion can be gleaned from
analysing shares of intra-ASEAN and extra-ASEAN trade in comparison with total trade.
Table 13 shows that total intra-ASEAN trade share compared with total regional trade
(ASEAN 6 to ASEAN 10) indeed increased by more than 10 percentage points from 1995
to 2003.  However, judging from the share of intra-ASEAN agriculture trade, most of this
increase had come, not from increased agriculture trade, but from industry trade.
Intra-ASEAN agriculture trade share to total ASEAN trade increased from 1.4 per cent in
1995 to 1.9 per cent in 2003, approximately a 0.5 percentage point increase, even as total
intra-ASEAN trade share had increased from 21.4 per cent in 1995 to 31.7 per cent in
2003, or by about 10 percentage points.
Total trade among the ASEAN 6 as a share of total trade averaged 21 per cent
from 1993 to 2003 (figure VII) compared with 79 per cent for non-ASEAN 6.
15  Figure VII
shows the share of agriculture and industry to total trade, as well as the share of intra- and
extra-ASEAN trade.  It indicates that more than 90 per cent of ASEAN trade is in industry,
and only about 10 per cent in agriculture.  In fact, the average growth of agriculture share
to total trade from 1993-2003 is -2 per cent while growth of industry’s share averaged
0.22 per cent.  While this indicates that there was little change as far as the importance of
industry to total trade was concerned, it implies that the importance of agriculture to
ASEAN trade had dissipated even more.
Average growth of the intra-ASEAN trade share to total trade was roughly 1.5 per
cent from 1993 to 2003 while growth of the extra-ASEAN share averaged -0.35 per cent.
This possibly indicates some trade diversion effect of AFTA but it is relatively small compared
with the growth effect on intra-ASEAN trade, again much of which was accounted for by
industry trade rather than agriculture.
Table 12.  Intra-ASEAN imports by selected country (US$ ’000)
Number of tariff lines Imports from ASEAN
 w/CEPT = 0
(HS 6-digit) 2003 1999
Philippines 72 180 027 136 481*
Thailand 43 20 323 16 019
Malaysia 539 1 188 935 629 868
Indonesia 223 497 258 878 654
Sources: ASEAN Secretariat and United Nations Conference on Trade and Development PC-TAS.
* Year 2000 figures have been used.
15 Based on the computation of ASEAN 6 to ASEAN 6 trade from the ASEAN Statistical Yearbook
2004.106




1995 2000 2003 1995 2000 2003 1995 2000 2003
A. ASEAN 6 trade
(US$ million)
ASEAN 6 53 244 72 511 75 393 69 518 87 634 88 476 20.23 29.25 29.61
ASEAN 10 54 900 75 237 79 140 74 994 94 047 96 504 21.41 30.92 31.74
Non-ASEAN 258 058 174 113 164 086 218 810 204 112 213 718 78.59 69.08 68.26
B. ASEAN 6 agricultural
trade (US$ million)
ASEAN 6 2 997 2 792 4 097 4 021 3 909 5 101 1.16 1.22 1.66
ASEAN 10 3 536 3 292 4 523 5 224 4 767 6 003 1.44 1.47 1.9
Non-ASEAN 11 237 7 481 7 242 18 147 6 970 10 334 4.84 2.64 3.18
Source: United Nations Conference on Trde and Development PC-TAS.
Source: ASEAN Secretariat.
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Agriculture Industry Intra-ASEAN Extra-ASEAN
The fact that most of the growth of intra-ASEAN trade came from trade in industry
is, to a certain extent, not surprising.  First, as mentioned above, the ASEAN member
countries produce agriculture products that are broadly similar, i.e., mostly tropical products,
thus providing relatively little room for trade with one another.  Second, AFTA itself was
originally conceived not with the aim of fostering trade in agriculture but of facilitating the
already burgeoning intra-industry trade in manufacturing that arose from the vertically
linked operations of transnational corporations in ASEAN.  The extension of AFTA to
agricultural goods came almost as an afterthought.  Being notified in WTO under the
Enabling Clause, rather than under GATT Chapter XXIV, ASEAN was not under any107
obligation to satisfy the “substantially all trade” requirement.  It could, therefore, initially
exclude the entire agricultural sector.  It was only later that agriculture liberalization was
appended in the agreement.  Consequently, agriculture tariff reduction was one of those
carried out more recently, unlike trade in some industrial goods that was opened up almost
from day one of the FTA.
(b) Growth in total agriculture trade due to extra-ASEAN trade
Figure VIII shows that the share of total agriculture trade in total ASEAN trade
16
had been on the decline since 1993, and that this trend started to reverse in 2000.  From
2000 to 2003, the total share of agricultural trade increased by almost 1 percentage point
from 5.7 per cent in 2000 to 6.6 per cent in 2003.  Much of this increase, however, came
from extra-ASEAN agricultural trade, which increased its share of total trade by 0.6 percentage
points (from 4.5 per cent in 2000 to 5.1 per cent in 2003).  During the same period, the
intra-ASEAN agriculture export share of total exports increased by a mere 0.3 percentage
points (from 1.2 per cent in 2000 to 1.5 per cent in 2003).  This implies that the ASEAN
member countries do not trade much with one another in agricultural products, presumably
16 Figures are from ASEAN 6 to ASEAN 6.
Sources: ASEAN Secretariat and WITS.
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because they produce similar agricultural goods.  Rather, as in industrial goods, their
agricultural trade tends to be mostly with countries outside ASEAN.
(c) Individual country differences
The apparently sluggish growth of intra-ASEAN agricultural trade for ASEAN 6,
however, masks individual country performance.  While the intra-ASEAN share of agricultural
trade in total trade has not been significant, its ratio to extra-ASEAN trade has actually
grown, especially if observed at the individual country level.  For example, figure IX shows
an upward trend for the intra-/extra-ASEAN agricultural trade ratio, but the change has
been more pronounced for the Philippines and Thailand.  In 1995, the ratios of intra-/extra-
ASEAN trade for those two countries were 0.11 and 0.12, respectively, while in 2003, the
intra-ASEAN trade ratios expanded to 0.22 and 0.19.
Similarly, the intra-ASEAN agricultural trade share of total trade shows varied growth
across ASEAN 6; however, the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand (ASEAN 4)
appear to have reaped greater gains compared with Singapore.  In terms of growth of
values of agricultural intra-ASEAN trade, ASEAN 4 trade more than doubled from 1993
(figures X and XI).
Figure IX.  Ratio of intra/extra-ASEAN agricultural trade








1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand109













Figure XI.  Total intra-ASEAN agricultural trade
















Sources: ASEAN Secretariat and WITS.110
In summary, despite individual country differences in agriculture trade performance,
the analysis above confirms the results of many gravity trade models indicating that AFTA
is not trade diverting, particularly with regard to agriculture, as trade in intra-ASEAN
agriculture products grew only marginally from 1.44 per cent share to total trade in 1995 to
1.9 per cent in 2003 (table 13).  The analysis shows that most of the growth in agriculture
trade was due to extra-ASEAN trade.
17  It also adds evidence to the conclusion by Gilbert
and others (2001) that AFTA has benefited manufacturing much more than agriculture.
However, recent dynamic gravity models have found that AFTA is among the PTAs that are
stumbling blocks, i.e., where trade diversion exceeds trade creation.  This underscores the
non-liberalizing nature of PTAs due to stringent rules of origin and persisting non-tariff
measures that are not sufficiently addressed in such agreements.  This issue of non-tariff
measures is discussed below.
3.  Non-tariff measures
The pace of removing the tariff protection structure, as shown in section B, stands
in stark contrast to the apparently sluggish progress in intra-ASEAN trade in agriculture.
The question is whether the reason for such slowness is just because ASEAN products
are competing with each other, therefore allowing little scope for intra-(product) trade (for
example, two countries exporting and importing rice), or whether the problem lies not in
tariffs but in other non-tariff measures.  Table 14 indicates that the latter reason is highly
plausible.  A high percentage of the many non-tariff measures in ASEAN, especially technical
measures or health and safety standards requirements, are applied to agricultural products.
At least 70 per cent of tariff lines that involve technical measures are agricultural products.
It appears that the more developed ASEAN countries (for example, Singapore and Malaysia)
impose a greater number of tariff lines on agricultural products than is the case with other
countries.
Another major non-tariff measure that affects agricultural trade in particular is that
involving quantity control and licensing/monopolistic procedures.  While ASEAN has done
away with import quotas, import licensing for some products is only given to a government
monopoly, as in the case of rice imports by the Philippines, or to registered importers.
Further corroboration of this result has been provided by Adams and others (2003)
who attempted to develop a Member Liberalization Index (MLI) for different PTAs throughout
the world.  The objective was to assess how, in reality, these preferential arrangements
(after taking many non-tariff measures and rules of origin requirements into account) had
made economies freer.  In essence, the higher their measure on the MLI, the more
liberalizing the PTA is supposed to be.
18  Table 15 shows a portion of the index construction
by Adams and others (2003), where AFTA achieved a total measure of only 0.035 out of
17 A referee rightly notes that, based on previous discussions, this conclusion is true primarily
because there has been less (slower) liberalization, so far, in the agriculture sector.
18 The actual computation of the Members Liberalization Index, taken from Adams and others (2003),
is shown in annex tables 3a and 3b.111






(1) (2)  (2)/(1)
Brunei Darussalam (2004)
Price control measure 34 18 52.9
Automatic licensing measure 3 3 100
Quantity control measure 205 118 57.6
Monopolistic measures 4 4 100
Technical measures 49 44 89.8
Indonesia (2003)
Price control measure 35 1 2.9
Quantity control measure 259 81 31.3
Monopolistic measures 62 25 40.3
Technical measures 486 411 84.6
Malaysia (2003)
Price control measure 8 0 0
Finance licensing 2 0 0
Automatic licensing measure 16 1 6.3
Quantity control measure 412 138 33.5
Monopolistic measures 6 6 100
Technical measures 215 167 77.7
Philippines (2001)
Price control measure 18 0 0
Automatic licensing measure 26 18 69.2
Quantity control measure 264 168 63.6
Technical measures 339 284 83.8
Singapore (2001)
Price control measure 16 0 0
Automatic licensing measure 24 18 75.0
Quantity control measure 212 97 45.8
Monopolistic measures 1 1 100
Technical measures 264 182 68.9
Thailand (2003)
Price control measure 13 0 0
Finance licensing measure 1 0 0
Quantity control measure 127 66 52.0
Technical measures 600 449 74.8
Source: WITS.112
Table 15.  Ranking of preferential trading arrangements
All trade Agriculture Industry
Singapore-New Zealand 1 1 1
European Union 2 6 2
ANZCERTA 3 2 4
Chile-MERCOSUR 4 4 3
Chile-Mexico 5 3 6
NAFTA 6 11 10
European Union-Poland 7 7 13
ANDEAN 8 5 5
MERCOSUR 9 8 7
Chile-Columbia 10 13 9
ASEAN-FTA 11 16 14
EFTA 12 9 8
PATCRA 13 10 12
Israel-United States 14 17 15
European Union-Switzerland 15 18 11
European Union-Egypt 16 14 17
SPARTECA 17 12 16
LAIA 18 15 18
Source: R. Adams and others (2003), “The trade and Investment effects of preferential trading
arrangements:  Old and new evidence”, Productivity Commission Working Paper, Canberra,
May 2003.
Note: A ranking of 1 means PTA provisions contain highly liberalizing elements.
a “perfect” score of 0.10 for agriculture.  It is ranked sixteenth out of the 18 PTAs considered
in the study.  It ranked slightly better with fourteenth place for industry, and eleventh for
overall trade (table 16).  Admittedly, the index construction entails a certain amount of
subjective judgment; nevertheless, the low ranking for agriculture is telling of the lack of
the sector’s actual liberalization within the region.  This perhaps partly explains why
intra-ASEAN agricultural trade has not significantly increased at a rate close to that of
industrial trade.
D.  Summary and conclusions
This paper shows that, in the case of AFTA, the PTA helped to accelerate the
lowering of tariff barriers against other ASEAN countries.  The average and median CEPT
tariffs have been significantly reduced compared with MFN levels.  The tariff distribution
analysis shows that tariffs on a large proportion of agricultural products, and indeed on all
commodities, have been capped within the zero to 5 per cent range, while in MFN a large
portion of tariffs still lies between 5 per cent and 20 per cent.  Therefore, the entry of major113
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ASEAN exports into the domestic markets of other ASEAN members are not prevented by
high tariffs, except in the case of commodities such as rice, sugar and coffee.
The analysis of the relative tariff ratio index reveals that ASEAN agriculture tariff
protection is relatively high with respect to those of developed countries, except China and
the Republic of Korea.  Developed countries, except Japan, are, likewise, relatively more
open when it comes to industrial exports.  While they may have very low tariff barriers in
agriculture, various non-tariff measures not captured in the above tariff analysis work to
the disadvantage of developing countries such as those in South-East Asia.  Even among
ASEAN members, many of the non-tariff measures – particularly health and safety standards,
import licensing and quota measures – are applied more especially to agricultural products.
This, perhaps, partly explains the relatively low growth of intra-ASEAN agriculture trade
over total interregional trade.  Nonetheless, the paper highlights individual country
performances in improving trade with other ASEAN members.
The above discussion of specific PTA treatment of agricultural products also shows
that while such products remain sensitive and continue to receive special consideration
(for example, a prolonged liberalization timetable), the fact that PTAs manage to include
many sensitive products in the schedule of liberalization should be considered an advance
over multilateral negotiations.  It is understandable that some countries, for political reasons,
would have greater difficulty opening up certain parts of the agricultural sector.  However,
the flexibility afforded them in PTAs makes for a less painful transition process.  At the
same time, the fact that these countries have committed to the liberalization of even
difficult sectors is a major improvement over the multilateral negotiations.  The need now
is for time and patience to ensure that those commitments are observed and not eventually
withdrawn through policy reversals.
In the final analysis, the answer to the question of whether PTAs are a stumbling or
building block in the multilateral liberalization process depends greatly on the design of the
trade agreements, sector inclusiveness, timetables and flexibilities that are agreed on.  In
the case of AFTA, the answer remains that it is a building block as far as total trade is
concerned.  However, on the question whether AFTA is also a building block when it
comes to agricultural trade, an affirmative answer may be less enthusiastic.  Many tariffs
on agricultural products were lowered later than tariffs on other goods, and a few more
years may therefore be required before the real effect is revealed on agricultural trade
within the region.115
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Annex
Annex table 1.  Foreign trade agreements in East and South-East Asia
In force In negotiation Under study
A.  South-East Asia
AFTA (1993) ASEAN-Rep. of Korea ASEAN-Japan
ASEAN-China (2003) ASEAN-India ASEAN-EU
Singapore-New Zealand (2001) Japan-Philippines ASEAN-United States
Singapore-Japan (2002) Japan-Malaysia ASEAN-CER
Singapore-EFTA (2002) Japan-Thailand Singapore-EU
Singapore-Australia (2003) Japan-Indonesia Singapore-Bahrain
Singapore-United States (2004) Singapore-Kuwait Singapore-Egypt
Singapore-Rep. of Korea (2005/6) Singapore-Panama Singapore-Islamic Rep.
Singapore-India (2005/6) Singapore-South Africa    of Iran
Singapore-Chile-New Zealand- Singapore-Pakistan Thailand-Pakistan
   Brunei Darussalam 2005/6 Singapore-Qatar Thailand-Peru
Singapore-Jordan (2005/6) Singapore-Canada Thailand-Chile
Thailand-Australia (2005) Singapore-Mexico Philippines-United States






B.  East Asia
China-Hong Kong, China (2004) China-Malaysia China-India
China-Macao, China (2004) China-Australia China-Singapore
China-Macao, China (2004) China-New Zealand




   of China
Rep. of Korea-Chile (2004) Rep. of Korea-Japan Rep. of Korea-
Rep. of Korea-Singapore Rep. of Korea-Mexico    New Zealand
   (signed, 2005) Rep. of Korea- Rep. of Korea-China








   China-Japan
Source: RTA-BTA Database, ESCAP Trade and Investment Division, Trade Policy Section.118
Annex table 2.  Highlights of FT
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Annex table 3a.  Member Liberalization Index
Weight Score Category
Measures covering trade in agriculture
0.003 Technical barriers to trade
0.00 No provisions
0.10 Initiatives to promote the harmonization of standards
0.20 Provisions that require notification to a committee, review and/or
examination
0.40 National treatment of standards
0.70 Voluntary recognition of test results
1.00 Harmonization of standards
0.006 Export incentives
0.00 No provisions
0.50 Provisions to review and exam




1.00 Safeguard provisions are prohibited
0.002 Safeguards conditions – time limit
0.00 Safeguard provisions specify no time limit for the measure
0.25 Safeguard provisions that permit safeguards to be in place for two
years or more
0.50 Safeguard provisions that permit safeguards to be in place for one
year
0.75 Safeguard provisions that permit safeguards to be in place for less
than one year
1.00 No safeguard provisions
0.002 Safeguards conditions – type of measure
0.00 Safeguard provisions permit any measure to be used
0.75 Safeguard provisions specify the type of measure – quotas or
suspension of preferences
1.00 No safeguard provisions
0.006 Anti-dumping and countervailing measures
0.00 No restriction on the use of anti-dumping and countervailing
measures
0.50 Requires consultations with other members before anti-dumping or
countervailing measures can be imposed
0.75 Anti-dumping and countervailing measures can be imposed provided
they are consistent with WTO rules
1.00 Anti-dumping and countervailing measures are prohibited between
members126
0.004 Years remaining in tariff reduction schedules as at 1 January
2001 for agriculture
0.00 No provision to reduce tariffs
0.10 Continuing reductions until 1 January 2008
0.20 Continuing reductions until 1 January 2007
0.30 Continuing reductions until 1 January 2006
0.40 Continuing reductions until 1 January 2005
0.50 Continuing reductions until 1 January 2004
0.60 Continuing reductions until 1 January 2003
0.70 Continuing reductions until 1 January 2002
0.80 Continuing reductions until 1 January 2002
1.00 Provisions that abolished tariffs on commencement or tariffs have
been eliminated
Source: R. Adams and others (2003), “Trade and Investment effects of preferential trading
arrangements:  Old and new evidence”, Productivity Commission Staff Working paper,
Canberra, Australia.
Annex table 3a (continued)
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Annex table 3b.  Construction of Member Liberalization Index
Weight Score Category
Measures covering trade in agriculture
0.003 Technical barriers to trade
0.00 No provisions
0.10 Initiatives to promote the harmonization of standards
0.20 Provisions that require notification to a committee, review and/or
examination
0.40 National treatment of standards
0.70 Voluntary recognition of test results
1.00 Harmonization of standards
0.006 Export incentives
0.00 No provisions
0.50 Provisions to review and exam




1.00 Safeguard provisions are prohibited
0.002 Safeguards conditions – time limit
0.00 Safeguard provisions specify no time limit for the measure
0.25 Safeguard provisions that permit safeguards to be in place for two
years or more
0.50 Safeguard provisions that permit safeguards to be in place for one
year
0.75 Safeguard provisions that permit safeguards to be in place for less
than one year
1.00 No safeguard provisions
0.002 Safeguards conditions – type of measure
0.00 Safeguard provisions permit any measure to be used
0.75 Safeguard provisions specify the type of measure – quotas or
suspension of preferences
1.00 No safeguard provisions
0.006 Anti-dumping and countervailing measures
0.00 No restriction on the use of anti-dumping and countervailing
measures
0.50 Requires consultations with other members before anti-dumping or
countervailing measures can be imposed
0.75 Anti-dumping and countervailing measures can be imposed provided
they are consistent with WTO rules
1.00 Anti-dumping and countervailing measures are prohibited between
members128
0.004 Years remaining in tariff reduction schedules as at 1 January
2001 for agriculture
0.00 No provision to reduce tariffs
0.10 Continuing reductions until 1 January 2008
0.20 Continuing reductions until 1 January 2007
0.30 Continuing reductions until 1 January 2006
0.40 Continuing reductions until 1 January 2005
0.50 Continuing reductions until 1 January 2004
0.60 Continuing reductions until 1 January 2003
0.70 Continuing reductions until 1 January 2002
0.80 Continuing reductions until 1 January 2002
1.00 Provisions that abolished tariffs on commencement or tariffs have
been eliminated
Source: R. Adams and others (2003), “Trade and Investment effects of preferential trading
arrangements:  Old and new evidence”, Productivity Commission Staff Working paper,
Canberra, Australia.
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Annex table 4.  Early Harvest Programme – China and ASEAN
The Early Harvest Programme will be implemented no later than 1 January 2004 as follows:
(a) China and ASEAN 6
Product category
No later than 1 No later than 1 No later than 1
January 2004 (%)  January 2005 (%)  January 2006 (%)
1





a For China and ASEAN 6, this refers to all products with applied MFN tariff rates higher than 15 per
cent.  For newer ASEAN member States, this refers to all products with applied MFN tariff rates of
30 per cent or higher.
b For China and ASEAN 6, this refers to all products with applied MFN tariff rates between 5 per cent
(inclusive) and 15 per cent (inclusive).  For the newer ASEAN member States, this refers to all
products with applied MFN tariff rates between 15 per cent (inclusive) and 30 per cent (exclusive)
c For China and ASEAN 6, this refers to all products with applied MFN tariff rates lower than 5 per
cent.  For the newer ASEAN member States, this refers to all products with applied MFN tariff rates
lower than 15 per cent
(b) Newer ASEAN member States
Product Category 1 (per cent)
No later No later No later No later No later No later No later
Country
than 1  than 1 than 1  than 1 than 1 than 1  than 1
January January January  January January January January
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Viet Nam 20 15 10 5 0 0 0
Lao PDR – – 20 14 8 0 0
and
Myanmar
Cambodia – – 20 15 10 5 0
Product Category 2 (per cent)
No later No later No later No later No later No later No later
Country
than 1  than 1 than 1  than 1 than 1 than 1  than 1
January January January  January January January January
2004 2005 2006 2007  2008 2009 2010
Viet Nam 10 10 5 5 0 0 0
Lao PDR – – 10 10 5 0 0
and
Myanmar
Cambodia – – 10 10 5 5 0130
Product Category 3 (per cent)
No later No later No later No later No later No later No later
Country
than 1  than 1 than 1  than 1 than 1 than 1  than 1
January January January  January January January January
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Viet Nam 5 5 0-5 0-5 0 0 0
Lao PDR – – 5 5 0-5 0 0
and
Myanmar
Cambodia – – 5 5 0-5 0-5 0
Source: China-ASEAN Early Harvest Trade Agreement – Annex tables.131
IV.  AGRICULTURAL TRADE LIBERALIZATION IN THE
ASIA-PACIFIC REGION WITH SPECIFIC REFERENCE
TO PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS:
SCENARIO AND IMPACT ANALYSIS
By Jayatilleke S. Bandara and Wusheng Yu*
Introduction
As in many other regions in the world, agriculture has been the most protected and
distorted sector in the Asian and Pacific region.  Many countries in the region are currently
following a combined approach to agricultural trade reform.  Those countries have been
making some progress towards multilateral trade liberalization through the World Trade
Organization (WTO) trade negotiations and regional trade liberalization through regional
trade agreements (RTAs).  As surveyed in chapters II and III, they have also been successful
in concluding a large number of bilateral trade agreements (BTAs).  Following the global
trend, regional integration is gaining momentum in the Asia-Pacific region.  Countries in
Asia and the Pacific have also taken the initiative in forming a mega-RTA similar to the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) or the European Union in recent years
(Scollay and Gilbert, 2001).  As Chandra and Pratap (2005) noted, “the emerging dinosauric
aspirations within the Asian region have also been discussed”.  They cited the “Expert
Group Meeting on the Regional Agreements in Asia and the Pacific” held in Bangkok in
January 2003 under the auspices of ESCAP as well as the International Conference on
“Building New Asia:  Towards an Asian Economic Community” held in New Delhi in March
2003 under the auspices of the Research and Information System for Non-Aligned Countries
(RIS), as examples of this trend.
The ideas of regional cooperation among the Association of South East Asian
Nations plus China, Japan and the Republic of Korea (ASEAN plus 3) and ASEAN plus
SARRC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation) were highlighted at the ESCAP
meeting.  Chapters II and III of this book have provided detailed discussions on agricultural
trade liberalization in the South-East Asian and South Asian regions separately.  The main
objective of this chapter is to attempt to evaluate the impact of agricultural trade reform in
the Asia-Pacific region, focusing on RTAs and BTAs using some examples such as ASEAN,
SAARC, ASEAN plus 3, ASEAN plus 3 plus India, and the Indo-Lanka Free Trade Agreement
(FTA).
* The authors wish to thank the reviewers of the first draft of this chapter and Dr. Mia Mikic (Trade
and Investment Division, ESCAP) for their helpful comments.132
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows.  Section A briefly summarizes
the gains from the Doha agricultural trade reform with the focus on the Asia-Pacific region,
using recent quantitative assessments.  Section B briefly surveys the most popular technique,
i.e., computable general equilibrium (CGE) modelling, used in evaluating the effects of
RTAs.  The global CGE model and the database used in this study are briefly outlined in
section C.  The effects of selected RTAs and BTAs are evaluated in section D.  Limitations
of the modelling technique used in this chapter are considered in section E while section F
comprises concluding remarks and policy implications.
A.  Effects of the Doha agricultural reform – a brief overview
As surveyed in another paper that is part of this study (Bandara, 2007), a number
of studies have emerged on quantifying the possible effects of multilateral trade liberalization
in agriculture on different regions in the world under the Doha Development Agenda
(DDA).  It is not intended to reproduce similar empirical studies in this chapter.  Therefore,
the results of previous studies are used to highlight the implications of multilateral trade
liberalization for countries in the Asian and Pacific region.  Table 1 provides a summary of
the results of four main studies.  Column one of the table shows the results of one policy
simulation of the well-known World Bank study (Anderson and Martin, 2005a-2005g; Anderson
and others, 2005).  These results are relevant to agricultural trade liberalization (i.e., the
welfare effects of tiered agricultural tariff cuts, elimination of export subsidies and cuts in
actual domestic support, as of 2001, of 28 per cent in the United States, 18 per cent in the
European Union and 16 per cent in Norway).
The most striking feature of these results is that countries in the Asia-Pacific region
are the main winners of Doha agricultural trade liberalization.  While the total global
welfare gain from this policy scenario is some US$ 74.5 billion (2015), the total gain for the
Asia-Pacific region is some US$ 32.6 billion (about 44 per cent of the total global gain).
However, the big winners in the region are developed countries such as Australia, Japan,
the Republic of Korea, Taiwan Province of China, New Zealand and Thailand.  Only China
as well as Hong Kong, China, Singapore and Viet Nam record small losses.  Although
many developing countries in South Asia and South-East Asia gain from agricultural trade
liberalization, the gains are just moderate.
Hertel and Keeney (2005) also examined the effects of agricultural trade policy
reforms under DDA, using their recently developed GTAP-AGR model.  The results of that
study are summarized in the second column of table 1.  The results of Hertel and Keeney
(2005) also indicate that agricultural trade reforms under DDA generate a substantial
amount of global welfare (US$ 55.7 billion in 2001 value).  Developing countries would
gain around US$ 11.9 billion.  Similar to the previous study, import market access for
agricultural products has been the main source of welfare gains (93 per cent of total
gains).  The relative contribution of the abolition of export subsidies and domestic support
has been minimal.  According to the study, small countries such as Bangladesh, the
Philippines and Viet Nam would lose while large countries such as China and India would
gain from full agricultural trade liberalization under DDA.133
Recently, Antimiani and others (2005) examined the effects of agricultural trade
liberalization under alternative scenarios by incorporating the outcomes of interaction
between the strategies of country groups in the negotiations.  The main results of that
examination are summarised in column three of table 1, with the focus on countries in the
Asia-Pacific region.  The gains from agricultural trade liberalization in the study are similar
to those shown in the World Bank study.  According to the Antimiani study, the total global
welfare gain is some US$ 69.2 billion (2013) and the total Asia-Pacific gain is some US$
31.6 billion (about 46 per cent).  Once again, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Taiwan
Province of China and Thailand are the biggest winners in the region while countries such
as Bangladesh, China, Indonesia and Viet Nam would lose marginally from agricultural
trade liberalization.
The above three studies are highly optimistic about agricultural trade liberalization.
The last column of table 1 summarizes the results of another recent study carried out by
a group of researchers who are also the main contributors in compiling of protection data
systematically and the development of the MAcMap database (Bouet and others, 2004a
and 2005).  The researchers claimed that most of the global CGE studies on Doha
agricultural trade liberalization were excessively optimistic due to several reasons (Bouet
and others, 2004a).  Their welfare results are shown in percentage change form rather
than in absolute United States dollar terms compared with the other three studies.  The
welfare results of this study indicated that agricultural trade liberalization under DDA would
lead to a very small percentage increase in global welfare (0.08 per cent).  It is not clear
how they calculated this change and it is therefore very difficult to compare the results with
those of previous studies since they are in United States dollar terms.  The results across
countries and regions indicate that developing countries in the Asia-Pacific region would
gain again from agricultural trade liberalization.  However, agricultural trade liberalization
results in welfare losses in country groups such as sub-Saharan Africa, the Mediterranean
and the poorest countries of the world.  In general, in contrast to many other CGE studies,
this study suggests that the welfare gains from agricultural liberalization are just moderate.
All in all, the above quantitative assessments indicate that most countries in the
Asia-Pacific region may experience welfare gains as a result of agricultural trade reform
under DDA.  However, some developing countries such as Bangladesh and Viet Nam may
experience modest welfare losses and they are at risk.  Section C of this chapter examines
whether the countries in the region would gain further in undertaking agricultural trade
reform within RTAs and BTAs on top of multilateral agricultural trade liberalization.134











(US$ billion) (US$ billion) (% change)
Asia-Pacific
Australia and New Zealand 2.0 n.a. 2.0 n.a.
Singapore and Hong Kong, -0.1 n.a. n.a. 0.05
China
Japan 18.9 n.a. 23.5 0.05
Republic of Korea and 10.9 n.a. 3.1 n.a.
   Taiwan Province of China
Bangladesh 0.0 -0.050 -0.1 n.a.
China -0.5 0.560 -1.4 0.15
India 0.2 1.275 1.8 n.a.
Indonesia 0.1 0.085 -0.2 n.a.
Malaysia n.a. n.a. 1.3 n.a.
Philippines n.a. -0.085 -0.1 n.a.
Sri Lanka n.a. n.a. 0.2 n.a.
Thailand 0.9 n.a. 1.0 n.a.
Viet Nam -0.1 -0.007 -0.2 n.a.
Rest of South Asia 0.2 n.a. 0.7 n.a.
Rest of East Asia 0.1 n.a. n.a. n.a.
High-income countries 65.6 41.6 n.a. n.a.
European Union 25 plus EFTA 29.5 n.a. 8.8 0.14 and
0.11
United States of America 3.0 n.a. 3.0 0.05
Canada 1.4 n.a. 1.1 n.a.
Developing countries 9.0 11.9 n.a. n.a.
East Asia and the Pacific 0.5 n.a. n.a. n.a.
South Asia 0.4 n.a. n.a. 0.17
Europe and Central Asia 0.1 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Middle East and North Africa -0.8 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.3 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Latin America and Caribbean 8.1 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Transition economies n.a. 2.2
World total 74.5 55.7 69.2 0.08135
B.  Use of CGE models in evaluating RTAs
With the surge of RTAs around the world in recent years, a growing body of
literature has been developed that focuses on the empirical assessment of the effects of
those RTAs due to the increasing demand for such assessments.  The ambiguity of the
welfare effects of RTAs at theoretical level has also been a main reason for such increase
in the demand for empirical assessments (Harrison and others, 2003; Robinson and
Thierfelder, 2002).  Some of the quantitative assessments have been carried out by policy
analysts at the request of governments participating in RTAs (see, for example, Harrison
and others, 2003).  All these empirical studies can be classified by using two approaches.
The first approach is to categorize them based on the time perspective they adopt:  ex
ante or ex post (DeRosa, 1998).  While the ex ante evaluation estimate likely effects an
RTA prior to its implementation or predicts future outcomes of an existing RTA, the ex post
evaluation estimates such effects after the implementation of an RTA.  Adams and others
(2003) also followed this approach in reviewing empirical studies of RTAs.  The second
approach is to categorize them based on the methodology used in the studies, such as
analytical, residual imputation and survey methods.  Analytical studies involve using analytical
models or methods for both ex ante and ex post evaluations while residual imputation can
be employed only in the case of ex post situations.  Survey methods depend on surveying
various actors, sectors or industries in the economy.  Of the three, analytical models have
proven to be most popular among policy analysts.
A number of analytical techniques have been used by different analysts in recent
years to evaluate the effects of various RTAs around the world.  They range from single
equation regressions to large-scale, multi-country global CGE models such as the currently
popular GTAP model.  Baldwin and Venables (1995) classified all analytical models under
two groups:  econometric models and CGE models.  While econometric evaluations typically
involve a large amount of historical or contemporary data, the estimation of parameters
and hypothesis testing is done without a proper theoretical structure.  Adams and others
(2003) categorized the econometric evaluations (almost all of which are gravity models) as
ex post evaluations, and CGE applications as ex ante evaluations.  CGE applications are
conducted based on a clear economy-wide theoretical structure, but rely mainly on
estimates of key parameters outside the model (Baldwin and Venables, 1995; DeRosa,
1998).  Both types of techniques have strengths and weaknesses (see Adams and others,
2003 and Neilsen, 2003 for detailed reviews).
Srinivasan and others (1993) surveyed several econometric studies from the 1960s
and 1970s that attempted to evaluate the degree of trade diversion or trade creation as
a result of the formation of RTAs in Europe and Latin America.  However, none of those
studies was able to present the welfare effects of RTAs because they lacked a proper
microeconomic foundation.  CGE models with a strong microeconomic foundation offer
a systematic way of analysing welfare changes.  Baldwin and Venables (1995) provided
a systematic approach to welfare decomposition by grouping a number of possible
mechanisms for welfare changes into seven components, as detailed below:136
(a) In a setting of competitive world markets, an RTA may affect welfare through:
(i) Trade volumes, and hence changes in tariff revenue or quota rents;
(ii) Trade costs, and hence changes in import/export margins;
(iii) The terms of trade, through the large-country effects;
(b) In a setting of imperfectly competitive markets, an RTA may affect welfare
through:
(i) Output effects, and hence changes in producer rents;
(ii) Scale effects, and hence changes in production costs;
(iii) Variety effects where consumers value diversity itself;
(c) In the long term, an RTA may affect welfare through accumulation effects that
arise from changes in the rate of investment in those cases where the social
rate of return diverges from the social discount rate.
In many recent CGE studies of RTAs, group (a) above has been taken into
consideration, particularly after the introduction of the welfare decomposition method by
Huff and Hertel (1996) into the GTAP framework.  This has been one of the main strengths
of using CGE models in analysing the effects of RTAs.  There are CGE models that
include the extensions of GTAP capable of capturing the welfare effects of groups (b) and
(c) above.  In addition to the ability of global CGE models to capture economy-wide as well
as multiregional effects of RTAs, these models provide consistent and rigorously specified
theoretical frameworks for performing a range of policy simulations.  For this reason as
well as other strengths, CGE modelling is currently the most popular technique in assessing
RTAs.
As noted above, the increasing demand for quantitative assessments of PTAs
such as the European Union, NAFTA and the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) has given
rise to the extensive use of global modelling by policy analysts.  Multiregional, multisector
CGE models have been used as a tool for better understanding of the effects of an RTA.
The trade literature show many CGE modelling applications deal with issues related to
RTAs.  These applications were surveyed by Flam (1992), Baldwin and Venables (1995),
Francois and Sheills (1994), De Rosa (1998), and Robinson and Thierfelder (2002).  Despite
the criticism levelled at CGE evaluations of PTAs (Panagariya, 2000; Panagariya and
Dattagupta, 1999), however, Baldwin and Venables (1995), De Rosa (1998), Robinson
and Thierfelder (2002), Adams and others (2003) and Nielsen (2003) clearly recognized
the contributions made by CGE models in evaluating PTAs.  More recently, Harrison and
others (2003) summarized the conclusions of many CGE studies they had undertaken to
evaluate the effects of different RTAs, usually at the request of the client governments of
the World Bank.
The evaluation of RTAs in the Asia-Pacific region by using CGE models has also
been popular over the past decade or so.  Many CGE studies have focusing on single
RTAs as well as a number of RTAs and BTAs in the region.  Some of the early CGE137
studies of RTAs in the Asia-Pacific region were carried out by Lewis and others (1995),
Brown and others (1996), and Ballard and Cheong (1997).  Those studies examined the
effects of possible RTA initiatives in the region.  Following those early studies, there has
been a surge of CGE studies of RTAs in recent years (for example, Robinson and
Thierfelder, 2002, Nielsen, 2003, and Adams and others, 2003).  Of all these studies, it is
worth mentioning at least three studies that focused on a number of RTA initiatives similar
to the ones considered in chapter III.  The three studies are Ballard and Cheong (1997),
Scollay and Gilbert (2001) and Ma and Wang (2002).
1.  Ballard and Cheong, 1997
This study used perfectly competitive and imperfectly competitive versions of
a global CGE model based on a GTAP database.  It focused on the following policy
scenarios under different combinations of model assumptions:
(a) The regional initiative of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC);
(b) A Pacific FTA with 11 member nations;
(c) An East-Asia FTA;
(d) Global liberalization.
Three main conclusions of this study were:
(a) “Every member of a proposed new free trade area would reap welfare gains”;
(b) “The imperfectly-competitive model simulates substantially larger welfare
gains than does the perfectly-competitive model”;
(c) “Welfare gains will be larger when the proposed FTA is larger”.
2.  Scollay and Gilbert, 2001
This is the most comprehensive CGE study of RTAs and BTAs in the Asia-Pacific
region in terms of coverage.  It used the standard GTAP model and database, and focused
on a large number of RTAs and BTAs under four different headings:
(a) New bilateral and plurilateral subregional trade agreements (SRTAs) such as
the trans-Pacific initiatives and intra-Western Pacific initiatives;
(b) Potential steps towards the formation of an East Asian trade bloc;
(c) APEC liberalization on a nondiscriminatory basis and preferential basis;
(d) The formation of the Asia-Pacific trade bloc and global contexts.
The main conclusions of this comprehensive study were:
(a) The effects of many proposed and new small RTAs and BTAs (known as
SRTAs) were likely to be small;138
(b) The recent proliferation of bilateral and plurilateral SRTAs could create trade
conflicts and tension in the region;
(c) The welfare gains would be large in the case of SRTAs involving countries
such as Japan and the United States.
3.  Ma and Wang (2002)
This study used a recursive dynamic global CGE model and the GTAP database.
It covered the four FTA scenarios in the region:
(a) ASEAN plus China;
(b) ASEAN plus Japan;
(c) ASEAN plus 3 (Japan, China and the Republic of Korea);
(d) ASEAN plus China, Japan, the Republic of Korea and the United States.
The main conclusions of the study were:
(a) ASEAN plus China is the main winner among the four scenarios;
(b) Japan gains from the ASEAN plus Japan FTA at the expense of China;
(c) All countries gain from the ASEAN plus three FTA and it offers substantially
larger markets for its members.
While CGE models have been widely used to evaluate the effects of RTAs in the
Asia-Pacific region, in general, less attention has been paid to RTAs in South Asia.
However, a number of GTAP-based CGE studies have focused on South Asian RTAs (see
Bandara, 2004 for a survey).  For example, Pigato and others (1997) briefly assessed the
effects of the South Asia Preferential Trading Arrangement (SAPTA) using the GTAP
model; this can be considered as the first CGE study on SAPTA.  This study found that
SAPTA would create some welfare gains for its member countries, and that small countries
would benefit more.  However, unilateral trade liberalization would create larger gains for
the region, and India would benefit from unilateral trade liberalization to a greater extent
than the rest of South Asia.
Following the above study, Siriwardana (2001) used the GTAP model to investigate
several trade liberalization options for Sri Lanka beyond preferential trade liberalization
within SAARC.  The study conducted a series of 12 policy experiments with the GTAP
model, ranging from bilateral trade liberalization between Sri Lanka, other SAARC countries,
ASEAN countries and other Asian countries.  The results of this study indicated that
bilateral trade liberalization with other SAARC countries would be beneficial to the Sri
Lankan economy.
One of the most recent studies using GTAP to evaluate gains from a South Asian
Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA) is that of Bandara and Yu (2003).  This study investigated
the question of “how desirable is the South Asian Free Trade Area?”  To address this139
question, a series of policy experiments were carried out with the GTAP model.  Two
opposite policy simulations were performed:  (a) a unilateral trade liberalization scenario
(South Asian countries liberalizing trade unilaterally); and (b) a preferential trade liberalization
scenario (trade liberalization among trading partners in the region).  The results of the two
policy simulations demonstrated that the impact of preferential trade liberalization would
be very small and that the impact of unilateral trade liberalization was significant for South
Asia.  Under preferential liberalization, small countries would lose or gain marginally while
the biggest country in the region, India, would likely be the sole significant winner.
The results of other extra policy simulations (preferential trade liberalization
between South Asia and ASEAN, the European Union and NAFTA) were also analysed in
this study.  While preferential trade between South Asia and ASEAN was expected to
create adverse effects on South Asia, preferential trade between South Asia and European
Union or NAFTA was expected to be beneficial to South Asia.  More recently, Chandha
and Pratap (2005) used a global CGE model based on the GTAP database to investigate
a series of RTA scenarios involving South Asia.
The brief survey above indicates that a large number of attempts have been made
to evaluate the effects of RTAs in the Asia-Pacific region in recent years.  Many of these
studies have attempted to evaluate the overall effects of different RTAs.  Less attention
has been paid to the agricultural trade liberalization under RTAs in this region.  The
purpose of this chapter is to undertake a similar quantitative study, but with the focus on
agricultural trade liberalization.  Similar to many previous studies, the standard GTAP
model and its latest database (version 6) have been used for this purpose.  Section C
provides a brief description of the GTAP model and database used in this chapter.
C.  GTAP model and database
The GTAP database has been used in all of these studies within CGE modelling
frameworks.  However, the models differ from study to study.  It was decided to use the
standard GTAP model and the database (version 6) in the present study.  In this section
the main features of the GTAP model and the database are briefly outlined.
1
1.  Overview of the GTAP model
As noted in the introduction, the GTAP model and the database have been widely
used to explore the economic effects of global and regional trade liberalization around the
world in recent years.  Since the establishment of GTAP in 1992, many analysts have used
either the standard GTAP model or the GTAP database to quantify the economic effects of
RTAs around the world.  In fact, this has been one of the most researched areas using
GTAP.  The structure of the “standard” GTAP model is well documented in chapter 2 of
Hertel (1997).  Although there are new extensions of this core model, only the standard
GTAP model is used in this study together with the GTAP database.  The core of GTAP is
1 See the GTAP website at http://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu for more details.140
its database that comprises a fully articulate record of transactions as well as export and
import duties between different regions for a wide range of commodities.  Since 1992,
a number of versions of the GTAP database have been released.  With each updated
version, the quality of data has increased.  The number of regions and commodities has
also increased.  Since the early versions, countries in the Asia-Pacific region have been
well represented in GTAP.  This present analysis uses the GTAP version 6 database as it
represents a more disaggregated Asia-Pacific regional classification as well as improved
quality of protection data.
There are some advantages of using the GTAP model to analyse the effects of
agricultural trade liberalization on Asia and the Pacific.  First, the GTAP model links
different individual countries and regions with detailed specifications that describe the
economic activities of firms, households and governments.  Second, the model is based
on the input-output structures of each region or country that link industries together in
a value-added chain, starting from primary goods and moving into continuously higher
stages of intermediate processing, to the final assembling of consumption goods for
households and governments.  Third, all individual regions or countries are linked through
international trade flows to form a single global general equilibrium model in which prices
and quantities supplied and demanded are determined simultaneously in all primary factor
markets in domestic and international commodity markets.  Finally, the GTAP model structure
reflects the fact that all parts of the economy are connected in a network of direct and
indirect linkages.  This means that any changes in any part of the system will have
repercussions throughout the global economy.
The standard GTAP model is a comparative static global general equilibrium model
based on neo-classical economic theory.  Neo-classical utility maximization and cost
minimization assumptions are used to derive demand functions for household consumption
and inputs.  Each region contains a representative household that maximizes regional
utility.  The private household demand is specified as a Constant Difference Elasticity
(CDE) demand system.  In all markets (both output and factor markets), perfect competition
is assumed while the constant returns scale technology is assumed in production.  Firms
are all assumed to maximize profits.  Market clearing conditions are enforced for all the
markets.  The production of each commodity employs a composite of primary factors
called value-added (a Constant Elasticity of Substitution [CES] of various primary factors)
and an intermediate input composite (a CES composite of domestically produced goods
and imported goods).  The value-added component is combined with the composite
intermediate input in a Leontief fashion to form the final product.  Technical changes are
incorporated into the value-added nest and the final output nest.  Further, the production
system has been incorporated into the GTAP model in order to distinguish production
sectors by their intensities in factors of production.  Five factors of production have been
identified:  (a) agricultural land; (b) other natural resources; (c) unskilled labour; (d) skilled
labour; and (e) physical capital.
International trade is modelled as a nested Armington structure (Armington, 1969),
which not only differentiates imported goods from domestically produced ones but also141
differentiates imported products by regions.  This structure is useful in tracking the existing
trade pattern, especially the “cross hauling” of similar products.  In the first net of this
structure, imports of a given good are sourced by origins and then combined by a CES
function as a composite at the border of the importing country.  Once the composite
product is imported into the region, it is considered a homogeneous product and cannot be
distinguished by origin.  This composite imported good is further divided into intermediate
input, private consumption and government consumption.  However, composite imported
goods are differentiated from domestically produced goods when consumers/producers
are making a decision on the optimal mix of domestic and imported goods.
In order to carry out policy simulations with the model, it is necessary to close it by
declaring some variables as exogenous since there are more variables than equations in
the model.  This is known as the “closure” of the model in CGE modelling literature.  In the
standard closure, regional savings are assumed to be homogeneous and contribute to
a pool of savings, which is then allocated among regions for investment in response to
change in regional expected rates of return.  These changes are assumed to be equalized
across regions, thus giving rise to capital mobility across regions.  These assumptions
allow greater changes in the balance of trade balance as a result of trade liberalization,
and tend to dampen the terms of trade effects.  Both labour and capital stocks are
assumed to be mobile within a region and immobile across regions.  However, land and
natural resources are industry-specific.  All factors of production are assumed constant
and, hence, factor prices adjust to clear factor markets.
2.  Main features of GTAP database, version 6
The standard GTAP model based on the GTAP version 6 database has been used
to perform various simulations for this study.  The GTAP version 6 database covers up to
a maximum of 87 regions and countries, 57 industries and 5 primary factor endowments.
It gives a “snapshot” of the world economy in 2001.  The GTAP database distinguishes
trade transactions between commodities and services based on their regions of origin and
destination as well as agents such as intermediate users, households and governments
that absorb the commodities in the importing country.  Trade taxes have been recorded for
every trade transaction.  The database consists of regional input-output tables that take
detailed account of the inter-industrial linkages within regions, detailed bilateral trade,
transport and protection data that describe the interregional economic linkages and
macroeconomic data.  All these data sources are combined in a consistent manner.  Often
in a research application, the sectors and regions are aggregated to a smaller size that
suits specific needs of the research.  Although the scope of GTAP has far exceeded the
boundary of “trade analysis”, bilateral trade data and the protection instruments remain
two key components in its database, the quality of which has improved continuously.  The
quality of the data and the solid structure of the model provide insurance of quality
analysis on trade liberalization, as the correct representation of the initial trade structure
and the protection situation determine whether the starting point is accurate.142
According to Martin and Anderson (2005), the new version of the GTAP database
(version 6) contains a number of additional features compared with the previous versions:
• New protection data are included for a recent year (2001) compared with the
previous version (1997);
• Using systematically developed new protection data from the MAcMap
database, this version has incorporated much detail on different items of
protection such as bound and applied tariffs, non-reciprocal as well as reciprocal
tariff preferences, and the ad valorem equivalents of specific tariffs for the
first time;
• Also included are main trade policy reforms occurring outside the Doha
negotiations such as the commitments associated with accession to WTO by
such economies as China and Taiwan Province of China;
• The implementation of the last Uruguay Round commitments such as the
abolition of quotas on trade in textiles and clothing at the end of 2004 and
final agricultural tariff reductions in developing countries; and
• The incorporation of the European Union expansion from 15 to 25 members
in April 2004.  This new database contains all new member countries, so an
EU 25 region can be aggregated.
In order to undertake any sensible policy simulation with the GTAP version 6
database, it is necessary to aggregate regions or countries (with maximum possible
disaggregation of the Asia-Pacific region) and sectors (with maximum disaggregation of
agricultural sectors) since it is difficult to use the full disaggregated version of the database
(with 87 countries and regions, and 57 industries) in this study.  As table 2 shows, the
aggregated database of this study contains 24 regions, with many Asia-Pacific countries
featured separately, and 26 sectors, keeping all agricultural sectors separately.
D.  Effects of agricultural trade liberalization
in Asia-Pacific RTAs and BTAs
This section provides estimates of potential welfare gains as a result of agricultural
trade liberalization under different RTA and BTA initiatives.  The main intention is not to
attempt to quantify the effects of all RTAs and BTAs similar to Scollay and Gilbert (2001),
due to time and resource constraints; instead, an attempt is made to evaluate the effects
of agricultural liberalization related to selected RTAs and BTAs.
1.  Experiments
The impact of RTAs within the Asia-Pacific region and the hypothetical gigantic
Asia-Pacific RTA would be analysed through the use of the GTAP model by simulating
possible agricultural trade liberalization (elimination of all import tariffs within member
countries).  Many CGE studies related to the Asia-Pacific region, including those surveyed
in section B of this chapter, did not focus on:143
(a) The effects of agricultural trade liberalization within RTAs;
(b) The link between multilateral agricultural trade liberalization under DDA and
possible agricultural trade liberalization within RTAs.
Therefore, it was decided to focus on the above two aspects in this study.  First, it
was decided to run all simulations to focus on agricultural trade liberalization within RTAs.
As reviewed in chapters II and III, many of the current and proposed RTAs and BTAs
exclude a wide range of agricultural products.  This study attempts to evaluate the effects
Table 2.  Aggregation of GTAP regions and industries
Number Code Description Number Code Description
1 AUS Australia 1 PDR Paddy rice
2 NZL New Zealand 2 WHT Wheat
3 XOC Rest of Oceania 3 GRO Cereal grains nec
4 CHN China 4 V_F Vegetables, fruit, nuts
5 HKG Hong Kong, China 5 OSDs Oil seeds
6 JPN Japan 6 C_B Sugar cane, sugar beet
7 KOR Republic of Korea 7 PFB Plant-based fibres
8 TWN Taiwan Province of China 8 OCR Crops nec
9 XEA Rest of East Asia 9 CTL Bovine cattle, sheep
and goats, horses
10 IDN Indonesia 10 OAP Animal products nec
11 MYS Malaysia 11 RMK Raw milk
12 PHL Philippines 12 WOL Wool, silkworm cocoons
13 SGP Singapore 13 FRS Forestry
14 THA Thailand 14 FSH Fishing
15 VNM Viet Nam 15 OIL Oil, coal, gas and
minerals nec
16 XSE Rest of South-East Asia 16 CMT Bovine meat products
17 BGD Bangladesh 17 OMT Meat products nec
18 IND India 18 VOL Vegetable oils and fats
19 LKA Sri Lanka 19 MIL Dairy products
20 XSA Rest of South Asia 20 PCR Processed rice
21 USA United States 21 SGR Sugar
22 CNA Canada 22 OFD Food products nec
23 EU EU 25 23 B_T Beverages and tobacco
products
24 ROW Rest of the World 24 TEX Textiles and wearing
apparel
25 MNFCS Other manufacturing
26 SVCES All services
Note: nec = Not elsewhere classified.144
of agricultural trade liberalization if the members of RTAs and BTAs are also willing to
extend preferences towards agricultural trade.  Second, an attempt is made to establish
the link between multilateral trade liberalization and agricultural trade liberalization within
RTAs.
Although there are a number of approaches to establishing this link, the approach
used in this chapter is the introduction of RTAs and BTAs as post-DDA scenarios.  As the
starting point, a basic simulation is run to capture the DDA trade liberalization reform.
Similar to previous studies reviewed in section A, the proposed tariff cuts and elimination
of subsidies for DDA trade liberalization are used in this simulation to create an updated
database using the GTAP model and the adjusted database described in the previous
section.  This updated database takes into account the effects of multilateral trade
liberalization.  After creating this updated database, simulations related selected RTAs and
BTAs were carried out to evaluate how countries’ gains or losses from multilateral trade
liberalization would alter with the agricultural trade reforms within RTAs and BTAs if the
member countries agreed to extend preferences to cover agricultural products.  A number
of simulations were carried out using the selected scenarios listed below in relation to
selected RTAs and BTAs in the region.
(a) Selected experiments related to RTAs
Experiment 1 – SAFTA:  SAARC countries eliminating agricultural tariffs with one
another while maintaining existing agricultural barriers on trade with other countries.
Experiment 2 – AFTA:  ASEAN countries eliminating agricultural tariffs with one
another while maintaining existing agricultural barriers on trade with other countries.
Experiment 3 – ASEAN plus 3:  ASEAN plus 3 countries eliminating agricultural
tariffs with one another while maintaining existing agricultural barriers on trade with other
countries.
Experiment 4 – ASEAN plus 3 plus India:  ASEAN plus 3 countries and India
eliminating agricultural tariffs with one another while maintaining existing agricultural
barriers on trade with other countries.
Experiment 5 – Gigantic Asia-Pacific RTA:  ESCAP member countries (excluding
North American and South American countries) eliminating agricultural tariffs with one
another while maintaining existing agricultural barriers on trade with other countries.
(b) Selected experiments related to BTAs
Experiment 6 – Indo-Lanka Trade Agreement:  India and Sri Lanka eliminating
agricultural tariffs with one another while maintaining existing agricultural barriers on trade
with other countries.145
Experiment 7 – Thailand-Japan Trade Agreement:  Thailand and Japan eliminating
agricultural tariffs with one another while maintaining existing agricultural barriers on trade
with other countries.
It is important to note here that all the experiments mentioned above focused on
the removal of all agricultural tariffs within RTAs and BTAs.  This is not exactly what is
happening in actual trade negotiations related to these agreements.  As reviewed in
chapters II and III, there are “sensitive” agricultural sectors such as sugar, tea and rice.
Many member countries are reluctant to include these sectors in trade agreements.  However,
the incorporation of actual tariff cuts in these agreements and the exclusion of sensitive
products was a very difficult and complex task in this study.  For example, the GTAP
commodity classification was not sufficient to accommodate some of the “sensitive”
agricultural sectors in this region.  Therefore, an attempt was made to evaluate the effects
of full removal of agricultural tariffs within RTAs and BTAs to produce some benchmarks.
(c) Results of the experiments
In this section, the results of the different simulations related to the above experiments
are discussed.  Only the welfare results have been used to indicate “winners” and “losers”.
Analysing the welfare effects of trade liberalization under different scenarios is a complex
task.  Similar to any other GTAP application, the measure of change in welfare reported in
this chapter is the equivalent variation in income, which can be defined as the money
matrix equivalent of the utility change bought about by the price change.  The standard
GTAP model provides the results with a number of welfare decomposition components, in
order to trace major factors that course welfare changes.  There are two main factors or
components among these components.  The first important welfare component is the
allocation efficiency.  Countries are achieving efficiency gains when they remove trade
distortion.  This is the well-known allocation efficiency.  The second important welfare
component is the terms of trade (TOT) effect.  In general, trade liberalization in agriculture
will lead to a rise in food prices, particularly in the case of products that are highly
protected in developed countries.  This will lead to a TOT improvement in countries that
are net exporters of protected commodities.  On the other hand, net food importing countries
expect to lose through TOT deterioration.  This study focuses on these two factors when
presenting results in this section.
It is important to caution readers about the welfare results of this study before
carrying out the simulations and analysing the results.  As summarised in section B,
Baldwin and Venables (1995) grouped the possible mechanisms for welfare changes as
a result of forming an RTA under three groups.  In common with many CGE studies, the
simulations carried out with the standard GTAP model in this study only identify the
welfare mechanisms in the first group.  Therefore, it is obvious that the results underestimate
the welfare gains or loss.  To capture other mechanisms, a dynamic CGE model based on
imperfect competition is necessary.  However, this study only uses the standard static
GTAP model, based on the perfect competition assumption since dynamic and imperfect
competitive variants of global CGE models are not freely available to users.146
(i) Agricultural trade liberalization under SAFTA
Some of the main findings of the review of South Asian regional integration and
agricultural trade liberalization in chapter II are that:
• South Asian economies remain the most protective region for agriculture;
• The South Asia interregional trade negotiations have given fewer preferences
for agricultural trade;
• The number of agricultural products covered in these negotiations is very
limited;
• The RTR and REST indices indicate potential for improving agricultural trade
in the region;
• India can provide more opportunities to promote agricultural trade in the
region.
The above findings indicate that agricultural trade liberalization is limited under the
current preferential trading arrangements in South Asia.  This allows a simulation to be run
to examine the effects of full agricultural trade liberalization within the region if the member
countries are willing to extend preferences toward agriculture with the implementation of
multilateral trade liberalization under DDA.  This will help in answering the question of “is it
worthwhile for South Asian countries to move towards an FTA rather than focusing on
multilateral trade liberalization?”  This question has been raised by several experts in
recent years in relation to SAFTA (Panagariya, 1999 and 2003).  As stated at the beginning
of this chapter, this simulation was run using the updated database after running the DDA
simulation.  The welfare results of this experiment are presented in table 3.  The last
column of table 3 shows the effects of multilateral trade liberalization for comparison
purposes.
As table 3 shows, while major South Asian countries (India and the rest of South
Asia including Pakistan) would benefit moderately from agricultural trade liberalization
among the South Asian countries under SAFTA, small countries such as Bangladesh and
Sri Lanka might experience moderate welfare losses.  This is not surprising considering
the relative share of South Asian trade in total world trade, as welfare results depend to
a large extend on trade shares.  As expected, India and Pakistan are winners.  The results
of revealed comparative advantage (RCA) calculations in chapter II indicated that India
has RCA in a wide variety of agricultural goods and a higher potential to benefit from
agricultural trade liberalization within the region.  The results of our simulation support this
finding.  Bangladesh and Sri Lanka are likely to lose because they are net food importers.
Bangladesh would be the biggest loser of welfare as a result of TOT effects.  The low
complementarity of trade within the region and low intraregional trade as indicated in
chapter II have been reasons for marginal gains from agricultural trade liberalization in the
region.  South Asian countries, particularly India, would gain more under multilateral trade
liberalization.  These results are consistent with the previous study by Bandara and Yu
(2003).  The results show that the potential gains from agricultural trade liberalization147
Table 3.  Welfare effects of trade liberalization under SAFTA
(Equivalent variation in income, in 2001 US$ million)
Total
Total













1. Australia 0.2 -9.8 -9.6 452.30
2. New Zealand -0.1 -1.2 -1.2 385.58
3. Rest of Oceania 0.0 0.0 0.0 69.93
4. China 4.9 2.9 6.8 -49.21
5. Hong Kong, China 0.0 1.7 2.0 -21.6
6. Japan 0.2 4.5 4.6 4 809.76
7. Republic of Korea -1.8 1.8 -0.3 1 581.01
8. Taiwan Province of China -0.1 1.7 1.5 9.78
9. Rest of East Asia 0.1 0.2 0.3 37.98
10. Indonesia 0.7 -12.0 -8.5 -10.68
11. Malaysia -0.4 -4.0 -4.0 273.16
12. Philippines 0.3 0.0 0.2 -2.13
13. Singapore 0.1 0.2 0.3 10.22
14. Thailand 0.3 -4.1 -3.6 240.54
15. Viet Nam 0.3 -0.9 -0.7 3.12
16. Rest of South-East Asia 0.1 -2.6 -2.3 15.71
17. Bangladesh 3.2 -9.1 -8.2 -7.08
18. India 3.8 9.5 12.9 466.29
19. Sri Lanka -3.9 3.1 -0.8 16.09
20. Rest of South Asia -4.3 61.8 58.9 27.35
21. United States -3.3 -10 -15.3 773.5
22. Canada -0.4 -7.2 -7.1 429.22
23. European Union 7.7 -2.2 5.5 6 685.68
24. Rest of the world 2.5 -24.4 -21.3 357.90
Total 10.2 -0.2 10.1 16 554.46
Note: The sum of allocation efficiency and terms of trade does not equal the “total column” as
total welfare also includes other components.  See Huff and Hertel (1996) for welfare
decomposition in the GTAP model.148
would be moderate under SAFTA and it is therefore important for South Asian countries to
pursue multilateral trade liberalization.  This was emphasised by Panagariya (1999 and
2003) on a number of occasions using a simple analytical model.
(ii) Agricultural trade liberalization under AFTA
Once again, before analysing the quantitative results of this experiment, it is also
important to note some findings of the descriptive analysis of agricultural trade between
ASEAN countries in chapter III:
• The average share of intra-ASEAN agricultural exports (imports) in total ASEAN
exports (imports) between 1993 and 2003 was low at 1.6 (1.4) per cent, while
that of extra-ASEAN was slightly higher at 6 (5) per cent;
• In general, there is product similarity in agricultural trade or trade competitiveness
rather than trade complementarity;
• The tariffs on a large proportion of intra-ASEAN agricultural trade are much
lower compared to the most favoured nation (MFN) tariffs on extra-ASEAN
agricultural trade.
Table 4 shows the potential welfare gains of agricultural under AFTA.  The gains
from agricultural trade liberalization are not large.  These results are not surprising and, in
fact, are consistent with the findings in chapter III.  Even individual country welfare results
related to ASEAN members are consistent with the descriptive analysis in chapter III.
Agricultural trade liberalization within the ASEAN region results in welfare gains for member
countries except the Philippines.  However, the gains are not large.  Members such as
Thailand and Viet Nam perform well.  As shown in chapter III, both Thailand and Viet Nam
have a comparative advantage in a wide variety of agricultural products.  The results
suggest that the Philippines could suffer a very small loss as a result of agricultural trade
liberalization within ASEAN.  The welfare loss as a result of TOT deterioration is much
bigger for the Philippines than for other countries.  Agricultural trade liberalization within
ASEAN member countries could result in welfare loses in non-partner countries, including
small Asia-Pacific and South Asian countries, because of the well-known trade diversion
effect.
(iii) Trade liberalization under ASEAN plus three countries
The results of the previous experiment demonstrate that agricultural trade liberalization
within the ASEAN region would not result in substantial welfare gains for member countries.
In this experiment, an attempt is made to show how ASEAN countries would benefit from
an RTA of ASEAN plus three big economies in the region (China, the Republic of Korea
and Japan).  As noted in chapter III:
(a) Inter-ASEAN agricultural trade is higher than intra-ASEAN agricultural trade;149
(b) Agricultural trade between ASEAN member countries, Japan and the Republic
of Korea is more complementary than competitive, and there is a large degree
of trade complementarity;
(c) Protection of the agricultural sector in Japan and the Republic of Korea is
higher than in ASEAN member countries.
This experiment simulated the effects of agricultural trade liberalization within an
enlarged AFTA covering ASEAN member countries plus China, the Republic of Korea and
Japan.  This simulation was run on the updated database after running the AFTA simulation
Table 4.  Welfare effects of agricultural trade liberalization under AFTA
(Equivalent variation in income, in 2001 US$ million)
Welfare
Allocative Terms of trade Total welfare
efficiency effects changes
1. Australia 0.6 -2.0 -0.7
2. New Zealand -0.4 -7.7 -7.4
3. Rest of Oceania -1.3 -4.2 -6.5
4. China -9.4 -33.2 -31.8
5. Hong Kong, China -0.1 -11.7 -12.2
6. Japan -20.9 -10.6 -23.1
7. Republic of Korea -5.6 -6.9 -10.7
8. Taiwan Province of China -0.3 -5.5 -4.8
9. Rest of East Asia -1.4 -1.3 -3.5
10. Indonesia 17.3 6.1 19.2
11. Malaysia 64.7 -7.4 20.8
12. Philippines 51.2 -50.5 -6.4
13. Singapore 8.8 87.0 101.1
14. Thailand -14.7 109.3 90.7
15. Viet Nam 0.7 26.0 20.6
16. Rest of South-East Asia -3.6 -9.7 -9.1
17. Bangladesh -0.1 -1.3 -1.6
18. India -0.6 -6.7 -6.2
19. Sri Lanka -0.2 -0.1 -0.3
20. Rest of South Asia -0.7 -1.5 -2.1
21. United States 9.7 -20.4 -8.4
22. Canada 2.0 2.5 6.4
23. European Union 2.1 -14.6 0.1
24. Rest of the world -10.2 -35.6 -36.8
Total 87.5 -0.1 87.4
Note: The sum of allocation efficiency and terms of trade does not equal the “total column” as
total welfare also includes other components.  See Huff and Hertel (1996) for welfare
decomposition in the GTAP model.150
to examine the marginal benefits of adding the big three economies to ASEAN.  Table 5
shows the welfare effects that emerged from this simulation.  In this case, all participating
countries in the RTA would benefit and the welfare gains would be much higher than those
of AFTA.  Japan would be the biggest winner from agricultural trade liberalization in an
ASEAN plus 3 RTA (more than US$ 13 billion).  The Republic of Korea would be the
second biggest winner from this RTA.  In fact, these countries would gain more than
multilateral trade liberalization since full liberalization of agricultural trade within ASEAN
plus 3 is assumed, rather than the reduction of tariffs by certain percentages under multilateral
trade liberalization.
Table 5.  Welfare effects of trade liberalization under ASEAN plus 3
(Equivalent variation in income, in 2001 US$ million)
Welfare
Allocative Terms of trade Total welfare
efficiency effects changes
1. Australia 8.0 -166.6 -155
2. New Zealand -1.7 -47.4 -44.1
3. Rest of Oceania -3.3 -6.7 -12.2
4. China -1 049.6 2 721.3 1 382.0
5. Hong Kong, China -0.2 -139.5 -133.8
6. Japan 13 768.5 -601.9 1 3418.2
7. Republic of Korea 6 186.2 -3 328.2 2824.1
8. Taiwan Province of China 2.7 77.6 80.6
9. Rest of East Asia 5.9 107.2 138.7
10. Indonesia 17.1 23.0 15.7
11. Malaysia 0.0 68.4 25.0
12. Philippines 11.1 -86.2 -86.1
13. Singapore 65.9 603.9 704.6
14. Thailand -169.6 785.4 578.2
15. Viet Nam -111.3 84.0 -17.9
16. Rest of South-East Asia -205.9 -4.7 -203.8
17. Bangladesh -6.2 -2.6 -6.5
18. India 17.8 -24.0 -2.9
19. Sri Lanka 0.2 -2.5 -2.2
20. Rest of South Asia 7.9 -1.5 7.0
21. United States 160.4 -311.4 -112.8
22. Canada 9.1 -39.7 -24.7
23. European Union 95.4 424.8 554.4
24. Rest of the world -19.0 -169.6 -172.4
Total 18 789.8 -37.0 18 754.2
Note: The sum of allocation efficiency and terms of trade does not equal the “total column” as
total welfare also includes other components.  See Huff and Hertel (1996) for welfare
decomposition in the GTAP model.151
These results once again confirm one of the main conclusions of the previous
comprehensive CGE study by Scollay and Gilbert (2001) on RTAs and BTAs in the
Asia-Pacific region.  According to them, the welfare gains from RTAs would be much larger
in the case of RTAs and BTAs involving developed countries such as Japan.  However, our
results demonstrate that while developed and large developing countries would gain from
an ASEAN plus 3, small countries such as the Philippines and Viet Nam would be at risk of
moderate welfare losses.  This could be due to competition from a country such as China.
For example, Viet Nam was found to be a main winner under the AFTA scenario.  However,
the results of this simulation show that Viet Nam could experience a welfare loss from an
ASEAN plus 3.  This might be due to competition from China in agricultural trade.
Excluded countries, such as those in South Asia, are likely to suffer under this
scenario due to possible trade diversion effects.
(iv) Trade liberalization under ASEAN plus 3 plus India
In this experiment India was added to the ASEAN plus 3 RTA.  Once again, the
updated database was used to eliminate tariffs between ASEAN plus 3 plus India in order
to evaluate the marginal effect of adding India to ASEAN plus 3.  Table 6 presents the
welfare gains under this scenario.  Again, all participating countries would gain under this
RTA.  The results suggest that India would gain much more in participating in an ASEAN
plus 3 plus India RTA than in a South Asian RTA.  Our results are consistent with recent
efforts by India in joining an ASEAN RTA.  The marginal benefits of adding India to ASEAN
plus 3 would not be as large as adding Japan, the Republic of Korea and China to ASEAN.
However, all member countries would benefit from adding India to ASEAN plus 3.
(v) Trade liberalization under a gigantic Asia-Pacific RTA
Under this scenario it is assumed that all countries in the Asia-Pacific region, with
the exception of the United States, are participating in a gigantic Asia-Pacific RTA similar
to the European Union and NAFTA.  The database, updated after running the DDA agricultural
scenario, was also used in this experiment.  The welfare results, shown in table 7, are very
interesting.  Overall, many countries in the region could gain more from the gigantic RTA
than by participating in small RTAs.  The total gains are higher than even the total welfare
gains from the DDA agricultural scenario because full liberalization of agriculture was
assumed in this experiment.  However, the results suggest that two small South Asian
countries (Bangladesh and Sri Lanka) and the Philippines could suffer welfare losses as
a result of agricultural trade liberalization under a gigantic Asia-Pacific RTA.  This is
because of the competition from other developing countries in the regions.
The Indo-Lanka FTA has been one of the most popular BTAs in the South Asian
region and an example for small BTAs.  The results of agricultural trade liberalization
between India and Sri Lanka are shown in table 8.152
Table 6.  Welfare effects of trade liberalization under ASEAN plus 3 plus India
(Equivalent variation in income, in 2001 US$ million)
Welfare
Allocative Terms of trade Total welfare
efficiency effects changes
1. Australia 9.5 -214.5 -199.7
2. New Zealand -2.0 -50.7 -47.1
3. Rest of Oceania -3.3 -6.4 -11.8
4. China -1 010.7 2 635.0 1 353.7
5. Hong Kong, China -0.2 -138.8 -132.2
6. Japan 13 495.6 -644.6 13 121.4
7. Republic of Korea 6 293.5 -3 303.3 2 954.1
8. Taiwan Province of China 3.6 77.5 81.6
9. Rest of East Asia 5.5 107.7 138.7
10. Indonesia -10.0 201.7 111.1
11. Malaysia 125.5 262.4 295.5
12. Philippines 61.5 -33.5 21.0
13. Singapore 62.5 560.1 658.0
14. Thailand -34.3 859.0 783.7
15. Viet Nam 2.4 47.1 56.3
16. Rest of South-East Asia -7.4 59.7 50.7
17. Bangladesh -6.7 -4.6 -8.9
18. India 408.4 -118.4 296
19. Sri Lanka 0.0 -3.7 -3.5
20. Rest of South Asia 7.9 -22.3 -14.1
21. United States 197.5 -423.9 -166.7
22. Canada 13.5 -77.8 -53.3
23. European Union 123.8 440.3 624.3
24. Rest of the world -8.4 -245.3 -216.9
Total 19 727.7 -37.0 19 692.2
Note: The sum of allocation efficiency and terms of trade does not equal the “total column” as
total welfare also includes other components.  See Huff and Hertel (1996) for welfare
decomposition in the GTAP model.
(vi) Indo-Lanka Free Trade Agreement
As pointed out in Scollay and Gilbert (2001), our results suggest that forming a BTA
between small developing countries would not result in big welfare gains for the participating
countries.  In fact, some small countries may lose from these BTAs.  Sri Lanka tends to
lose from agricultural trade liberalization under the Indo-Lanka FTA.  This is the reason
why Sri Lanka is reluctant to open its market to agricultural exports from India.  As shown
in chapter II, India has a comparative advantage in a wide variety of agricultural commodities
and has become a major food supplier to Sri Lanka.  Therefore, agricultural trade liberalization
under the Indo-Lanka FTA will lead to further benefits for India.  Other countries in the153
Table 7.  Welfare effects of trade liberalization within the ESCAP region
(Equivalent variation in income, in 2001 US$ million)
Welfare
Allocative Terms of trade Total welfare
efficiency effects changes
1. Australia 28.4 1 642.1 1 666.4
2. New Zealand 20.7 151.4 154.6
3. Rest of Oceania 43.9 44.9 108.6
4. China -928.1 2 235.6 1 089.6
5. Hong Kong, China -1.0 -89.6 -82.1
6. Japan 14 399.8 -1 171.9 13 529.6
7. Republic of Korea 6 334.5 -3 294.3 3 011.2
8. Taiwan Province of China 57.1 -19.3 45.8
9. Rest of East Asia 5.3 125.7 161.3
10. Indonesia -14.9 157.5 72
11. Malaysia 124.8 284.3 313.6
12. Philippines 67.8 -56.5 2.0
13. Singapore 53.8 474.1 558.3
14. Thailand -2.3 572.6 547.8
15. Viet Nam 22.1 36.1 59.0
16. Rest of South-East Asia -6.8 50.9 43.9
17. Bangladesh 17.4 -33.9 -21.0
18. India 563.3 -328.5 242.2
19. Sri Lanka -2.4 -4.3 -6.5
20. Rest of South Asia 52.0 11.5 64.4
21. United States 222.3 -681.2 -535.8
22. Canada -1.3 -127.9 -108.1
23. European Union 75.0 302.4 444.8
24. Rest of the world -27.2 -331.4 -305.6
Total 21 104.2 -49.6 21 055.9
Note: The sum of allocation efficiency and terms of trade does not equal the “total column” as
total welfare also includes other components.  See Huff and Hertel (1996) for welfare
decomposition in the GTAP model.
South Asian region may moderately suffer as a result of this agreement due to the trade
diversion effect.
(vii) Agricultural trade liberalization under a Japan-Thailand FTA
In contrast to the Indo-Lanka FTA, the proposed FTA between Japan and Thailand
is a very interesting case.  This is between a developed and a rapidly developing country
in the region.  There is a trade complementarity between Japan and Thailand.  However,
Japan’s agricultural sector is highly protected compared to Thailand.  As reviewed in
chapter III, Thailand is the biggest exporter of agricultural and fisheries products to Japan154
and nearly half of its current exports to Japan face market access restrictions.  Japan has
already agreed to cut tariffs on more than 500 agricultural products from Thailand.  However,
they have excluded rice and sugar from the preference list.  This experiment was carried
out to show how Thailand would benefit if Japan removed all barriers to Thai agricultural
exports, even after multilateral trade reform under DDA.
Table 9 presents the results of this experiment.  The results indicate that both
countries would gain from agricultural trade liberalization under this FTA, unlike the case
of the Indo-Lanka FTA.  Thailand is the biggest winner in this case because it is assumed
Table 8.  Welfare effects of trade liberalization under the Indo-Lanka
Trade Agreement
(Equivalent variation in income, in 2001 US$ million)
Welfare
Allocative Terms of trade Total welfare
efficiency effects changes
1. Australia 0.0 -1.1 -1.2
2. New Zealand 0.0 -0.2 -0.2
3. Rest of Oceania 0.0 0.0 0.0
4. China 0.3 -0.1 0.2
5. Hong Kong, China 0.0 0.1 0.1
6. Japan 0.3 0.8 1.2
7. Republic of Korea 0.0 0.3 0.3
8. Taiwan Province of China 0.0 0.1 0.1
9. Rest of East Asia 0.0 0.0 0.0
10. Indonesia 0.0 -1.2 -1.0
11. Malaysia -0.1 -0.2 -0.3
12. Philippines 0.0 0.0 0.0
13. Singapore 0.0 -0.2 -0.2
14. Thailand 0.1 -1.4 -1.3
15. Viet Nam 0.0 -0.2 -0.2
16. Rest of South-East Asia 0.0 -0.1 -0.1
17. Bangladesh 0.0 -0.1 -0.2
18. India -2.7 8.3 5.5
19. Sri Lanka -5.0 -0.4 -5.4
20. Rest of South Asia 0.2 -1.2 -1.1
21. United States 0.2 -0.2 -0.1
22. Canada 0.0 -0.1 -0.1
23. European Union 0.3 0.1 0.4
24. Rest of the world -0.6 -2.9 -3.4
Total -6.9 0.0 -6.9
Note: The sum of allocation efficiency and terms of trade does not equal the “total column” as
total welfare also includes other components.  See Huff and Hertel (1996) for welfare
decomposition in the GTAP model.155
that Japan is ready to remove its high trade barriers to Thai agricultural exports.  As
Thailand is a net agricultural exporter to Japan, it would enjoy a huge welfare gain through
TOT.  Japan would also benefit from this FTA, as shown in table 9.  These gains are
through allocation efficiency.  However, the results also show that there is a trade diversion
problem because of discriminatory trade.  Some other countries in the region, such as
Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines and the rest of South-East Asia, might lose due to the
Thai-Japan FTA.
Table 9.  Welfare effects of trade liberalization under Japan-Thailand
Trade Agreement
(Equivalent variation in income, in 2001 US$ million)
Welfare
Allocative Terms of trade Total welfare
efficiency effects changes
1. Australia 5.6 -22.0 -17.3
2. New Zealand 0.9 5.7 7.4
3. Rest of Oceania -1.8 -5.1 -9.2
4. China -25.0 -68.5 -52.5
5. Hong Kong, China 0.6 -67.8 -72.2
6. Japan 5 805.2 -3 440.1 2 545.2
7. Republic of Korea -16.3 -3.5 -6.4
8. Taiwan Province of China -4.1 -2.7 6.3
9. Rest of East Asia 2.7 57.0 70.9
10. Indonesia -17.7 -32.4 -41.9
11. Malaysia -17.1 -75.9 -60.9
12. Philippines -21.1 5.9 -16.0
13. Singapore -5.0 -55.9 -66.1
14. Thailand -109.2 3 672.5 3 477.4
15. Viet Nam 1.0 35.2 40.2
16. Rest of South-East Asia -4.7 -17.4 -22.7
17. Bangladesh -2.2 -3.0 -5.8
18. India -25.9 50.5 22.1
19. Sri Lanka 0.0 1.3 1.2
20. Rest of South Asia -6.1 22.4 16.4
21. United States 9.7 236 58.7
22. Canada 0.9 -27.0 -18.0
23. European Union -172.7 -24.3 -219.1
24. Rest of the world -251.8 -283.8 -534.0
Total 5 145.7 -43 5 103.6
Note: The sum of allocation efficiency and terms of trade does not equal the “total column” as
total welfare also includes other components.  See Huff and Hertel (1996) for welfare
decomposition in the GTAP model.156
E.  Limitations of the above quantitative analysis
The main tool used in the quantitative analysis in this chapter was the standard
GTAP model based on the version 6 database, which has become the most popular global
CGE model in the world.  As noted in section B, the CGE modelling technique has also
become the most popular analytical technique for evaluating the effects of RTAs.  However,
these models have been criticized on various grounds such as problems in interpreting the
results, questions regarding the general equilibrium theory itself, poor performance of
these models, the assumptions used in these models and weak econometric foundations
(Dhar, 2006; Kehoe, 2002; Panagariya, 2000; Panagariya and Duttagupta, 2001; Ackerman,
1999; McKitrick, 1998; and Jorgenson, 1984).  This section briefly outlines some of the
limitations highlighted in the literature in order to show that the results presented in the
previous section are subject to limitations.
First, Dhar (2006) noted the limitations of the theoretical framework of the general
equilibrium model, citing Ackerman (1999).  According to these critics, CGE models are
based on the assumptions of neo-classical microeconomics.  They question the idealistic
behaviour of producers and consumers of equilibrium models as well as the existence of
equilibrium.  In addition, they criticize some assumptions such as perfect competition and
market clearing prices.
Second, CGE models have been criticized on the basis of their sizes using standard
labelling of “black boxes”.  This is the same old argument used by opponents of CGE
modelling, who claim it is difficult to understand what is driving the results because these
models are large and complex.  The critics add that the modellers are unable to interpret
the results due to the complexities of these big models.  In recent years, CGE modellers
have been able to respond to this criticism by making their models more transparent and
by developing methods to explain where the results come from.  Welfare decomposition is
a good example.
Third, the critics (Panagariya 2000; Panagariya and Duttagupta, 2001) argue that
the CGE models generate benefits for a country from its own preferential trade liberalization
due to erroneous reasons, such as:
(a) CGE models are based on internally inconsistent assumptions (wrong models);
(b) The gains are generated by choosing questionable values of some key
parameters (wrong parameters).
With regard to the first point, critics argue that the CGE models covered by the
survey of Robinson and Thierfelder (2002) are fundamentally flawed because they combine
the Armington assumption (i.e., goods are differentiated by the country of origin) and fixed
terms of trade.  Further, they argue that the product differentiation associated with the
Armington assumption is incompatible with fixed terms of trade.  Using the partial equilibrium
analysis, they argue that the introduction of terms of trade changes (flexibility) leads to
a deterioration of welfare in member countries.  On the second point, they believe that157
CGE models generate benefits from RTAs because modellers are using the wrong model
with the wrong parameter values.  According to them, if a theoretically correct conventional
model is selected, the CGE models are unlikely to generate benefits for a PTA member
from its own preferential trade liberalization.
In their study, Panagariya and Duttagupta (2001) developed a partial equilibrium
model and a stylized CGE model.  Then, they argued, the results obtained from the
stylized model based on the Armington assumption and their “correct” closure were consistent
with their partial equilibrium story, i.e., a member of a PTA hurts itself and benefits the
recipient of the preference.
Finally, the base year of databases and the level of aggregation of the sectors of
CGE models have also been subjected to criticism.
The CGE modellers should take these limitations seriously and attempt to respond
to their critics in a convincing way.  In fact, they have already responded to these criticisms
and attempted to improve the modelling techniques and the quality of results (Bandara
and Yu, 2002; Hertel and others, 2003).
Although CGE models have been subjected to various criticisms such as those
discussed above, they are the most popular analytical technique available to policy analysts
of RTAs because of their ability to capture region-wide and country-wide effects.  They
have also allowed policy analysts to conduct a range of policy simulations, such as this
study, within a consistent and rigorously specified theoretical framework.  To date, the
critics have not been able to produce an alternative empirical analytical technique to
evaluate RTAs.  This has been the main reason for the emergence of hundreds of CGE
applications in analysing RTAs in recent years.
F.  Conclusions
In this chapter, we have discussed the results of the simulations related to
agricultural trade liberalization within selected RTAs and BTAs.  The modelling was carried
out using the standard GTAP model, which is a static model based on the assumption of
perfect competition and its version 6 database.  The starting point was the agricultural
trade liberalization under DDA.  The standard GTAP model was used to create an updated
database with the DDA agricultural reform.  The DDA agricultural reform simulation was
carried out in a similar manner to those in previous studies.  The different policy simulations
were carried out based on the updated database except for the ASEAN plus 3 and
ASEAN plus 3 plus India experiments.  (The updated database from the ASEAN experiment
was used for the ASEAN plus 3 and the updated database from ASEAN plus 3 was used
for the ASEAN plus 3 plus India experiment, in order to observe the marginal benefits of
adding members to an existing PTA).  The main findings of this chapter can be summarized
as follows.158
The simulation results given in this chapter show that the welfare effects of
agricultural trade liberalization on member countries within small RTAs such as SAFTA,
the Indo-Lanka FTA and even AFTA are negligible.  These results, however, suggest that
the welfare gains will be larger when the proposed RTA is larger.  At the same time,
however, non-member countries will experience widespread negative welfare effects as
a result of these large RTAs.  In general, countries that are excluded from a particular RTA
are much more likely to suffer welfare losses than are the included countries in the region.
A gigantic RTA for the Asia-Pacific region is more suitable than overlapping small RTAs
and BTAs, as discussed in the recent forums mentioned in the introduction.  Japan may
gain much higher welfare benefits when it participates in an ASEAN RTA and it may suffer
when it does not participate in an ASEAN RTA.  Some South Asian countries may suffer
from a gigantic Asia-Pacific RTA.  One point that stands out from many of our simulations
is that Bangladesh and the Philippines are at risk of losing from agricultural trade
liberalization in RTAs.  This can be observed in the quantitative studies related to DDA
agricultural trade liberalization surveyed in section A of this chapter.
It should be noted that the simulation results presented in this chapter are subject
to the limitations highlighted otherwise in this publication.159
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In a series of studies published during the past few years, World Bank economists
have provided detailed projections by simulating the possible outcomes of the Doha Round
negotiations.
1  The projections were obtained by using the LINKAGE Model, which is
considered to be a global dynamic computable general equilibrium (CGE) model.  The
studies relied on the latest version of the LINKAGE Model, LINK6, which uses the Global
Trade Analysis Program (GTAP).  LINK6 incorporates 87 countries/regions and 57 sectors,
and uses a dataset that has been updated up to 2001.  This latter feature of the model,
according to the authors of the studies, has helped to generate far more realistic results
than those that used the earlier versions, which had incorporated data only up to 1997.
This chapter attempts a critical assessment of the above-mentioned studies.  Section
A presents an analysis of the results by looking at their implications for the developing
countries in general and India in particular.  Section B broadly alludes to some of the
methodological problems that are associated with CGE models of the LINKAGE genre.
The contention of the author is that the limitations of these models, especially in terms of
the assumptions on which they are based, deserve close scrutiny and that this dimension
needs to be kept in view as the results obtained from studies are read.
Section C comments on an important facet of this genre of studies, which is their
emphasis on unbridled trade liberalization involving agricultural products.  This facet ignores
the fact that the developing countries have been arguing that they need to address their
critical concerns regarding food security and livelihood while agreeing to the eventual
Doha Round package.  Most of the major developing countries are in agreement that
products that meet their food security needs, and which support sizeable numbers of
agricultural producers, should be granted higher levels of protection.  The so-called Special
Products (SPs), along with a Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM), are the essential
elements of the proposals tabled by these countries.
2  Section D presents a summary of
the points highlighted by this chapter.
1 The most quoted of these papers are by Kym Anderson, Will Martin and Dominique van der
Mensbrugghe (2005 and 2006).
2 The G33 group of developing countries took the lead in proposing that SPs and an SSM should
be included in the new agriculture deal.  Subsequently, the G20 group also lent its support to the G33
proposal.164
A.  Analysis of the results
The LINKAGE model provides a baseline projection of the world economy, first up
to 2005 and then up to 2015, assuming there are no other policy changes.  Deviations
from that baseline in 2015, due to total liberalization from 2005, are then examined.
3  The
simulations for 2015 are based on alternative scenarios of trade liberalization emerging
from the current round of multilateral trade negotiations.  The results have been presented
based on two sets of assumptions.  The first assumes full liberalization of global merchandise
trade.  The projections relying on this assumption are worked out on the basis of a new
source for protection data, which integrates trade preferences, specific tariffs and a partial
evaluation of non-tariff barriers (NTBs).
Inclusion of NTBs in the CGE models has been one of the less satisfactory aspects.
This stems from the fact that attempts made thus far to quantify the impact of NTBs has
not been fully satisfactory.  While the database on non-tariff measures that has been
developed by UNCTAD, viz. the TRAINS database, is fraught with limitations ranging from
incomplete coverage
4 to problems related to the measurement of their differential impacts
on countries,
5 the Market Access Map (MAcMap) database that has been developed by
ITC together with CEPII (Paris) includes only tariff quotas in its database.  Considering
that NTBs (i.e., standards and others) are assuming increasing importance in a world
where tariffs are steadily declining, this limitation of LINK6 needs to be highlighted.
The second set of results is based on some of the key proposals for agricultural
trade reforms that are being actively discussed in the ongoing negotiations.  The simulations
take into consideration the proposals for tariff cuts together with those for treating some of
the tariff lines as “sensitive” or “special products”.  What needs particular mention here is
that none of the results of the two sets takes cognizance of the subsidy dimension, which,
without doubt, holds the key to realizing the objective of a distortion-free market for
agricultural commodities.
1.  Full liberalization of global merchandise trade
The first major set of results that is reported in the above-mentioned papers pertains
to the effect of the ongoing trade liberalization efforts on the real income up until 2015.
These estimates have been made against the benchmark that assumes a complete freeing
of merchandise trade during 2005-2010.  It has been reported that real income gains by
2015 for the global economy as a whole would be US$ 287.3 billion per year.  Of this
3 Anderson and others (2005).
4 For most countries, the TRAINS database covers NTBs until the end of the 1990s.  In the case of
India, the NTB data are provided up to 1997, which is even before the removal of quantitative
restrictions (QRs) that India was maintaining for balance of payments purposes.
5 For instance, exporters from LDCs and developing countries endowed with a relatively low level of
technical skills would find it very difficult to conform to a technical barrier imposed by a developed
country.  However, the same may not be true for other countries.
differential165
increase, the share of the developed countries would be US$ 201.6 billion while for the
developing countries the gains would be US$ 85.7 billion.  In other words, the share of the
developing countries in the total gains would be a third of the total global gains.  More
importantly, real income gains reported for the developing countries would be 0.8 per cent
of the baseline income in 2015, which is marginally higher than the corresponding figure
for the developed countries (0.6 per cent).  Among the developing countries, the relatively
prosperous Latin American region is expected to register real income of 1 per cent of the
baseline income in 2015 while for the South Asian region the corresponding figure is only
0.4 per cent.
These broad results lend themselves to two varying interpretations.  The first,
which has been provided in the studies, is that the results are significantly favourable for
the developing countries since their expected real income gains are considerably larger
than their existing share in global production.  Thus, while the developing countries as
a whole account for a quarter of global production at present, they would be able to enjoy
a third of the global gains in real income that is expected annually until 2015.  An alternate
view is that what the results are pointing to is the increasing gulf between the relatively
prosperous and poorer countries.  In overall terms, it can be said that the disproportionately
large gains for the developed countries that the studies under discussion have predicted
would reinforce the status of the lesser players in the global economy as “developing”
even after the so-called “development round” has been implemented.  What is more, the
results point to increasing differentiation between the developing countries, as the more
prosperous regions are slated to record relatively larger increases in real income.
The disaggregated results provided for a small set of countries broadly reinforce
the above-mentioned conclusions.  India is expected to register a real income gain of only
US$ 3.4 billion a year, which is 0.4 per cent of the baseline income in 2015.  In the case of
China, the corresponding figures are US$ 5.6 billion and 0.2 per cent, respectively.  On the
other hand, countries such as Thailand are expected to gain US$ 7.7 billion while for
Argentina, the real income gain could be nearly US$ 5 billion (see annex table 1 for
details).
From the point of view of developing countries, the expected movements in the
terms of trade provide the most disquieting numbers for this set of results.  In what are
considered as pioneering studies, Raul Prebisch (1960) and Hans Singer (1950) pointed
out that developing countries, as exporters of primary commodities, faced deteriorating
terms of trade while trading with the exporters of manufactured goods, viz., the industrialized
countries.
6  Subsequently, many studies have argued that for most of the past six decades,
the terms of trade deterioration has been a major malaise for the developing countries.  In
fact, past studies had indicated that the developing countries would not have suffered the
ignominy of the debt crisis if they had not experienced deterioration in their terms of trade.
In their attempt to maintain their past levels of United States dollar earnings in the face of
6 For a more recent rendering of the issues involved, see United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (2005).166
the deteriorating terms of trade, developing countries have only encouraged the development
of unsustainable production structures that could have serious medium- to long-term
implications for their non-tradeables, particularly labour and the environment.
The results provided by the LINKAGE Model show that the developing countries as
a whole would suffer significant losses as a result of the changes in the terms of trade.
The total loss that those countries are expected to suffer is expected to be nearly US$ 30
billion per year.  This sharply contrasts with the projection for the high-income countries,
which should expect more than US$ 30 billion gains annually from the terms of trade
changes alone.
Among the developing country groupings, the projected changes in the terms of
trade bring benefit only to the Latin American region.  The South Asian region would suffer
the largest losses on this account, amounting to more than US$ 11 billion per year, and
most of those losses would be because of the US$ 9.4 billion losses that India is projected
to suffer annually.
7  The results show that India and China would suffer the largest losses
arising from the movements in the terms of trade.  This implies that for the two emerging
economies the projected gains in real income would come at a considerable price in terms
of domestic resource use.
The gains from full liberalization of global merchandise trade, as estimated by the
LINKAGE Model, occur largely due to the liberalization of the agriculture and food sectors.
Almost two-thirds of the global gains are due to agricultural trade liberalization and are
expected mainly because high-income countries would liberalize their agriculture sector.
While these results are more along the expected lines, the disaggregated results that
capture the impact of full global trade liberalization on agricultural and food output as well
as trade, should raise plenty of heckles in many low-income developing countries, including
India.
According to the results provided by the LINKAGE Model, global trade liberalization
would significantly squeeze global agricultural output by 2015.  Agricultural output should
decrease by almost US$ 138 billion per year relative to the baseline.  The members of the
European Union would experience a sharp downturn in their output, as would also be the
case for Japan.  From among the group of developing countries, India and China are
expected to face declines in agricultural output; in the case of the former country, the
decline is expected to be much larger in absolute terms.  However, the group of agricultural
exporters (the Cairns group countries) are likely to have a vastly different experience.  Two
of the major countries in this group, i.e., Brazil and Argentina, are expected to find their
agricultural output increasing annually by US$ 66 billion and US$ 12 billion, respectively.
Some of the South-East Asian countries are also expected to register gains, albeit relatively
small amounts.  However, while Brazil and Argentina are projected to make a collective
gain of more than US$ 76 billion a year, the gains for the developing countries as a whole
7 The losses that India would suffer because of adverse terms of trade would be nearly three times
its real income gains following from the full liberalization of global merchandise trade.167
are put at US$ 67 billion.  Quite obviously, therefore, some countries in the developing
world are expected to suffer significant losses, and this group of countries is headed by
India.  The projected annual losses for India a projected to be of the order of US$ 24
billion per year, which is a 4 per cent decline in relation to the baseline.  Together with
India, China is also expected to be a loser, but of a much smaller magnitude (US$ 10
billion per year).
The projections made by LINK6 about the winners and losers in the agriculture
sector following from the global trade liberalization have yet another significant dimension,
in that the distribution of gains within the developing world is expected to be highly
skewed.  Thus, while the middle-income countries are expected to register annual increases
of more than US$ 88 billion a year, the low-income countries are expected to suffer annual
losses of more than US$ 21 billion.  These results have serious longer-term implications
since the projected losers in the developing world will be those countries that are significantly
dependent on the agricultural sector as a source of livelihood for a majority of their
populations.  What the World Bank is therefore trying to tell us is that the agricultural
sector in developing countries such as India, which is already feeling a tremendous
squeeze, could suffer further as full global trade liberalization takes effect.
In regard to trade in agricultural products, the projections provided by LINK6 have
a few surprises.  China is shown to be emerging as a major exporter of agricultural
products, with a likely export growth of nearly 146 per cent over the baseline.  In comparison,
China’s import growth is expected to be a modest 27 per cent.  India is expected to
register a tremendous increase in agricultural imports – in excess of 165 per cent over the
baseline.  However, India’s exports of agricultural commodities would increase by a relatively
modest 53 per cent.  These figures do not bode well for a country that is expecting to
improve its presence in the global market for agricultural commodities once the prevailing
policy distortions are substantially eliminated at the end of the current round of negotiations.
An interesting facet of the results on the emerging scenario in agricultural trade is
that some of the agricultural exporters in the South-East Asian countries are not expected
to do as well.  For example, Thailand should expect a large import surge but only modest
gains in exports by 2015.
For most developing countries, the objectives of food security and protection of
livelihoods remains of paramount importance in the current round of multilateral trade
negotiations.  Food security, as is commonly understood, is the access to food at all times
and at prices that are affordable.  Thus, individual countries can ensure realization of the
objective of food security by removing uncertainties in supplies and by having a reasonable
control over the prices of the commodities forming the food basket.  It may be argued that
these twin objectives can at once be realized primarily by promoting local production of
foodgrains.  Furthermore, encouragement of the local production systems in developing
countries would be the sine qua non for addressing the issue of livelihood security in the
rural areas.168
The question of whether or not developing countries would be able to address their
food security concerns by promoting their domestic production systems has been addressed
in the studies under discussion here.  However, these results suffer from at least two sets
of limitations.  First, the results have been presented in terms of the broad groups of
countries, with the exception of China.  Second, the results for developing countries have
been captured via regional groups, but not all regional groups have been included in the
tables.
The results indicate that while the developing countries as a whole would be fully
self-sufficient
8 in respect of food and agricultural products following full global liberalization
of merchandise trade, the developed countries would increase their dependence on the
global markets for these products.  As for the regional groups of developing countries, the
Latin American countries would improve their position as net suppliers to the global market,
as would the countries of sub-Saharan Africa.  At the same time, however, the South Asian
countries would face deterioration in their self-sufficiency ratio and, in case of China, full
liberalization of global merchandise trade leaves the self-sufficiency ratio unaltered.
9  It
should be pointed out that the projected deterioration in the self-sufficiency ratio in food
and agriculture products for the South Asian region is a result of the large imbalance
between the growth of imports and exports that has been estimated for India.  As indicated
above, LINK6 has estimated a large increase in India’s import volumes together with
a relatively modest increase in exports in the aftermath of full trade liberalization.
The foregoing discussion shows quite clearly that the claims of a win-win situation
arising from the full liberalization of merchandise trade, which the World Bank has never
ceased to make, have been challenged by World Bank-supported studies.  The results
indicate that liberalization of merchandise trade would lead to greater inequities in the
global economy, much of which would be reflected in the realm of trade.  The inequities
would not just be between the developed and the developing countries, but even between
developing countries.  Thus, while the relatively advanced countries in the Latin American,
East Asian and South-East Asian regions are expected to perform much better, the
low-income countries, particularly those in the South Asian region, would be confirmed as
the laggards.  The studies also point to a sharp deterioration in the terms of trade of
a large majority of developing countries, which could take place in the aftermath of the
liberalization episode.  Changes in the terms of trade faced by the developing countries
and their implications have not been given much importance in the current discourse, but it
is the author’s view that countries suffering from the adverse terms of trade movements
need to remember the seminal contributions of Prebisch, Singer and other scholars to
making us understand the inimical consequences of this phenomenon.
8 Defined as domestic production as a percentage of domestic consumption.
9 The results predict a 91 per cent self-sufficiency ratio for China.  This conclusion needs to be seen
in the context of an earlier World Bank study that predicted China could attain a self-sufficiency ratio of
90 per cent in cereals, but only if it made substantial investments in bolstering agricultural productivity.
See World Bank (1997).169
What is particularly significant is the fact that the liberalization of merchandise
trade is likely to have deleterious consequences for the agricultural sector of the South
Asian region.  In this context, results provided for India stand out.  The results indicate
a decline in India’s agricultural output; as a logical corollary, India is expected to end up
increasing its imports by a wide margin.  The results thus portend a major crisis that India,
and some of the other low-income countries, would face should full liberalization of
merchandise trade take place.
The second set of results provides simulations using various proposals in the realm
of market access that are currently being discussed as a part of the Doha Round of
multilateral trade negotiations.  The following discussion brings out the key features of the
results.
2.  Doha Round scenarios
Based on the proposals that are on the negotiating table, eight scenarios have
been provided for working out the possible outcome the Doha Round:
(a) Scenario 1 – Tariff reduction using the tiered formula with three rates of
reduction for developed countries (45, 70 and 75 per cent), four for developing
countries (35, 40, 50 and 60 per cent) and no reduction for least developed
countries (LDCs).
(b) Scenario 2 – Inclusion of “sensitive” products in scenario 1 with developed
countries being allowed to treat 2 per cent of their HS six-digit tariff lines as
“sensitive”, which would be subjected to tariff reduction of 15 per cent.
Developing countries and LDCs allowed 4 per cent of HS six-digit tariff lines
as “special” products.
(c) Scenario 3 – Inclusion of “sensitive” products in scenario 1 with developed
countries being allowed to treat 5 per cent of their HS six-digit tariff lines as
“sensitive”, which would be subject to tariff reduction of 15 per cent.  Developing
countries and LDCs allowed 10 per cent of HS six- digit tariff lines as “special”
products.
(d) Scenario 4 – A proportional cut in tariffs that brings about the same reduction
in average agricultural tariffs in developed countries as a group (44 per cent)
and developing countries as a group (21 per cent), as would be the case by
using the tiered formula.
(e) Scenario 5 – Includes in scenario 4, 2 per cent “sensitive” products for
developed countries and 4 per cent “sensitive” and “special” products for
developing countries.  As a result, the average tariff reduction would be
16 per cent for developed countries and 9 per cent for developing countries.
(f) Scenario 6 – Adds to scenario 5 a tariff cap of 200 per cent – resultant
average cuts in agricultural tariffs, 18 per cent170
(g) Scenario 7 – Includes in scenario 1 cuts in non-agricultural tariff bindings of
50 per cent to be effected by developed countries, 33 per cent by developing
countries and none by LDCs.
(h) Scenario 8 – Developing countries and LDCs take the same level of cuts in
bound tariffs on non-agricultural products as do the developed countries in
scenario 7.
The results obtained under each of these scenarios have some interesting
dimensions.  The largest gains in real income for all countries and country groupings
would be made only when the parallelism between tariff reductions in agricultural and
non-agricultural products becomes a reality.
10  At the other extreme, are the results obtained
under scenario 3, which provides for the inclusion of “sensitive” and “special” in the mode.
The results show a decline in the real income for developing countries as a whole, with
only gains for the developed countries.  Therefore, the studies under discussion are
predicting that developing countries would be worse off by taking recourse to the special
and differential treatment.
The major results presented for the various Doha Round scenarios need to be
critically evaluated as they appear to be militating against the position that the developing
countries have taken during the negotiations.  Based on their assessment of the impact of
trade liberalization on their economies, developing countries have argued that gradualism
must be accepted as the universal basis for liberalization efforts that are under way in the
current Round.  This principle has been emphasized particularly in the area of agriculture,
where concerns for the small and marginal farmers and their lack of staying power in the
market, in the face of competition from agro-business, have been raised.  What has lent
strength to their arguments is the fact that in several developing countries, the “big bang”
liberalization episodes involving the agriculture sector have had inimical consequences for
production and employment in the sector.
11
It may be pointed out that the results presented in the studies do not capture the
objective reality because of the inherent limitations of the methodology of the model
employed.  In the past few years, critics have pointed to the methodological shortcomings
of the CGE framework upon which the LINKAGE Model is based.  As is briefly indicated in
the next section, the assumptions upon which the LINKAGE Model is based are either
unrealistic in nature or are far removed from the conditions that exist in the developing
world.  It must be mentioned that the limitations alluded to here are intrinsic to the
10 The implications of this finding should be considered carefully in the light of the Hong Kong
Ministerial Declaration, which, in paragraph 24, instructed the “negotiators to ensure that there is
a comparably high level of ambition in market access for agriculture and NAMA”.  Although the
Declaration added that “[t]his ambition is to be achieved in a balanced and proportionate manner
consistent with the principle of special and differential treatment”, the findings of the studies in question
suggest that developing countries would be better off by foregoing their S&D options.
11 Dhar (2005) gives an account of the experiences of some of the South-East Asian countries in this
regard.171
LINKAGE Model; in other words, whatever “improved” versions of the present studies that
the authors may subsequently present to us, the results would still remain debatable.
B.  Methodological limitations of the LINKAGE Model
In a persuasive article, Ackerman (1999) has given us plenty to think about with
regard to the structural limitations of the CGE framework.  The general equilibrium theory
bases itself on the two Arrow-Debreu theorems developed in the 1950s.  The first postulates
that assuming the existence of a competitive market economy, any market equilibrium
would be Pareto optimum.  The second theorem stipulates that under certain conditions,
every Pareto optimum is a market equilibrium given some initial conditions.  There has
been considerable debate centring on the Arrow-Debreu framework, the nub of which is
the realism of some of the assumptions.  Ackerman, for example, points out that the
assumptions such as increasing returns to scale are a common occurrence, but if this fact
is incorporated in the theory, the existence of equilibrium is no longer certain.  This would,
in other words, imply that a Pareto optimum need not be market equilibrium.
The major problem with the CGE models, as has been commented upon by several
of its critics, stems from the rather limited set of assumptions on which they are based.
These models are primarily market simulation models incorporating idealistic behaviour of
producers and consumers across markets and determining equilibrium, market-clearing
prices and quantities.  The limitation of considering the ideal types could lead to problems
of aggregation, as aggregate demand, for example, may not be as well-behaved as individual
demand.  Micro-foundations of macroeconomics can, therefore, be fraught with imponderables.
This general discussion sets the stage for looking at some of the specifications that
have been used to define the LINKAGE Model.  As indicated briefly, some of the assumptions
on which the model is based do not even remotely capture the reality, particularly in the
developing countries.  Some of the assumptions made in the model are that:
(a) “All sectors are assumed to operate under cost optimization”.  This assumption
assumes away market imperfections that may not allow producers to manage
their operations for ensuring “cost optimization”.
(b) “Three different production archetypes are defined in the model – crops,
livestock and all other goods and services.  Sectors are differentiated by
different input combinations and substitution elasticities within each one of
the main production archetypes”.  Clearly, the problem of aggregation, as
was alluded to above, would occur because of this assumption.  This problem
would appear in a more acute manner in the case of a country such as India,
which has an extremely diversified agricultural sector.
(c) “The key feature of the crop production structure is the substitution between
intensive cropping versus extensive cropping, i.e., between fertilizer and land”.
This assumption assumes away the production rigidities that exist in the
agricultural sector of the developing countries.  An overwhelmingly large172
proportion of the farm population has virtually no choice, in so far as changing
the nature of crop production.  Change in the relative prices of fertilizers and
land could not, therefore, lead to any change in the production structure.
(d) “Land is assumed to be partially mobile across agricultural sectors”.  Refer to
the comment made in respect of assumption (c).
(e) “Each national economy is divided into two distinct geographic zones [that]
define potentially separate labour markets.  A single elasticity … determines
the nature of the labour market”.  Labour markets are far from the ideal type
that is assumed for the purposes of the model in question.  In particular, the
assumption of “a single elasticity” does not at all capture the complexities of
the labour market as it exists in developing countries.
The above-mentioned examples of assumptions made in the LINKAGE Model
unerringly point to the need for interpreting the results with some degree of caution.
It does appear that some of the leading advocates of the CGE models are quite
aware of the limitations when they suggest that the results of the models should be
undergo the test of validation with observations from the real world, which they have tried
to capture.  It has been argued that such cross-checking “has to allow for the fact that the
projections from an AGE (applied general equilibrium) are conditional in that they are
based on particular assumptions about values of variables exogenous to the model, and,
as such, the projections could deviate from the actual outcomes if the realized values of
exogenous variables differed from the assumed values”.  It has been further surmised that
in “actual implementation, aspects of policy could differ from their assumed values”.
12
Thus, while some of the foremost protagonists of the CGE models have suggested that
the results of the models should be considered after examining their validity with the real
world, the authors of the studies under discussion have presented their results in such
a manner that the decision makers should treat them as absolute benchmarks.  In this
context, it needs to be pointed out that even during the Uruguay Round negotiations,
a plethora of studies, again using the CGE models, projected significant gains for the
developing countries that turned out to be no more than a chimera.
13  Several developing
countries had, in fact, made extensive commitments hoping for the gains that the studies
had projected; however, only two years after the implementation of the Uruguay Round
package had begun, they were forced to bring to the fore the fact that the anticipated
gains had not materialized.
14
Further corroboration was provided recently of the point that the recommendations
made by the genre of studies referred to above are unlikely to benefit the developing
countries.  A study by Maros Ivanic and Will Martin (2006) on “Potential implications of
12 Kehoe, Srinivasan and Whalley (2005).
13 See, for example, Goldin and Mensbrugghe (1993).
14 These issues were first raised by developing countries as the so-called “implementation issues” in
the Second Ministerial Conference held in Geneva in 1998.173
agricultural special products for poverty in low-income countries”
15 provided an expansive
analysis of how poverty in developing countries would increase if those countries relied on
the instrument of SPs, which, according to the G20 and the G33 countries, must form
a central pillar of the outcome of the Doha Round negotiations on agriculture.  However,
as indicated in the following section, the exposition of Ivanic and Martin is based on
a flawed understanding of the bases on which the G20 and G33 countries have argued
for the recognition of SPs.
C.  Inadequate understanding of the critical concerns
of developing countries
Although from the title of the paper it would appear that they are addressing the
problems of poverty at the economy-wide level, the authors are effectively focusing on
urban poverty for arriving at most of their conclusions.  Thus, the authors surmise that
poverty would increase because protection granted to the SPs would increase prices of
staples and would hence affect the marginalised sections of the urban population.  This
conclusion is based on an inappropriate methodology for selecting the SPs.  The authors
use only a few elements of the criteria proposed by the G33, which helps them to assume
that SPs would only comprise staples.  They fail to recognize that list of SPs would also
include non-food commodities that are significant from the point of view of safeguarding
livelihoods, besides contributing to rural development.  These two criteria are extremely
important, as they could provide the much needed policy space for the developing countries
to improve the fortunes of their rural economy.
In putting forth their strong arguments against the use of SPs, the authors seem to
be unaware that one of the major causes of growing urban poverty in most developing
countries is the fact that the rural sector in those countries has faced relative neglect; in
other words, there has been a bias against this sector in the overall development priorities.
With the rural sector failing to create increased employment opportunities due to this
policy bias, the urban centres appear to have provided the much needed window of
opportunities for the rural population.  However, the resultant large-scale migration has
eventually swelled the ranks of the marginalized sections in the urban areas.  For the
developing countries, therefore, development of the rural economy – which includes
above all the improvement in the income-generating capacities of agriculture – is of utmost
priority.  Many of these countries have argued in the ongoing negotiations on agriculture
that the “development dimension” must be recognized by granting the much needed policy
space for the developing countries to pursue the right set of policies, one that removes the
policy bias against the agricultural sector.  The key to the pursuit of this objective, in the
view of the G20 and the G33, is the mechanism of SPs.
15 The comments are based on a version of the paper dated 16 October 2006.  Subsequently,
however, the World Bank withdrew the paper in the face of critical comments.  On 24 January 2007,
Francois J. Bourguignon, World Bank Chief Economist, issued a statement saying that the final paper
would be posted on the World Bank’s research page “when the research is complete and it has gone
through the standard review processes”.174
The inadequate understanding of the authors is also reflected in their comments
that increased protection from the use of SPs “effect poverty through three broad channels”.
The first is the “effect of commodity prices and wages on incomes in the short term”.
While the authors are concerned about the detrimental effect of commodity price rise on
the urban consumers, most developing counties would like to use the SPs to influence
commodity prices and wages so as to benefit the farm households.  It may be argued that
the main reason for using the instrument of SPs is to ensure reversal of the secular
decline in commodity prices, in particular prices of commodities that are critical for providing
livelihood security for farm households.  In the past decades, low commodity prices have
reduced the farmers in developing countries to marginalized existence and this situation
can get far worse if the subsidized commodities are allowed to enter the developing
country markets for “promoting” trade.
According to Ivanic and Martin (2006), the second adverse effect of protecting SPs
would be that resources would be “diverted away from the activities that yield the highest
social returns into those that generate the highest market returns at distorted prices”.  It is
argued here that the purpose of the SPs is precisely to divert resources into the agriculture,
since this would yield the highest social return in the medium to the long term.  As
indicated earlier, the policy bias against agriculture had militated against the flow of resources
into the sector that supports around two-thirds of the workforce in India.  This policy bias
can be set right by providing adequate protection to the products that are sensitive in
nature by using the mechanism of SPs.  There is absolutely no case for lowering protection
to products that are identified as SPs by promoting inefficient producers who can take
advantage of the distorted prices in the markets for agricultural commodities.
The third concern of the authors that SPs would result in diverting resources away
from “export-oriented activities towards import replacement”, causing productivity to fall,
again exposes their limited understanding of economic realities.  Contrary to their
understanding that the SPs are to be viewed from the trade perspective, developing
countries have argued that this instrument would ensure the realization of food security
and protection of livelihoods, which stand out among the major objectives of development
policy.  These countries have frequently argued that that the twin objectives of food
security and livelihoods protection should be viewed as non-trade concerns.
The issue of food security has been identified as a major objective to be pursued
by the global community by the Rome Declaration on World Food Security and the World
Food Summit Plan of Action in 1996.  The Summit emphasized that food security exists
when “all people at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and
nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy
life”.  The Rome Declaration took into consideration the multifaceted character of food
security, and emphasized that “concerted national action and effective international efforts”
were needed to “supplement and reinforce national action.”
16   The Plan of Action adopted
16 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Report of the World Food Summit,
13-17 November 1996 (WFS 96/REP), part one, appendix.175
by the World Food Summit proposed that “each nation must adopt a strategy consistent
with its resources and capacities to achieve its individual goals and, at the same time,
cooperate regionally and internationally in order to organize collective solutions to global
issues of food security.” Besides emphasizing the importance of national policies, the
Rome Declaration and the Plan of Action presented an interesting perspective on the role
of trade in the pursuit of food security.  The participating countries expressed their commitment
to “strive to ensure that food, agricultural trade and overall trade policies are conducive to
fostering food security for all through a fair and market-oriented world trade system.”
Thus, quite contrary to the view that imperatives of trade should be given primacy, as is
the underlying theme of the Ivanic and Martin paper, the World Food Summit had emphasized
that food security should be the primary concern of the global community.
D.  Conclusions
This chapter provides a critical view of the studies based on the LINKAGE Model,
a variant of the CGE models, which have projected the possible outcomes of the Doha
Round of multilateral trade negotiations.  These studies have provided detailed estimates
of the likely gains/losses for individual countries/groups of countries in 2015, and the
projected end-date for the implementation of the commitments that WTO member States
would take at the end of the current round of negotiations.
The aggregative results presented in the studies indicate that of the annual gains
in real income that would result from full liberalization of merchandise trade in all WTO
member States, the share of the developing countries would be one-third.  According to
the authors of the studies in question, developing countries should consider the projected
gains as a favourable outcome, since their current share in global production is around
25 per cent of the total.  However, what these results also imply is that the wedge between
the developed and the developing countries would get wider following a disproportionately
large increase in the gains for the former.
The detailed results for individual countries/groups of countries only provide more
evidence of a widening gap between the more prosperous and the less prosperous
regions of the world.  In the developing world, the likely gainers are the more advanced
middle-income countries, while the low-income countries, including India, would not fare
well.  The more disturbing of the results is the projected deterioration of the terms of trade,
particularly in countries such as India and China, in the aftermath of full liberalization of
global merchandise trade.  This chapter has attempted to argue that it is these detailed
results, rather than the aggregative numbers, that need to looked at carefully.
An attempt has also been made to indicate that there is a more fundamental
problem with these studies.  The CGE models are based on assumptions whose veracity
is questionable, particularly in the case of developing countries.  In addition, as expected,
the models are considerably at odds with the reality in the developing countries.176
It is pertinent to note here that some of the leading advocates for the CGE models
have opined that the results obtained from the models must be cross-checked with real-life
conditions in order to ascertain their reliability.  Such an exercise is, of course, impossible
in respect of the results that the studies in question have provided.  However, what should
be pointed out is that CGE models of an earlier generation projected substantial gains for
the developing countries following on from the implementation of the Uruguay Round
package.  It would have been more appropriate if the authors of the papers under discussion
had presented their results against the backdrop of the past frailties of their models.177
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Annex
Annex table 1.  Impacts on real income from full liberalization of global
merchandise trade, by country/region, 2015
(Relative to the baseline, in 2001 US$)
Real income
Gain due just As percentage
Country/region gain
to change in of baseline
(US$ billion)
terms of trade  income in
(US$ billion)  2015
Australia and New Zealand 6.1 3.5 1.0
EU25 and EFTA 65.2 0.5 0.6
United States of America 16.2 10.7 0.1
Canada 3.8 -0.3 0.4
Japan 54.6 7.5 1.1
Republic of Korea and 44.6 0.4 3.5
   Taiwan Province of China
Singapore and Hong Kong, China 11.2 7.9 2.6
Argentina 4.9 1.2 1.2
Bangladesh 0.1 -1.1 0.2
Brazil 9.9 4.6 1.5
China 5.6 -8.3 0.2
India 3.4 -9.4 0.4
Indonesia 1.9 0.2 0.7
Thailand 7.7 0.7 3.8
Viet Nam 3.0 -0.2 5.2
Russian Federation 2.7 -2.7 0.6
Mexico 3.6 -3.6 0.4
South Africa 1.3 0.0 0.9
Turkey 3.3 0.2 1.3
Rest of South Asia 1.0 -0.8 0.5
Rest of East Asia 5.3 -0.9 1.9
Rest of Latin America and 10.3 0.0 1.2
   Caribbean
Rest of ECA 1.0 -1.6 0.3
Middle East and North Africa 14.0 -6.4 1.2
Selected sub-Saharan Africa 1.0 0.5 1.5
Rest of sub-Saharan Africa 2.5 -2.3 1.1
Rest of world 3.4 0.1 1.5
High-income countries 201.6 30.3 0.6
Developing countries – 141.5 -21.4 1.2
   WTO definition
Developing countries 85.7 -29.7 0.8179
   Middle-income countries 69.5 -16.7 0.8
   Low-income countries 16.2 -12.9 0.8
East Asia and the Pacific 23.5 -8.5 0.7
South Asia 4.5 -11.2 0.4
Europe and Central Asia 7.0 -4.0 0.7
Middle East and North Africa 14.0 -6.4 1.2
Sub-Saharan Africa 4.8 -1.8 1.1
Latin America and the Caribbean 28.7 2.2 1.0
World total 287.3 0.6 0.7
Source: Anderson and others (2006).
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Annex table 2.  Regional and sectoral source of gains from full liberalization of
global merchandise trade, developing and high-income countries, 2015
(Relative to baseline scenario)*








Developing countries         
Agriculture, food 28 19 47 33 9 17
Textiles, clothing 9 14 23 10 7 8
Other merchandise 6 52 58 7 26 20
All sectors 43 85 128 50 42 45
High-income countries       
Agriculture, food 26 109 135 30 54 47
Textiles, clothing 13 2 15 15 1 5
Other merchandise 4 5 9 5 2 3
All sectors 43 116 159 50 57 55
All countries liberalize       
Agriculture, food 54 128 182 63 64 63
Textiles, clothing 22 16 38 25 8 14
Other merchandise 10 57 67 12 28 23
All sectors 86 201 287 100 100 100
Source: Anderson and others (2006).
* Small interaction effects are distributed proportionately and numbers are rounded to sum
to 100 per cent.180
Annex table 3.  Impacts of full global trade liberalization on agricultural and
food output and trade, by country/region, 2015




Country/region relative to baseline
 Exports Imports Output Exports Imports Output
Australia and New Zealand 18.0 1.4 27.9 38.0 23.0 20.5
EU25 and EFTA 21.7 103.5 -185.8 -10.8 39.3 -12.3
United States 18.4 16.5 30.7 11.6 25.6 0.0
Canada 14.6 6.9 7.2 40.2 54.3 4.8
Japan 2.8 34.7 -91.7 60.4 169.7 -18.4
Republic of Korea and 33.2 12.3 -0.4 600.2 189.8 20.2
   Taiwan Province of China
Singapore and Hong Kong, China 7.0 1.5 7.4 115.2 7.6 35.4
Argentina 10.4 0.7 12.2 44.2 36.9 11.5
Bangladesh 0.8 0.4 -2.5 60.9 15.6 0.8
Brazil 38.0 2.8 66.4 120.6 48.4 34.0
China 15.1 24.1 -9.9 145.6 27.3 -0.9
India 5.1 13.4 -23.8 53.2 165.4 -3.7
Indonesia 3.6 1.9 4.5 32.2 23.5 2.4
Thailand 5.6 5.2 5.3 29.2 57.2 4.7
Viet Nam 1.2 3.3 -2.1 13.9 170.4 -13.3
Russian Federation 0.7 4.4 -7.8 15.4 22.3 -5.4
Mexico 11.9 6.7 6.2 66.0 52.9 2.2
South Africa 2.4 1.1 1.4 55.9 40.2 4.9
Turkey 4.3 4.3 -0.1 109.4 140.3 0.5
Rest of South Asia 2.9 3.7 -1.5 57.1 83.3 -1.8
Rest of East Asia and the Pacific 9.4 5.8 7.4 61.7 50.7 6.8
Rest of Latin America and 36.0 9.6 37.0 68.1 42.3 11.7
   Caribbean
Rest of ECA 9.2 10.9 -22.2 106 90.5 -1.6
Middle East and North Africa 13.2 17.5 -7.8 64.1 43.1 -1.2
Selected sub-Saharan African 4.5 1.3 5.3 50.0 74.4 9.2
   countries
Rest of sub-Saharan Africa 9.5 8.1 -4.1 45.4 79.2 -0.6
Rest of world 8.2 5.8 2.9 168.3 123.3 4.4
High-income countries 115.8 176.7 -204.7 15.7 65.5 -5.3
Developing countries 191.9 131 66.8 67.4 51.5 2.2181
   Middle-income countries 156.1 93.1 88.2 72.7 41.9 3.2
   Low-income countries 35.8 37.9 -21.4 52.3 99.3 -1.0
East Asia and the Pacific 34.8 40.4 5.2 54.4 35.5 0.1
South Asia 8.9 17.5 -27.8 55.1 122.9 -3.0
Europe and Central Asia 14.2 19.6 -30.0 79.7 62.6 -1.9
Middle East and North Africa 13.2 17.5 -7.8 64.1 43.1 -1.2
Sub-Saharan Africa 16.4 10.5 2.6 47.7 71.6 2.1
Latin America and the Caribbean 96.3 19.8 121.8 75.7 46.1 13.8
World total (excluding 307.7 307.7 -137.8 36.3 59.8 -1.3
intra-European Union trade)
Source: Anderson and others (2006).
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Country/region relative to baseline
 Exports Imports Output Exports Imports Output182
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Anderson and others (2006).
* Self-suf
f
iciency is defined as domestic production as a percentage of domestic consumption.184
Annex table 5.  Change in real income in alternative Doha scenarios, 2015
(In 2001 US$ billion compared with baseline scenario)
 
Country/region
Scen. Scen. Scen. Scen. Scen. Scen. Scen. Scen.
1234 5678
Australia and New Zealand 2.0 1.1 1.1 2.2 1.2 1.2 2.4 2.8
EU25 and EFTA 29.5 10.7 9.1 28.2 10.7 10.9 31.4 35.7
United States 3.0 2.3 2 3.4 2.5 2.1 4.9 6.6
Canada 1.4 0.5 0.3 1.2 0.4 0.4 0.9 1.0
Japan 18.9 1.8 1.3 15.1 1.4 12.9 23.7 25.4
Republic of Korea and 10.9 1.7 1.6 7.3 1.7 15.9 15 22.6
   Taiwan Province of China
Singapore and Hong Kong, China -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 1.5 2.2
Argentina 1.3 1.0 1.0 1.4 1.1 1.0 1.3 1.6
Bangladesh 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1
Brazil 3.3 1.1 0.9 3.2 1.1 1.1 3.6 3.9
China -0.5 -1.5 -1.6 -0.4 -1.4 -1.1 1.7 1.6
India 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 2.2 3.5
Indonesia 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.0 1.0 1.2
Thailand 0.9 0.6 0.3 1.0 0.8 0.8 2.0 2.7
Viet Nam -0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.5 -0.6
Russian Federation -0.3 -0.7 -0.8 -0.1 -0.7 -0.7 0.8 1.5
Mexico -0.2 -0.3 -0.3 -0.2 -0.3 -0.3 -0.9 -0.2
South Africa 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.7
Turkey 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.1 0.0 0.7 1.4
Rest of South Asia 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.7
Rest of East Asia 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 1.0 0.3 0.6
Rest of Latin America and 3.7 0.5 0.5 3.7 0.5 0.4 3.9 4.0
   Caribbean
Rest of ECA -0.2 -0.3 -0.3 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.6 -0.7
Middle East and North Africa -0.8 -1.2 -1.5 -0.9 -1.2 -1.2 -0.6 0.1
Selected sub-Sahara African 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2
   Countries
Rest of sub-Saharan Africa 0.0 -0.3 -0.3 0.0 -0.3 -0.3 -0.1 0.3
Rest of world 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.6
High-income countries 65.6 18.1 15.2 57.2 17.8 43.2 79.9 96.4
Developing countries 9.0 -0.4 -1.7 9.1 0.1 1.1 16.1 22.9
   Middle-income countries 8.0 -0.5 -1.9 8.3 0.0 1.0 12.5 17.1
   Low-income countries 1.0 0.1 0.1 0.8 0.2 0.0 3.6 5.9
East Asia and the Pacific 0.5 -0.8 -1.2 0.9 -0.4 0.6 4.5 5.5
South Asia 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 2.5 4.2
Europe and Central Asia 0.1 -0.9 -1.1 0.2 -0.9 -0.9 0.8 2.1
Middle East and North Africa -0.8 -1.2 -1.5 -0.9 -1.2 -1.2 -0.6 0.1
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.3 0.0 -0.2 0.3 -0.2 -0.1 0.4 1.2
Latin America and the Caribbean 8.1 2.3 2.0 8.0 2.5 2.1 7.9 9.2
World total 74.5 17.7 13.4 66.3 17.9 44.3 96.1 119.3
Source: Anderson and others (2006).185
Annex table 6.  Change in real income in alternative Doha scenarios,
2015 percentage change
(In 2001 US$ billion compared with baseline scenario)
Country/region
Scen. Scen. Scen. Scen. Scen. Scen. Scen. Scen.
1234 5678
Australia and New Zealand 0.35 0.20 0.18 0.38 0.22 0.20 0.42 0.48
EU25 and EFTA 0.29 0.11 0.09 0.28 0.11 0.11 0.31 0.36
United States 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.05
Canada 0.15 0.05 0.03 0.13 0.05 0.05 0.10 0.11
Japan 0.38 0.04 0.03 0.30 0.03 0.26 0.48 0.51
Republic of Korea and 0.86 0.13 0.13 0.58 0.14 1.26 1.19 1.79
   Taiwan Province of China
Singapore and Hong Kong, China -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.04 -0.04 0.35 0.52
Argentina 0.32 0.26 0.25 0.34 0.27 0.26 0.34 0.39
Bangladesh -0.06 -0.03 -0.02 -0.06 -0.03 -0.04 -0.10 -0.09
Brazil 0.50 0.16 0.13 0.49 0.17 0.17 0.55 0.59
China -0.02 -0.06 -0.06 -0.01 -0.05 -0.04 0.07 0.06
India 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.25 0.40
Indonesia 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.01 0.37 0.44
Thailand 0.43 0.29 0.15 0.49 0.38 0.38 0.99 1.33
Viet Nam -0.20 -0.09 -0.06 -0.22 -0.11 -0.16 -0.83 -0.97
Russian Federation -0.06 -0.16 -0.17 -0.03 -0.15 -0.15 0.16 0.31
Mexico -0.02 -0.04 -0.04 -0.02 -0.04 -0.04 -0.11 -0.02
South Africa 0.06 0.17 0.05 0.09 0.11 0.17 0.25 0.49
Rest of South Asia 0.13 0.05 0.05 0.11 0.06 0.14 0.17 0.39
Rest of East Asia 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.04 0.36 0.09 0.22
Rest of Latin America and 0.44 0.06 0.06 0.43 0.06 0.04 0.46 0.47
   Caribbean
Rest of ECA -0.06 -0.09 -0.09 -0.06 -0.09 -0.08 -0.22 -0.26
Middle East and North Africa -0.07 -0.10 -0.13 -0.07 -0.10 -0.10 -0.05 0.01
Rest of sub-Saharan Africa 0.02 -0.13 -0.13 0.01 -0.14 -0.14 -0.02 0.13
Rest of world 0.19 0.0 0.0 0.14 0.0 0.02 0.26 0.28
High-income countries 0.20 0.06 0.05 0.18 0.05 0.13 0.25 0.30
Developing countries 0.09 0.0 -0.02 0.09 0.0 0.01 0.16 0.22
   Middle-income countries 0.10 -0.01 -0.02 0.10 0.0 0.01 0.15 0.21
   Low-income countries 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.0 0.18 0.30
East Asia and the Pacific 0.01 -0.02 -0.03 0.03 -0.01 0.02 0.13 0.16
South Asia 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.21 0.36
Europe and Central Asia 0.01 -0.09 -0.11 0.02 -0.09 -0.09 0.08 0.21
Middle East and North Africa -0.07 -0.10 -0.13 -0.07 -0.10 -0.1 -0.05 0.01
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.06 -0.01 -0.05 0.06 -0.04 -0.02 0.10 0.27
Latin America and the Caribbean 0.29 0.08 0.07 0.29 0.09 0.08 0.29 0.33
World total 0.18 0.04 0.03 0.16 0.04 0.10 0.23 0.28
Source: Anderson and others (2006).186
Annex table 7.  Share of agricultural and food production exported






Baseline liberalization, Scenario 7
2015
Australia and New Zealand 33.3 37.2 42.7 39.5
EU25 and EFTA 16.7 17.3 17.6 16.6
EU25 and EFTA (excluding intra-EU25) 4.0 5.1 7.7 5.0
United States 6.3 7.9 9.2 8.1
Canada 24.5 29.5 40.0 32.5
Japan 0.9 1.2 2.3 1.5
Republic of Korea and 4.4 4.8 26.5 8.6
   Taiwan Province of China
Singapore and Hong Kong, China 26.0 30.0 47.8 30.8
Argentina 21.6 25.2 32.5 26.9
Bangladesh 1.7 3.6 5.7 3.5
Brazil 15.3 17.3 28.9 21.7
China 3.3 0.9 2.2 1.0
India 3.5 3.0 4.7 3.3
Indonesia 11.9 10.0 12.9 9.9
Thailand 30.2 28.2 34.6 30.1
Viet Nam 23.9 26.9 35.3 26.7
Russian Federation 6.1 5.5 6.7 6.0
Mexico 5.6 7.8 13.2 8.5
South Africa 16.0 12.7 18.8 13.5
Turkey 9.6 6.0 12.4 7.0
Rest of South Asia 6.0 6.2 9.9 6.6
Rest of East Asia 16.1 14.6 22.1 14.9
Rest of Latin America and Caribbean 13.9 18.1 27.1 20.7
Rest of ECA 2.4 1.7 3.7 1.9
Middle East and North Africa 5.2 6.7 11.2 7.2
Selected SSA countries 13.2 18.1 25.4 19.2
Rest of sub-Saharan Africa 11.2 15.8 23.3 16.5
Rest of world 6.6 7.0 17.7 8.7
High-income countries 5.8 7.5 11.6 8.2
Developing countries 7.5 6.9 11.6 7.8
   Middle-income countries 7.6 6.6 11.4 7.6
   Low-income countries 7.3 7.9 12.4 8.4
East Asia and the Pacific 7.2 4.1 6.5 4.3
South Asia 3.8 3.6 5.7 3.9
Europe and Central Asia 3.7 2.7 5.0 3.0
Middle East and North Africa 5.2 6.7 11.2 7.2
Sub-Saharan Africa 12.5 15.8 23.1 16.6
Latin America and the Caribbean 12.7 15.9 24.8 18.5
World total 9.5 9.5 13.2 10.0
World total (excluding intra-EU25) 6.6 7.2 11.6 8.0
Source: Anderson and others (2006).187
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1 as a member of WTO, has become part of the multilateral trade negotiations.
At the regional level, China has also entered into negotiations with ASEAN, Australia,
New Zealand and Chile on FTAs.  Agriculture is a contentious issue in all those talks.
China is the largest developing member country of WTO and a key trader in agricultural
products; thus, its positions on, and their implications for WTO agriculture negotiations and
regional FTA talks have received much attention.
To understand all those issues, it is also necessary to have a clear understanding
of the role of Chinese agriculture in the country’s national economic development as well
as the economic and political factors that help shape Chinese agricultural trade policy.
Section A reviews the Chinese industrialization process and identifies major distortions
created under central planning.  Section B compares Chinese agricultural and industrial
reforms with the focus on agricultural trade.  Section C discusses the political economy of
Chinese agricultural trade policy and speculates about its future development.  Section D
explains Chinese negotiation positions on agricultural issues in WTO and evaluates the
China-ASEAN FTA.  Section E provides the conclusion.
A.  Distortions in the pre-reform Chinese economy
During the mid-twentieth century, when the People’s Republic of China was founded,
China was an agrarian economy with an underdeveloped industrial sector.  Eager to catch
up with the Western powers, like most developing countries at that time, China adopted
* The author is grateful for the research assistance provided by Cao Lijuan in carrying out this study.
The technical support of the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific
and additional support form the AusAID China Australia Governance Programme is gratefully
acknowledged.  This chapter benefited from discussions with Colin Carter and participants at a series
of Beijing Agricultural Trade Policy Dialogues, which were inaugurated in September 2003.  The author
is also grateful to Dr. Mia Mikic, Zhong Funing, Zhu Jing and an anonymous expert for their valuable
comments.
1 Throughout this chapter, China refers to mainland China (excluding Hong Kong, China and Macao,
China) as a customs entity.  Hong Kong, China as well as Macao, China and Taiwan Province of China
are identified as independent customs entities.188
a strategy that emphasized the development of the industrial sector.
2  Agriculture, as in
many countries pursuing fast industrialization, was given a role to support this development
strategy.  Nationalization of the fledging industrial and commercial enterprises, together
with collectivization of the rural economy, made it possible for the Government to carry out
that strategy effectively, following the Soviet model of central planning in its management
of the national economy.
Except for the early 1950s, when the country received aid from the former Soviet
Union, China was isolated from rest of the world until 1979.  As a result, China’s early
industrialization had to be internally financed.  In addition to budget outlay, the bulk of
which went to industrial investment, the Government set low wage levels for industrial
workers, high prices for industrial products and low prices for agricultural products as an
implicit tax aimed at diverting agricultural revenues and private savings into the industrial
sector.  As a result, the agricultural sector became disadvantaged.
To develop the industrial infrastructure at the expense of agriculture was a common
practice in most post-Second World War developing countries.  However, in China, it was
not just a matter of economic policy or development strategy.  At play was also the way
political status was granted to various social groups.  According to the Constitution of
China, it was not peasants but workers in the mostly state-owned industrial sector who
were given the leading class status in the Chinese political establishment.  It was customary
for communist countries to regard proletariat workers as the vanguard of the regimes,
because most revolutions took place in cities and industrial workers formed the backbone
of the communist military forces.  Therefore, orthodox communist ideology commends
proletariat workers.  In China, however, the rural-based Chinese Communist Party was
supported by the peasants in the civil war against the city-based Nationalists.  Yet, surprisingly,
the Constitution of China put proletariat workers above peasants in Chinese political life.
This can be seen as being a convenient way for the Government to lend its political
support to the industrialization campaign while, at the same time, aligning itself with
orthodox communist ideology.
At that time, wages for Chinese workers were low by international standards, yet
enviable in the eyes of the peasants.  Workers in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) also
enjoyed free housing and health care as well as guaranteed job security.  Later in the
reform era, when laid-off workers lost those benefits, there was a widespread outcry and
the pace of SOE reform had to be slowed.  In contrast, the under-represented Chinese
peasants have never received the same treatment, a situation for which there is ample
anecdotal evidence.  In one incident, a rural housewife resorted to seeking the personal
intervention of the Chinese prime minister (through an accidental encounter) to help her
husband, who was a migrant worker at an urban construction site, to get his (and a million
others) long overdue wages.  The Chinese legal system itself should have been able to
2 See Yifu Lin, Cai Fang and Li Zhou (2003), China’s Miracle:  Development Strategy and Economic
Reform, for a thorough analysis of this “catch-up” strategy.189
handle such a case, but obviously it did not live up to the expectations of “justice for all”,
including the under-represented.
Biased resource allocation between agriculture and manufacturing at the national
level was only one of many pervasive distortions in China’s central planning system at that
time.  Within the manufacturing sector, priority was given to heavy industries that produced
investment goods at the expense of light industries that produced consumer goods.  Within
the agricultural sector, grain production was emphasized to ensure an adequate food
supply for the country.
Normally, a catch-up strategy also requires an import-substitution trade policy that
effectively prevents a country from engaging in international trade to its fullest potential.  In
China’s case, the United Nations embargo led by the United States of America against the
then-new communist regime in the 1950s forced the country to make “self-reliance and
self-sufficiency” the cornerstone of its foreign trade policy.  In agriculture, a policy-induced
1958-1960 famine further reinforced the conviction of the Chinese leadership that “grain
self-sufficiency” should become the principle of utmost importance in agricultural trade
policy-making.
In order to build up an industrial infrastructure in a short period, this development
strategy had its own merit.  However, given China’s scarce capital and land resources but
abundant supply of labour, the strategy was not in line with that country’s comparative
advantages and was only viable when foreign trade was restricted.
Emphasis on heavy industries and grain production did help boost production,
although apparently at levels that were far below potential.
3  However, intrinsic flaws in
central planning also created severe problems, such as a structural imbalance in the
national economy and a lack of incentives for producers.  By the end of the 1970s, the
economy was such a shambles that it prompted the Government to embark on reforms
that profoundly transformed the Chinese economy.
B.  Chinese reform and agricultural trade
Chinese reform has been a gradual process.  At the beginning, the reform was
aimed at improving the efficiency of the system within the central planning framework, and
market elements were introduced as supplements.  Since the early 1990s, the market
economy approach has been increasingly gaining legitimacy in the official reform blueprint
and bold initiatives have been introduced to correct various distortions.  The result has
been economic growth both in the agricultural and industrial sectors.
Agricultural reform in China has resembled industrial reform in many aspects.  The
“household responsibility system” was introduced in the early 1980s to boost farmers’
3 The high growth rate under central planning was mainly due to greater inputs but often with low
productivity gains, a point that was made popular by Paul Krugman, in his article, “The myth of Asia’s
miracle” in Foreign Affairs, November 1994.190
incentives in agricultural production, and a similar responsibility system was later applied
to enterprises.  As a quasi-privatization measure, the land tenure system was instituted to
ensure the rights of farmers to keep their land for 20 years; in enterprise reform, the
shareholding system gave workers a stake in production performance.  Most commodity
prices were freed up, subject only to market forces.  Grain production was still the priority
in agriculture.  But instead of mandatory production quotas to be sold to the Government
at lower than market prices (the procurement practice during most of the reform years),
a price support programme has been put in place to encourage grain production even
though market prices are often higher than the minimal procurement prices.  For Chinese
peasants, this change in procurement policy has helped to transfer grain revenue from
grain marketing bureaus to grain growers, and is a positive move as far as peasants’
income is concerned.
Liberalization has unleashed the potential of labour-intensive production in both
agriculture and industry.  In agriculture, the development of the horticulture, poultry, dairy
and animal husbandry subsectors has helped to diversify the diet of the population, and
has increased peasants’ income.  In industry, the development of the consumer goods
sector and integration with the international production chain through foreign trade,
particularly under the processing trade regime, has changed the Chinese industrial makeup.
As a result, within both agriculture and industry, distortions due to overemphasis of grain
production and heavy industry during the pre-reform era have been substantially reduced;
however, more needs to be done to the factor markets.
Yet, despite extensive liberalization of the Chinese economy throughout the reform
era, the practice of taxing agriculture to subsidize industry did not change until 2006.
Notwithstanding the overall economic growth, the rural-urban divide has further increased
(the urban-rural per capita income ratio increased to more than 3:1 in 2005).  To correct
this disparity, China’s eleventh Five-Year Plan includes the New Rural Development (NRD)
programme in its platform, which is aimed at giving rural development a higher priority.
One immediate policy reform has been the abolition of all fees and taxes associated
with agricultural production.  This is a highly significant move because, for the first time in
several thousand years of Chinese history, no taxes and fees are being imposed on
peasants.  This reflects the determination of the Chinese leadership to deal with rural
backwardness, which is a long overdue task.  However, it remains to be seen how far the
NRD campaign can go, as it is a top-down approach.  It is not initiated, monitored or run
by rural residents, who are the potential beneficiaries, and it may therefore deviate from its
original objectives during the course of its implementation.  After all, NRD supporters have
to compete for resources with other more politically powerful constituencies.
In China, arable land and capital are scarce.  However, unlike arable land, capital
can be borrowed from abroad.  This simple fact explains the different ways in which
structural adjustment has been achieved in both agriculture and industry.  In agriculture,
with a slight increase in total sown area, additional land use for horticulture has been met
mainly by a smaller sown area for grain (figure I).  This is a reflection of China’s changing
policy on “grain self-sufficiency” (down from 100 per cent to 95 per cent).  The declining191
grain acreage has been met by simultaneous gains in productivity.  The household
responsibility system gave a boost to grain production in the early 1980s.  Agricultural
research and development investment, mostly in the grain sector (some of which was
during the pre-reform era), started to show its impact in the reform years.  However, since
the 1990s, grain yield has been mainly fuelled by more inputs rather than by productivity
improvement, a reflection of the grain sector’s fatigue.
Figure I.  Sown area of major crops in China, 1990-2002
Sources: China Statistics Yearbook and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United
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The correction of distortions within Chinese industry has taken a different route.
While many small SOEs have been privatized, medium and large-sized SOEs are mostly
intact and continue to receive generous state subsidies.  Without substantial reform of
SOEs, the makeup of Chinese industry has been transformed by the emergence of
a vibrant non-state sector that includes private, collective and foreign-funded industrial
enterprises.  While the private and collective enterprises are struggling to raise money for
their operations, foreign-funded enterprises have brought in huge amounts of capital in the
form of foreign direct investment.  Today, China is the world’s top recipient of foreign direct
investment.  Of course, the release of rural surplus labour has also contributed to the
development of labour-intensive industries.  As a result, in 2005, SOEs contributed only
one third of the total industrial gross domestic product in China.  In contrast, because
agricultural production solely relies on local factors (such as land and labour), its structural
makeup has not changed very much compared to industrial production.  The share of
grain and other land-intensive crops (soya and cotton) in China still made up as much as
70 per cent of sown areas in 2002.
4
4 If measured in terms of actual arable area, this number will be smaller as sown areas shown in
Chinese statistics are based on single cropping for horticulture and multiple cropping for grains.192
How far has the correctional process progressed in Chinese agriculture?  To answer
this question, an international comparison can be made with Brazil, a country of similar
size but a quite different labour/land endowment ratio.  As discussed by Jales and others
(2005), in the past 30 years, the reduction of state intervention, market deregulation and
trade liberalization, combined with research and development investment and macro
stabilization, have helped modernize Brazilian agriculture and agribusiness.  Brazil now
has one of the most liberalized agricultural trade regimes in the world (table 1).  China is
also quite liberalized as far as tariffs are concerned, but its agricultural trade patterns are
also determined by other factors, as will be discussed below.
Table 1.  Applied tariff structures for Brazil, China and other countries
Brazil China United States EU India
2003 2002 2003 2003 2002
Mean 10.2 15.3 12.3 29.3 36.9
Median 10.0 13.0 4.4 14.4 30.0
Standard deviation 6.0 11.5 29.6 40.2 25.8
Variation coefficient 0.58 0.75 2.40 1.37 0.70
Maximum tariff 55.0 71.0 350.0 277.2 182.0
No. of tariff lines 959 1 044 1 829 2 091 690
No. of tariff lines = 0 79 80 388 403 17
No. of tariff lines > 30% 4 130 167 633 108
Sources: Ministério do Desenvolvimento, Indústria e Comércio Exterior-Brazil, United States International
Trade Commission, integrated tariff of the European Communities-European Union and the
World Trade Organization, cited in Jales and others, 2006, p. 7.
China has 154.6 million hectares of arable land compared to 54.5 million ha in
Brazil.  At the same time, China’s total employment is 737.1 million while that of Brazil is
66.2 million (Jales and others, 2006).  These numbers suggest that if Chinese agriculture
were sufficiently open to international trade, production of its labour-intensive versus
land-intensive agricultural products should have exhibited a pattern that is in sharp contrast
to that of Brazil.  In fact, figure II, which depicts the composition of total Brazilian and
Chinese planted area in 2002, shows striking similarities in farmland composition for
land-intensive versus labour-intensive crops (7:3 for cereals and oil-bearing crops versus
horticulture etc.) in the two countries.  This simple comparison suggests that Chinese
agriculture has not been fully integrated into the world economy.  Barriers to trade in
various forms, either policy-induced or natural, are to blame.  Chinese agriculture mainly
consists of smallholders on subsistence farms who have not been brought into the domestic
market.  Obviously, there is still a long way to go to complete the integration of Chinese
agriculture into the domestic and international markets.193
The various ways in which the Government supports the grain sector and SOEs
have ramifications for trade reform.  With a broad tax base including non-state sectors
(and until recently, agriculture) and the dwindling share of SOEs in the national economy,
subsidizing SOEs through easy loans and enabling them to survive competition from
non-state sectors as well as imports is financially manageable for the Government.  Trade
liberalization in the manufacturing sector can make the life of SOEs miserable but does
not necessarily threaten their existence.  In contrast, the viability of the price support
programme instituted to ensure grain self-sufficiency as well as the grain self-sufficiency
target itself requires a grain-trade protectionist policy.  The economic logic is that liberalizing
border measures (improved market access, in China’s case) would make it financially
infeasible to maintain the price support programme, given the large size of the Chinese
grain sector and very limited budget for agricultural domestic support.  (This is especially
true when the inefficient SOEs keep siphoning off financial resources from banks and the
state budget).
It is true that, as far as tariffs are concerned, Chinese agricultural trade is also
quite liberalized as illustrated by table 1.  However, key Chinese agricultural imports,
including grains, are also subject to tariff rate quota (TRQ) restriction (table 2).  While
TRQs have been expanding over the years, Jales and others (2005), citing Bryan Lohmar
and David Skully (2003), observed that:
“The implementation of China’s TRQ commitments, however, has proved to
be rather problematic.  Those who export to China express concerns as to
the lack of transparency in the quota allocation process, since no information
on the quantities and destinies of the TRQs is provided.  Another problem
reported is that TRQs allocated to some commodities are too small to be
commercially viable.  A potential importer holding a quota for a few thousand
metric tons of grains has to pool the quota with other shipments in order to
Figure II.  Composition of planted area in Brazil and China, 2002
Sources: Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics, China Statistics Yearbook, and the
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations as cited in Jales and
























fill a large grain cargo ship (which generally holds between 10,000 and
55,000 mt).  Such practice adds transaction costs and could be further
complicated if the Government imposes restrictions on pooling.”
Obviously, Chinese TRQs are more binding on imports than they are meant to be.















(million mt) (million mt) quantity
(million mt)
Wheat 7.884 9.636 2004 1-10 74 2002:8.468
(6 products) (depending (accession); 2003:9.052
on product) 65 (final) 2004:9.636
Corn 5.175 7.2 2004 1-10 64 2002:5.85
(5 products) (depending (accession); 2003:6.525
on product) 51 (final) 2004:7.2
Rice-short and 1.6625 2.66 2004 1-9 57 2002:1.995
medium grain (depending (accession); 2003:2.3275
(7 products) on product)  46 (final) 2004:2.66
Rice, long 1.6625 2.66 2004 1-9 57 2002:1.995
grain (depending (accession); 2003:2.3275
(7 products) on product) 46 (final) 2004:2.66
Soybean oil 2.118 3.5871 2005 9 63.3 2002:2.518
(2 products) (accession); 2003:2.818
9 (final 2004:3.118
by 2006) 2005:3.5871
Palm oil 2.1 3.168 2005 9 63.3 2002:2.4
(2 products) (accession); 2003:2.6
9 (final 2004:2.7
by 2006) 2005:3.168
Rapeseed oil 0.7392 1.243 2005 9 63.3 2002:0.8789
(2 products) (accession); 2003:1.0186
9 (final 2004:1.1266
by 2006) 2005:1.243
Sugar 1.68 1.945 2004 20 68.6 2002:1.764
(6 products) (initial); (accession); 2003:1.852
15 (final) 2004:1.945
50 (final)195
Thanks in part to its protectionist grain trade policy, different patterns exist in
Chinese foreign trade in agriculture and manufacturing.  Figure III shows that while overall
Chinese foreign trade is growing at an exponential rate, the country’s agricultural trade
remains flat.  Although the share of agriculture in global commerce declined during the
past decade, in 2003 it still accounted for as much as 9 per cent of total world trade and
11 per cent of total trade by developing countries.  In comparison, the share of agriculture
in Chinese foreign trade was below 4 per cent for the same year.  Even more striking is the
fact that today the share of agriculture has fallen to one-thirtieth of global GDP and to
1.8 per cent of developed countries’ GDP.  However, as recently as 2002, in China the
share was as high as 14.5 per cent.  In terms of the share of agriculture in total employment,
the comparison is even sharper – 43.4 per cent in China compared with less than 2 per
cent in developed countries.
5
Earlier, a widely circulated graph indicated a significant expansion of Chinese
agricultural trade along the lines of its comparative advantage (e.g., Rosen and others,
[2004], figure 3.1, page 38).  However, in contrast to that graph, when trade data are
carefully grouped into various agricultural products (figure IV), they show that Chinese
agricultural trade patterns changed very little in the past 10 years as far as trade balance
was concerned.  The exception is a sharp rise in soya and cotton imports in recent years,
6
Wool 0.25325 0.287 2004 1 38 2002:0.2645
(6 products) (accession); 2003:0.27575
38 (final) 2004:0.287
Cotton 0.78075 0.894 2004 1 61.6 2002:0.8185
(2 products) (accession); 2003:0.85625
40 (final) 2004:0.894
Source: United States General Accounting Office, “Report to Congressional Committees:  Analysis
of China’s commitments to other members,” GAO-03-04, October 2002, in Jales and others
(2006), p. 8.

















(million mt) (million mt) quantity
(million mt)
5 Agricultural products for China are defined in the Annex to the Uruguay Round Agreement on
Agriculture.  Except for China, all numbers in this paragraph come from Kym Anderson and Will Martin
(2005).
6 A graph of this type first appeared in C.A. Carter and X. Li (2002), using inflation-adjusted data for
1980-1997.196
which is discussed in the following section.  Histogram analysis over a span of 18 years
(1980-1997) finds stronger evidence of persistent trade patterns in agriculture than in
manufacture and primary products (Carter and Li, 2002).  Of course, in addition to
a protectionist grain trade policy in China, barriers to Chinese horticultural exports – which
are often disguised protectionism in the form of sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) and
technical barriers to trade (TBT) measures – also contribute to the slow improvement in
Chinese agricultural trade patterns along the lines of its comparative advantage.  This
occurs despite the fact that, through intra- and intersectoral adjustment, there has been
much domestic market liberalization in the Chinese agricultural sector.
Figure III.  Agriculture in total trade






















Chinese foreign trade, 1995-2004
Figure IV.  Chinese agricultural trade balance, 1992-2003
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As part of its WTO accession commitment, China was opening up its grain trade
through the lowering of tariffs and the expansion of TRQs up until 2006.  However, in the
initial years following accession, bad weather in North America reduced grain exports to
China; at the same time, China began releasing the grain reserve that had been built up
during the late 1990s into the domestic and even international markets.  That helped to
ease the pressure of grain imports.  As a result, a surge in grain imports was not seen until
2005, when import pressure began to be felt.
A poor transportation infrastructure has often been cited as a reason for the lack of
an integrated domestic agricultural market.  Cotton producers in north-western Xingjian
autonomous region faced difficulties in shipping their produce to the textile and clothing
factories in the eastern region, and the transportation subsidies they received became
a controversial issue in the WTO agriculture negotiations.  Similarly, soybeans produced in
China’s north-eastern provinces have a hard time reaching the coastal oil crushing facilities.
The weak transport infrastructure also serves as a natural barrier to the expansion of
Chinese agricultural trade, as do the grain reserve system and the low degree of
commercialization in Chinese agriculture.
C.  Political economy of Chinese agricultural trade policy
Differing patterns of agricultural protection in rich and poor countries can be
explained based on economics as well as the unique political system of each country.
Rich countries, such as the United States and Japan, as well as the European Union have
a small number of farmers compared with the total population, and it is easier for them to
form a united front to lobby for agricultural protection.  Fluctuations in agricultural harvests
due to weather dependence, food shortages or famine in recent history, and the not-so-
justifiable “multi-functionality” argument
7 all help to attract public sympathy for farmers and
the imposition of protectionist agricultural policies and support programmes in those countries.
Total expenditure on agricultural subsidies may not be small, but it is much more affordable
for rich countries, given the relatively small share of agriculture in the economy and the
number of farmers in the total population.  Although taxpayers and consumers have to foot
the bill, they are generally tolerant of the small per capita burden imposed on them
(Anderson, 1995).  Political systems also play a role.  For example, under the electoral
system in the United States, farmers are over-represented in Congress, which helps to
perpetuate the government farm support programmes.
The opposite is true in the case of China.  The large peasant population makes it
virtually impossible to overcome the “free rider” problem in forming a farm lobby and it is
financially infeasible to subsidize agriculture, which currently accounts for more than
40 per cent of total employment in China.  Economics aside, China’s official ideology
traditionally favours proletariat workers in SOEs over peasants simply because the latter
7 In “Agriculture’s ‘multifunctionality’ and the WTO,” Anderson (2000) refutes the claim that agriculture
deserves greater price support and import protection than other sectors because of the non-marketed
externalities and public goods it produces jointly with marketable food and fibre.198
as private citizens own property or a means of production.  Furthermore, China does not
have a law that legitimizes a nationwide independent trade union, and any trade
associations have to be affiliated with a government agency.  A farmers’ union or association
is no exception.  As a result, Chinese peasants have very limited influence on agricultural
trade policy-making.  Unlike agricultural protection in the United States, which has become
deeply embedded in the economic and political establishments, Chinese emphasis on
“grain self-sufficiency”, the cornerstone of its agricultural policy, has much weaker institutional
underpinnings and is susceptible to the influence of many interest groups.
However, the official attitude towards private ownership is changing, and to own
a property is less politically incorrect than before.  The most significant change in official
ideology towards private ownership is the “Three Represents Theory”, the masterpiece of
former Communist Party Secretary-General Jiang Zemin under which successful private
businessmen are welcome to join the ruling party and business interests are given
a bigger say in policy-making.
The grain self-sufficiency policy was the product of the Cold War era, which was
punctuated by embargoes on, and famines in China.  However, China now as a completely
new international environment and the grain self-sufficiency doctrine is facing challenges
both from within and outside China.  The Chinese policy community is debating whether it
is justifiable to pursue this costly doctrine.  However, because the embargo and famine
scene is still all too near in memory, it takes time for the leadership to change their
perception of the evolving grain security issue.
Domestic liberalization has left the market as the sole regulator of grain production.
However, WTO accession commitments have opened the door (up to TRQ limits) for
imports, making it difficult to maintain sufficiently high domestic grain prices.  Boosting
grain production through farm subsidies, although allowed under China’s accession protocol,
is not a financially viable option given its sheer size and the large number of farmers
engaging in grain production.  Water shortages in China’s grain belt and the excessive use
of farm chemicals are also raising environmental concerns over grain production (Murphy,
2004).
Chinese peasants are in no position to influence agricultural policy-making in the
same way that their United States and European Union counterparts are able to do.
Nevertheless, the urban-rural divide and the plight of the Chinese peasants do pose
a threat to social stability, which is the overwhelming concern of the leadership.  In
addition, the need to create a rural market for the demand-driven economic growth has
resulted in the Chinese leadership taking rural development seriously in an unprecedented
manner by including the NRD programme in the eleventh Five-Year Plan.
The NRD programme will certainly inject more investment into rural areas and the
agricultural sector, but its impact on grain production would be ambiguous.  First, the NRD
programme may have positive effects on grain production by helping improve the rural
infrastructure, but funds available to the ambitious programme will be limited.  The politically
powerful SOEs still receive huge amount of subsidies through easy loans and from the199
state budget, leaving the Government with little room for financial maneuvering.  Foreign
direct investment has played a vital role in Chinese urban and industrial development;
however, as a commercial operation, little has been earmarked for the rural areas.  Second,
the NRD programme comprises a long list of projects (for example, rural infrastructure,
and health-care and education projects) that will compete for funds with the shoestring
operation of grain production subsidies.  Finally, with better infrastructure, education and
health-care services, factor mobility will be improved, which will accelerate the process of
factor (and product) market integration and production adjustment away from grain
production (Zhong and others, 2006).  Therefore, the net effects of NRD on grain production
would be undetermined.
To raise the income of farmers is a key goal of the NRD programme.  Given the
limited resources, one feasible approach is to correct the remaining distortions within
agriculture.  This includes providing equal opportunities in accessing credit, inputs, research,
and development funds and logistic support etc. for all agricultural production, in addition
to price liberalization.  Resources devoted to the grain support programme should be
redirected to more productive or profitable use in agriculture.  This would certainly boost
horticultural and other types of labour-intensive production, and it would draw resources
from the grain sector as the correction progresses.  Since Chinese agricultural liberalization
has proceeded in this direction for almost 30 years, this intra-agricultural correction alone
may not suffice to raise the income of farmers significantly.  From a global point of view,
Chinese farmers could benefit enormously from the expansion of labour-intensive production,
most notably horticulture wherein its comparative advantage lies.  However, the comparative
advantage of Chinese agriculture cannot be exploited to its fullest potential unless land
and other resources, which are limited, are released from the grain sector.  This is possible
only if the grain trade is liberalized.
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The rising living standards of the Chinese population (particularly city dwellers)
require the availability of more processed, convenient and better-packaged quality food
rather than raw farm products.  In response, food processing industries and agribusinesses
are flourishing.  At the same time, global trade liberalization in manufactures creates
plenty of room for the expansion of the Chinese textile and clothing sector, which uses
cotton as the major input.  In some cases, however, their interests may not be consistent
with those of domestic producers of primary agricultural inputs.
Soya was once among the strategic commodities whose self-sufficiency was
encouraged.  The Chinese Ministry of Science and Technology also made huge
investments in research and development of genetic modification technology to boost soya
production.  To meet the rising domestic demand for quality cooking oil, many crushing
facilities had been established in the coastal region of China by the late 1990s.  Unable to
access domestic soya supplies, most of which was produced in north-eastern China, the
8 An increase in horticultural production may result in a domestic price decline or terms of trade
deterioration.  This problem could be solved by upgrading the products for high-end domestic or
international markets.  However, this requires other inputs in addition to unskilled labour.200
crushing industry successfully lobbied the Government in 2001 for opening up to soya
imports despite opposition from domestic stakeholders.  A similar idea is being floating for
opening up to imports of corn feed in order to meet the demand in the livestock raising,
dairy and meat industries.
Cotton is another strategic commodity.  Chinese negotiators worked very hard to
secure a quota limit in the accession negotiations in order to protect the cotton sector.
However, China’s textile and clothing industry was under expansion in anticipation of the
expiry of the Multi-Fibre Arrangement by 2004 and was in need of cheap cotton, a key
input for the industry.  As a result, the National Development and Reform Commission
allowed cotton imports that were well above the quota limit at the in-quota tariff rate,
starting in 2003.
WTO negotiations are cross-sectoral in nature and agricultural trade agreements
are often linked with the negotiation outcomes in other areas.  When presented with
a possible trade deal, the top leadership will weigh the agricultural interests against other
more powerful constituencies (for example, those of the telecom, banking and insurance
sectors) if a trade-off has to be made.
Pressure to liberalize the grain trade can also be felt from outside China.  The
Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture has a built-in agenda for trade talks on the three
pillars of agricultural support, i.e., market access, domestic support and export assistance.
At the Hong Kong Ministerial Conference in 2005, significant progress in modality talks on
the last two issues was achieved and negotiations on market access are ongoing.  Among
the three pillars, China has no export assistance and almost zero, if not negative,
9 domestic
support.  Market access is the only defence interest for China in the negotiations.  Among
the five interested parties that lead the agriculture negotiations, the United States, Brazil
and Australia all have an ambitious market access agenda, and the United States and
Australia are the top source countries of Chinese grain imports.  In the ongoing
China-Australia FTA talks, Australia is insisting on a comprehensive FTA, i.e., free trade for
all commodities with no exceptions for wheat, barley and other grain products.  Pressure
to import more rice from ASEAN exists, although China has successfully had rice excluded
from the China-ASEAN FTA.
D.  China in the WTO and FTA negotiations
Having brought Chinese agricultural trade policy into perspective, this discourse
now turns to Chinese foreign trade relations, with particular focus on agriculture, followed
by a discussion of the Chinese positions in WTO agriculture negotiations and China’s FTA
talks with ASEAN and Australia.
9 Because of various fees and taxes imposed on farmers, Chinese agriculture in fact was receiving
negative overall support for years until recently, according to Sun Dongsheng in his presentation at the
conference on “Globalization, Market Integration, Agricultural Support Policy and Smallholders,” Nanjing,
China, 8-9 November 2004.201
1.  Agriculture in Chinese foreign trade relations
Chinese agricultural trade relations can be well understood from the viewpoints of
labour/land endowment, climate, geography and cultural proximity with its neighbours.
Figure V shows the distribution of Chinese agricultural imports by region.  North America
has traditionally been the most important source of Chinese agricultural imports, followed
in 2003 by Latin America, ASEAN, Australia and New Zealand, the European Union and
sub-Saharan Africa.  There has been a sharp rise in imports from Latin America since
2000, largely because China opened up its soya imports in 2001, and because Brazil and
Argentina have been major soya exporters to China.  This policy alone has boosted Latin
America to the rank of second-largest source of Chinese agricultural imports, closely
following first-ranked North America.
Figure V.  Chinese agricultural imports by region, 2003









































On the export side, Japan was the top destination, followed by ASEAN, Hong
Kong, China, the Republic of Korea, the European Union and North America in 2003
(figure VI).  In the case of Hong Kong, China, it is important to remember that it is a major
gateway for Chinese exports to the world; goods recorded as exports to Hong Kong, China
may actually be destined for a third country.  Since 1993, Chinese Customs has been
trying to identify the final destinations of Chinese exports.  However, the effort cannot be
exhaustive because Chinese exporters and even the Hong Kong, China traders who run
the re-export business do not really know the final destination when the goods clear the
Chinese Customs as exports and the Hong Kong, China Customs as imports.  It is only
when goods are further processed and sorted in Hong Kong, China that the traders know
exactly to where the goods will eventually be shipped.  That is why Hong Kong, China
import data do not include information on final destinations.  This information can only be
obtained from re-export data (Feenstra and others, 1998).  It is clear that ASEAN occupies
a solid second place among China’s agricultural export destinations.202
Table 3.  Chinese agricultural imports and exports by region, 2003
(Unit:  US$ million)
Origin/destination Imports Exports
Australia and New Zealand 1 687 163
ASEAN 2 530 2 089
Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union 233 852
European Union 1 097 1 543
Hong Kong, China 28 2 063
Japan 167 3 889
Latin America 4 554 209
Middle East and North Africa 110 808
North America 5 229 1 176
Rest of the world 115 383
South Asia 98 324
Republic of Korea 103 1 811
Sub-Saharan Africa 428 438
Taiwan Province of China 83 224
Sources: China Customs statistics and calculations by the author.
When comparing figures V and VI, it can be seen that they are in sharp contrast
and that, with the exception of ASEAN, China has a trade imbalance with all other major
agricultural trading partners.  Imports are mainly from North America and Latin America
while exports are mainly to neighbouring Asian countries.
Figure VI.  Chinese agricultural exports by region, 2003














































Chinese agricultural trade relations shown in figures V and VI can be easily
understood in terms of resource endowments in China and those other countries.  China
has abundant labour but is land-scarce relative to North America and Latin America.  This
explains the level of Chinese imports of wheat, barley, maize, soya and cotton from those
regions.  If a comparison is made between labour/land resources and capital, China
certainly has comparative advantages in agriculture.  It is for that reason that China
exports mainly agricultural products (as well as labour-intensive manufactured goods) to
Japan, Hong Kong, China and the Republic of Korea while importing capital- and technology-
intensive industrial goods from those countries.
ASEAN is the only region that has a balanced agricultural trade with China.  These
two regions do not differ distinctly in relative factor endowments.  Rather, climate makes
a difference in determining bilateral agricultural trade patterns.  China exports temperate
horticultural products and grains (except rice), soya and cotton to ASEAN, and imports
mostly tropical products and rice from ASEAN.
Geographical proximity makes it easier for China to export perishable horticultural
products to its neighbours.  Historically, those countries have been influenced by Chinese
culture and some even have large ethnic Chinese populations.  Chinese-made agricultural
products are particularly in demand in those regions.  Finally, stringent SPS rules in the
European Union and the United States result in China looking to its neighbouring developing
countries for export markets.  The success of Chinese horticultural exports to Japan is
largely due to Japanese investment in China in horticultural production and processing,
which helps in improving the quality of Chinese exports to Japan and in meeting stringent
Japanese SPS requirements (Wu Huang, 2002).
2.  China in WTO agricultural negotiations
Since China began participating in the WTO agriculture negotiations, much of the
attention in the international trade policy area has been on the role the Chinese will play in
those negotiations.  Interest in China intensified after the country joined the G20 at the
Cancun WTO Ministerial Meeting in September 2003.  So far, China has given the impression
that it is a low-key player and lacks a clear position.  This subsection attempts to explain
why China chose to maintain a low profile, compared to Brazil, the leader of the G20 and
one of the “Five Interested Parties” dominating the agriculture negotiations.
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China is a net importer of cotton and soya, and a potential net importer of grain.
These products are subsidized in the United States, which is the major destination for
Chinese exports.  Subsidized exports benefit China as a whole and are very much welcomed
by China’s textile, clothing and oil-crushing industries.  However, they run contrary to the
grain self-sufficiency policy of China, which has been the primary reason for Chinese
opposition to agricultural subsidies in developed countries.  China’s ambiguity in agriculture
10 For a comparative study of the Brazilian and Chinese agriculture sectors, see Jales and others
(2006).204
negotiations reflects this dilemma; this raises the question as to whether China, as a net
grain importer, will stay in the G20.  This question is considered at the end of this subsection.
As for market access, which is one of the three pillars in agriculture negotiations,
the grain sector has most of China’s defence interest, which is limited but sensitive.
China’s offence interest includes tariff cuts in overseas markets for its horticultural exports.
Although there is room for further tariff reductions in export markets, barriers of the first
order to Chinese horticultural exports are not tariffs, but disguised protectionism in the
forms of SPS and TBT, which are not on the negotiation agenda of the Doha Round.  As
a result, there is no strong incentive for China to push for liberalization in market access.
Of course, as a new member, weak negotiating capacity is also a reason why China is not
pushing as hard as Brazil for agricultural trade reform.
In contrast, Brazil is a net exporter of many agricultural products and is in direct
competition with exporters in the United States and the European Union.  Subsidies in
developed countries hurt the Brazilian soya, cotton, sugar and beef industries.  Furthermore,
the European Union, which zealously guards its domestic market through various border
measures, is the top destination for Brazilian agricultural exports.  As such, Brazil has
every reason to push very hard for liberalization in all three pillars of agriculture negotiations,
which will unambiguously benefit Brazilian agriculture as well as its national economy.
Will China stay in the G20?  While it would be possible in theory to have all
Chinese sectors benefit from foreign-subsidized grain imports through a carefully defined
taxation and transfer payment scheme, it would be politically infeasible for the Ministry of
Agriculture (which is in charge of agriculture negotiations) to give concessions to foreign
countries and seek concessions from other Chinese ministries.  After all, negotiations at
home are the most difficult part of the overall trade negotiations, a sentiment shared by
many negotiators.  For this reason, the author believes that China will choose to stay in
the G20.
3.  China in FTA negotiations
Immediately after China became a WTO member in 2001, the Government of Hong
Kong, China proposed the establishment of a Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement
with China.  Shortly afterwards, the Government of Macao, China made a similar proposal.
The two Closer Economic Partnership Arrangements were the first bilateral FTAs for
China.  Since then, China has successfully negotiated three more BTAs, two of which are
in force, and it is currently considering a number of other BTAs.
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The idea for a China-Japan-Republic of Korea FTA has long been entertained
among scholars but has never entered the negotiation phase.  Political tension between
China and Japan is an often-cited reason as to why no progress has been made so far.
11 The China – Pakistan FTA is pending country ratification, while BTAs with Chile and Niger are in
implementation.  China also negotiated accession to APTA and concluded an FTA with ASEAN.  More
information of these agreements can be found at the APTIAD website, www.unescap.org/tid/aptiad.205
However, protectionist agricultural trade policies in the Republic of Korea and Japan are
also to blame.  On the other hand, some progress has been made in China’s FTA talks
with Australia and New Zealand, while FTAs with ASEAN and Chile are in force.
This subsection explores the relationship between FTAs and the WTO multilateral
negotiations, with particular reference to the China-ASEAN and China-Australia FTAs.
One frequently asked question concerning this issue is whether the former helps the latter,
or whether an FTA is a building block or a stumbling block multilateral negotiations.
Literature on this topic is abundant but there is no definite answer (Winters, 1996).  Instead
of attempting to answer such a general question, two specific questions are posed here:
(a) Will FTA-induced production adjustment in the grain sector be consistent with
that potentially induced by future multilateral liberalization?
(b) Will the China-Japan rivalry in their FTA negotiations with ASEAN or a possible
China-Australia FTA generate any positive dynamics for WTO agriculture
negotiations?
With regard to the second question, figure VII illustrates the trade patterns of key
grains among China, ASEAN, Australia, Japan and the United States.
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(a) China-ASEAN FTA
As discussed in section D1, ASEAN is the only trading partner of China that has
significant agricultural trade in both imports and exports.  The China-ASEAN FTA, which
entered into force on 1 July 2003, is designed to eliminate 99 per cent of tariffs and is
considered as one of a few quality FTAs characterized by comprehensive market access
liberalization and manageable provisions on rules of origin (Cheong, 2006).  In this regard,
it is only second to the Australia-New Zealand Closer Economic Relations, the only FTA in
the world under which all tariffs and quantitative restrictions on trade in goods are eliminated.
Indeed, unlike the many other FTAs negotiated in recent years in which agriculture has
been excluded, agriculture was negotiated upfront in the China-ASEAN FTA and is the key
component of its Early Harvest Programme.  Most agricultural trade, except for a few206
sensitive aspects such as ASEAN rice exports to China, has been granted duty-free
access in China (Pasadilla, chapter III, this publication).
The answer to the first question above is “no”.  With regard to ASEAN, China has
a regional comparative advantage in non-rice grain, but globally it has a comparative
disadvantage in the same agricultural products.  Chinese exports of non-rice grains to
ASEAN will expand as a result of the FTA.  However, if a breakthrough is achieved in the
WTO agriculture negotiations in the area of market access, China would certainly import
more grain, which would depress Chinese grain production.  The opposite movement of
resources in the grain sector represents the elements in the China-ASEAN FTA that are
not consistent with multilateral liberalization.
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As for the second question, the focus is on rice, which is the only crop both
sensitive in the WTO talks and significant for all three parties involved.  In this sense, rice
is the only agricultural product that would, if liberalization is achieved in FTA talks, have
a positive impact on the multilateral negotiations.  As shown in figure VII, in the rice
triangle, China and Japan are on the defensive while ASEAN is on the offensive.
However, in the China-ASEAN FTA deal, rice is exempt from liberalization.  Thus,
with this precedence on the part of China, it is not surprising to see that Japan has also
excluded rice from its FTA with Thailand.  For the same reason, it is very unlikely that
Japan will make any concessions in rice market access in FTA negotiations with ASEAN in
order to compete with China.
On the other hand, trade diversion for Japan as a result of the China-ASEAN FTA
may pressure Japan to seal its FTA deal with ASEAN as soon as possible; however, there
is no indication that Japan will have to resort to rice liberalization to convince ASEAN.  In
fact, ASEAN 6 exports twice as much to Japan as it does to China, and Japan has enough
chips in its hand in the talks.
Furthermore, the swift FTA deal between China and ASEAN benefits from the fact
that the two regions have quite similar economic structures.  Both are emerging markets
with a significant agricultural sector and a mostly labour-intensive manufacturing sector.
Therefore, politically sensitive products were very few and the FTA negotiations
encountered little domestic opposition.  However, trade between Japan and ASEAN is
more of a complementary nature; therefore, issues that are more contentious will arise in
the negotiations.  For example, in addition to rice, Japanese luxury cars are also
a sensitive issue for Thailand, which has been excluded from the deal, as noted by
Pasadilla (chapter III, this publication).  Trade talks are about reciprocity.  In the light of this
situation, rice liberalization cannot be placed on the agenda in the Japan-ASEAN FTA
talks before many other sticking points are cleared.  In short, with rice as an untouchable
issue, China-Japan rivalry in their FTA negotiations with ASEAN can hardly generate any
positive dynamics for WTO agriculture negotiations.
12 A similar case for Viet Nam is provided by the World Bank (2005), in Global Economic Prospects:
Trade, Regionalism and Development, box 6.2, p. 132.207
(b) China-Australia FTA
The proposed China-Australia FTA is significant for both countries.  For China, it
will be the first FTA with a developed country.  Since China’s accession to WTO,
anti-dumping investigations of Chinese products in the United States and the European
Union have often been conducted with invocation of the clause concerning non-market
economy status in China’s accession protocol.  Seeking recognition of its market economy
status has been a top priority in Chinese foreign trade diplomacy, and it is part of the FTA
deal with Australia.  Strengthening trade relations with Australia also conforms to China’s
need for secured energy supplies to fuel its fast-growing economy.
To have unfettered access to the Chinese market is the primary motivation for the
FTA on the part of Australia, and is of particular importance to Australian mineral, energy
and agricultural exports.  Talks with China have gained momentum since Australia reached
an FTA agreement with the United States in February 2004, partly in response to criticism
at home that an FTA with the United States would isolate Australia from the booming East
Asian economies.
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Given the enormous economic benefits from a potential FTA (Mai and others,
2005) and the strategic importance of mutual engagement between these two large countries
in the Asian-Pacific region, the FTA initiative enjoys high-level political support by the two
Governments.  However, negotiations have been stalled over the treatment of Australian
grain exports to China; while Australia aims for a comprehensive FTA, China insists that
grain should be considered a sensitive product and exempted from liberalization.  Although
it is beyond the scope of this chapter to speculate on the negotiation outcomes, some
analysis of the grain issue in a possible comprehensive China-Australia FTA can be made
here in an attempt to answer the two questions raised at the beginning of this subsection.
The answer to the first question is “yes”.  A comprehensive FTA with Australia will
increase Chinese grain imports, as Australia has a comparative advantage in grain production
in relation to China.  From a global perspective, Chinese agriculture does not have
a comparative advantage in grain production, and with the progress in agricultural market
access negotiations at WTO, China will certainly increase grain imports.  Adjustment of
Chinese grain production in response to trade liberalization induced by a comprehensive
China-Australia FTA will be an intermediate step towards multilateral liberalization in
agriculture.
Again, as figure VII indicates, a comprehensive China-Australia FTA would give
Australia a preferential margin over the United States in access to the Chinese grain
market.  Given its credentials as the champion of global agricultural trade reform, Australia
will not stop pushing for the multilateral process at WTO.  On the other hand, the United
States would be disadvantaged in its grain exports to China.  Formation of a United
 13 For example, Ross Garnaut, who is a prominent critic of the Australia-United States FTA and is
politically allied with the opposition party, often uses the “stumbling block” concept (Bhagwati, 1993) in
formulating his argument in the popular media.208
States-China FTA is almost impossible in the near future, and a comprehensive
China-Australia FTA will only pressure the United States to pursue agricultural reform at
WTO more actively, particularly with regard to market access, which is the area most
critical to the WTO agriculture negotiations.
E.  Conclusion
Chinese agricultural reform has made much progress in the past but there is still
a long way to go before full integration with the world trading system is achieved.  Analysis
of the political economy of Chinese agricultural trade policy indicates that, although
a strongly held belief, the “grain security” perception is changing as a result of the evolving
political and economic environments, both at home and abroad.  China’s unique trade
patterns and its emphasis on grain self-sufficiency can explain the ambiguity of its positions
in the WTO agriculture negotiations.
There is no clear indication as to whether the China-ASEAN FTA will help with the
multilateral progress or not; however, the FTA deal is resulting in the movement of resources
into China’s grain sector (except rice), which is not the same direction that multilateral
liberalization would take.  However, a China-Australia FTA, if it is comprehensive, would
have a different impact in terms of grain production adjustment.  It would also generate
pressure to speed up the WTO agriculture negotiations.209
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VII.  AGRICULTURAL TRADE AND GOVERNMENT




Since the Uruguay Round negotiating mandate sought “greater liberalization of
trade in agriculture”, WTO members have been locked in an intense debate on the nature
and extent of trade liberalization in agriculture.  Various perspectives of agricultural trade
liberalization have come to the fore in the debate.  The proponents of the trade liberalization
agenda have argued aggressively in favour of dismantling the tariff walls as, in their view,
this would bring significant global welfare gains.  However, opposing voices have emphasized
the fact that significant non-trade concerns exist, which would have to be given precedence
over the trade agenda.  This chapter reviews traditional arguments for trade liberalization
and provides a closer look at the additional reasons for use of government intervention,
including trade policy, in agriculture in a developing country, with particular reference to
India.
A.  Rationale for liberalizing agricultural trade
The case for liberalizing agricultural trade has been built on arguments, the origins
of which can be traced back to the pure theory of international trade.  According to
these arguments, trade liberalization provides the “optimal solution”, but only under “ideal”
market conditions.  Some of the key assumptions that are made in this regard are that:
(a) markets are assumed to be perfectly competitive; (b) producers minimize costs subject
to constant returns to scale; (c) consumers maximize their utility; and (d) all markets,
including that for labour, are cleared with flexible prices.
While the earlier studies enumerated the welfare implications of adoption or
otherwise of free trade policies in largely conceptual terms, the more recent studies have
provided precise estimates of the welfare gains that would result from the liberalization of
agricultural trade.  Among the more influential of these studies are those that have used
general equilibrium models.
In a series of papers published during the past few years, World Bank economists
have provided detailed projections by simulating the possible outcomes of the Doha
Round negotiations.
1
1 The most quoted of these papers are by Kym Anderson, Will Martin and Dominique van der
Mensbrugghe (2005 and 2006) and Van der Mensbrugghe (2004); see reference list.  See also
chapters IV and V in this volume.212
The first major set of results reported in the papers pertains to the effect of the
ongoing trade liberalization efforts on real income up to 2015.  These estimates have been
made against the benchmark that assumes a complete freeing of merchandise trade over
the period 2005-2010.  It has been projected that real income gains by 2015 for the global
economy as a whole would be US$ 287.3 billion per year (in 2001 US dollars).  Of this
increase, the share of developed countries would be US$ 201.6 billion while for the
developing countries the gains would be US$ 85.7 billion.  In other words, the share of the
developing countries would be a third of the total global gains.  More importantly, real
income gains reported for the developing countries would be 0.8 per cent of the baseline
income in 2015, which is marginally higher than the corresponding figure for the
developed countries (0.6 per cent).  Among the developing countries, the relatively
prosperous Latin American region is expected to register real income, which would be
1 per cent of the baseline income in 2015 while for the South Asian region the corresponding
figure would only be 0.4 per cent.
These broad results lend themselves to two varying interpretations.  The first one,
which has been provided in the papers referred to above, is that the results are significantly
favourable for the developing countries since their expected real income gains are considerably
larger than their existing share in global production.  Thus, while the developing countries
as a whole account for a quarter of the global production at present, they would be able to
enjoy a third of the global gains in real income that is expected annually until 2015.  An
alternate view would be that the results are pointing to the increasing gulf between the
relatively prosperous and poorer regions and countries.
In overall terms, it could be said that the disproportionately large gains for the
developed countries that the papers under discussion have predicted would reinforce the
status of the lesser players in the global economy as “developing”, even after the so-called
“development round” has been implemented.  What is more, the results point to increasing
differentiation between the developing countries, as the more prosperous regions are
slated to record relatively larger increases in real income.
The disaggregated results provided for a small set of countries broadly reinforce
the above-mentioned conclusions.  India is expected to register a real income gain of only
US$ 3.4 billion a year, which is 0.4 per cent of the base line income in 2015.  In the case
of China, the corresponding figures are US$ 5.6 billion and 0.2 per cent, respectively.  On
the other hand, countries such as Thailand are expected to gain US$ 7.7 billion, while for
Argentina the real income gain could be nearly US$ 5 billion.
Although the proponents of trade liberalization have made significant claims about
the gains that would arise from dropping the tariff walls, the empirical evidence provided
by the stylised models fails to provide clinching proof that the lesser players in the global
economy would have much to gain from the process.  An important issue that arises in this
context is whether the models have made the right predictions, given that they represent
a vastly simplified image of the real world.  Most significantly, the theoretical basis of these
models, i.e., a distortion-free perfectly competitive world, needs to be re-assessed
(Dhar, 2006 and chapter V in this publication).213
Indeed, through the many decades that trade theory has been developing, it has
been at pains to evolve a credible conceptual framework that can capture cross-border
transactions.  One of the major challenges that trade theory has been confronted with is
the provision of a sound basis for the “appropriate set of policy interventions that can
accommodate the plethora of distortions that rule the real world.  The use of trade protection
measures has been an anathema for the economists credited with developing the
so-called “pure theory” of trade.  In fact, much of the debate on trade theory in the
decades prior to the advent of strategic trade theory – which boldly announces the use of
government interventions for realizing national policy objectives, given the reality of
imperfectly competitive markets – has tried to provide narrowly defined exceptions for the
use of interventions.  The following section provides an account of how trade theory has
dealt with the issue of the use of interventionist policy.
B.  Trade theory and the use of interventions
The free trade world, as several generations of economists have reminded us,
provides Pareto optimal outcomes.  The equilibrium is reached as the marginal rate of
transformation in domestic production and the marginal rate of substitution in consumption
and foreign trade would be equalized.  Furthermore, under assumptions of free trade,
domestic prices are equalized with landed, foreign prices – and domestic prices are
equated with the marginal rate of transformation in production and the marginal rate of
substitution in consumption.  Argued in a somewhat different framework, proponents of the
free trade ideal put forth the notion that opening up of trade, from an erstwhile situation of
trade restrictions, would result in global welfare maximization in the long term.  The gains
would accrue as trade creates conditions for securing benefits through comparative
advantage (Bhagwati, 1969, p.11ff.).
The fundamental proposition that a protagonist of free trade would make is that
adjustment costs do not arise in the long-term perspective.  The process through which
this happens was well summarized by F.W. Taussig:  “The free trader argues that if the
duties were given up and the protected industries pushed out of the field by foreign
competitors, the workmen engaged in them would find no less well-paid employment
elsewhere”.
2  Gottfried Haberler (1950) formulated the same idea, but somewhat
differently:  “We may conclude that in the long term the working class as a whole has
nothing to fear from international trade, since, in the long term, labour is the least specific
of all factors.  It will gain by the general increase in productivity due to the international
division of labour, and is not likely to lose at all seriously by a change in the functional
distribution of national income”.
3
2 F.W. Taussig, Principles of Economics (1939, p. 516), quoted by Stolper, Wolfgang and Paul
A. Samuelson (1941).
3 Gottfried Haberler (1950), “The Theory of International Trade”, quoted by Stolper, Wolfgang and
Paul A. Samuelson (1941).214
Conceptualized in the terms of the two-factor framework, the meaning of the above
conclusions arrived at by Taussig and Haberler is fairly obvious.  Unemployment of resources
would be ruled out in a free trade world, since the lowering of protection would automatically
trigger an adjustment process that would result in a market clearing outcome.
These virtues of free trade notwithstanding, it was argued that use of protectionist
measures could be justified under specific circumstances.  In the view of Haberler (1950)
and subsequently H.G. Johnson (1965), one such situation would be when there was
immobility of the factors of production or factor prices suffered from rigidities.
It may be pointed out that a situation of factor immobility in relative terms, in
particular involving the labour force engaged in the rural sector, is the stark reality that
faces many developing countries.  In those countries, although the relative importance of
agriculture has declined quite significantly in recent years (as is apparent from the declining
share of the sector in GDP, the share of the rural population has not declined in any
meaningful manner.  Table 1 captures this reality for some developing countries, including
India and China.
Table 1.  Changing importance of agriculture and the rural sector
in selected developing countries
Low income
China India Indonesia developing
Year
countries
Agriculture, Rural Agriculture, Rural Agriculture, Rural Agriculture, Rural
value added population value added population value added population  value added population
(% of GDP) (% of total) (% of GDP) (% of total) (% of GDP) (% of total) (% of GDP) (% of total)
1970 35.2 82.6 46.1 80.1 44.9 82.5 43.6 81.3
1975 32.4 82.6 41.3 78.8 30.2 80.5 39.7 79.7
1980 30.1 80.4 38.9 77.0 24.0 78.4 36.6 77.4
1985 28.4 77.0 33.7 75.7 23.2 73.6 34.3 76.1
1990 27.0 72.3 31.3 74.5 19.4 69.7 32.4 74.7
1995 19.8 68.9 28.2 73.4 17.1 64.2 29.9 73.2
2000 14.8 64.4 23.7 72.1 15.6 58.3 26.8 71.6




Source: World Development Indicators (2006).
The asymmetry between the fast decline of agriculture’s share in GDP and the
slow fall of the share of rural population is most significant in China and India.  The
situation looks particularly difficult for India, which has seen a halving of the share of
agriculture in GDP over the past three decades while the share of its rural population has
declined by a mere 10 per cent.  It is also important to note that paid employment in215
agriculture in India (about 5 per cent in 2004) falls very much behind China (60 per cent in
2003), Indonesia (44 per cent in 2005) and some other developing countries, according
to International Labour Organization Online Statistics and Asian Development Bank Kew
Indicators.
This situation has emerged in many developing countries because of a structural
bias against agriculture in the so-called development policies that those countries have
adopted over the past several decades.  One of the manifestations of the bias against
agriculture was reflected in the form of distortions in the labour market.  Johnson (1965)
offered two reasons for such a distortion that are commonly advanced in the literature on
economic development, both of which pertain to distortion in the labour market.  First,
earnings of labour in agriculture exceed the marginal productivity of agricultural labour, so
that the industrial wage must exceed the alternative opportunity cost of labour.  Second,
industrial wages exceed wages in agriculture by a margin greater than can be accounted
for by the disutility or higher cost of urban life.
It may be argued that most distortions, including those in the labour market, in
developing countries were imposed by adopting policies that provided excessive protection
to the industrial sector.  In many cases, agriculture was also taxed, in the sense that the
imperatives such as attainment of food security and, in particular, providing the population
with the basic food items at affordable prices was responsible for agricultural producers
being unable to realize the efficiency prices for their products.
The policy bias against agriculture in developing countries was reflected in the
tardy deployment of the relatively scarce resource, capital.  India stands out as a case in
point.  In the early 1980s, the share of agriculture in the gross capital formation in the
country was close to 20 per cent; however, by the turn of the century, this figure had
declined to a mere 6 per cent, despite overall growth in investment across the whole
economy.  Quite clearly, therefore, agriculture in India has been affected by the domestic
distortion, caused largely by the policy bias.  Under such circumstances, trade theorists
may require interaction in the form of tariffs or subsidies, or both.
Bhagwati and Ramaswami (1963) provided a conceptual framework for the use of
tariffs and subsidies in the presence of domestic distortions.  Given the objective of
realizing an optimum solution that is characterized by the quality of the foreign rate of
transformation (FRT), the domestic rate of transformation in production (DRT) and the
domestic rate of substitution (DRS), Bhagwati and Ramaswami postulated that a policy
permitting the attainment of maximum welfare involved a tax-cum-subsidy on domestic
production.  A tariff-alone policy would, in their view, equate DRT and FRT, but would
destroy the equality between DRS and FRT.  By the same token, a subsidy-alone
intervention would tend to establish parity between DRT and FRT, but would destroy the
equality between DRS and DRT.
If, in the earlier decades, trade theorists were discussing issues related to
distortions as exceptional cases to the free trade ideal that they stood by, in recent
decades the advent of strategic trade theory changed all of that.  The 1970s saw the216
initiation of a discourse that challenged the fundamentals of the traditionalist view of trade
theory.  This body of literature was based on the premise that global markets were
characterized by imperfect competition.  Using the conceptual bases from the theory of
industrial organization, the proponents of this view argued that under imperfect competition,
there was a possibility that interventionist trade policies might have beneficial “strategic”
effects (Helpman and Krugman, 1989).  Based on this understanding, the strategic trade
theorists have analysed various situations in which government intervention can be justified.
The original idea of strategic trade theory was propounded by Brander and Spencer
(1981 and 1984),
4 who showed that government intervention could raise national welfare
by shifting oligopoly rents from foreign to domestic firms.  They argued that the grant of
export subsidies would have the effect of a deterrent on foreign exports, as a result of
which profits of the home firm would rise more than the amount of subsidy.  This would
result in a rise in home income through increased rent capture by a domestic firm.  Little or
no consideration, however, was given to domestic consumers in those early models on
strategic trade policy.
The large body of literature that has since emerged has provided analytical insights
into the functioning of the various sectors (largely in the context of the United States’
economy) in which interventions of the type that this school of trade theory has tried to
conceptualize are prevalent.
5  These studies have assessed the potential gains from using
strategic trade policies.  They have concluded that carefully designed import tariffs or
export subsidies can ensure better outcomes that free trade in certain markets, mostly in
differentiated manufactured products associated with oligopolistic market structures.  At
the same time, however, the authors emphasized the point that their findings should in no
way be interpreted as general support for pro-interventionist policies.
While it is industry that has been the focus of analytical studies using strategic
trade theory, there have been some attempts to look at “strategic trade” issues in agriculture
(Reimer and Stiegert, 2006).  Arguably, a number of markets for agricultural products are
also associated with a high concentration of “agents”, indicating potential applicability of
“strategic” policy interventions in the agricultural sector by developing countries.  Hamilton
and Stiegert (2002) and Dong, Marsh and Stiegert (2006) examined the case of the
Canadian Wheat Board (CWB) in the international durum wheat market; the latter examined
CWB and Australian Barley Board (ABB) in the malting barley market (Reimer and Stiegert,
2006).  These studies argued that state trading enterprises (STEs) such as CWB and ABB
fitted the requirements associated with strategic trade theory in at least three major ways.
First, the markets for both durum wheat and malting barley are characterized by imperfect
competition.  While CWB was found to be controlling 40-60 per cent of the global durum
wheat market, the malting barley market was effectively controlled by CWB and ABB.
Second, the respective governments had made unilateral prior commitments to both CWB
and ABB.  Finally, STEs maintained legal and executive control over the instruments of
4 See also Paul R. Krugman (1990).
5 For a comprehensive survey, see J.A. Brander (1995).217
strategic trade and the quantity traded.  This, according to the studies, gave CWB and
ABB an advantage over independent firms, which may also have strategic delegation
issues and asymmetric information problems.
Although available studies have indicated that the use of strategic trade theory is
more of an exception, the reality seems to be at considerable variance with this point of
view.  Over the past several decades, governments in the developed world, particularly
those of the United States and the European Union, have de facto used strategic trade
theory to maintain their domination over the global markets for major agricultural commodities.
6
The instrumentalities for using strategic trade theory were provided by the farm policies
that the United States and the European member countries have been adopting since the
1950s without being subjected to multilateral discipline.
7  For example, the farm policy
instruments are aimed at managing output in the markets that have often suffered because
supplies have far exceeded what the markets can carry.
The use of policy instruments by the United States and the European Union to
improve their advantage in the global agricultural markets has resulted in an interesting
debate in the context of the reshaping of the global agricultural policies, in which the World
Trade Organization (WTO) is currently engaged.  Initiated by the developing countries, this
debate makes the point that the persistence of distortions in the global agricultural markets
requires “strategic” interventions on their part.  These interventions combined with sound
distributive policies, they argue, are necessary for safeguarding the livelihoods of the
multitude of marginal farmers that dot the agricultural landscape in their countries in
addition to ensuring that the food security concerns are met.
C.  A case for special products as ‘strategic’ interventions
The debate on agricultural trade liberalization that WTO negotiations created two
decades ago, has brought to the fore a range of issues that have posed serious challenges
to formulating trade policies.  Particularly significant in this context are the articulations
made by the developing countries, which claim that development concerns stemming from
the imperatives of meeting the objectives of food security and livelihoods have to form an
integral part of the new trade disciplines.  In other words, those countries have been
emphasizing that the focus of trade policy must shift away from the realization of the
free-trade ideal, as has been the case hitherto, to one that provides the space to use
instruments for meeting these development concerns.
6 While the United States and the members of the European Union control nearly 50 per cent of
wheat exports, the United States has a share in excess of 50 per cent in the exports of soybeans and
maize.
7 Although the United States has been using its farm policy to provide a strategic advantage to its
farm sector since the 1930s, it received legal sanction to use the farm policy instruments after the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Contracting Parties agreed to grant a waiver from the
application of Articles II and XI of GATT (see GATT [1955]).  In 1957, the Treaty of Rome (known more
often as the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community) established the basis of the
Common Agricultural Policy that has directed agricultural policy of the European Union member States.218
The cornerstone of this changed focus of trade policy-making, in the author’s view,
should be the proposal by most of the major developing countries to adopt the twin
instruments of Special Products (SPs) and the Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM) as
a way to address concerns of food security, livelihoods and rural development.
8  B y
suggesting the adoption of these instruments, the developing countries have emphasized
that “strategic” interventions such as the use of tariff protection are essential for the
realization of development objectives.
Inadequacies in understanding the concerns raised by developing countries using
the traditional trade theory framework have been aptly demonstrated in a recent paper by
Ivanic and Martin (2006), in which they critically commented on the proposal to introduce
SPs that developing countries have made.  They commented that increased protection
from the use of SPs “effects poverty through three broad channels”.  The first is the effects
of commodity prices and wages on incomes in the short term.  The second is through the
efficiency of resource allocation, and hence aggregate real national income, as resources
are diverted away from the activities that yield the highest social returns into those that
generate the highest market returns at distorted prices.  The third is through changes in
productivity – as resources are diverted away from export-oriented activities towards import
replacement, productivity tends to fall.
With regard to the first point, it needs to be stated that while Ivanic and Martin were
concerned about the detrimental effect of commodity price rises on urban consumers,
most developing counties would like to use SPs to influence commodity prices and wages
to benefit farm households.  It may be argued that the main reason for using the instrument
of SPs is to ensure reversal of the secular decline in commodity prices, and in particular
prices of commodities that are critical for providing livelihood security for farm households.
In past decades, low commodity prices have reduced the farmers in developing countries
to a marginalized existence; this situation can become far worse if the subsidized commodities
are allowed to enter developing country markets for “promoting” trade.
According to Ivanic and Martin (2006), the second adverse effect of protecting SPs
would be the diversion of resources “away from the activities that yield the highest social
returns into those that generate the highest market returns at distorted prices”.  It is
argued here that the purpose of SPs is precisely to divert resources into agriculture since
this would yield the highest social return in the medium to long term.  As indicated above,
the policy bias against agriculture had militated against the flow of resources into the
sector, which supports an overwhelming majority of workforce in many developing countries,
including India.  This policy bias can be set right by providing adequate protection for
products that are sensitive in nature by using the mechanism of SPs.
They commented that the third concern was that SPs would result in diverting
resources away from “export-oriented activities towards import replacement”, causing
  8 The G33 group of developing countries took the lead in proposing that SPs and SSM should be
included in the new agriculture deal.  Subsequently, the G20 group also lent its support to the G33
proposal.219
productivity to fall.  This again exposes their limited understanding of economic realities.
Contrary to their understanding that SPs are to be viewed from the trade perspective,
developing countries have argued that SPs would ensure the realization of food security
and protection of livelihoods, which stand out among the major objectives of development
policy.  Those countries have frequently argued that that the twin objectives of food
security and livelihoods protection should be viewed as non-trade concerns.
The issue of food security was identified as a major objective to be pursued by the
global community in the Rome Declaration on World Food Security and the World Food
Summit Plan of Action in 1996.  The Summit emphasized that food security existed when
“all people at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious
food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life”.  The
Rome Declaration took into consideration the multifaceted character of food security and
emphasized that “concerted national action and effective international efforts” were needed
to “supplement and reinforce national action.” The Plan of Action adopted by the World
Food Summit proposed that “each nation must adopt a strategy consistent with its resources
and capacities to achieve its individual goals and, at the same time, cooperate regionally
and internationally in order to organize collective solutions to global issues of food security.”
In addition to emphasizing the importance of national policies, the Rome Declaration and
the Plan of Action presented an interesting perspective on the role of trade in the pursuit of
food security.  The participating countries expressed their commitment to “strive to ensure
that food, agricultural trade and overall trade policies are conducive to fostering food
security for all through a fair and market oriented world trade system.”  Thus, quite
contrary to the view that imperatives of trade should be given primacy, as is the underlying
theme of the received wisdom in trade policy-making, the World Food Summit emphasized
that food security should be the primary concern of the global community.
The emphasis on ensuring food security by making all possible efforts at the
national level to do so, appear justified on at least two counts.  First, global trade in major
commodities has not expanded during the past decade despite the enhanced focus on
trade expansion, particularly since the establishment of WTO.  Table 2 illustrates this fact.
Table 2.  Share of global exports in production of major cereals
(Unit:  Percentage)
Global exports
1995 1998 2000 2002 2003 2004
to production
Rice 6 8 6 7 8 7
Wheat 23 22 24 26 25 23
M a i z e 1 71 41 51 61 51 3
Source: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, FOSTAT.220
As indicated in table 2, rice has been the least traded among the major cereals,
with global exports as a share of production not exceeding 10 per cent, since 1995.  Even
in the case of wheat, which is traded the most among the major cereals, the share of
global exports has not been significantly higher than a quarter of the global production.
Given such a scenario, countries would indeed be risking their futures if they decided to
rely on the global market for their food supplies.
This point is further corroborated by the fact that global stocks of major cereals
have been declining rather sharply since the late 1990s.  The figure below captures this
phenomenon.
It can be seen from the figure below that global stocks of the major cereals have
experienced steep declines since the late 1990s to reach their lowest levels since 1990.
The sharpest decline has been in case of maize, with global stocks having declined by
nearly 54 per cent since 1999-2000.
In summary, the message for policy makers is that it is necessary to retain enough
policy space for “strategic” interventions that seek to address development concerns as
important as food security, and rural employment and livelihood.  Such policy space may
include the ability to set import tariffs on selected agricultural products, as an affordable
way to counterbalance direct or indirect (and possibly “strategic”) support provided mainly
by developed countries to their own agriculture sector.  This is also a policy that may
encourage allocation of resources to rural areas, where most of the poor in developing
countries still live.  The literature has often failed to distinguish between policy interventions
of the kind suggested above and the use of protectionist measures for supporting the
dominant interest groups.  It is hoped that the discussion in this chapter will contribute to
more careful and fuller consideration of the motives underlying the use of trade policy
instruments in development strategies.  Furthermore, the same more careful approach
should be useful when entering preferential trade negotiations, even when they are expected
to result only in a limited liberalization of trade.221
Year-wise ending stocks of major cereals, 1990/91-2006/07
Source: United States Department of Agriculture, “Production, supply
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VIII.  NON-TARIFF BARRIERS IN AGRICULTURAL TRADE:
PERSPECTIVES FROM BANGLADESH
AND CAMBODIA
By Uttam Kumar Deb*
Introduction
Non-tariff barriers (NTBs) are becoming increasingly important determinants of
agricultural trade.  NTBs generally refer to any measure other than a tariff that restricts or
distorts trade.  The least developed countries (LDCs) have been enjoying preferential
market access to the developed country markets such as those of the European Union as
well as Australia, Canada, Japan and the United States of America.  It is argued that
although preferential market access has reduced the tariff barriers for most of the agricultural
products exported by LDCs, the prevalence of NTBs are limiting exports from the
preference-receiving countries.
The economic effect of NTBs has been receiving a great deal of attention in the
literature.  It is observed that with the decrease in tariffs under multilateral and bilateral
trade agreements, other barriers to trade have emerged.  Surveys conducted across the
world in a number of industries indicate that businesses feel constrained in their ability to
access foreign markets by a broad set of NTBs and other obstacles (Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development, 2003a).  NTBs are in operation in many forms,
such as:
(a) Quantitative restrictions (the volume or value of imports or exports is limited
on a global or selected country basis);
(b) Customs procedures and administrative practices;
(c) Special charges and taxes, restrictive practices, including state trading and
procurement policy; and
(d) Technical barriers to trade (stringent policy measures through sanitary
regulations and quality standards, safety and industrial standards).
* Mr. Narayan Chandra Das, Research Associate, Centre for Policy Dialogue (CPD), provided
extensive research assistance for this study.  Ms. Nafisa Khaled, Research Associate, CPD and
Ms. Naheed Rabbani, former Programme Associate, CPD provided valuable support in data gathering
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World Trade Organization were very useful in finalizing the report.  The author appreciates the comments
provided by Dr. Mia Mikic and Dr. Yann L. Duval, ESCAP, and Dr. Biswajit Dhar, Indian Institute of
Foreign Trade, and by the participants of the ARTNeT Research Team meeting held in Colombo in
August 2005.  The author is also grateful to Dr. Debapriya Bhattacharya, Executive Director, CPD and
Prof. Mustafizur Rahman, Research Director, CPD for their valuable suggestions and support.226
Brenton (2003) showed that Bangladesh and Cambodia faced an average tariff
equivalent to 5.65 per cent and 7.66 per cent, respectively, on their exports to the European
Union even though they have duty-free access.
NTBs vary from country to country and product to product.  It is also observed that
NTBs change over time and that countries apply several types of NTBs for the same
product.  Therefore, a study of NTBs needs to cover a wide range of countries as well as
products.  However, it is not possible to study NTBs imposed by, and on all countries, or
the way they are faced by different countries with limited resources and time.  In that
context, this chapter focuses on NTBs of some selected developed countries (European
Union members, Japan and the United States) and developing countries (India and Thailand)
from the perspective of LDCs (Bangladesh and Cambodia).  The reason for selecting
these developed countries is that they are the world’s top three agricultural importing
countries.  In 2001, the value of agricultural imports by the European Union, United States
and Japan totalled US$ 37.76 billion, US$ 22.41 billion and US$ 12.36 billion, respectively
(European Commission, 2003).  On the other hand, Bangladesh and Cambodia have
substantial trade deals with India and Thailand.  Bangladesh has preferential trading
arrangements (PTAs) with India under SAPTA and the APTA, and with Thailand under the
Bangladesh-Thailand BTA.  Cambodia has a PTA with Thailand under the ASEAN Free
Trade Area (AFTA) agreement.  Therefore, India and Thailand will provide an understanding
about NTBs prevailing in developing countries of Asia.  On the other hand, Bangladesh
and Cambodia represent the South Asian and South-East Asian situation in terms of
understanding the impact of NTBs on agricultural exports from LDCs.  Thus, a comprehensive
understanding is provided of NTBs faced by Asian LDCs while exporting agricultural
commodities to both developed and developing country markets.
The broad objective of this chapter is to analyse NTBs applied in selected developed
and developing countries as well as their impacts on export of agricultural products from
LDCs.  The specific objectives of the study are:
(a) To identify major agricultural products exported by Bangladesh and Cambodia
as well as potential agricultural export items of these countries;
(b) To analyse the trends in agricultural trade by Bangladesh and Cambodia;
(c) To identify different types of NTBs imposed by the European Union, the
United States, Japan, India and Thailand on agricultural imports from
Bangladesh and Cambodia;
(d) To identify the impacts of NTBs on agricultural exports by Bangladesh and
Cambodia;
(e) To suggest some policy measures for Bangladesh and Cambodia to consider
for their trade policies and the formulation of strategies for negotiations on
agriculture at WTO.
This chapter is based on desk research of information and data available in published
documents and databases.  It is limited mainly to NTBs imposed by selected developed227
countries (the United States, the European Union and Japan) and developing countries
(India and Thailand) on agricultural imports from LDCs (Bangladesh and Cambodia).
A.  Concept, types and measures of NTBs
1.  Concept
NTBs or non-tariff measures (NTMs) generally refer to any measure other than
a tariff that restricts or distorts trade.  Baldwin (1970) defined “non-tariff distortions” as
“any measure (public or private) that causes internationally traded goods and services or
resources devoted to the production of these goods and services, to be allocated in such
a way as to reduce potential real world income.” Bora and others (2002a) used the term
“non-tariff measures” to include export restraints, and production and export subsidies, or
measures with a similar effect, and not just import restraints.  NTBs are described in terms
of their existence in the whole gamut of trade process and practices.
2.  Types
A wide variety of NTBs exist that may be related to product standards, process
standards, certification, registration and testing procedures, packaging, mark-up, labelling
and language barriers or even as environmental barriers.  The United Nations Conference
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) (1994) used a classification system of more than
100 trade measures, including a discretionary or variable component.  The UNCTAD
classification system grouped various tariff and non-tariff measures under several broad
categories such as tariffs, para-tariffs, price control, finance measures, automatic licensing,
quantity control, monopolistic measures and technical measures.  However, this classification
system does not include any measures applied to production or exports.
Trade policy researchers often describe NTBs under the following major categories:
(a) Quantitative restrictions and similar specific limitations.  Quantitative restrictions
(QRs) are implemented through various actions such as import quotas, export
quotas, licensing requirement for imports and exports, voluntary export restraints,
prohibitions, foreign exchange allocation restrictions, surrender requirements,
import monitoring, temporary bans to balance trade, discriminatory bilateral
agreements, counter trade, domestic content and mixing requirements,
mandatory certification, and allocation process for quantitative restriction;
(b) Customs procedures and administrative practices.  Several customs procedures
and administrative practices such as customs surcharges, decreed customs
valuation minimum import prices, customs classification procedures, customs
clearance procedures, minimum custom value, excises, and special customs
formalities such as stamping often create barriers to trade;
(c) Non-tariff charges and related policies affecting imports.  Imports may also
be affected by various policies and non-tariff charges such as special sales228
taxes, variable levies, border tax adjustment, value added tax, anti-dumping
and countervailing measures, cash margin requirements, and rules of origin;
(d) Government participation in trade, restrictive practices and more generalized
policies.  Governments often provide subsidies and other aids, participate in
state trading, and designate goods subject to specialized management by
line ministries.  In addition, they formulate state procurement policy, tax
exemptions for critical imports, and single or limited number of channels for
imports of food and agricultural products.  All these can act as non-tariff
barriers;
(e) Technical barriers to trade.  Governments, on various grounds, often set
standards such as health and sanitary regulations and quality standards,
safety and industrial standards and regulations, packaging and labeling
regulations, advertising and media regulations.  These technical requirements
can also act as non-tariff barriers to trade.
3.  Measures used for studying NTBs
A review of the existing literature on NTBs
1 provides information on measures used
for studying NTBs as well as their strengths and limitations.  Thirteen types of measures
and approaches can be used for studying NTBs:
(a) Inventory-based approach;
(b) Frequency-type measures;
(c) Price differential approach;
(d) Quota-auction price measures;
(e) Gravity-based approach;
(f) Tariff equivalent;
(g) Trade Restrictiveness Index (TRI);
(h) Effective protection;
(i) Survey-based approach;
(j) Risk assessment-based cost-benefit measures;
(k) Stylized macroeconomic approaches;
(l) Quantification using sectoral or multi-market models; and
(m) Measure of equivalent of nominal rates of assistance.
1 Baldwin (1970); Beghin and Bureau (2001); Bora and others (2002a); Corden (1971); Deardoff
and Stern (1998); Feenstra (1988); Goldin and Knudsen (1990); Helpman and Krugman (1989);
Krueger, Schiff and Valdes (1988); Laird and Yeats (1990); Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development (1994); Vousden (1990); and Webb, Lopez and Penn (1990).229
(a) Inventory-based approach
Various types of NTBs such as export duties, export restrictions, non-automatic
import licensing, prohibitions and quotas are catalogued under this approach.  Three
sources of information can be used:
(a) Data on regulations, such as the number of regulations, which can be used
to construct various statistical indicators, or proxy variables, such as the
number of pages of national regulations;
(b) Data on frequency of detentions; and
(c) Data on complaints from the industry over discriminatory regulatory practices
and notifications to international bodies about such practices.
Inventory-based approaches can be used from both a quantitative and a qualitative
perspective to assess the importance of domestic regulations as trade barriers.  Inventory-
based approaches can be useful for directing attention to the frequency of occurrence and
the trade or production coverage of various types of NTBs.  The major limitations and
weaknesses of this method are:  (a) an inventory-based approach does not provide
a quantification of the effect of regulations on trade per se; (b) data availability is a major
problem; (c) standards vary in importance across sectors and products.  Different standards
would not be expected to have similar effects, and the number of standards or number of
pages of domestic regulations is a poor proxy for the trade restrictiveness of the overall
regulatory set.
(b) Frequency-type measures
This method is calculated based on number of HS commodity categories subject to
NTBs.  The number of product categories subject to NTBs is expressed as a percentage
of the total number of product categories in the HS group in order to get the frequency
ratio.  Another frequency measure is import coverage ratio (IC).  This method is useful in
directing attention to the frequency of occurrence of various types of NTBs.  However, this
approach is unable to quantify the effect on price and quantity.
(c) Price differential approach
This approach, also known as the price wedge method, calculates the differential
between the import price and the domestic price, and the domestic price of each commodity
at a disaggregated level, and subtracts the tariff rate on the commodity from this differential.
The result is treated as a non-tariff barrier.  The main advantages of this method are that it
is easy to estimate and it enables a quick understanding about the situation.  However, the
price-wedge method has several limitations.  First, the method makes it possible to quantify
the effect of a set of NTBs present on the market but seldom makes it possible to identify
what those NTBs are precisely.  Second, formulas that measure NTBs in an implicit way,
as a percentage price wedge between imports and domestic prices, are valid only under
the assumption that imported goods are perfect substitutes.  The main limitation of the230
method lies in its practical difficulties.  For large-scale studies, available data are often too
aggregated to reflect differences in the quality of imported goods.
(d) Quota-auction price measures
Quota-auction price measures have been calculated, particularly in connection with
the multi-fibre arrangement (MFA).  MFA can be characterized as a voluntary export
restraint (VER) in which the import quotas are allocated to foreign suppliers.
(e) Gravity-based approach
The gravity-based approach includes estimating gravity equation with residual errors
then considered as the effect of NTBs.  It quantifies the effect of NTBs on trade flows.
However, there may be factors other than NTBs responsible for residual errors.
(f) Tariff equivalent
The tariff equivalent is estimated by calculating the price wedge between the imported
goods and the comparable product in the domestic market.
(g) Trade Restrictiveness Index
This approach is used to measure changes in welfare resulting from policy changes
over time.  It provides a single number that characterizes the overall effects of a country’s
trade policies that apply to a particular aggregate of goods under general equilibrium
conditions.  However, the data requirement of this method is huge.
(h) Effective protection
The effective protection of a product measures the extent to which the margin
between the selling price and the cost of tradable inputs on the international market has
widened or narrowed.  This is achieved by combining the effective protection of the
commodity and the protection of tradable inputs.  Effective protection is measured by
estimating effective protection coefficient (EPC) or effective rate of protection (ERP).
(i) Survey-based approach
This method uses a survey conducted among exporters to find the various types of
NTBs faced during the export of commodities.  The econometric exploitation of the US
Department of Agriculture survey shows that surveys can be used as a basis for indicating
NTB measures that are more refined.  In the absence of information from other sources,
survey-based methods are useful.  With this method, it is possible to identify barriers that
are difficult to measure (for example, administrative procedures).  However, it is a costly
approach and requires special skills in designing and administering surveys.231
(j) Risk assessment-based cost-benefit measures
Risk assessment approaches appear to be far removed from the measurement of
NTBs.  However, these methods have been coupled with cost-benefit calculations and
indirectly contribute to the measurement of the effect of regulations and, therefore, of
NTBs.  Rather than quantifying the actual impact of this measure on trade, they provide
some indication of what should be included as trade barriers based on the effect on
welfare.  The main advantage of this method is in its combined use of scientific and
cost-benefit assessment for identifying and assessing the effects of NTBs.  The main
limitation of this approach is the uncertainty that surrounds the level of risks and the
economic consequences.
(k) Stylized macroeconomic approaches
The effects of NTBs are estimated by observing the displacement of the market
equilibrium induced by a regulation.  It helps in assessing how much trade is forgone
because of regulations, how extensively consumer preferences are affected and what the
effect of harmonization of regulations versus mutual recognition agreements might be for
particular nations.  The major disadvantage lies in the fact that the analytical framework
becomes rapidly intractable unless drastic simplifying assumptions are made.
(l) Quantification using sectoral or multi-market models
This approach relies on partial equilibrium modelling.  Partial equilibrium models
provide a framework for analysing tariff rate equivalents of standards and technical
regulations.  The main feature, when compared to gravity models, is that it is possible to
assess not only the impact of regulations on trade flows but also on welfare.  Compared to
stylized approaches that focus on qualitative effects, used in industrial economics, partial
equilibrium models provide more quantitative results.  It is a very useful method for estimating
welfare effects of regulations such as SPS or TBT measures.  The major limitation is
related to the fact that quantification of trade and welfare effects of SPS and TBT regulation
requires taking into account the more sophisticated mechanism related to imperfect
competition or consumer information.
(m) Measure of equivalent of nominal rates of assistance
Producers’ subsidy equivalent (PSE) is a concise way of measuring the transfers,
as a result of government policies, to producers.  It is measured by tracing direct and
indirect government expenditures to producers, or by imputing the effects of policies by
calculating the difference between actual domestic prices and what those prices would
have been in the absence of trade interventions.  One way of expressing PSE is the
nominal assistance coefficient (NAC).  The NAC for production is the ratio of the border
price plus the unit PSE to the border price.  The nominal rate of assistance is the ratio of
the value of assistance to the unassisted value of production multiplied by 100.  It captures
both transfers from the government expenditures and transfers from price distortions.
However, it does not take into account the distortions prevailing in the input markets.232
A review of the literature reveals that there is no unique method for appropriately
quantifying the size and impacts of NTBs.  Each methodology has its own methodological
limitations and advantages based on availability of information and data.
4.  Major findings of studies of NTBs in agriculture
The major findings of studies dealing with NTBs are summarized in table 1.
B.  Agricultural trade performance of Bangladesh
and Cambodia
A major limitation in analysing the performance of agricultural trade, particularly in
connection with WTO, is the definition of agriculture itself.  The WTO definition of agriculture,
as approved in the WTO Agreement on Agriculture (AoA), is different from the conventionally
understanding of agriculture.  The WTO definition of agriculture, as reported in Annex 1 of
AoA, is given in table 2.  Usually, all crops, livestock and primary dairy processing, and
fisheries and forestry activities are included in agriculture.  However, the WTO definition
excludes fish and fish products and jute (among crops) but includes certain tree products
such as sorbitol, manitol, essential oils, glue and other similar products.  The WTO definition
of agriculture also includes some industrial items such as cigarettes that are processed
from agricultural products.  It should be mentioned here that Annex 1 of AoA specifically
mentions that the product coverage under the Agreement will not limit product coverage on
the application of SPS measures.
Agricultural items, which are excluded from the WTO definition, have significant
importance to Bangladesh and Cambodia.  The value of total exports of fish and fish
products (HS 03.03; 0306.13; 0304.90; 03.05; 0305.60) from Bangladesh in the financial
year 2002/03 was US$ 330.14 million, which accounted for 5.04 per cent of the total
export earnings of Bangladesh.  Earnings from raw jute (HS 5303.01) exports by Bangladesh
in 2002/03 amounted to US$ 82.46 million, which was 1.26 per cent of the country’s total
export earnings.  In 2004, Cambodia earned US$ 13.14 million from exporting fish and fish
products (HS 0306; 0303; 0301; 0302; 0305; 0307; and 0304), which was 0.47 per cent of
its total export earnings and 40 per cent of agricultural export earnings (HS 1-24 chapters).
These goods, particularly fish and fish products, face various types of NTBs in the importing
country markets.  Therefore, this chapter is not limited to WTO-defined agriculture.  It has
attempted to include fish and fish products in the analysis.
Availability of trade data series that reflect all agricultural commodities of
Bangladesh and Cambodia is another limitation in such an analysis.  For example, the
FAO data series on agricultural trade includes primary and processed crops as well as
livestock products, but excludes fish and fish products.  UNCOMTRADE data do not offer
a ready definition of agriculture (WTO defined or traditional).  Under these circumstances,
a summation is used of all export and import items included in Chapters 1-24 of the HS
code system reported in UNCOMTRADE.  This has surely underestimated the total
agricultural export and import levels of Bangladesh and Cambodia.  Readers are requested233
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Review of the studies carried out by the author
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to keep this limitation of the present study in mind and to be aware of the definition of
agriculture used here while interpreting and citing its research findings.
1.  Trends in agricultural trade
The value of all agricultural exports from Bangladesh increased from US$ 215
million in 1991 to US$ 467 million in 2004 (table 3).  On the other hand, the value of
WTO-defined agricultural exports increased from US$ 55.2 million in 1991 to US$ 88.9
million in 2004.  During that period, the total value of goods exported from Bangladesh
increased from US$ 1,690 million to US$ 5,797 million.  Thus, the share of WTO-defined
agriculture as a percentage of total exports decreased from 3.26 per cent in 1991 to
1.53 per cent in 2004.
The value of all agricultural exports from Cambodia increased from US$ 13.4
million in 2000 to US$ 32.8 million in 2004 (table 4).  On the other hand, the value of
WTO-defined agricultural exports increased from US$ 7.7 million in 2000 to US$ 19.7
million in 2004.  The total value of exports from Cambodia increased from US$ 1,389
million in 2000 to US$ 2,798 million in 2004.  Thus, the share of WTO-defined agriculture
as a percentage of the total exports has increased from 0.56 per cent in 2000 to 0.71 per
cent in 2004.  On the other hand, the share of all agricultural exports in total exports by
Cambodia increased from 0.96 per cent in 2000 to 1.17 per cent in 2004.
Table 2.  Product coverage in the WTO Agreement on Agriculture
(i) HS Chapters 1 to 24 less fish and fish products, plus*
(ii) HS Code 2905.43 (mannitol)
HS Code 2905.44 (sorbitol)
HS Heading 33.01 (essential oils)
HS Headings 35.01 to 35.05 (albuminoidal substances, modified starches,
glues)
HS Code 3809.10 (finishing agents)
HS Code 3823.60 (sorbitol n.e.p.)
HS Headings 41.01 to 41.03 (hides and skins)
HS Heading 43.01 (raw fur skins)
HS Headings 50.01 to 50.03 (raw silk and silk waste)
HS Headings 51.01 to 51.03 (wool and animal hair)
HS Headings 52.01 to 52.03 (raw cotton, waste and cotton carded or
combed)
HS Heading 53.01 (raw flax)
HS Heading 53.02 (raw hemp)
Source: WTO Agreement on Agriculture.
* The product descriptions in parentheses are not necessarily exhaustive.240
Table 3.  Trends in agricultural exports from Bangladesh, 1991-2004




 WTO-defined agricultural exports
Year Total exports
 (HS code






1991 1 690.2 215.2 55.2 12.73 3.26
1992 1 941.6 215.5 49.9 11.10 2.57
1993 2 253.1 268.7 57.5 11.93 2.55
1994 2 483.3 339.8 71.3 13.68 2.87
1995 3 407.2 358.3 46.5 10.52 1.36
1996 3 538.5 358.4 35.4 10.13 1.00
1997 4 017.5 340.0 43.2 8.46 1.08
1998 5 056.9 368.6 83.6 7.29 1.65
1999 4 936.2 337.2 28.3 6.83 0.57
2000 5 034.9 353.0 23.7 7.01 0.47
2001 5 681.8 400.9 45.5 7.06 0.80
2002 5 218.9 346.1 44.9 6.63 0.86
2003 5 809.4 362.1 39.0 6.23 0.67
2004 5 796.9 466.5 88.9 8.05 1.53
Sources: Author’s calculations based on data compiled from UNCOMTRADE and Foreign Trade
Statistics of Bangladesh as well as FAO and WTO; agricultural export data of Bangladesh
for 1999 compiled from Foreign Trade Statistics of Bangladesh.
Table 4.  Trends in agricultural exports from Cambodia, 2000-2004




 WTO-defined agricultural exports
Year Total exports
 (HS code






2000 1 389.3 13.4  7.7 0.96 0.56
2001 1 499.6 18.4 12.6 1.23 0.84
2002 1 922.9 15.3 11.2 0.80 0.58
2003 2 118.3 11.6  8.8 0.55 0.42
2004 2 797.7 32.8 19.7 1.17 0.71
Source: Author’s calculations based on data compiled from UNCOMTRADE.241
An analysis of trends in agricultural imports by Bangladesh shows that imports of
all agricultural products increased from US$ 547.7 million in 1991 to US$ 1,628.4 million in
2004 (table 5).  Imports of WTO-defined agricultural commodities increased from
US$ 644.4 million in 1991 to US$ 2,215.7 million in 2004.  The total value of imports by
Bangladesh increased from US$ 3,136.7 million in 1991 to US$ 8,537.4 million in 2004.
Thus, the share of WTO-defined agricultural imports in the total imports of Bangladesh
increased from 20.5 per cent in 1991 to 26 per cent in 2004.  On the other hand, the share
of all agricultural imports in the total imports of Bangladesh increased from 17.5 per cent in
1991 to 19.1 per cent in 2004.
Table 5.  Trends in agricultural imports by Bangladesh, 1991-2004
(Unit:  US$ million)











Chapters  1-24) goods All
WTO-
defined
1991 3 136.68  547.65  644.39 17.46 20.54
1992 3 467.05  637.19  735.53 18.38 21.21
1993 3 525.71  566.39  667.49 16.06 18.93
1994 n.a. n.a. n.a.  n.a.  n.a.
1995 5 438.41  947.22 1 058.18 17.42 19.46
1996 6 225.30 1 067.30 1 255.67 17.14 20.17
1997 6 784.46 1 156.06 1 407.15 17.04 20.74
1998 7 017.97 1 081.99 1 384.03 15.42 19.72
1999 n.a. n.a. n.a.  n.a.  n.a.
2000 7 572.20 1 514.12 1 842.35 20.00 24.33
2001 8 096.56 1 346.88 1 759.22 16.64 21.73
2002 8 955.09 1 280.46 1 631.51 14.30 18.22
2003 8 705.70 1 534.61 1 972.10 17.63 22.65
2004 8 537.37 1 628.36 2 215.67 19.07 25.95
Source: Author’s calculations based on data compiled from UNCOMTRADE.
An analysis of trends in agricultural imports by Cambodia shows that the value of
Cambodian imports of all agricultural products increased from US$ 137.2 million in 2000 to
US$ 162.3 million in 2004 (table 6).  The value of imports of WTO-defined agricultural
commodities increased from US$ 137.5 million in 2000 to US$ 160.2 million in 2004.  The
total value of imports of all goods by Cambodia increased from almost US$ 1,438.7 million
in 2000 to nearly US$ 2,062.9 million in 2004.  Thus, the share of WTO-defined agricultural
imports in the total imports by Cambodia decreased from 9.56 per cent in 2000 to 7.76 per242
Table 6.  Trends in agricultural imports by Cambodia, 2000-2004
(Unit:  US$ million)











Chapters  1-24) goods All
WTO-
defined
2000 1 438.66 137.18 137.50 9.54 9.56
2001 1 507.20 146.95 148.06 9.75 9.82
2002 1 667.16 149.61 151.63 8.97 9.10
2003 1 774.76 135.49 140.46 7.63 7.91
2004 2 062.85 162.25 160.17 7.87 7.76
Source: Author’s calculations based on data compiled from UNCOMTRADE.
cent in 2004.  On the other hand, the share of all agricultural imports in the total imports by
Cambodia decreased from 9.54 per cent in 2000 to 7.87 per cent in 2004.
The composition of agricultural exports from Bangladesh and Cambodia is pertinent.
An analysis of product-specific trends in exports would essentially lead to commodities for
which tracking NTBs have trade implications for Bangladesh and Cambodia.  Information
about NTBs is obtainable at the six-digit HS level.  Therefore, the identification of agricultural
exportables from both Bangladesh and Cambodia has been done at the six-digit level.
Tables 7 and 8 show the top 40 agricultural export items of Bangladesh and
Cambodia, which were identified by calculating average annual exports of different
agricultural commodities at the six-digit HS classification level during 2002-2004.  The
analysis reveals that the annual average export value of agricultural products from
Bangladesh during that period was US$ 392 million (table 7).  Bangladesh’s top export
item during 2002-2004 was shrimps and prawns, frozen (HS 030613), which accounted for
77.57 per cent of all agricultural exports from Bangladesh.  The second most important
agricultural export item was tea, black (fermented or partly) in packages of < 3 kg (HS
090230), which accounted for 3.43 per cent of total agricultural exports from Bangladesh.
Fish not elsewhere specified, frozen, whole (HS 030379) were third, accounting for 3 per
cent of agricultural exports from Bangladesh.  Other major agricultural export items that
have more than a 1 per cent share of total agricultural exports were vegetables, fresh or
chilled, not elsewhere specified (HS 070990) and cigarettes containing tobacco (HS 240220).
These five products together accounted for about 88 per cent of total agricultural exports
from Bangladesh.
The value of annual average agricultural exports from Cambodia during 2002-2004
was US$ 19.92 million (table 8).  During 2002-2004, Cambodia’s largest export item was
shrimps and prawns, frozen (HS 030613) with a 19.7 per cent share of total agricultural
exports.  The second most important agricultural export commodity of Cambodia was243
Table 7.  Major agricultural exports (six-digit HS) by Bangladesh, 2002-2004









exports   product
export
items
030613 Shrimps and prawns, frozen 303 734.33 77.57 1
090230 Tea, black (fermented or partly) in packages < 3 kg 13 422.84 3.43 2
030379 Fish nes, frozen, whole 11 764.10 3.00 3
070990 Vegetables, fresh or chilled nes 11 069.41 2.83 4
240220 Cigarettes containing tobacco 4 706.65 1.20 5
240120 Tobacco, unmanufactured, stemmed or stripped 3 712.53 0.95 6
030420 Fish fillets, frozen 2 819.05 0.72 7
030549 Smoked fish and fillets other than herrings or salmon 2 502.68 0.64 8
060499 Foliage, branches for bouquets etc., except fresh 2 191.71 0.56 9
070910 Globe artichokes, fresh or chilled 2 105.68 0.54 10
030269 Fish nes, fresh or chilled, whole 2 053.84 0.52 11
030329 Salmonidae, nes, frozen, whole 1 961.02 0.50 12
170111 Raw sugar, cane 1 735.57 0.44 13
030490 Fish meat and mince, except liver, roe and fillets, 1 447.52 0.37 14
   frozen
90240 Tea, black (fermented or partly) in packages > 3 kg 1 399.91 0.36 15
030559 Dried fish, other than cod, not smoked 1 197.51 0.31 16
030614 Crabs, frozen 1 184.38 0.30 17
030310 Salmon, Pacific, frozen, whole 1 161.30 0.30 18
240130 Tobacco refuse 1 136.58 0.29 19
030623 Shrimps and prawns, not frozen 1 024.41 0.26 20
240290 Cigars, cheroots, cigarettes, with tobacco substitute 960.00 0.25 21
030339 Flatfish except halibut, plaice or sole, frozen, whole 885.03 0.23 22
240110 Tobacco, unprocessed, not stemmed or stripped 807.87 0.21 23
030624 Crabs, not frozen 799.09 0.20 24
030551 Cod dried, whether or not salted but not smoked 728.46 0.19 25
030520 Livers and roes, dried, smoked, salted or in brine 724.16 0.18 26
210690 Food preparations nes 666.56 0.17 27
150790 Refined soya-bean oil, not chemically modified 650.50 0.17 28
050610 Ossein and bones treated with acid 625.53 0.16 29
030410 Fish fillet or meat, fresh or chilled, not liver, roe 581.98 0.15 30
030622 Lobsters (Homarus), not frozen 564.45 0.14 31
140110 Bamboo used primarily for plaiting 488.28 0.12 32
190410 Cereal foods obtained by swelling, roasting of cereal 454.52 0.12 33
030376 Eels, frozen, whole 406.39 0.10 34
070390 Leeks and other alliaceous vegetables, fresh or chilled 391.32 0.10 35244
050510 Feathers and down used for stuffing 384.41 0.10 36
010600 Animals, live, except farm animals 357.73 0.09 37
200980 Single fruit, vegetable juice nes, not fermented or spirit 348.45 0.09 38
030619 Crustaceans nes, frozen 289.58 0.07 39
100630 Rice, husked (brown) 246.14 0.06 40
Others 7 879.20 2.01
01 to 24 All agricultural products 391 571.00 100
Source: Author’s calculations based on data compiled from UNCOMTRADE.
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030613 Shrimps and prawns, frozen 3 920.04 19.68 1
240220 Cigarettes containing tobacco 1 621.88 8.14 2
030110 Ornamental fish, live 1 361.05 6.83 3
100620 Rice, husked (brown) 1 292.47 6.49 4
100590 Maize except seed corn 1 212.87 6.09 5
010290 Bovine animals, live, except pure-bred breeding 1 083.29 5.44 6
100630 Rice, husked (brown) 1 050.86 5.28 7
110814 Manioc (cassava) starch 1 034.35 5.19 8
030329 Salmonidae, nes, frozen, whole 712.27 3.58 9
080130 Cashew nuts, fresh or dried 631.23 3.17 10
240120 Tobacco, unmanufactured, stemmed or stripped 545.85 2.74 11
240130 Tobacco refuse 472.97 2.37 12
070320 Garlic, fresh or chilled 329.72 1.66 13
240210 Cigars, cheroots and cigarillos, containing tobacco 281.42 1.41 14
240110 Tobacco, unmanufactured, not stemmed or stripped 255.19 1.28 15
030211 Trout, fresh or chilled, whole 204.20 1.03 16
200310 Mushrooms, prepared or preserved, not in vinegar 165.87 0.83 17
030623 Shrimps and prawns, not frozen 153.17 0.77 18
071230 Mushrooms and truffles, dried, not further prepared 135.48 0.68 19245
cigarettes containing tobacco (HS 240220), which contributed 8.1 per cent to the agricultural
export earnings of Cambodia.  The third most important agricultural commodity exported
by Cambodia was ornamental fish, live (HS 030110), which accounted for 6.8 per cent of
Cambodia’s agricultural export earnings.  The other main agricultural export items having
a share of more than 5 per cent of total exports included rice, husked (brown) (HS100620),
maize except seed corn (100590), bovine animals, live, except pure-bred breeding stock
(010290), rice, husked (brown) (100630), and manioc (cassava) starch (110814).  Salmonidae,
not mentioned elsewhere, frozen, whole (HS 030329), and cashew nuts, fresh or dried
(HS 080130) each had a share of more than 3 per cent of total exports.  These top 10
010600 Animals, live, except farm animals 94.88 0.48 20
220300 Beer made from malt 93.58 0.47 21
020629 Bovine edible offal, frozen except livers and tongues 75.24 0.38 22
030749 Cuttlefish, squid, frozen, dried, salted or in brine 66.44 0.33 23
220820 Spirits obtained by distilling grape wine, grape marc 63.69 0.32 24
110220 Maize (corn) flour 61.66 0.31 25
100190 Wheat except durum wheat, and meslin 48.79 0.24 26
190510 Crispbread 45.89 0.23 27
100510 Maize (corn) seed 45.62 0.23 28
030510 Flours, meals and pellets of fish for human 43.87 0.22 29
   consumption
030622 Lobsters (Homarus), not frozen 42.68 0.21 30
040210 Milk powder < 1.5% fat 41.86 0.21 31
030269 Fish nes, fresh or chilled, whole 38.85 0.20 32
071190 Vegetables nes and mixtures provisionally preserved 37.55 0.19 33
070820 Beans, shelled or unshelled, fresh or chilled 35.46 0.18 34
030530 Fish fillets, dried, salted or in brine, not smoked 35.36 0.18 35
240310 Cigarette or pipe tobacco and tobacco substitute mixes 33.40 0.17 36
030490 Fish meat and mince, except liver, roe and fillets, 31.98 0.16 37
   frozen
030791 Aquatic invertebrates nes, fresh or chilled, live 28.34 0.14 38
030199 Fish live, except trout, eel or carp 27.63 0.14 39
030729 Scallops other than live, fresh or chilled 22.94 0.12 40
Others 2 437.77 12.24
01 to 24 All agricultural products 19 918.00 100
Source: Author’s calculations based on data compiled from UNCOMTRADE.
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agricultural exports accounted for about 70 per cent of the total agricultural export earnings
of Cambodia.
The product-specific export performance of various commodities in the short and
long term can be understood by analysing the rates of growth in exports of individual
commodities.  In this regard, the rate of growth in the value of exports and the quantity of
exported commodities are essential.  An analysis of annual compound rates of growth of
various agricultural commodities exported by Bangladesh for two periods (1991-2003 and
2000-2003) was carried out.  Estimated growth rates are shown in table 9.  It is evident
from the table that long-term growth (1991-2003) in the export value of fish (not elsewhere
specified), frozen, whole (HS 030379) was 0.14 per cent per year while the exported
quantity of the commodity experienced a decline at the rate of 1.09 per cent annually.
During the same period, long-term growth in the export value of shrimps and prawns,
Table 9.  Annual compound rate of growth in agricultural exports
(six-digit HS) by Bangladesh, 1991-2003




 Code  1991-2003 2000-2003 1991-2003 2000-2003
010600 Animals, live, except farm animals   57.44
030110 Ornamental fish, live   -8.46
030192 Eels, live   133.41
030270 Fish livers and roes, fresh or chilled   -25.69
030379 Fish nes, frozen, whole -1.09 -9.15 0.14 -3.17
030410 Fish fillet or meat, fresh or chilled, 61.56   79.15
   not liver, roe  
030420 Fish fillets, frozen   130.40
030490 Fish meat and mince, except liver, 173.98
   roe and fillets, frozen  
030530 Fish fillets, dried, salted or in brine, -4.56
   not smoked  
030549 Smoked fish and fillets other than -2.00 -31.04 2.17 -32.17
   herrings or salmon
030559 Dried fish, other than cod, not smoked -10.72 -29.18 -9.81 -35.99
030569 Fish nes, salted or in brine, not dried -40.64   56.51
   or smoked  
030613 Shrimps and prawns, frozen 2.45 -4.29 5.99 -2.80
030623 Shrimps and prawns, not frozen   14.58   -36.30
030710 Oysters  8.68   22.22
050510 Feathers and down used for stuffing 2.29 14.36 7.87 21.62
050610 Ossein and bones treated with acid   -45.83   -26.67
050690 Bones and horn-cores unworked -14.96
   or simply worked nes      247
050790 Whalebone, horns etc., unworked or 1.35 -7.27 -0.49 13.34
   simply prepared nes
060499 Foliage, branches for bouquets etc., -34.02
   except fresh  
070190 Potatoes, fresh or chilled except seed   -0.78   -20.34
070990 Vegetables, fresh or chilled nes     6.64 149.33
071010 Potatoes, frozen, uncooked steamed 61.39   49.96
   or boiled  
071080 Vegetables, frozen nes, uncooked -23.65   -9.80
   steamed or boiled  
090220 Tea, green (unfermented) -17.89 -89.96 -20.09 -98.34
   in packages > 3 kg
090230 Tea, black (fermented or partly) -1.85 -16.97 -3.00 -3.69
   in packages < 3 kg
100630 Rice, husked (brown)   35.76   19.17
140110 Bamboo used primarily for plaiting   9.76   11.68
140190 Vegetable materials nes, used primarily 26.80 0.58 25.40 -7.20
   for plaiting
151620 Vegetable fats, oils or fractions -123.67
   hydrogenated, esterified    
190410 Cereal foods obtained by swelling, 6.17   16.58
   roasting of cereal  
190490 Cereals, except maize grain, -14.01   -23.69
   prepared nes  
190590 Communion wafers, rice paper, bakers -50.62   -24.94
   wares nes  
210690 Food preparations nes 31.00 12.44 31.76 23.95
220300 Beer made from malt 21.49 -96.26 17.79 -94.21
220830 Whiskies 2.58 -102.24 -11.17 -103.50
240110 Tobacco, unmanufactured, not stemmed 31.05   104.26
   or stripped  
240120 Tobacco, unmanufactured, stemmed -3.68 90.36 0.02 39.30
   or stripped
240130 Tobacco refuse       0.41
240220 Cigarettes containing tobacco 11.38 129.60 22.17 69.14
240290 Cigars, cheroots, cigarettes, -26.22
   with tobacco substitute      
240399 Products of tobacco, substitute nes, 27.64   -59.21
   extract, essences
Source: Author’s calculation based on data compiled from UNCOMTRADE.
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 Code  1991-2003 2000-2003 1991-2003 2000-2003248
frozen (HS 030613) was 5.99 per cent while the annual compound growth rate in export
quantity of the commodity was 2.45 per cent.  It may be recalled that the shares of fish not
elsewhere specified, frozen, whole (HS 030379) and shrimps and prawns, frozen (HS
030613) in total agricultural exports from Bangladesh during 2002-2004 were 3 per cent
and 77.57 per cent, respectively.  Two commodities – vegetable materials, not elsewhere
specified, used primarily for plaiting (HS 140190) and food preparations, not elsewhere
specified (HS 210690) – experienced very high growth (more than 25 per cent per year) in
export value and export volume during 1991-2001.  Feathers and down used for stuffing
(HS 050510) and cigarettes containing tobacco (HS 240220) showed positive growth both
in export value and volume.  On the other hand, dried fish, other than cod, not smoked
(030559), tea, green (unfermented) in packages > 3 kg (HS 090220) and tea, black
(fermented or partly) in packages < 3 kg (HS 090230) showed negative long-term growth,
both in export value and export volume.
Short-term growth (2000-2003) in agricultural exports, both in value and volume of
exports, was very high (more than 10 per cent) for commodities such as fish fillet or
meat, fresh or chilled, not liver, roe (HS 030410), feathers and down used for stuffing
(HS 050510), potatoes, frozen, uncooked steamed or boiled (HS 071010), rice, husked
(brown) (HS 100630), food preparations not elsewhere specified (HS 210690), tobacco,
unmanufactured, not stemmed or stripped (HS 240110), tobacco, unmanufactured, stemmed
or stripped (HS 240120) and cigarettes containing tobacco (HS 240220).  In the case of
animals, live, except farm animals (HS 010600), eels, live (HS 030192), fish fillets, frozen
(HS 030420), and fish meat and mince, except liver, roe and fillets, frozen (HS 030490),
growth rates in quantity of exports were very high.  Due to non-availability of the values for
these commodities, the growth rates of export values could not be estimated.
Analysis of the export growth of various agricultural commodities from Cambodia
during 2000-2004 reveals some important insights.  Both the value and quantity of exports
of bovine animals, live, except pure-bred breeding (HS 010290), Salmonidae, nes, frozen,
whole (030329), shrimps and prawns, frozen (HS 030613), mushrooms and truffles, dried,
not further prepared (HS 071230), beer made from malt (HS 220300) and tobacco,
unmanufactured, stemmed or stripped (HS 240120) experienced high growth (table 10).
On the other hand, both the value and volume of exports declined for ornamental fish, live
(HS 030110), fish live, except trout, eels or carp (HS 030199), trout, fresh or chilled, whole
(HS 030211), shrimps and prawns, not frozen (HS 030623), mussels, frozen, dried, salted
or in brine (HS 030739), nuts edible, fresh or dried, not specified elsewhere (HS 080290),
alcoholic liqueurs not specified elsewhere (HS 220890) and cigarettes containing tobacco
(HS 240220).  During the same period, lobsters (Homarus) frozen (HS 030612) and
animals, live, except farm animals (HS 010600) recorded positive growth in both export
value and quantity.  Although the exported quantity of fish, not specified elsewhere, fresh
or chilled, whole (HS 030269) increased at the rate of 3.2 per cent per annum, the value of
exports declined at the rate of 5.7 per cent per annum.  In the case of rice, husked (brown)
(HS 100630), the export value showed high growth at the rate of 13.9 per cent per year;
however, the exported quantity of rice declined at the rate of 10.6 per cent per year.249
Products with export potential
One way of identifying the export potential of various agricultural commodities is to
calculate the comparative advantage of the product at the export parity level, which is an
arduous task and often constrained by non-availability of necessary data.  Another way of
identifying export potential is to analyse the growth trends in exports of the commodity in
recent years.  In this regard, the estimated rates of growth in exports of various agricultural
commodities described in tables 9 and 10 can provide some assistance.  Two commodities,
tobacco, unmanufactured, stemmed or stripped (HS 240120) and cigarettes containing
tobacco (HS 240220), experienced high growth rates in export values and export volumes
during 2000-2003.  These commodities each had a share of about 1 per cent of the total
agricultural exports by Bangladesh.  Therefore, the high growth in the export value and
volume of these commodities indicates that possibly they will become important export
items of Bangladesh in the future.
Several commodities such as fish fillet or meat, fresh or chilled, not liver, roe (HS
030410), feathers and down used for stuffing (HS 050510), potatoes, frozen, uncooked
steamed or boiled (HS 071010), rice, husked (brown) (HS 100630), food preparations not
Table 10.  Annual compound rate of growth in agricultural exports
(six-digit HS) by Cambodia, 2000-2004
(Unit:  Annual growth rate in per cent)
HS Code Product Value Quantity
010290 Bovine animals, live, except pure-bred breeding 111.09 186.93
010600 Animals, live, except farm animals 13.46 4.92
030110 Ornamental fish, live -41.07 -22.14
030199 Fish live, except trout, eel or carp -75.25 -75.16
030211 Trout, fresh or chilled, whole -10.60 -12.69
030269 Fish nes, fresh or chilled, whole -5.73 3.22
030329 Salmonidae, nes, frozen, whole 47.69 39.44
030612 Lobsters (Homarus) frozen 7.20 7.61
030613 Shrimps and prawns, frozen 38.64 38.14
030623 Shrimps and prawns, not frozen -119.20 -107.05
030739 Mussels, frozen, dried, salted or in brine -30.60 -11.12
030760 Snails, edible (except sea snails)   40.24
071230 Mushrooms and truffles, dried, not further prepared 17.46 15.94
080290 Nuts edible, fresh or dried, nes -95.21 -94.67
100630 Rice, husked (brown) 13.91 -10.61
220300 Beer made from malt 23.87 18.01
220890 Alcoholic liqueurs nes -64.74 -37.28
240120 Tobacco, unmanufactured, stemmed or stripped 22.02 7.53
240220 Cigarettes containing tobacco -18.46 -2.30
Source: Author’s calculation based on data compiled from UNCOMTRADE.250
elsewhere specified (HS 210690) and tobacco, unmanufactured, not stemmed or stripped
(HS 240110) had relatively very low shares (less than 0.22 per cent) of the total exports by
Bangladesh.  However, they recorded high growth (generally more than 10 per cent per
year) in export value and volume during 2000-2003.  Therefore, these commodities may
also play an important role in future exports of agricultural commodities from Bangladesh.
It is pertinent to mention here that two recent studies (Shahabuddin and others, 2002;
Shahabuddin, 2002) estimated the comparative advantage in crop production (using the
domestic resource cost method on input-output prices, market distortions and production
coefficients for 2000) found that Bangladesh had a comparative advantage in the production
of Aman rice, jute and vegetables at export parity prices.  In other words, Bangladesh
could gain from increased production of these crops, provided that the surplus production
could be exported to the world market.
The Cambodian situation may be understood from table 10, which shows the rate
of growth in export values and volumes of agricultural exports.  Two commodities, bovine
animals, live, except purebred breeding (HS 010290), and shrimps and prawns, frozen
(HS 030613), each recorded a share of more than 5 per cent of total agricultural exports
by Cambodia as well as high growth in export values and volumes during 2000-2004.  This
indicates that these commodities could play an important role in the export basket of
Cambodia.  On the other hand, both the value and quantity of exports of Salmonidae, not
specified elsewhere, frozen, whole (HS030329), mushrooms and truffles, dried, not further
prepared (HS 071230), beer made from malt (HS 220300), tobacco, unmanufactured,
stemmed or stripped (HS 240120), lobsters (Homarus) frozen (HS 030612), animals, live,
except farm animals (HS 010600) showed high growth in export value and volume during
2000-2004.  However, they held a relatively lower share than the commodities mentioned
earlier.  The implication of the high export growth of these products is that in the future
they will play an important role in agricultural exports by Cambodia.
2.  Diversity in agricultural trade
Diversity in agricultural trade is very important for sustainability of trade performance.
Diversity in trade minimizes the risk of price falls as well as other negative outcomes in the
market.  It is also argued that in one way or another, such diversity helps to ensure better
utilization of resource endowments and distribution of trade benefits to a wider group of
the economically active population.  Therefore, diversity in agricultural trade (exports and
imports) of Bangladesh and Cambodia has been estimated.  Diversity in agricultural exports
is likely to indicate the implications for producers.  On the other hand, diversity in imports
will be helpful in understanding the situation of consumers.
In estimating diversity indices, the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index (HHI) was used.
The index is traditionally used to understand the concentration of market share.  If the
value of the index is 1, then the market is fully concentrated, i.e., only one firm has all the
shares.  On the other hand, if the value of index is 0, then the market is fully dispersed,
i.e., numerous firms have a share in the market.251
In the present study, the concept of HHI of Concentration (HHIc) has been used to
examine the relative contribution (i.e., market share) of each agricultural commodity to
total agricultural exports, with the relative contributions expressed as proportions of the
total agricultural exports of the country.  HHIc may therefore be defined as:





i is the value of exports from i
th commodity, Q is the total agricultural
exports by the country, and n is the total number of agricultural products exported from the
country.
The Hirschman-Herfindahl Index of Diversity (HHId) is defined as:
HHId = 1 – HHIc  (2)
Alternatively,
HHId = 1 – ∑ (p
i ) ( 3 )
Using equation (3), trends in diversity of agricultural exports from Bangladesh and
Cambodia have been estimated for 1991-2004.  Estimated diversity indices are shown in
table 11.  Bangladesh has a low level of diversity (for example, 0.42 in 2004) in its
agricultural exports, indicating that only a few agricultural commodities dominate its export
basket.  An analysis of trends in diversity of agricultural exports revealed a fluctuating
situation (for example, 0.52 in 1991, 0.27 in 2000 and 0.42 in 2004).  This indicates that
Bangladesh’s export basket is not stable over time.  In the case of Cambodia, diversity in
agricultural exports is reasonably high and stable.  The value of the diversity index of
agricultural exports from Cambodia during 2000-2004 was more than 0.80 while in 2004 it
was 0.85.  On the other hand, estimated values of diversity in agricultural imports by
Bangladesh ranged between 0.80 and 0.91, indicating that Bangladesh imports a large
number of agricultural products.  The estimated value of the diversity index of agricultural
imports by Cambodia ranges between 0.72 and 0.75, indicating that Cambodia also depends
on a large number of imported agricultural commodities.
3.  Agricultural products relevant to NTB analysis
The major points that emerge from the above discussion are that:
(a) Both Bangladesh and Cambodia display significant export concentration
(especially Bangladesh) and will therefore be vulnerable if they face
unfavourable market conditions arising from NTBs in their major markets;
(b) Agricultural exports account for a small share of total exports from Bangladesh
and even more so from Cambodia; and








The detailed analysis carried out so far has enabled the identification of potential
agricultural products for detailed tracking of NTBs (table 12).  NTBs applied to these
products are analysed in detail in the next section.
C.  Nature and extent of NTBs imposed on exports from
Bangladesh and Cambodia
An empirical analysis of NTBs applied to agricultural products needs to be carried
out at two levels:  (a) types of NTBs practiced; and (b) NTBs used on specific products
that are of export interest of Bangladesh.  Analysis of the types of NTBs in operation would
be helpful to negotiations while an understanding of product specific NTBs would be useful
in establishing export strategies.  In addition to information about NTBs, knowledge about
the practice of TRQs used by the countries under the purview of the present study would
be useful.  Since TRQs are expressed in terms of tariffs, TRQs are therefore tariff barriers.
So, TRQs can be ignored in an analysis of NTBs such as this study.  However, it is widely
known that TRQs have a clear adverse effect on trade of non-beneficiaries, equivalent to
a physical restriction on trade.  Therefore, TRQs are noted as barriers to trade in the
Table 11.  Trends in diversity of agricultural exports and imports
by Bangladesh and Cambodia, 1991-2004
Hirschman-Herfindahl Index of Hirschman-Herfindahl Index of
Year
Diversity (HHId) for agricultural Diversity (HHId) for agricultural
exports from   imports by










2000 0.27 0.87 0.88 0.72
2001 0.30 0.86 0.89 0.73
2002 0.36 0.82 0.86 0.75
2003 0.34 0.93 0.88 0.72
2004 0.42 0.85 0.91 0.73
Source: Author’s estimation based on data compiled from UNCOMTRADE and foreign trade statistics
of Bangladesh.253
Table 12.  Agricultural products relevant to analysis of non-tariff barriers
HS Code Product Export interest
010290 Bovine animals, live, except purebred breeding Cambodia
010600 Animals, live, except farm animals Bangladesh, Cambodia
020629 Bovine edible offal, frozen except livers and tongues Cambodia
030110 Ornamental fish, live Cambodia
030199 Fish live, except trout, eels or carp Cambodia
030211 Trout, fresh or chilled, whole Cambodia
030269 Fish nes, fresh or chilled, whole Bangladesh, Cambodia
030310 Salmon, Pacific, frozen, whole Bangladesh
030329 Salmonidae, nes, frozen, whole Bangladesh, Cambodia
030339 Flatfish except halibut, plaice or sole, frozen, whole Bangladesh
030376 Eels, frozen, whole Bangladesh
030379 Fish nes, frozen, whole Bangladesh
030410 Fish fillet or meat, fresh or chilled, not liver, roe Bangladesh
030420 Fish fillets, frozen Bangladesh
030490 Fish meat and mince, except liver, roe and fillets, frozen Bangladesh, Cambodia
030510 Flour, meal and pellets of fish for human consumption Cambodia
030520 Liver and roe, dried, smoked, salted or in brine Bangladesh
030530 Fish fillets, dried, salted or in brine, not smoked Cambodia
030549 Smoked fish and fillets other than herrings or salmon Bangladesh
030551 Cod dried, whether or not salted but not smoked Bangladesh
030559 Dried fish, other than cod, not smoked Bangladesh
030613 Shrimps and prawns, frozen Bangladesh, Cambodia
030614 Crabs, frozen Bangladesh
030619 Crustaceans nes, frozen Bangladesh
030622 Lobsters (Homarus), not frozen Bangladesh, Cambodia
030623 Shrimps and prawns, not frozen Bangladesh, Cambodia
030624 Crabs, not frozen Bangladesh
030729 Scallops other than live, fresh or chilled Cambodia
030749 Cuttlefish, squid, frozen, dried, salted or in brine Cambodia
030791 Aquatic invertebrates nes, fresh or chilled, live Cambodia
040210 Milk powder < 1.5% fat Cambodia
050510 Feathers and down used for stuffing Bangladesh
050610 Ossein and bones treated with acid Bangladesh
060499 Foliage, branches for bouquets etc., except fresh Bangladesh
070320 Garlic, fresh or chilled Cambodia
070390 Leeks and other alliaceous vegetables, fresh or chilled Bangladesh
070820 Beans, shelled or unshelled, fresh or chilled Cambodia
070910 Globe artichokes, fresh or chilled Bangladesh
070990 Vegetables, fresh or chilled nes Bangladesh
071190 Vegetables nes and mixtures provisionally preserved Cambodia254
071230 Mushrooms and truffles, dried, not further prepared Cambodia
080130 Cashew nuts, fresh or dried Cambodia
090230 Tea, black (fermented or partly) in packages < 3 kg Bangladesh
090240 Tea, black (fermented or partly) in packages > 3 kg Bangladesh
100190 Wheat except durum wheat, and meslin Cambodia
100510 Maize (corn) seed Cambodia
100590 Maize except seed corn Cambodia
100620 Rice, husked (brown) Cambodia
100630 Rice, husked (brown) Bangladesh, Cambodia
110220 Maize (corn) flour Cambodia
110814 Manioc (cassava) starch Cambodia
140110 Bamboo used primarily for plaiting Bangladesh
150790 Refined soya-bean oil, not chemically modified Bangladesh
170111 Raw sugar, cane Bangladesh
190410 Cereal foods obtained by swelling, roasting of cereal Bangladesh
190510 Crispbread Cambodia
200310 Mushrooms, prepared or preserved, not in vinegar Cambodia
200980 Single fruit, vegetable juice nes, not fermented or spirits Bangladesh
210690 Food preparations nes Bangladesh
220300 Beer made from malt Cambodia
220820 Spirits obtained by distilling grape wine, grape marc Cambodia
240110 Tobacco, unmanufactured, not stemmed or stripped Bangladesh, Cambodia
240120 Tobacco, unmanufactured, stemmed or stripped Bangladesh, Cambodia
240130 Tobacco refuse Bangladesh, Cambodia
240210 Cigars, cheroots and cigarillos, containing tobacco Cambodia
240220 Cigarettes containing tobacco Bangladesh, Cambodia
240290 Cigars, cheroots, cigarettes, with tobacco substitute Bangladesh
240310 Cigarette or pipe tobacco and tobacco substitute mixes Cambodia
Source: Author’s calculations.
Table 12 (continued)
HS Code Product Export interest
following discussion.  LDCs such as Bangladesh and Cambodia may take advantage of
this information in formulating their WTO negotiation strategies.
An attempt has been made to document the various types of NTBs as well as
product-specific NTBs that are in place in the European Union, India, Japan, Thailand and
the United States.  Research findings on various types of NTBs in the study countries are
detailed in tables 13-17.  Table 13 illustrates the quantitative restrictions practiced by these
countries.  All five countries use tariff quotas for imports of agricultural products.  India also
uses export quotas for certain agricultural products.  Licensing is required for imports of
several agricultural commodities in the European Union, the United States and Thailand.
Licensing is required for exports from India of some agricultural commodities.  India also
maintains export restraints on a voluntary basis.  A summary of customs and administrative255
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tarif
f
 lines.  In-quota
import of rice, wheat
and barley
, certain milk
products, and raw silk




amounts of all products
except raw silk may be
imported by private
entities.  Import quotas




products remain subject to
tarif
f





(HS 0813.40); (2) copra
(1203.00.0005); (3) milk and
cream, not concentrated, not
containing added sugar or
other matters (including
flavoured milk) (0401,
2202.90); (4) milk and
cream, concentrated or




, granules or other
solid forms, or a fat content,
by weight, not exceeding
1.5% (0402.10.0007);
(5) potatoes, fresh or chilled
(0701); (6) onions, fresh,
chilled, dried, whole, cut,
sliced, broken or in powder
,





fresh or chilled, whether








 quotas are maintained
on several products

















4,000 tons at 6% for each
year); (4) herring, fresh,
chilled or frozen (an
autonomous quota
opened for three years.
Quota for 2001-2003:
20,000 tons at zero per cent
between 1 November and
31 December of each year);
(5) herring, spiced/vinegar
cured, in brine, preserved in
barrels of at least 70 kg net
drained weight (an
autonomous quota opened
for three years.  Quota for
2001-2003:  5,000 tons at
6% for each year).





(32) animal feed containing
milk; (33) raw cane sugar;
(34) other cane or beet
sugars or syrups; (35) other
mixtures, more than 10%
sugar; (36) sweetened
cocoa powder; (37) mixes
and doughs; (38) mixed
condiments and seasonings;
(39) tobacco; (40) short
staple cotton; (41) harsh or
rough cotton; (42) medium
staple cotton; (43) long





fresh or dried, whether or














containing any portion of












(13) rice (including paddy
,
broken) (1006); (14) soya
beans, edible and inedible,




(16) soya-bean oil and its
fractions, whether or not
refined, but not chemically
modified (1507.10.0001,
1507.90.0006); (17) palm oil
and its fractions, whether





(18) coconut oil and its
fractions, whether or not
refined, but not chemically
modified (1513.1
1.0008,
1513.19.0005); (19) cane or
beet sugar and chemically
pure sucrose in solid form
(1701); (20) instant cof
fee
and other extracts, essences
and concentrates, of cof
fee,
and preparations with a
basis of these extracts,
essences or concentrates















milk; pure milk; butter
(unless exported as branded
products in consumers
packs not exceeding 5 kg);














Licensing is required for










animals, exotic birds, tallow
,



















Nadu coast origin in
processed form; sandalwood




Import licences are required
for quota management
purposes of all agricultural
products (subject to tarif
f
quotas), such as cereals and
cereal products, rice, sugar
,
oils and fats, milk products,
beef and veal, sheep and
goat meat, fresh fruit and
vegetables, and processed
fruit and vegetables.
Import licensing on plants
and animals and their
products, fish and wildlife,
narcotic drugs, alcohol and
tobacco.
A range of products
including fishmeal, gunny






are subject to import
licensing.
Prohibitions
A number of products are
subject to import prohibitions.













unrendered or otherwise, of
any animal origin, including
(i) lard stearine, oleo
stearine, tallow stearine,
lard oil, oleo oil and tallow
oil not emulsified or mixed





s-foot oil and fats
from bone or waste,
(iii) poultry fats, rendered or
solvent extracted, (iv) fats
and oils of fish/marine origin,
whether or not refined,




and (v) margarine, imitation
lard and other prepared
edible fats of animal origin;
(2) animal rennet; (3) wild
animals, including their
parts and products and ivory;
and (4) beef and products
containing beef in any form.
India has a list of 300
sensitive items, the import
of which it monitors; these
items include milk products,













Baht 300 million must
have a related counter
trade transaction of at
least one half of the
procurement value.
According to the authorities
there is no law requiring
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 barriers, in view of the adverse ef
fects of 
TRQs on the trade of non-beneficiaries they are noted here as barriers to trade, so that














procedures that act as NTBs in the United States, the European Union, Japan, Thailand
and India is given in table 14.  Table 15 provides a summary of non-tariff charges and
related policies that affect imports.  A comprehensive summary of measures and practices
related to government participation in trade, restrictive practices and policies that are more
general is given in table 16.  Table 17 summarizes various technical barriers in place in the
United States, the European Union, Japan, Thailand and India.
As mentioned above, NTBs on a product specific basis (six-digit HS level) for all
major agricultural commodities exported by Bangladesh and Cambodia were documented.
A summary of the findings given in table 18 shows that the European Union imposes
import quotas on, and provides domestic support for fish products.  However, as a result of
the European Union EBA, Bangladesh and Cambodia do not face import quotas for their
products exported to the European Union.  The European Union also imposes an import
licence requirement on vegetables and rice, and provides export subsidies for tobacco-
related products, wheat, rice and vegetables.  As explained above, fish and tobacco-
related products are the most important export items of Bangladesh, whereas fish, rice
and tobacco are the main export items of Cambodia.  Thus, products of Bangladesh and
Cambodia with greater export potential face NTBs in the European Union market.
Major NTBs imposed by the United States on agricultural products include import
licensing, import quotas, export subsidies, among others.  The United States requires
import licences for fish, tobacco and vegetables, imposes import quotas on sugar and
tobacco, and provides export subsidies for vegetables, rice, maize and wheat, implying
that United States also imposes NTBs on agricultural products having export potential for
Bangladesh and Cambodia.  On the other hand, notable NTBs used by Japan are tariff
quota, state trading and state procurement, among others.  Japanese NTBs on agricultural
products are imposed mainly on tobacco, raw sugar and cereal products.  It thus appears
that developed countries protect their agriculture with stringent NTBs, and that products
with strong potential for export by Bangladesh and Cambodia are associated with NTBs.
LDCs face NTBs not only in developed country markets but also in the developing
countries.  Among the developing countries, Thailand and India are considered in this
study.  Thailand’s trade barriers related to agricultural products are the imposition of tariff
quotas on tobacco, raw sugar, rice and maize.  Thailand also imposes an import surcharge
on maize.  On the other hand, major barriers imposed on agricultural products by India are
import monitoring, import quotas, government procurement and state trading, among others.
India monitors imports of rice, maize, tea and vegetables while it procures wheat and rice,
and imposes an import quota on maize.  A detailed list of product-specific NTBs (two-digit,
four-digit, six-digit and seven- to nine-digit) applied by Thailand is given in table 19.
(a) Incidence of non-tariff measures
The most comprehensive collection of publicly available information on NTMs is
the UNCTAD Database on Trade Control Measures, which is available in UNCTAD Trade
Analysis and Information Systems (TRAINS).  TRAINS reports the NTM incidence at the262
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have been established in
accordance with the relevant
provisions of its treaty and












not required for imported
goods entering certain free
zones (of protocol type 1)
and free warehouses.
Imports are valued
based on cif value
(which is taken to
be the transaction
value of the imports).
Customs duty can be
paid through a multi-
payment network
system introduced








invoices and other related
documents (including
country of origin, quantity
composition of value, and
description of goods) are
taken into consideration for
valuation purposes.
Thailand uses the cif (cost
insurance and freight)
prices of imports as the
basis for customs
valuation.
The value of imported goods
is based on their transaction
value, which is defined as
the price actually paid, or is
payable for the goods when
sold for exports to India,
adjusted for the value of
certain costs and services
including commissions and
brokerage charges,
container and packing costs
(customs valuation).  For
imports, three documents
are normally required:  the
invoice, packing list and bill
of lading or airways bill.
Health certificates, plant
certificates and phytosanitary
certificates are required for
certain goods; import
permits, to be obtained from
the relevant Government
departments, are also
required for items such as

















content more than 60%
(HS 2301.200.106), and oil
cake residues from the
extraction of soya-bean oil
(2304.00.0008).
Excise
Excise duties are applied at









rates are required on
alcoholic beverages,
manufactured tobacco
products and mineral oils.
Excise tax on imports at the
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Excise duties, additional
duties and special additional
duties are imposed, but it is
not clear that they are levied



















x (HMT), introduced in
1986, is an ad valorem levy
of 0.125% collected by the
CBI (Caribbean Basin
Initiative) (formerly the US








 applies to imports and
locally produced goods at
the same rates.  While the
tax base is fully harmonized,
the rates applied by member







 rate that is
not less than 15%, with one
or two reduced rates not
less than 5%.  Under
specific conditions, V
AT
exemptions are also granted
upon final importation of
certain agricultural products
















and preferential rules of
origins.  In determining both
non-preferential and
preferential origin of
products that are not wholly







through:  (1) criteria based
on the change of tarif
f
headings; (2) economic
criteria based on value-
added; and (3) technical or
industrial criteria based on





preferential rules of origin
are more sensitive for
products with higher
preferential margins, such
as beverages and tobacco.
For many agricultural
products (e.g., eggs, meat
and poultry), country of
origin marking and labelling
regulations are used to
provide consumers with
information regarding the
origin of the product,
and are mandatory
.
The United States applies
preferential and
non-preferential rules of
origin.  While the substantial
transformation criterion is
central to all United States
rules of origin, its definition
varies according to the




States rules of origin state
that the product is
considered to have been
produced in a country when
(1) the goods are wholly the
growth, product, or
manufacture of that country
,
or (2) the goods have been
in that country and
“substantially transformed
































Thailand does not have
specific laws, judicial
decisions or administrative
rulings of general application
relating to non-preferential
rules of origin.  Imports
from 
ASEAN countries are
subject to the rules of
origin for the 
ASEAN CEPT
Scheme.
Does not apply rules of
origin for imports from MFN
sources.  Preferential rules
of origin are applied under













” with a name,
character or use that is
distinct from that of the
article or articles from which
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provides export subsidies for
wheat and wheat flower
,
coarse grains, rice,
rapeseed, olive oil, butter
and butter oil, skim milk
powder
, cheese, other milk
products, beef meat,
pig-meat, poultry meat,
eggs, wine, fresh and
processed fruit and
vegetables, raw tobacco
and alcohol.  
The products
receiving the highest share






(15.1%), butter and butter
oil (12.6%) and cheese
(7.3%).
Although the European
Commission does not have
a policy of direct or indirect
assistance to exports, such
assistance can be of
fered
by individual member States,
subject to community rules.







The United States has
committed to spending total
outlays not exceeding US$
594 million, per annum on




Actual export subsidies in
2000 amounted to US$ 15
million, and were
concentrated on exports of





 total of 91%
of total exports of skimmed
milk powder were
subsidized, up from 71%
in 1999.  In 2001, export
subsidies amounted to US$
55 million, and covered only
dairy products.
From October 1999 to
September 2000, 
AMS
was US$ 17 billion for
agricultural products.
Direct payments for soya










tax and import duty
, but it
does not provide direct
subsidies for exports.
Minimum support price
(MSP) for rice, wheat,
oil seeds etc; price support
for pulses, oilseeds and
other products.
Market Intervention Scheme
(MIS) for a number of
horticultural products,
including oranges, coriander
seed, apples, oil palm,
potatoes, red chillies, areca
















amounted to 1.4% of
GDP in 2002, while the
sector
’







include a pledging scheme,












(AMS) amounted to 43,654
million pounds, while
domestic support through
green box and blue box
measures reached 21,845




estimate for EC remains
very high, particularly for
beef and veal, wheat and
other grains, sugar
, milk
and sheep meat; eggs
benefit the least.
provide a fixed revenue
floor per unit of production
for producers of eligible
crops, and thus provide
incentives to continue
production when price falls
which covers rice, corn,
sorghum, barley and oats,
extra long staple (ELS) and










for wheat, corn, sorghum,
barley
,
 oats, upland cotton,
rice, soya beans, other
oilseeds and peanuts.
Aside from the Step 2
programme for cotton, it is













State trading on wheat, corn,
oilseeds, cotton (upland and
extra long staple), rice,
tobacco, small chick peas,
lentils and dry peas, milk








Imports subject to state
trading include urea, whether
or not in aqueous solution;
ammonium sulphonitrite;
coconut oil and its fractions;
copra; some cereals (wheat,











A few export items (e.g.,
orchids, longans and durian)








Wheat, rice and edible oils
are procured by the
Government and provided
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State trading activities
involve leaf tobacco,








ble 17.  T













The plant health regulations
cover protective measures
against diseases of plants
and pesticide residues, and
the marketing of seeds and






especially for plants and
animal products, is generally





Animal and Plant Health
Inspection Service (APHIS)
and Food and Safety
Inspection Service (FSIS)
inspectors located at the
borders.  It requires issuing
country of origin labelling
guidelines for voluntary use
by retailers who wish to
notify their customers of the
country of origin of beef

















standards for food and
food additives, in order




processed foods if it
is derived from cattle
originating in a country




Under a notification issued
in October 2001, “livestock
products
” include products,
eggs and seeds of all aquatic
animals.  Imports of all these
products require a sanitary
















animal and plant resources
from exotic pests and
The Bureau of Indian
Standards (BIS) endeavours
to align Indian standards












diseases.  Its Import
Authorization System (IAS)
allows importers to submit
applications for permits to
import fruit and vegetables,
and animal products and
organisms.
As of 1 
April 2001, 3,020
Indian Standards (some
17%) had been harmonized
with international standards;
from 1998 to 2001, however
,
the percentage of standards





The BIS Certification Mark
was made mandatory for







labelled with the name
of the substance, date
of minimum durability
,












of rice, wheat and
Information required on
packaging and labelling for
all packaged products
includes:  (a) name and
address of the importer;
(b) generic or common
name of the commodity;
(c) net quantity in terms of
standard unit of weights and
measures (or its equivalent
if given in any other unit);
(d) month and year in which
the commodity was
manufactured, packeted or












barley as well as soya
beans.
retail sale price (including all
taxes, freight, transport
charges, commission















a number of poultry
products, while the volume-
based SSG clause was
made operational for some
fruit and vegetable products.
SSGs were taken
during 2002-2004 for
a number of products,
including rice, small
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ble 18.  Non-tariff barriers imposed by the European Union, Japan, India, Thailand and the United States

































ea, black (fermented or partly)
Bangladesh
Import monitoring




















































































ea, black (fermented or partly)
Bangladesh




































































































































Nuts edible, fresh or dried, nes
Bangladesh
190590








Cereal foods obtained by
Bangladesh
swelling, roasting of cereal
050510











































































































































































Spirits obtained by distilling
Cambodia
grape wine, grape marc
080130
Cashew nuts, fresh or dried
Cambodia
100190
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Table 19.  Non-tariff barriers applied by Thailand to agricultural commodities
HS Code NTM type Description
2-digit 4-digit 6-digit 7/8/9-digit 
02 0202 to – – Technical measure Quality inspection required by Ministry of
0210 Agriculture
07 0702 – – Import licence Import licence required by Department of
Foreign Trade, Ministry of Commerce/
Ministry of Agriculture
07 0703 0703.10 – Import licence Import licence required by Department of
Foreign Trade, Ministry of Commerce/
Ministry of Agriculture
07 0712 0712.20, – Import licence Import licence required by Department of
0712.90 Foreign Trade, Ministry of Commerce/
Ministry of Agriculture
08 0801 0801.11, – Import licence Import licence required by Department of
0801.19 Foreign Trade, Ministry of Commerce/
Ministry of Agriculture
08 0811 – – Technical measure Quality inspection required by Thailand
Industrial Standard Institute (TISI)
08 0813 0813.40 – Import licence Import licence required by Department of
Foreign Trade, Ministry of Commerce/
Ministry of Agriculture
09 0901 – – Import licence Import licence required by Department of
Foreign Trade, Ministry of Commerce/
Ministry of Agriculture
09 0901 0901.21 – Import licence Import licence required by Department of
Foreign Trade, Ministry of Commerce/
Ministry of Agriculture
09 0902 – – Import licence Import licence required by Department of
Foreign Trade, Ministry of Commerce/
Ministry of Agriculture
09 0904 0904.11, – Import licence Import licence required by Department of
0904.12 Foreign Trade, Ministry of Commerce /
Ministry of Agriculture
10 1005 1005.90 – Import licence Import licence required by Department of
Foreign Trade, Ministry of Commerce/
Ministry of Agriculture
10 1006 1006.10, – Import licence Import licence required by Department of
1006.20, Foreign Trade, Ministry of Commerce/
1006.30, Ministry of Agriculture
1006.40
12 1201 1201.00 1201.001 Import licence Import licence required by Department of
Foreign Trade, Ministry of Commerce/
Ministry of Agriculture
12 1201 1201.00 1201.009 Import licence Import licence required by Department of
Foreign Trade, Ministry of Commerce/
Ministry of Agriculture280
12 1203 1203.00 – Import licence Import licence required by Department of
Foreign Trade, Ministry of Commerce/
Ministry of Agriculture
12 1209 1209.91, – Import licence Import licence required by Department of
1209.99 Foreign Trade, Ministry of Commerce/
Ministry of Agriculture
14 1401 1401.20 – Import licence Import licence required by Department of
Foreign Trade, Ministry of Commerce/
Ministry of Agriculture
19 – – – Quantity control Import controlled by Food and Drug
measure Administration
20 2008 2008.20 – Import licence Import licence required by Department of
Foreign Trade, Ministry of Commerce/
Ministry of Agriculture
20 2009 2009.41 – Import licence Import licence required by Department of
Foreign Trade, Ministry of Commerce/
Ministry of Agriculture
21 2101 2101.11 – Import licence Import licence required by Department of
Foreign Trade, Ministry of Commerce/
Ministry of Agriculture
22 – – – Import licence and Import is subject to licensing, testing,
technical measure inspection and quarantine requirements
by Food and Drug Administration
23 2301 2301.20 2301.20.0106 Import licence: Import licence required by Department of
Non-automatic Foreign Trade, Ministry of Commerce/
licensing Ministry of Agriculture
23 2304 – – Import licence Import licence required by Department of
to 2305 Foreign Trade, Ministry of Commerce/
Ministry of Agriculture
Source: ASEAN website www.aseansec.org (accessed on 17 October 2005).
Table 19 (continued)
HS Code NTM type Description
product level.  NTM data reported in TRAINS are at the six-digit classification level in the
Harmonized System and cover “core” NTMs or relatively restrictive NTMs.  A core NTM
includes three major categories of non-tariff measures:  (a) quantity control measures,
excluding tariff quotas and enterprise-specific restrictions; (b) finance measures, excluding
regulations concerning terms of payment and transfer delays, and (c) price control measures
(Bora and others, 2002a and 2002b).
The product-specific incidence of NTBs for all major agricultural commodities of
export interest to Bangladesh and Cambodia is shown in table 20.  These data were
obtained from TRAINS.  Before interpreting the numbers reported in the table, it is pertinent
to mention the procedure followed by UNCTAD in calculating these numbers.  UNCTAD
used the most conventional tool for quantifying the incidence of NTMs, i.e., the frequency
index, which shows the number of tariff lines covered by some pre-selected groups of the
NTM.  By way of illustration, consider a six-digit code comprising four subheadings that281
Table 20.  Product-specific incidence (frequency ratio percentage)
of non-tariff measures
Export
European India Japan Thailand
  United
HS Code Product interests
Union  (1997) (2001) (2001)
States
of (1999)




a Animals, live, except Bangladesh, 100   100
farm animals Cambodia    
020629 Bovine edible offal, Cambodia 87 100 0 100 100
frozen except livers
and tongues
030110 Ornamental fish, live Cambodia 50 100 100 100 50
030199 Fish live, except trout, Cambodia 5 100 100 100 50
eel or carp
030211 Trout, fresh or chilled, Cambodia 0 100 100 100 100
whole
030269 Fish nes, fresh or Bangladesh, 1 100 100 100 100
chilled, whole Cambodia
030310
a Salmon, Pacific, frozen, Bangladesh   100   100
whole  
030329 Salmonidae, nes, frozen, Bangladesh, 25 100 100 100 100
whole Cambodia
030339 Flatfish except halibut, Bangladesh 0 100 100 100 100
plaice or sole, frozen,
whole
030376 Eels, frozen, whole Bangladesh 0 100 100 100 100
030379 Fish nes, frozen, whole Bangladesh 1 100 100 100 100
030410 Fish fillet or meat, fresh Bangladesh 4 100 100 100 100
or chilled, not liver, roe
030420 Fish fillets, frozen Bangladesh 2 100 100 100 100
030490 Fish meat and mince, Bangladesh, 2 100 100 100 100
except liver, roe and Cambodia
fillets, frozen
030510 Flour, meal and pellets Cambodia 50 100 100 100 100
of fish for human
consumption
030520 Livers and roes, dried, Bangladesh 16 100 100 100 100
smoked, salted or in brine
030530 Fish fillets, dried, salted Cambodia 7 100 100 100 100
or in brine, not smoked
030549 Smoked fish and fillets Bangladesh 7 100 100 100 100
other than herrings
or salmon
030551 Cod dried, whether or Bangladesh 0 0 100 100 100
not salted but not smoked282
030559 Dried fish, other than cod, Bangladesh 15 0 100 100 100
not smoked
030613 Shrimps and prawns, Bangladesh, 0 100 100 100 100
frozen Cambodia
030614 Crabs, frozen Bangladesh 0 100 100 100 100
030619 Crustaceans nes, frozen Bangladesh 0 100 100 100 100
030622 Lobsters (Homarus), Bangladesh, 0 0 100 100 100
not frozen Cambodia
030623 Shrimps and prawns, Bangladesh, 0 0 100 100 100
not frozen Cambodia
030624 Crabs, not frozen Bangladesh 0 0 100 100 100
030729 Scallops other than live, Cambodia 0 100 100 100 100
fresh or chilled
030749 Cuttlefish, squid, frozen, Cambodia 0 100 100 100 100
dried, salted or in brine
030791 Aquatic invertebrates, Cambodia 50 100 100 100 100
nes, fresh or chilled, live
040210 Milk powder < 1.5% fat Cambodia 0 100 100 100 100
050510 Feathers and down used Bangladesh 0 100 0 100 100
for stuffing
050610 Ossein and bones Bangladesh 50 100 100 100 100
treated with acid
060499 Foliage branches for Bangladesh 16 100 0 100 100
bouquets etc., except
fresh
070320 Garlic, fresh or chilled Cambodia 0 100 0 100 100
070390 Leeks and other Bangladesh 0 100 0 100 100
alliaceous vegetables,
fresh or chilled
070820 Beans, shelled or Cambodia 0 100 0 100 100
unshelled, fresh or chilled
070910 Globe artichokes, fresh Bangladesh 0 100 0 100 100
or chilled
070990 Vegetables, fresh or Bangladesh 12 100 0 100 88
chilled, nes




a Mushrooms and truffles, Cambodia   100   100
dried, not further prepared  
080130
b Cashew nuts, fresh or Cambodia
dried       
Table 20 (continued)
Export
European India Japan Thailand
  United
HS Code Product interests
Union  (1997) (2001) (2001)
States
of (1999)283
090230 Tea, black (fermented or Bangladesh 0 100 0 100 0
partly) in packages < 3 kg
090240 Tea, black (fermented or Bangladesh 0 100 0 100 100
partly) in packages > 3 kg
100190 Wheat except durum Cambodia 0 0 100 100 100
wheat, and meslin
100510 Maize (corn) seed Cambodia 0 0 0 100 100
100590 Maize except seed corn Cambodia 0 0 0 100 100
100620 Rice, husked (brown) Cambodia 0 0 100 100 100
100630 Rice, husked (brown) Bangladesh, 0 0 100 100 100
Cambodia
110220 Maize (corn) flour Cambodia 0 100 0 100 0
110814 Manioc (cassava) starch Cambodia 0 0 100 100 0
140110 Bamboos used primarily Bangladesh 0 0 0 0 0
for plaiting
150790 Refined soya-bean oil, Bangladesh 0 100 0 100 0
not chemically modified
170111 Raw sugar, cane Bangladesh 0 0 0 100 100
190410 Cereal foods obtained Bangladesh 100 100 75 100 100
by swelling, roasting
of cereal
190510 Crispbread Cambodia 0 0 0 100 100
200310 Mushrooms, prepared or Cambodia 0 100 0 100 50
preserved, not in vinegar
200980 Single fruit, vegetable Bangladesh 0 100 0 100 100
juice, nes, not fermented
or spirits
210690 Food preparations nes Bangladesh 0 100 100 100 97
220300 Beer made from malt Cambodia 0 100 0 0 100
220820 Spirits obtained by Cambodia 0 100 0 0 100
distilling grape wine,
grape marc
240110 Tobacco, unmanufactured, Bangladesh, 0 0 0 0 0
not stemmed or stripped Cambodia
240120 Tobacco, unmanufactured, Bangladesh, 0 0 0 0 0
stemmed or stripped Cambodia
240130 Tobacco refuse Bangladesh, 0 0 0 0 0
Cambodia
240210 Cigars, cheroots and Cambodia 0 100 0 100 0
cigarillos, containing
tobacco




European India Japan Thailand
  United
HS Code Product interests
Union  (1997) (2001) (2001)
States
of (1999)284
240290 Cigars, cheroots, Bangladesh 0 100 0 100 0
cigarettes, with tobacco
substitute
240310 Cigarette or pipe tobacco Cambodia 0 100 0 100 0
and tobacco substitute
mixes
Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2004, TRAINS Database.  Data
coverage of TRAINS on Internet, 1 November 2004.
Note: Dates in the parentheses indicate reference year for NTM incidence.
a Obtained for 2001.
b Obtained for 1995.
Table 20 (continued)
Export
European India Japan Thailand
  United
HS Code Product interests
Union  (1997) (2001) (2001)
States
of (1999)
include separate lines for apples and bananas, pineapples, grapes and melons, and oranges.
An import licence applies to apples and oranges, while an advance import deposit applies
to grapes and melons.  In this example, the NTM incidence is 100 per cent for the oranges
tariff line, since they are subject to licensing, 50 per cent for apples as they are only
affected by licensing, zero per cent for pineapples, and 100 per cent for grapes and
melons.  It is important to note that the percentage term indicates only the incidence and
not the impact of NTMs.  Furthermore, the number calculated is dependent on the number
of lines that are affected, not the number of measures.
The prevalence of 100 in table 20 indicates that most of the major agricultural
export items from Bangladesh and Cambodia face NTMs in all the study countries.  An
important note of caution needs to be mentioned here – a value of 0 (zero) may indicate
data not available or no incidence of NTBs.  Therefore, researchers always use other
evidence and information for interpreting zero values.  Since verification from other sources
was not possible, zero values have not been interpreted.
Product-specific NTM incidence is very important for the formulation of export
strategies.  However, comprehensive measures are needed for quick understanding.
Therefore, researchers report these values of aggregation at the HS two-digit level.  A
more popular way is to use a classification that reflects industry categories according to
a Standard International Trade Classification (SITC).  Bora and others (2002a) reported
NTMs under four broad categories:  primary products; manufactures; other consumer
goods; and other products.  A comparison of NTM coverage of agricultural products in the
study countries is reported in table 21.  The difference in reference years limits cross-
country comparisons of NTMs.  However, in the absence of data for all countries in the
same year, this had to be done based on available data.  Therefore, this limitation needs
to be kept in mind.  It is evident from table 20 that coverage of NTMs is generally higher
for agricultural products than the average coverage applicable for primary products and for
all products.  Among the study countries, NTM coverage for agricultural products is highest
in India (42.24), followed by Japan, Thailand and the United States.285
Table 21.  Non-tariff measure coverage of agricultural products







(0-2, 4) (0-4, 68)
United States 1999 4.56 4.69 5.08
European Union 2.30 1.98 5.79
Japan 2001 7.69 7.49 5.61
Thailand 2001 6.67 6.32 3.97
India 1997 42.24 35.37 34.66
Sources: Bora and others (2002a); TRAINS database.
Bacchetta and Bora (2001) reported the frequency of NTBs faced by LDCs for their
agricultural exports (table 22).  Three important messages are evident from the table:
(a) The frequency of non-tariff measures is generally higher for agricultural products
than for manufactures, and minerals and fuels;
(b) In the case of agricultural products, developed countries and Quad countries
(United States, Canada, the European Union and Japan) have a higher
frequency of NTBs than that of other countries;
(c) Developed countries and Quad countries have a higher level of frequency of
NTBs for agricultural commodities of export interest to Bangladesh and
Cambodia, such as crustaceans (live), other fish than agricultural products
for which they cannot compete (coffee and substitutes with coffee, and oilseeds).
Bhattacharya and Mukhopadhaya (2002) reported NTMs faced by exports from
Bangladesh.  In 1998, Bangladesh exported US$ 2.3 billion worth of products to the
European Union, US$ 2.1 billion to the United States and US$ 0.1 billion to Japan
(table 23).  Exports facing NTMs as a percentage of total exports to the European Union,
the United States and Japan were 91 per cent, 94 per cent and 68 per cent, respectively.
The share of exports facing multiple NTMs in the European Union, the United States and
Japan were 93 per cent, 91 per cent and 63 per cent, respectively.  Non-traditional NTMs
such as SPS, TBT and related measures were the most prevalent measures, accounting
for about 96 per cent in the European Union, 95 per cent in the United States and 64 per
cent in Japan.
(b) Rules of origin as a barrier to trade
Rules of origin can also act as NTBs.  Brenton (2003) pointed out that both
Bangladesh and Cambodia had high relevance of EBA (i.e., exports eligible for preferences
are more than 30 per cent of total exports to the European Union) as well as high take-up286
Table 22.  Frequency of non-tariff measures faced by exports
















Africa Caribbean   Pacific
Agricultural 48.24 14.87 57.69 34.24 32.93 24.42 18.58 41.98
and fishery
products
Crustaceans 58.64  8.33 75.00 30.98 43.56 22.22 20.00 50.00
(live)
Other fish 64.49 14.07 75.16 30.96 43.85 22.87 20.28 55.43
Edible fruit 53.95 19.21 54.61 37.09 32.36 24.21 28.20 54.67
and nuts
Coffee and 32.26 17.86 44.64 28.10 20.36 26.19 18.18 21.43
substitutes
with coffee









Minerals  6.72  3.29  5.73  6.64  6.72  4.52  0.16  6.53
and fuels
Manufactures 10.67  7.20 10.96 11.68  7.15  5.57  1.74 16.78
Source: Bacchetta and Bora (2001).
of preferences (i.e., more than 30 per cent of exports are eligible for preferences).  Actual
take-up of preferences in 2001 was 36 per cent for Cambodia and 50 per cent for Bangladesh,
and about 50 per cent for all non-ACP LDCs.  The value of implied transfer that may have
entered duty-free (i.e., the value of exports that requested duty-free access multiplied by
the MFN tariff) in 2001 was Euro 1.9 billion for Bangladesh and Euro 2.3 million for
Cambodia.  The study added that if EBA had delivered duty-free access to all exports
recorded as having come from Bangladesh and Cambodia, there would have been an
additional transfer of Euro 1.93 billion to Bangladesh and Euro 3.7 million to Cambodia.
For Bangladesh, EBA led to a transfer (or a margin of preference) equivalent to 5.65 per
cent.  However, the lack of full utilization of the available preferences means that
Bangladesh faced a trade-weighted average tariff paid by many non-preferential exporters
to the European Union.  Cambodia faced relatively higher average tariffs (7.66 per cent)
when exporting to the European Union, after taking into account the fact that only
a proportion of exports could have entered the European Union duty-free.287





Total exports (US$ billion) 2.3 2.1 0.1
Exports subject to NTMs (US$ billion) 2.06 1.93 0.08
Exports facing NTMs in total exports (%) 91.01 93.86 68.41
Export subject to single NTM (US$ billion) 0.14 0.18 0.03
Export subject to multiple NTMs (US$ billion) 1.92 1.76 0.05
Share of exports facing single NTM (%) 6.6 9.1 36.6
Share of exports facing multiple NTMs (%) 93.4 90.9 63.4
Distribution of NTMs faced by Bangladesh
NTM incidences
Tariff quota 13
Anti-dumping measures 10 10
SPS, TBT and related measures 265 176 25
Percentage share
Tariff quota 33.3
Anti-dumping measures 5.4 3.6 2.6
SPS, TBT and related measures 96.4 94.6 64.1
Sources: Calculations made by Bhattacharya and Mukhopadhaya (2002), Tables A6 to A10; based on
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development TRAINS database.
Brenton and Manchin (2003) argued that the prime suspects for the lack of utilization
of European Union trade preferences were the rules of origin, both in terms of the nature
of the rules defining specific processing requirements, with the constraints that this entailed
for international sourcing from the lowest cost locations, and the costs of providing the
necessary documentation to prove conformity with the rules.  The costs of documentation
related to the rules of origin are compounded by the requirement that goods for which
preferences are requested must be shipped directly to the European Union.  If they are in
transit through another country (which will be the case for most LDCs), then documentary
evidence must be provided to show that the goods remained under the supervision of the
customs authorities of the country of transit, did not enter the domestic market there and
did not undergo operations other than unloading and reloading.  In practice, it may be very
difficult to obtain the necessary documentation.
D.  Impacts of NTBs on exports from Bangladesh
and Cambodia
Among the various NTMs, SPS is the most crucial for agricultural exports from
Bangladesh, Cambodia and other LDCs.  Bhattacharya and Mukhopadhaya (2002) reported
that almost all exports from Bangladesh to the European Union market were subject to288
SPS and TBT measures.  Using TRAINS-UNCTAD data, they noted that of 275 NTM
incidences faced by Bangladesh in the European Union in 1998, about 96.4 per cent were
due to of SPS-TBT measures.  Ferrer (2005) observed that exporters to the European
Union were experiencing a constant rise of barriers due to SPS regulations, to levels that
were at times widely viewed as protectionist NTBs rather than genuine and scientifically
based safety needs.  He argued that an indication of the rising SPS requirements could be
seen in the increasing number of rejections of imported goods to the European Union, up
from 230 cases in 1998 to 1,520 cases in 2003.  This was due to the increase in the
number, and the tightening of standards.  The study added that the rejections concentrated
on fish and crustaceans, meat, fruit and vegetables.  Section B of this chapter shows that
Bangladesh and Cambodia have a comparative advantage in these products.
Non-compliance with SPS requirements can have devastating consequences for
the exporting country.  Bangladesh has already suffered the impacts of an SPS-related
trade ban in 1997, when the European Union banned the import of shrimps as SPS
requirements were not correctly fulfilled.  The ban remained effective for five months,
between August and December 1997.  Cato and Santos (2000) carried out an in-depth
study of the negative impact of the ban, and estimated that the cost of the European Union
ban to Bangladesh was about US$ 65.1 million.  Some of the plants did succeed in
diverting a large part of their intended European Union shipments to the United States and
Japan, thereby reducing their losses.  Yet, despite such efforts, the estimated net loss was
equivalent to about US$ 14.7 million.  These were evidently short-term losses.  The
medium- to long-term losses stemming from the sector’s reduced momentum, market
diversions and erosion in price offered to exporters were, in all probability, much higher.
The Government of Bangladesh and the shrimp entrepreneurs had made substantial
investment in ensuring Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP) compliance.
The total cost of upgrading the facilities and equipment, and training the staff and workers
in order to achieve acceptable standards was about US$ 18 million, while the annual cost
of maintaining the HACCP programme was estimated to be US$ 2.4 million (Cato and
Santos, 2000).  Khatun (2006) discussed in detail the impacts of SPS and the trade ban
on poverty levels and livelihoods of farmers, transporters, processing factories, and male
and female processing workers.
Bora and others (2002b) assessed the effects of trade policy initiatives aimed at
improving market access for LDCs in Quad countries (Canada, European Union, Japan
and the United States).  The study simulated two policy scenarios:  (a) the elimination of
all tariff and non-tariff barriers against LDCs in the European Union; and (b) the elimination
of tariff and non-tariff barriers faced by LDCs in all Quad markets.  The simulations were
performed with the GTAP5 version database.  For the first simulation, the policy simulation
generated an expected improvement in allocative efficiency, which was especially evident
for LDCs.  In percentage terms, the big gainers were small sub-Saharan African countries
(Malawi, the United Republic of Tanzania, and Zambia), whose gains were above one
percentage point, while Bangladesh and Uganda enjoyed the smallest gains.  In the
second scenario, Bangladesh gained the most, both in absolute (US$ 1,200 million) and
percentage (3 per cent) terms.289
E.  Implications for policy and WTO negotiation strategy
The present study has important research findings related to NTBs practiced by the
importing countries on agricultural products exported by LDCs, particularly from Bangladesh
and Cambodia.  The study revealed that:
(a) Both the developed and developing countries use a number of NTBs in the
form of quantity control, price control and finance measures;
(b) NTBs limit exports from Bangladesh and Cambodia;
(c) Rules of origin compliance is often cumbersome due to certification and
documentation requirements and, thus, acts as an NTB in agricultural trade;
and
(d) Simpler rules of origin and enlargement of the scope of cumulation are likely
to result in better utilization of preferences.
In view of the research findings and challenges faced by Bangladesh and Cambodia,
particularly in the area of NTBs, they need to intervene at the domestic policy level and to
engage more proactively at the WTO negotiations.
1.  Implications for domestic policy
At the domestic level, both Bangladesh and Cambodia need to pursue a broad-
based, diversified agricultural production and export strategy.  They need to strengthen the
capacity of their concerned agencies for issuing the required certificates and for monitoring
compliance levels with rules of origin.  In view of the numerous agro-producers in those
countries, the governments need to design cost-effective SPS-compliant certification systems
and infrastructure development that would not only promote exports but would also benefit
poor producers of the country.  The public sector must provide market information to
agro-producers and processors on a regular basis.  Awareness building about opportunities
and compliance requirements among the producers, processors and exporters would be
helpful if it accompanied by a complementary effort towards market diversification.
2.  Implications for WTO negotiation strategy
At the WTO level, LDCs (particularly Bangladesh and Cambodia) have to engage
more proactively during the ongoing negotiations on agriculture in order to safeguard their
interests.  Given the fact that agro-products from LDCs are often constrained by various
NTBs and stringent standards imposed on SPS grounds, LDCs must demand WTO
compliance and transparent criteria for NTMs.  They should also demand that standards
will in no way be set beyond the required scientific limit.  In addition, LDCs may also ask
for exemption from all trade remedy measures for exports of their agricultural products.
Under the Aid for Trade package, LDCs may also negotiate for allocation of funding
for technical assistance in improving their facilities and capacities for compliance with
certification system and related requirements.290
LDCs have to implement the decisions reached through the Hong Kong Declaration
(World Trade Organization, 2005).  It is pertinent to recall that WTO members agreed that
developed country members, and developing country members declaring themselves in
a position to do so, would:
(a) Provide duty-free and quota-free market access, on a lasting basis, for all
products originating from all LDCs by 2008 or no later than the start of the
implementation period, in a manner that ensures stability, security and
predictability; and
(b) Members facing difficulties at this time in providing market access, as set out
above, will afford duty-free and quota-free market access for at least 97 per
cent of the products originating from LDCs, defined at the tariff line level, by
2008 or no later than the start of the implementation period.
They also agreed to ensure that preferential rules of origin applicable to imports
from LDCs are transparent and simple, and that they contribute to facilitating market
access.
Considering the Hong Kong decisions, LDCs including Bangladesh and Cambodia
may demand (a) harmonized rules of origin applicable in all developed countries,
(b) simpler rules of origin, and (c) a system that requires less documentation and certification.
In this connection, LDCs may also consider the proposals put forward by UNCTAD (2003)
which include proposals for:  (a) harmonizing and simplifying the percentage criterion; and
(b) designing product-specific rules of origin that match the industrial capacity of LDCs.
The UNCTAD report explained that if rules of origin based on a percentage criterion were
to be used under some unilateral preferences of GSP schemes, it would be desirable for
them to be based on a maximum import criterion rather than a minimum value-added
requirement.  The report added that a logical extension of the “import content” approach
was value-added tariffs for determining duty.  The problem with all rules of origin is the
arbitrary cut-off point above which one gets preferences and below which one pays MFN.
With value-added tariffs, the preferential rate is paid on the preferential component and
MFN on the remainder.  On the issue of development of product-specific rules of origin
matching the industrial capacity of LDCs, the report put forward specific suggestions:
(a) For products under HS heading No. Chapter 16 (preparations of meat, fish or
crustaceans, molluscs or other aquatic invertebrates), manufactured from
meat of chapter 2 or fish of chapter 3.  However, the simple addition of
seasoning or preservatives will not be a conferring operation.
(b) For products under HS heading No. Chapter 20 (preparations of vegetables,
fruit, nuts or other parts of plants), manufactured from fruit, nuts and vegetables
of chapters 7 and 8, including reconstitution of juices in retail packing from
concentrate of juices.291
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IX.  REGIONAL AGRICULTURAL TRADE LIBERALIZATION:
PRIORITIES FOR POLICY MAKERS AND
FUTURE RESEARCH NEEDS
By Allan N. Rae
A.  Overview of the regional studies
The preceding chapters amply demonstrate that regional trade arrangements and
ongoing negotiations over new BTAs and RTAs are numerous in the Asia-Pacific region.
In South Asia, SAPTA/SAFTA is the most extensive, bringing together seven regional
economies (Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, Maldives, Pakistan and Sri Lanka).  However,
some of these countries also have bilateral trade agreements among themselves – including
India-Sri Lanka (the India-Lanka FTA), Sri Lanka – Pakistan, India – Bhutan, India – Nepal
and India – Bangladesh.  Some are also members of trade agreements with other Asian
countries outside of South Asia, such as:
(a) APTA, which brings Bangladesh, India and Sri Lanka together with the Republic
of Korea, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic and China;
(b) The Thailand – Bangladesh preferential trade agreement; and
(c) The economic cooperation between Bangladesh, India and Sri Lanka with
Thailand and Myanmar (BIMSTEC).
South Asian countries are also involved in negotiating or studying additional
agreements with economies within Asia and beyond.
Preferential trade agreements in East Asia and South-East Asia are much more
numerous, which is perhaps not surprising given the number of countries in this region.
Chapter III lists 20 agreements in force, 26 under negotiation and another 29 under
study.  Of those in force at the time of writing, seven of the completed agreements were
solely between East Asian or South-East Asian economies.  Of those economies, Singapore
is included in most agreements, with 11 in force and another 18 under negotiation or study.
The Republic of Korea is also active, with three agreements in force (one with Singapore
and the other two with non-Asian partners) and 14 under negotiation or study.  By far the
most extensive in terms of the number of partner countries is AFTA (comprising the 10
ASEAN members), which is seeking further broadening through negotiations or studies
underway with another three Asian countries (Republic of Korea, India and Japan) as well
as the United States, Australia and New Zealand (CER) and the European Union.
The South Asian economies have experienced favourable economic growth in
recent years, but this has not always been experienced within their agricultural sectors.  In
some countries of the region, rural poverty and income inequality have worsened and are296
major issues given the high share of rural residents in the total population.  Despite the
geographic proximity of the South Asian economies, agricultural competitiveness shows
some variation across countries, suggesting scope for trade expansion under liberalized
regional trade policies; however, up to the present, intraregional trade has accounted for
advantage was shown to be relatively strong for fish in Maldives and Bangladesh, tea, and
spices in Sri Lanka and India, and cereals and sugar in Pakistan and India.
Following completion of the Uruguay Round negotiations (all except Bhutan are
WTO members) these countries bound agricultural tariffs at generally high levels, although
applied rates are often much lower.  On average, Bangladesh and India face lower agricultural
tariffs for their exports to the South Asian region than the tariffs they impose on other
South Asian imports, which is a broad indication of scope for gains from further regional
cooperation.  Of the South Asian economies, Maldives and Sri Lanka were shown to be
the most open to agricultural trade and India the least open.  Considerable economic
liberalization has taken place in the region, including the agricultural sector.  Nevertheless,
high agricultural bound tariffs remain, together with para-tariffs, quantitative restrictions on
agricultural trade and state import monopolies in some countries.  Domestic support, such
as input and other subsidies, is also provided to farmers – the levels of which vary across
the region and are relatively higher in India than elsewhere – and in some cases, export
subsidies are used.
SAPTA
1 includes a number of agricultural products offering concessions to the
member countries.  However, many of the agricultural tariff preferences offered under this
agreement were said to be irrelevant to the member countries, with the real interests of
such countries being subject to sensitive listings.  The agreement also provides for technical
assistance and special concessions to its least developed members.  Member countries
have agreed to implement the agreement by various dates, with the process to be completed
by 2015.  Analysis has shown that, so far, it has had a significant agricultural trade
creation effect.  The other intra-/interregional and bilateral trade agreements of the South
Asian economies have included very few additional agricultural products for further
liberalization.  Some of the bilateral agreements take similar approaches to product
coverage and rules of origin; they may classify agricultural products as “sensitive” or use
tariff rate quotas to allow limited imports at concessional or zero rates.  The India-Lanka
agreement, which has encouraged quite rapid growth in bilateral agricultural trade, has
less stringent rules of origin than does SAPTA.  The interregional agreements do not
include a significant number of agricultural concessions.  It should also be noted that the
domestic support and export subsidy policies of some countries in the region, together
with the activities of state trading enterprises, have not been explicitly addressed in any of
the agreements, in contrast to efforts in multilateral trade negotiations.
1 SAPTA, which was superseded by the implementation of SAFTA, was to have begun in 2006.
However, some problems remain that are related to the extension of MFN treatment of India by
Pakistan, and SAFTA therefore has not yet been fully implemented.
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Turning to South-East Asia and East Asia, agriculture is also found to be a sensitive
issue in bilateral and regional trade negotiations.  Many of the agreements in place exhibit
sensitive subsectors within agriculture that are either permanently or temporarily excluded,
or contain liberal extension times for transition and subsequent adjustment.  Nevertheless,
some successes have been achieved in liberalizing agricultural trading conditions.  Of
particular note is the ASEAN approach to incorporating agricultural products within the
scope of AFTA preferences.  This agreement initially excluded unprocessed agricultural
products from tariff concessions, but they were gradually incorporated through the use of
temporary exclusion lists and sensitive lists.  The time frame for moving such products
from exclusion and sensitive lists to the inclusion list differs among ASEAN members,
recognizing their particular concerns and stages of development.
Likewise, final concessionary tariff rates also can vary among member countries.
At the time of writing, only a handful of unprocessed agricultural products remain on the
sensitive list while any that have not already been liberalized are on track for eventual
liberalization.  As a result, average agricultural concessionary tariffs of ASEAN countries
are well below MFN rates, and the dispersion of concessionary tariffs is also less than that
of MFN rates.  Perhaps because of the similarity of agricultural commodities produced in
the ASEAN region, or because agricultural products were included relatively recently in the
AFTA agreement, there has not as yet been a marked increase in intra-ASEAN agricultural
trade that might be attributed to that agreement.  The AFTA process of stepwise tariff
reductions, phased transitions and other flexible arrangements illustrates how AFTA intends
to eventually achieve agricultural trade reforms that were earlier thought impossible.  It
could constitute a model to be adopted elsewhere in order to influence the political economy,
where it currently favours agricultural protectionism, towards a more liberal stance.
Also of note is the way in which agriculture was handled in the China – ASEAN
agreement.  Through its the Early Harvest Programme, most ASEAN countries have
included nearly all agricultural tariff lines for accelerated tariff reduction.  Reciprocity requires
that China exactly matches the concessions for the same products.  These ASEAN economies
appear eager, therefore, to engage in more open agricultural trading with China and are
prepared to permit Chinese access to their own markets in order to experience improved
access to China’s market.  The Republic of Korea – Chile agreement also provides wide
coverage of agricultural liberalization despite strong opposition from Korean farmers,
although some products are subject to tariff rate quotas, exclusions lists and other lists of
products that are to be negotiated once the Doha negotiations have been completed.
China is a relative latecomer to regional trade agreements.  In force are the 2003
agreement with ASEAN and the 2004 agreements with Hong Kong, China, and Macao,
China.  However, China is negotiating or studying trade agreements with Australia, Chile,
India, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand and Singapore.  China is a major
producer and consumer of agricultural products and is becoming an increasingly important
international trader of some of these products.  The economic reforms of the 1980s and
1990s contributed to this process and, more recently, to the lowering of China’s own trade
barriers as a consequence of joining WTO in 2001.  In addition to the non-tariff barriers298
that impede the international trade of China (and many other countries covered in this
study), China’s potential gains from bilateral and regional trade agreements are currently
restricted by its policy on grains self-sufficiency.  Earlier quotas and now a price support
system encourage grain production and thus discourage the shift of land use towards
more labour-intensive activities, such as fruit and vegetable cultivation and livestock raising,
in which China arguably has a comparative advantage.
One of the results of the Early Harvest Programme of the China – ASEAN free
trade agreement is that China is taking market share for horticultural products away from
ASEAN’s traditional suppliers.  Between 2002 and 2005, China’s share of ASEAN’s
horticultural imports rose from 31 per cent to 38 per cent while that of the United States,
Australia and New Zealand, for example, declined from 28 per cent to 20 per cent.
However, China also has a comparative advantage relative to ASEAN in non-rice grain
production, and this FTA could move against the imperative for China to reallocate land for
horticultural and other labour-intensive farming activities.
Using an applied global general equilibrium model, potential gains from various
bilateral and regional trade agreements are quantified and presented in chapter IV of this
publication.  Only agricultural tariffs have been eliminated in these studies.  Therefore,
they are valuable in that they are indicative of the gains that might be realized should
member countries choose to extend preferences to all agricultural trade, including sensitive
products such as rice.  Before summarizing some of the main findings and implications of
that work, a number of points need to be borne in mind.  Only agricultural tariffs have been
reduced in these analyses, so any existing domestic subsidies to agriculture, or agricultural
export subsidies, remain untouched.  Tariffs were completely eliminated by the member
countries for all agricultural products – no sensitive or excluded products were recognized.
The results provide a snapshot of outcomes at some time in the future when all those
tariffs will have been eliminated by all parties to the agreement; implications of the timing
of tariff reductions across products and countries, the resulting adjustment costs or the
competitive and productivity gains often associated with freer trade have not been addressed.
The studies recognize non-agricultural tariff preferences within existing agreements only to
the extent that they were reflected in the 2001 base year database that was employed.
(They are not recognized at all in hypothetical regional agreements analysed.) However,
these non-agricultural preferences may have impacts on the agricultural sector; expansion
or contraction of manufacturing sectors will have an impact on wages and resources
available to the primary sector while changes in manufactured prices will affect the costs
of agricultural activities that use such products (chemicals, machinery etc.).  Finally, the
analyses assume that trade will respond to tariff elimination – that is, there is no friction in
trading channels, such as that due to non-tariff barriers, which will prevent agents responding
to changes in price signals.
The analyses proceeded by first simulating an assumed Doha outcome, and then
explored the additional welfare gains or losses from a range of regional trade agreements.
Some were based on actual agreements such as SAFTA, AFTA and the India – Lanka
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and India to AFTA as well a wider grouping involving most ESCAP economies.  Some of
the conclusions arising from this work are detailed below.
For smaller bilateral agreements such as SAFTA, and also for AFTA, the gains to
member countries tend to be small and much less than might be enjoyed following
a successful Doha outcome, perhaps due to the similarity of their agricultural sectors.
Within each agreement, the larger countries and/or those with a comparative advantage in
agriculture (India and Pakistan, Thailand) gain the most from a regional agreement being
extended to include agriculture.  Agriculture is heavily protected in Japan and the Republic
of Korea, so when these countries are added to the ASEAN – China trade agreement and
agricultural tariffs are eliminated, they may be expected to dominate in terms of welfare
gains.  This is also the case, although with smaller gains, for China and most ASEAN
economies.  Viet Nam is shown to gain from agricultural liberalization within AFTA, but not
in the extended AFTA, suggesting that this country may be competitive relative to other
ASEAN countries but not with respect to China.
All members of this expanded AFTA agreement benefit from the addition of India,
which is also currently very protective of its agriculture.  It also appears that India stands to
gain more by linking up with ASEAN and the North Asian economies, than with other
South Asian partners.  In most of these analyses, moderate trade diversion was found to
occur.  This appeared to be a greater problem with a Thailand – Japan agreement, since
Japan’s agricultural imports could be diverted from other competitive suppliers such as
some in South-East Asia.  Should all the Asia-Pacific economies (with the exception of the
United States) come together in a pan-Pacific agreement, all members with the exception
of Bangladesh and Sri Lanka are shown to gain from including agriculture.  In fact, in
many cases, the gains are larger than those resulting from participation in regional
agreements involving fewer countries.  A major conclusion is that the larger the group, and
the more diverse the group in terms of both developed and developing country representation
and economic structures, the larger the aggregate welfare gains from the inclusion of
agriculture – with no exceptions – in regional agreements are likely to be.
B.  Future shape of regionalism in Asia
Quantitative research conducted during this study and by others (for example,
Gilbert, Scollay and Bora, 2001; Scollay and Gilbert, 2001) shows that larger regional
trade groupings in Asia are economically preferable to a spaghetti bowl of smaller and
bilateral groupings.  Scollay and Gilbert (2001) demonstrated that an Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC)-wide agreement combined with “open regionalism”, an APEC preferential
trade agreement, and a Western Pacific grouping are all preferable to other possible
arrangements in the Asian region, with aggregate economic benefits declining in that same
order.  The superiority of the “open regionalism” approach is that preferences are also
extended to non-members.  This has the advantage of greatly simplifying administration
procedures (for example, rules of origin would not be required), and trade diversion costs
would not exist.  A question is whether current efforts are likely to lead to such an
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As a continuing proliferation of smaller groupings and bilateral agreements would
impose costs on non-members through trade diversion, this fact encouraged Gilbert, Scollay
and Bora (2001) to wonder whether such costs would lead to friction within wider political
forums such as APEC, or encourage non-members to actively pursue wider arrangements.
While negotiating within smaller groupings might offer the path of least resistance from
a political point of view, trade friction could result with non-members that might well add to
political friction.  In addition, when countries are involved in negotiations over a larger
number of smaller groupings, scarce negotiating resources are absorbed that could be
directed in other directions that offer greater economic gains.
The history of smaller bilateral or regional agreements within Asia, and the
successive addition of new members may be viewed positively (Levy, 2006) as taking
smaller steps forward is often politically easier (for example, adjustment costs may be
less) while at the same time creating a certain momentum for regional integration.  This
process of progressive expansion and the potential amalgamation of smaller regional
groups may also assist in sensitizing entrenched domestic interests and lobby groups to
the benefits of liberalization and, therefore, the erosion of vested interests.  This process
might also provide what Levy called an “incubator” to enable domestic firms to adjust to
new competitive pressures and learn to trade regionally without being abruptly exposed to
fuller international competition.
From an Asian perspective, Scollay and Gilbert (2001) demonstrated that the
progressive expansion of groups generally benefited new as well as existing members,
and that amalgamation of groups generally benefited the members of the groups being
merged.  There is encouraging evidence that Asian economies are moving in that direction,
especially involving the regional powerhouses of Japan and China.  ASEAN has expanded
to embrace China, is in negotiations with the Republic of Korea and India, and is conducting
studies with Japan and Australia – New Zealand (CER).  In addition, of course, there is
much bilateral activity involving, among others, individual ASEAN countries, North-East
Asian economies, India, Pakistan, Australia and New Zealand.  Eventually, should
ASEAN – China link up with CER, a Japan – Republic of Korea BTA and SAPTA, the
gradual process will have resulted in the wider Asia grouping.  Obviously, many impediments
stand in the way of such an achievement, including the vexing issue of agricultural reforms.
Some priorities for easing or removing these barriers and facilitating progress are
discussed below.
C.  Priorities for policymakers
The formation, extension and subsequent amalgamation of regional trade
agreements can be facilitated through the harmonization of approaches in a number of
areas as well as the adoption of what Harrigan (2006) referred to as “good practices”.
2
2 These include product coverage, rules of origin, customs procedures, intellectual property protection,
foreign direct investment, anti-dumping and dispute resolution, government procurement, competition
and technical barriers to trade.301
Implementation of WTO procedures (for example, those of the safeguards, SPS, TBT,
rules of origin, trade facilitation and agricultural agreements) as well as various international
standards will contribute to the harmonization of regional rules as well as with the rules of
the multilateral system.  Because regional agreements involve relatively few members, it
may be possible to achieve deeper integration than is afforded by multilateral agreements.
The trade agreements in effect in Asia currently vary widely, as discussed in the
previous chapters of this publication.  They can differ, for example, in terms of product
coverage (contents of positive, negative and exclusion lists), the depth of preferences,
timelines, their use of non-tariff barriers such as tariff rate quotas and safeguards, and
varying and complex rules of origin, SPS and TBT rules, all of which can be reflective of
underlying protectionism.
1.  Product coverage and preferences
The agreements studied here vary widely in terms of their agricultural product
coverage, ranging from quite comprehensive coverage in some cases to very restrictive
coverage in others.  There is some evidence that sensitive sectors can be addressed in
regional agreements, albeit sometimes with long transitional periods and further progress
an obvious priority in existing as well as new agreements.  Wider coverage of agricultural
products, using negative rather than positive lists and with less diversity of excluded
products across agreements, should also assist in the harmonization of agreements and
their possible amalgamation.
AFTA provides an example of a step-by-step approach to agricultural inclusivity,
defining temporary exclusion, sensitive and highly sensitive product lists.  These products
are being liberalized according to an agreed timetable and end-of-period tariffs.  As
a result, very few agricultural products are excluded from the common preferential tariff
scheme, a degree of liberalization not considered possible a decade ago.
The Early Harvest Programme of the China – ASEAN agreement is another notable
example of where substantial agricultural coverage has been negotiated – several ASEAN
countries including Thailand have not excluded any products and, because of reciprocity,
China will exactly match those concessions.  Selected use of safeguard mechanisms,
which could be harmonized if based on WTO safeguard rules and tariff rate quotas, may
also ease problems associated with the inclusion of sensitive products if applied over
a strictly transitional period.
Where current applied tariffs and preferences for any product differ widely between
members and potential new members, or between agreements, reaching a harmonized set
is no easy task.  Nevertheless, solutions have been found within existing agreements that
can be applied to wider amalgamations.  These include different treatment of each country
by stage of economic development, transitional safeguards (whose application may be
restricted to least developed members) and, if meaningful progress is to be made in some
cases, recognition of some countries’ unique strategic or social objectives when attempting
to harmonize negative lists.302
2.  Rules of origin
Rules of origin are used in regional trade agreements to determine eligibility for
preferential treatment.  They raise important issues in the trading of agricultural products,
for example, because processed foods may combine raw materials from several countries.
For agricultural products, the country of origin may be determined in terms of whether or
not the product was wholly produced in the exporting country (especially applicable to raw
agricultural materials), by a process criterion (substantial transformation) or the percentage
of product content or value-added.  Documentary evidence is usually required by the
importer, and sometimes traceability.  Problems arise when a country belongs to two or
more regional agreements and the applicable rules are determined by the intended
destination of trade.  This complexity adds to compliance costs, which are exacerbated
when the rules are not especially transparent, and the increased costs may be perceived
by the exporter as outweighing the value of the preferences.
Rules of origin may lead to inefficiencies in production, when imported raw materials
(such as for processed foods) are diverted from the lowest-cost supplier in order to help
meet origin rules and therefore have the potential to discourage external sourcing.  Regulations
that do not permit cumulation, or permit only partial cumulation, will have a similar effect
when they discourage purchases of inputs from low-cost countries within the regional
agreement.  Rules of origin may be more stringent for sensitive products, and may provide
a mechanism for increasing protection levels through their use as trade policy instruments.
An earlier chapter in this book concludes that the low utilization by some Asian
developing countries of duty-free agricultural preferential access could well be due to
problems associated with rules of origin.  A priority is to amend the rules in order to allow
the preferences written into regional trade agreements to be more fully realized.  This
requires that:
(a) Attention is given to opportunities for harmonization and simplification of
content requirements;
(b) The rules are symmetrical between importer and exporter;
(c) Rules of origin are set with recognition of the processing and technical
capacity of exporters, and without reference to the political sensitivity of the
product concerned;
(d) Certification and administration procedures are simplified, and extension of
cumulation covers all members of the regional agreement.
Bonapace and Mikic (2005) describe how the proliferation of trade agreements is
“spinning a complex RoO web” and its trade deflecting or restricting effects.  They draw
attention to APTA’s rules of origin, which are simple, general and liberal, with a flat rate of
45% of local value content, reduced to 35% for LDCs.
Harrigan and others (2006) go further by suggesting that all Asian bilateral and
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of discouraging efficient production networks that might raise trade costs rather than
lowering them.  Such an approach to cumulation would also assist in the enlargement and
eventual amalgamation of regional agreements.  Exporters could be offered a choice
between alternative rules – an equivalence approach – such as maximum non-originating
value or minimum originating value, since the costs of applying different rules may not be
the same.  Special and differential treatment might also be considered by applying
different rules to the least developed members of the trade agreement in order to allow
them to take better advantage of tariff preferences.  Should WTO eventually adopt
a harmonized set of rules of origin, countries within regional trade agreements could be
encouraged to apply them in their own rule-making in order to assist in achieving harmonized
rules, both within and between preferential trade agreements.
3.  SPS and TBT regulations
Progress on regional harmonization of SPS issues is found in some of the
agreements.  Adherence to the WTO SPS (and TBT) agreements and international standards
should encourage a harmonized approach to these issues within and across regions,
hence facilitating expansion and future amalgamation of agreements.  It will also contribute
to harmonization with the multilateral system, and will contribute to reducing related frictions
in internal trade.  Thus, in the case of products imported from other member countries:
(a) Treatment should be no less favourably than domestic products;
(b) Food safety and health regulations should be based on scientific principles
and risk assessments;
(c) Regulations should not deliberately create obstacles to trade between
member countries, should be no more restrictive than necessary to achieve
their objectives, and should be based on international standards where they
exist to encourage harmonization;
(d) Equivalence should apply, and information on regulations and standards should
be transparent.
Some progress in these aims is reflected in the various regional trade agreements
to a greater or lesser extent.  AFTA, for example, makes provision for harmonization,
equivalence, mutual recognition and technical cooperation in respect of SPS measures
(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2004).  Chapter VIII, however,
notes that of the many non-tariff measures in the ASEAN economies, a large proportion
are applied to agricultural products, especially in the form of technical measures or health
and safety standards.  In other cases, there is more to be done in terms of facilitating the
application of the SPS provisions of the agreements, in monitoring compliance, and in
assisting the development of SPS regulations and inspection procedures among member
countries that do not have well-developed regulatory regimes.  Developed country partners,
in particular, can and do provide assistance in these areas, perhaps as part of SDT
components of regional agreements.  Although in some cases such assistance may be
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of what can be done; the institutions and processes so created may be generally available,
or may serve as models of good practice for all traders.
4.  Domestic agricultural policies
Domestic policies that provide assistance to farmers, such as price support, subsidies
on farm inputs or transport and marketing activities – together with the use of state trading
monopolies in exporting or importing, and export subsidies – are utilized by some Asian
economies.  The levels of protection of agriculture in Japan and the Republic of Korea are
among the highest in the world, although there has been some decline in those levels
since the mid-1980s (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2005).
There is also evidence that the level of protection is rising in some of the developing Asian
countries, or at least becoming less negative.  Despite recent agricultural reforms,
Indonesia’s agriculture sector has been protected during the past 20 years, with an increase
in protection in recent years of some commodities including rice and sugar (Thomas and
Orden, 2004).  In Viet Nam, most agriculture was effectively taxed up until the mid-1990s;
since then, however, rice, sugar and the agricultural sector in aggregate have been
increasingly protected (Nguyen and Grote, 2004).  In China, a trend increase in protection
is evident, while in India support is largely counter-cyclical and exhibited liberalization
during the 1990s and protection more recently with increased importance placed on input
subsidies (Mullen and others, 2004 and 2005).  Although the levels of protection in South
Asia or South-East Asia have not reached the scale of protection in North-East Asia, the
trend towards increasing protection bears some resemblance to similar trends that occurred
in Taiwan Province of China, the Republic of Korea and Japan earlier in the twentieth
century (Anderson and Hayami, 1986) that led to the high level of protection that is
observed today.
Domestic assistance programmes may cause friction in trade among member
countries of a trade agreement through a perception of unfair competition, and may distort
intraregional trade.  In addition, the use of domestic support policies can reduce the
potential gains from formation of a trade agreement.  Where such support involves the use
of administered output price schemes, or subsidies on tradeable inputs, the price changes
signalled through tariff reductions may not be transmitted to producers; as a result, the
efficient reallocation of resources will be impeded.  The corollary to this has been observed
in NAFTA (Burfisher and others, 1998), where domestic policy changes in the member
countries have allowed the strengthening of market signals and increased farmers’
responsiveness to changing prices that were the result of NAFTA implementation.  In fact,
domestic policy changes were found to have had a greater impact on the region’s agriculture
than did NAFTA.  By encouraging greater specialization within each country, the changes
also enhanced the trade creation effect, and diminished trade diversion caused by formation
of the regional agreement.  The quantitative work of Burfisher and others illustrated that
NAFTA provided greater welfare gains under the new farm policies than under the old
ones.  If these results could be replicated in Asia, they would provide sound reasons for
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Yet none of the agreements discussed in the previous chapters or in RTAs in
general (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2004) address domestic
support.  An obvious reason is that domestic subsidies cannot be reduced preferentially,
as production for internal trade is generally not separable from other farm production.  For
such commodities that might be primarily destined for intraregional markets, or for products
that are intensively traded at the regional level, the trade distortive effects of domestic
support could be addressed, and more deeply than is achieved through the WTO process.
Caution would have to be exercised in order to ensure that such subsidy cuts were not
reapplied to other farm products.  At the least, arrangements could be considered that
mandate consultation when domestic subsidies are considered to be affecting internal
trade.  Export subsidies (either explicit or implicit) are sometimes also not included in
regional trade agreements, although unlike domestic subsidies, export incentives can be
reduced or eliminated preferentially.  Within Asia, they are not mentioned in the AFTA,
ASEAN – China or Republic of Korea – Chile agreements; however, export subsidies are
not permitted under the New Zealand-Singapore bilateral agreement (Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development, 2004).  They are also not addressed in the
South Asia trade agreements.  Other non-Asian trade agreements may prohibit export
subsidies on internal trade, or (as in NAFTA) they may allow such subsidies to be applied
on internal trade if the importing country agrees to them, or the importer is benefiting from
subsidies from other countries.
5.  Trade facilitation
Trade facilitation is the simplification and harmonization of international trade
procedures, and the topic is clearly relevant to agricultural products, especially perishable
items.  Inefficiencies in border procedures and within handling and transport systems can
result in opportunities created through the formation of regional trade agreements not
being fully realized.  The design and efficient implementation of trade facilitation measures
throughout the Asian region is a priority if the potential benefits of increased trade flows
and opportunities, lower trade transaction costs, increased government tariff revenues and
encouragement of FDI are to be fully realized.  The costs that result from poor trade
facilitation may become magnified in the case of overlapping trade agreements when the
applicable tariff preferences and classification, rules of origin and other trade regulations
vary across regions.  For example, consider a Sri Lankan exporter wishing to sell to India
– does he/she do business under the SAPTA rules, those of the India – Lanka agreement,
or those of APTA?  Given the information and transaction costs imposed by the complexity
of trading arrangements – which are magnified if facilitation mechanisms are weak – it is
possible that the trader will find it least costly to trade under MFN conditions and hence
will be denied the potential benefits of the regional agreements.
A number of studies have demonstrated substantial welfare gains from reductions
in transaction costs, sometimes in excess of the potential gains from tariff liberalization.
Past studies have clarified priorities for improvement in the Asian region.  An Asia-Pacific
investigation (APEC, 2000) that was restricted to border procedures, listed complexity and
lack of information on customs regulations as well as problems with customs appeals306
mechanisms as major concerns of traders.  An ARTNeT study (ESCAP, 2006) identified
a number of areas requiring improvement as a result of a private sector survey in five
countries.  These included improvement of information completeness and timely availability,
elimination of corrupt official practices, improved coordination among official agencies,
simplification of documentation requirements, and improvements related to customs
classification and valuation procedures.  The continuing work of the WTO trade facilitation
negotiating group will contribute to some harmonization of approaches within Asian
regional trade agreements, although the WTO negotiations cover only a subset of facilitation
measures.  For example, the group’s work does not extend to the application of TBT and
SPS measures or rules of origin, or to infrastructural issues.
6.  Capacity-building, infrastructure and technical assistance
Numerous priorities are to be found in the areas of capacity-building and infrastructure
development, with the objective of permitting fuller realization of the potential gains of
trade liberalization.  Infrastructure can be thought of as both physical capacity (transport
networks and facilities, and communication networks, for example) and “soft” infrastructure,
which includes the essential elements of trade facilitation.  Overcoming infrastructural
deficiencies in conjunction with relevant capacity-building in institutions, processes and
people can be vital to regional trade integration and growth, and the alleviation of poverty
(Asian Development Bank, 2005).  By reducing trade and transport margins, it can intensify
comparative advantages, raise productivity and improve both international terms of trade,
together with those of rural households (Roland-Holst, 2006).  The pro-poor benefits of
infrastructure in the context of agricultural liberalization are especially relevant to the
connection of rural farmers through transport and information networks and markets to
ports – it will allow them to engage in new trading opportunities opened up through
regional integration, not to mention in urban domestic markets where prosperity and demand
may be enhanced through trade liberalization.
Relative to their trade with the rest of the world, there is comparatively little trade
between the regions of South Asia, South-East Asia and China – North-East Asia.
Infrastructural deficiencies contribute to this state of affairs, and overcoming them will
assist wider integration across Asia and spread the benefits of growth.  Trade agreements
per se may not address infrastructural issues, but infrastructural development could be
facilitated should the agreements extend to services and foreign investment.  Where trade
agreements include both developing and developed countries, the latter may agree to
provide financial, technical and capacity-building assistance of various kinds.  This is
already occurring in some instances, such as the development of soft infrastructure to
better allow developing country partners to achieve effective compliance with various
regulations and standards, such as rules of origin and standards associated with TBT and
SPS.
In addition to technical assistance and financing received through existing bilateral
and international processes, consideration should be given to how the “aid for trade”
mandate of the WTO Doha Round might work in concert with regional trade agreements in
Asia.  While specifics have yet to be decided, the aid for trade concept is to assist least307
developed and other developing countries to benefit from trade liberalization, by providing
aid for trade-facilitating capacity-building and trade-related infrastructure and adjustment
through new funding provided by donors.  The recommendations of the aid for trade task
force (World Trade Organization, 2006) include strengthening the processes for identifying
cross-border and regional needs, and requesting countries to consider the merits and
mechanisms for establishing regional cooperation and coordination.  Arrangements already
in place for the study, negotiation and ongoing administration of regional trade agreements
could provide the opportunity to play a prioritizing and coordination role with regard to aid
for trade.
7.  Research priorities
Several areas exist where the quantitative analysis of agricultural liberalization in
the Asian and Pacific region can be enhanced and extended.  In a dynamic setting, trade
liberalization can encourage gains due to the impact of increased competition on firms and
their productivity as well as the impacts of investment flows on economic performance.
Dynamic CGE models attempt to include such phenomena, and can specify time-dependent
behavioural models for producers and consumers as well as quantify an economy’s transition
path over time due to new investment and factor accumulation.  Compared with static
CGE models, the dynamic formulations promise a more complete analysis of the impacts
of trade liberalization on economic growth and poverty reduction.
Interest is growing in the relationship between liberalization, income inequality and
poverty reduction.  Some evidence points to increased inequality resulting from economic
liberalization, but this may or may not be accompanied by reductions in the prevalence of
absolute poverty.  Work on this aspect, using both CGE models and more detailed models
of household behaviour and income distribution, is at an early stage and further progress
would be of value in informing policy makers of possible poverty-reducing approaches to
liberalization.  Global trade models can demonstrate welfare gains from trade liberalization,
but are usually silent about the adjustments costs that must be incurred in the process of
realizing those gains.  In developing countries especially, where labour, financial and
information markets might be weak, and where underdeveloped infrastructure and education
systems impose barriers to skills improvement and regional migration, these adjustment
costs can fall disproportionately on the poorest people.
Yet another area for further research is how trade liberalization in the Asia-Pacific
agricultural sector might have an impact on the natural environment.  Will land be abandoned
or farmed more or less intensively?  What will be the results in terms of biodiversity,
deforestation, water and air pollution, and water scarcity?
Finally, where trade models such as GTAP are used to simulate the creation of new
or expanded regional trade arrangements, further efforts can be made to ensure that the
model structure, parameters and policy data are relevant to the study.  For example,
despite the best efforts of database creators, the databases may not incorporate the
appropriate base-year tariff data, which can be crucial to the evaluation of preferential
trade arrangements.308
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